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Abstract 
This thesis examines the successes and failures of different approaches to environmental 
policy making in contexts where the level of conflict are significant, both in intensity and 
complexity. In this thesis the term policy making is used to cover three elements: the way 
that a policy is formulated, the decision making process to select the policy instruments, 
and the nature of the policy instruments used or proposed to be used. The research 
question here is “what policy making approach is most likely to succeed in highly contested 
contexts where levels of conflict are significant, both in intensity and complexity?” This 
research is built on the key proposition that some policy making approaches are, by their 
nature, better suited to highly contested contexts than others.   
The communicative/deliberative turn in planning was the starting theoretical framework for 
understanding how policy making can be carried out in highly contested contexts. It was 
argued that this framework has great value in understanding the processes involved in 
dealing with conflict, but that there are shortcomings. In particular, conflict is seen largely as 
a social problem, but conflict in environmental policy making often involves so-called wicked 
problems, where the conflict is deeper, more complex and involving longer timeframes than 
most planning conflicts.  This thesis constructs a framework that describes the nature of 
conflict, with three broad themes being defined: social, governance, and science and 
information. It is argued that conflict is most likely where the resources at the centre of the 
conflict are scarce.  
Three types of scarcity are identified — decreasing quantity of a resource, increasing 
demand on a resource, and reducing quality of a resource. 
Four broad policy making approaches are defined: 
• The traditional expert-driven approach — a highly centralised approach dominated 
by the expert regulators using predominately science-based technical and statutory 
policy mechanisms; 
• The ecological modern approach — a more participative but still largely science-
based approach, favouring the use of either market-based or voluntary policy 
mechanisms; 
• The collaborative approach — a highly participative form of policy making that does 
not necessarily favour a particular type of policy mechanism; and 
• The adaptive–collaborative approach — a special case of collaborative policy 
making where adaptive management measures are adopted to deal with the 
uncertainty of the science and information. 
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These four approaches are analysed for their likely capacity to be successful in contexts 
where conflict is significant, and it is proposed that the first two are unlikely to be 
successful, whereas the two collaborative approaches, especially the adaptive–
collaborative approach, would be successful where all the types of conflict are present. 
A qualitative multiple case study methodology was adopted to address the research 
question and to test the finding of the literature review, focusing primarily on the policy 
making of Western Australian (WA) Environmental Protection Authority (EPA - the peak 
environmental agency in WA). A specific methodology to determine policy making success 
or failure (evaluation) has been developed and applied in this study, involving the use of 
four evaluation criteria.  
The review of policy making by the EPA showed that whilst its policy making in cases where 
conflict was low were successful, it failed in cases where conflict was significant. It was 
noted that in all cases the policy making approaches adopted were either traditional expert–
driven or ecological modern and not either of the two collaborative approaches, which, it 
was noted, was consistent with the finding of the literature review and would explain the 
policy failures in cases where conflict was significant. 
It was argued that recent policy making of the EPA shows some promise in dealing with 
conflict. This was because it has developed its Environmental Protection Policies (EPPs) 
more collaboratively, involving an additional complementary policy: the EPP sets high level 
objectives and deals with specific non–negotiable issues; and the more prescriptive 
implementation policy contains the detailed policy and management measures that would 
achieve the objectives in the EPP. These are called concurrent–complementary policies. 
A key part of this thesis is an in–depth analysis of a particular policy making exercise (major 
case study) set in a context where the three elements of conflict were significant, and the 
three resource scarcity types were present. The case study was Cockburn Sound, a large 
marine embayment approximately 20 kms south of Perth. Two concurrent–complementary 
policies were developed, and it was shown that the policy making approach of the 
implementation policy was adaptive–collaborative, and it was evaluated as being successful 
on all the four criteria. It was also noted that the draft EPP was a traditional expert–driven 
policy approach (although with a much improved level of participation) and that, it was 
evaluated as being unsuccessful on two of the four criteria — performance effectiveness 
and political support. 
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the broader implications for environmental policy 
making that can be drawn from this work, notably: that five policy making scenarios can be 
identified based on the nature and extent of conflict present, and recommendations made 
as to which policy making approach should be applied in each scenario.  
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Chapter 1 — Introduction 
 ‘Look at Mother Nature on the run in the nineteen seventies’ — 
After the Gold Rush, Neil Young 
 
Much has happened in the field of environmental planning since the 1960s and 1970s when 
environmentalism became a catalyst for social change. The links between urban and 
regional planning (here after referred to as planning) and environmental protection, 
arguably have its roots in era as well: for example, Garrett Hardin’s seminal 1968 essay 
Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968) can be interpreted as a failure of the planning 
system to prevent environmental degradation and subsequent social impacts. Two aspects 
of this social change are of particular interest in this thesis: the ongoing and often 
deepening conflict surrounding many aspects of the environmental debate, and the 
increased involvement of governments in regulating and controlling the environmental, in 
particular, the use of policy. The specific research question examined here is: “what policy 
making approach is most likely to succeed in highly contested contexts where levels of 
conflict are significant, both in intensity and complexity?”  
Scope of policies to be studied 
Governments throughout the developed world responded to growing community awareness 
about environmental problems by adopting an increasing number of environmental laws 
(Esty and Mendelsohn 1998). Australia was not immune to this trend with the number of 
pieces of environment–related legislation increasing from 130 to 500 between 1980 and 
1992 (Conacher and Conacher 2000:130). Parallel with this has been the growth in the use 
of policies to deal with specific issues that legislation cannot adequately cover and to 
provide governments and agencies with highly flexible and responsive approaches to the 
environmental protection (Fisher 2000:499). 
This study focuses on a particular level and type of environmental policy: the policies of 
government environmental agencies. Nakamura and Smallwood (Cited in Rist 1995) define 
policy at this level as “a set of instructions from policy makers to policy implementers that 
spell out both goals and the means of achieving those goals” (P. xviii). Government agency 
policies can be considered, therefore, sets of rules that decision makers should follow in the 
on–going management of the particular issue. 
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Policy making  
This thesis will go beyond an examination of environmental policies (the sets of rules) and 
will examine policy making. Policy making is not well defined in the literature. For example, 
whilst Lindblom and Woodhouse (1993) note that one way to examine policy making is to 
see it as a series of distinct steps, it rarely is this simple in practice and policy making can 
be “described more accurately as resembling a ‘primeval soup’” (p. 10). In this thesis policy 
making is used to cover three areas or elements:  
• The way that a policy is formulated,  
• The decision making process to select the policy instruments, and 
• The nature of the policy instruments used or proposed to be used. 
This puts the emphasis of this study on policy formulation more than policy implementation. 
This emphasis also allows certain draft policies to be included, as will be further explained 
below. 
Policy instruments or mechanisms are the specific measures of a policy which are applied 
during the implementation phase to deliver the desired environmental outcomes. These can 
include specific regulations, subsidies, taxes, covenants, voluntary agreements, education 
programmes and zoning of land. The mechanisms chosen can depend on the overall 
philosophy adopted by the policy makers: for example, agencies with a deregulation or free 
market philosophy would favour the use of emissions trading and tax concessions over 
regulations (Jimenez 2007).  
Environmental policy making, planning 
Whilst Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons was about the “population problem” and its 
impacts (Hardin 1968:1243), his notion of what is a commons and ways of finding solutions 
to the potential tragedies has links to both planning and environmental protection. For 
example, Hardin argues that pollution of waterways, public land and the air occurs because 
private land owners calculate that it is cheaper to discharge to the commons than to treat 
the pollution at the source. Regulation through land use controls and recognition of the 
public values of these commons is one way to avoid such tragedies and bring about more 
sustainable industry practices. These tensions between private benefit and public good are 
fundamental to planning. When those tensions are over environmental resources, policy 
contested spaces are created where planning and environmental protection compete for 
jurisdiction. Many of the policies covered in this thesis cover this contested policy making 
space, and, whilst environmental agencies have jurisdiction over some of this space, much 
if it belongs to planning. Inevitably, planning agencies will need to produce their own 
policies to guide decision making within the planning process. 
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Research questions, research significance and 
theoretical framework 
As noted above, the research question examined here is: “what policy making approach is 
most likely to succeed in highly contested contexts where levels of conflict are significant, 
both in intensity and complexity?” Implicit in this question is that some policy making 
approaches are more likely to succeed in highly contested contexts than others. Secondary 
research questions that arise from the primary question are: 
1. What are the dimensions of conflict in environmental policy making? 
2. What are the broad types of environmental policy making? 
3. How is policy making success (evaluation) determined? 
4. How well is policy evaluation understood and carried out in WA? 
5. What are the barriers to using the policy making approach most likely to 
succeed in highly contested contexts, both from the environmental and 
the planning agencies? 
6. What do the policy stakeholders see as being the key elements of good 
policy making? 
This research brings together three areas of study: policy making in highly contested 
contexts; collaborative policy making; and, adaptive policy solutions. The rise of 
collaborative policy making is, in part, a direct outcome of the rise in conflict that surrounds 
many modern policy making efforts. Existing analysis of collaborative policy making in the 
literature focuses on ways to manage that conflict rather than examining the nature of that 
conflict itself. This is a significant gap in the literature. This research will contribute to the 
understanding of both conflict in policy making and the collaborative approach by providing 
a theoretical framework within which to understand conflict (Chapter 2).  
Any thesis that examines modern conflict in decision making will draw its theoretical 
framework from writers in the communicative and participative planning fields, notably 
Healey (1997) and Forester (1999). Healey (1998) notes of these new ideas in planning 
theory: 
! that, through such a process of 'learning how to collaborate’, a richer 
understanding and awareness of conflicts over local environments can develop, from 
which collective approaches to resolving conflicts may emerge. 
(Healey 1998:34) 
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It will be argued here that collaboration alone will not deliver good policy making in all cases 
where conflict is deeply embedded as part of the process, notably where the conflict is in 
part centred on the science that supports decision making: that is, where there is a high 
level of uncertainty in the science. There has been considerable interest in the recent 
environmental management literature of the potential for adaptive management to be 
successful in circumstances where data is limited but there is considerable development 
pressure. Adaptive management is more flexible than traditional approaches and involves 
monitoring environmental performance and then altering or adapting management 
responses depending on the results of that monitoring. It is applied in cases where there is 
some uncertainty about how a certain environment will respond to change.  
Keen et al (2005) argue that adaptive management has part of it’s theoretical basis in social 
learning literature. They define adaptive management as “process of iterative reflection that 
occurs when we share our experiences, ideas and environments with others” (P.9)  
Lessard (1998) argues that adaptive management involves both social and technical 
learning where all stakeholders, including the general public, “learn more about the social, 
biological, and physical attributes of ecosystems and adapt more quickly to new knowledge” 
(P. 87) 
Policy making where a collaborative process is combined with adaptive management and 
policy measures (in this thesis called an adaptive–collaborative approach) will be given 
special attention. The adaptive–collaborative approach has its theoretical roots in both the 
participative planning and policy literature (collaborative) and the social learning literature 
(adaptive). It is participative in how policy is formulated and requires that flexible policy 
mechanisms be applied so that as both technical and social learning occurs throughout the 
process, policy can be adapted in the light of this learning. 
Whilst there has been considerable research and academic discussion of both the 
collaborative process and adaptive management, little work and analysis has been done on 
how these two work together as an adaptive–collaborative policy making approach, and 
specifically how this approach can deal with deeply embedded conflict. This research 
addresses this gap in research literature, and should be of interest to policy makers, the 
community and planners involved in environmental policy making approaches in these 
contested contexts. This thesis will examine this issue by studying case studies of 
environmental policies in WA in detail. 
The theoretical context for this study will examine two separate questions central to this 
thesis: 
1. What are the dimensions of conflict in environmental policy making? 
2. What are the broad types of environmental policy making? 
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As already noted, one of the weaknesses of the literature on collaborative planning and 
environmental policy making is that it focuses on the processes of collaboration rather than 
the nature and extent of conflict. This thesis addresses this gap by exploring the dimensions 
of conflict and establishes a theoretical model of conflict in environmental policy making 
based on an analysis of the relevant literature. As well, four broad approaches to 
environmental policy making will be identified, described and analysed for their potential to 
deal with conflict.  
Overview of research design 
To answer the research question posed here, real examples of the four policy making 
approaches will be examined, particularly where levels of conflict are high, and policy 
success/failure determined. There are two broad approaches of comparing policy making: a 
quantitative approach, where many environmental policy making efforts are reviewed and 
evaluated against specific criteria; or, a primarily qualitative method, where a limited 
number of policy making efforts are examined in detail. A qualitative case study approach 
was deliberately chosen here to allow for in–depth coverage of issues which resulted in the 
inevitable trade–off of a lack of precision. 
This case study approach has two layers. As noted earlier, environmental policies can be 
applied to a wide range of subjects across different levels of governance. Rather than study 
environmental policy making across all levels of governance, a single level was chosen as 
the first layer of case study: government agency policy making at the sub–national level. In 
this case, the policy making of the WA Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and the 
Western Australian Planning Commission (WAPC) are examined with the policy making of 
the EPA given particular attention (the EPA is the peak environmental agency in WA). 
Second, a single recent case study of policy making in a highly contested context is 
examined where two quite different policy making approaches were used, one of which has 
elements of the adaptive–collaborative approach and the other a more traditional expert 
centred less participative approach. 
The advantage of focusing on a single policy making level is that it allows deeper themes in 
policy making to be examined than a more quantitative approach would not necessarily 
allow. For example: 
• Is there a pattern of policy success/failure and what could account for this?  
• Is there a preference for a particular approach to policy making and why would 
policy makers favour certain approaches over others? 
• What is the nature of the debate within the environmental policy making community 
in WA? 
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This takes us to a key methodological question (the third secondary question raised above): 
how is policy making success (evaluation) determined? The evaluation method used here 
was developed using a two-stepped process. A draft method was arrived at based on a 
review of the policy evaluation literature. This was tested and fine tuned by seeking the 
views of key experts on environmental policy in WA. 
For the most part this research used qualitative data: a combination of semi–structured 
interviews, document reviews, phone interviews, meeting notes and file searches. 
Published quantitative data is used where appropriate. Chapter 3 gives the full description 
of the methodology used. 
Environmental policies covered 
Overview 
The policies examined in this study are the high level policies of the EPA and the 
environmental strategies and policies of the WAPC, the peak land use planning agency in 
WA. These agencies were chosen because their environmental policies cover the full range 
of environmental issues, whereas the other government agencies focus on specific 
elements of the environment (water resources, conservation, agriculture etc.). As this thesis 
unfolds, more and more emphasis will be given to the EPA's policies. This was done to limit 
the number of policies covered in detail so as to provide greater opportunity for more in–
depth analysis. 
EPA policies 
The EPA makes both statutory and non–statutory policies. The statutory policies are 
Environment Protection Policies (EPPs). EPPs are developed under Part III of the 
Environmental Protection Act (1986) and are, as noted by the EPA (2004), “whole–of–
government policies which are ratified by Parliament and have the force of law as if part of 
the Act” (P. 4). The first EPP was produced in 1992, and at the time of writing there were 
nine finalised EPPs and three more in draft stage. The EPA also produces a range of non–
statutory policies, notably State Environmental Policies (SEPs), Position Statements and 
Guidance Statements. For the purpose of this thesis, only the statutory EPPs and the SEPs 
will be referred to. 
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Draft EPPs and SEPs 
One interesting aspect of EPA’s policy making is that EPPs and SEPs that are in draft form 
only but are released for public comment have significant impacts on the decision making of 
other government agencies. This is in part due to the strong legislative nature of EPPs, 
giving draft EPPs a certain status within government; but also relates to the strong 
relationship between these draft policies and formal environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) of major proposals carried out by the EPA. EIA is a powerful statutory tool in its own 
right and the EPA will often use EIA in support of draft EPPs. As well, draft EPPs often 
emerge to address a specific problem that is commonly raised through project EIA. In these 
cases, the issues covered in draft EPPs already have some level of EPA and government 
support. For these reasons, the policy making of certain draft EPPs will be covered here. 
WAPC policies 
The WAPC produces a wide range of policy–type documents including statutory State 
Planning Policies (SPPs) and numerous non–statutory policies. SPPs are prepared under 
Part 3 of the Planning and Development Act 2005. Both the WAPC and local government 
are required to amend their Planning Schemes to be consistent with Gazetted SPPs and to 
subsequently make planning decisions consistent with SPPs. At the time of writing this 
thesis there were 18 Gazetted SPPs and a further five in preparation. Of these only five 
cover topics that have direct environmental relevance. 
The WAPC has a range of operational Development Control Policies that establish general 
principles that will be used by WAPC in its decision making (WAPC 2004:4). There are 40 
Development Control Policies. 
There are 25 Regional Strategies that allows the WAPC (1999) to “provide the basis for co–
operative action to be taken by State and local government on land use and development” 
(P. 10). There are also 25 Regional and Sub–Regional Structure plans that provide more 
comprehensive planning in areas subject to significant growth pressures. Many of the 
Regional Strategies and Regional and Sub–regional Structure plans cover environmentally 
significant areas in the State. The WAPC also has developed 18 Strategic Policies that deal 
with specific strategic planning issues or give detailed meaning to an aspect of a regional 
strategy. For the purpose of this thesis, only the statutory SPPs and the high level non–
statutory policies, Regional Strategies and Regional and Sub–regional Structure plans that 
cover environmentally significant areas in the State, will be referred to. 
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Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 establishes the overall theoretical framework for this study, where the nature and 
extent of conflict in modern environmental policy making, and broad approaches to 
environmental policy making are discussed. The key theoretical framework for this 
discussion draws from the communicative/participative planning field and the social learning 
literature. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology. 
Chapter 4 examines how policy success can be determined, particularly where the policy 
making context is highly contested, with an emphasis on WA. Chapter 5 examines WA 
environmental policy making over the last twenty years to identify those that have clearly 
succeeded or failed, and what factors led to that success or failure. Consistent with the 
focus of this thesis, particular attention is given to policy making that has been formulated 
within a highly contested context. The methodology proposed in Chapter 4 is applied to 
evaluate those policies. Conclusions about the usefulness of the general approaches to 
environmental policy making (identified in Chapter 2) to address highly contested contexts 
will be drawn, based on the WA experiences. As well, based on the outcomes of the policy 
making evaluations, some general comments about EPA policy making will be made. 
Chapter 6 explores a recent policy making case study set in a highly contested context: 
Cockburn Sound.  Chapter 7 concludes the study by discussing the broader implications of 
the results of this study beyond the WA context. 
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Chapter 2 — Theoretical context 
Introduction – planning theory 
“After years of stalemate and frustration, the state’s water management bureau held 
a public meeting to discuss the idea of irrigators voluntarily leasing some of their 
water to maintain instream flows. Most of the folks in the crowd that showed up 
clearly opposed the proposal, many of them shouting protests before the meeting 
even started. Standing in front of the mob, the water bureau chief asked for a chance 
to have a civil dialogue. ‘I hope we’ve moved forward from the days of vigilante 
justice’, he said. ‘You know, the first murder in Montana happened in a dispute over 
water’. The crowd quieted slightly. Then, from the back of the room, a gruff voice 
boomed out: ‘And before tonight’s over, there’s gonna be a few more’. Welcome to 
the Wild West.”  
(McKinney and Harmon 2007:2)  
This is a quote from a paper discussing the difficulties of water management planning in 
Montana in the USA where conflict over the use of the resource has reached extreme 
levels. Whilst not this intense, modern planning and policy making is becoming more and 
more difficult as communities and stakeholders compete to be heard and to have their 
interests taken into account by decision makers. Theorists like Stilwell (1993) see conflict in 
urban areas originating because of tensions within the broader political-economic realm 
caused by disputes within production (capital-labour), inequalities in distribution (race, 
gender and location) and problems of exchange (externalities, monopolies etc.) where 
urban conflict and protests have “posed significant challenges to the economic interests of 
capital and the legitimacy of the state” (P. 230). 
Healey (1997:5) sees conflict within the planning domain as a problem of the democratic 
and governance processes where planners need “new ways of understanding with which to 
grasp the dynamics of urban and regional change and new ways of thinking about the 
institutional design of governance.” 
Healey argues that a communicative approach to planning is required that encourages 
collaborative decision making through consensus building. The traditional approaches to 
planning are either rational, where the information and processes of planning are seen as 
value free and objective, or neo-liberal where the role of planning is to facilitate the proper 
function of market based mechanisms. Communicative planning, on the other hand, sees 
knowledge as intrinsically socially constructed. Conflict arises because people of differing 
interests and expectations interpret knowledge in their own socially constructed ways and 
because power is unevenly distributed (Healey 1997:29). Advocates of more participative 
approaches to planning acknowledge the problems inherent in carrying out a participation 
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exercise, for example access to resources and information, and inequalities of power. 
Forester (2006) is another advocate for more participative planning and acknowledges that 
such approaches can be “messy, unpredictable, and uncertain” (P. 448). However, this 
more participative approach is able to manage and reduce conflict and deliver an equitable 
planning outcome: as Healey (1999) noted in more recent work on the resurgence of 
regional strategic planning in Europe:  
Such endeavours commonly accept the need to engage with a dynamic, fluid and 
open relational diversity and build some kind of collective actor consciousness and 
mobilization force to enlarge the synergies, reduce the conflicts and turn coexistence 
into some kind of identification with the place of the urban region.  
(Healey 1999:541) 
In order to manage this conflict planners need to develop new skills and approaches 
including listening, mediating and negotiating. If these new skill aren’t developed Forester 
(1994:154) argues that conflict will remain unresolved and “planners will seek refuge in 
expertise and bureaucratic inaccessibility”   
Communicative environmental policy making 
The communicative turn in planning has its parallels in environmental policy making 
(Steelman and Ascher 1997; van den Hove 2000; Wagle 2000) where “! a ‘new’ discourse 
is (re–) entering public policy and management !” (Adams and Hess 2001:13). Forester 
(1999, 1994) argues that the role of decision makers has to change. Forester (1994) claims 
that planners 
! may also come to understand their roles in new ways: to see themselves as not 
unappreciated scapegoats, distrusted and resented by irate neighbors or developers, 
but as active facilitators and mediators of public voice; not just as narrow technicians 
but as technically competent professionals able to listen to conflicting views, mediate 
between interdependent parties, and negotiate to protect various public interests as 
well.  
(Forester 1994:155) 
Proponents of greater participation usually argue their case from three broad perspectives: 
normative, substantive and instrumental (Stirling 2006:96). The normative argument is that 
greater participation is central to making governments more democratic (Pratchett 1999; 
Weeks 2000). For example Patten (2001) suggests that: 
Working through the crux of the democratic challenge requires that we focus on 
opening up and democratizing policy formation within the executive branch of 
government. Moreover we must recognise that this can be best accomplished via a 
renewed (and transformed) commitment to democratic consultations and, very 
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importantly, the democratization of those aspects of public administration that 
facilitate societal input into public policy making.  
(Patten 2001:222) 
The substantive argument is that participation leads to better decision making because 
certain information relevant to the policy is held within the non policy making community 
and is not usually available to policy makers. Engaging the community will uncover this 
information, leading to a more relevant and appropriate policy. The instrumental argument 
is that participation gives more credibility to the final policy outcomes leading to a higher 
level of compliance, and will have the added benefit of increasing the credibility of the policy 
making agency.   
A fourth argument is what can be called valuative where participation ensures that the final 
decision making represents the different views, values and interests of the community 
(Hampton 1999). Renn (2006:35) argues that policy making goes beyond considerations of 
the technical issues, as this is “not a sufficient condition to make prudent environmental 
decisions. Without consideration of public values and preferences, decisions cannot be 
legitimised”. 
Participative ladders 
Participative ladders have been developed to make better sense of this participative turn, 
the most notable of which is Arnstein’s (1969) work which was later adapted by Healey 
(1997), as shown in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: Healey’s modified participative table (Source: Healey 1997:26) 
8 Citizen control  Control over decisions and agenda 
7 Delegated 
Power 
Degrees of 
citizen power 
Delegated decision making  
6 Partnership  Shared decision making 
5 Placation  Consultation with on–going efforts made to deal with 
concerns 
4 Consultation Degrees of 
tokenism 
Seeking input on proposals 
3 Informing  Providing information on proposals 
2 Therapy Non participation Dealing with concerns after decision making  
1 Manipulation  Deliberately working to change the public view on a 
problem 
Another more recent ladder or spectrum is that developed by the International Association 
for Public Participation (IAP2) that builds on the work of Arnstein and Healey. It has five 
levels, as shown in Table 2 below.  
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Table 2: IAP2’s participation spectrum (Source: International Association for Public 
Participation 2007)  
Participation 
level 
Aim of participation 
 
Input into policy making  Follow up 
Empower Policy makers give all 
decision making to the 
public. 
The public completely 
controls the policy 
making. 
Policy is as decided 
by the public. 
Collaborate Policy makers work 
directly with the public 
through a partnership 
approach to ensure that 
views are incorporated 
into all parts of the policy 
making process. 
Alternatives developed 
jointly and the views and 
recommendations of the 
public are included to the 
maximum extent possible. 
On–going 
involvement of the 
public. Where views 
of the public are not 
included the reasons 
are communicated to 
the public. 
Involve Work more directly and 
continuously with the 
public to ensure their 
views are understood and 
taken account of during 
the process. Policy 
makers and public work 
separately. 
Participation happens 
earlier in the policy 
making process and input 
is used to help the policy 
makers develop options.  
Final policy decision 
made by policy makers in 
isolation. 
Alternatives 
developed by the 
policy makers and 
interim decisions 
made that reflect the 
policy makers’ 
understanding of 
community views. 
Consult The policy makers carry 
out analysis and 
formulate alternatives 
with out public input then 
seek public views on 
these before a final 
decision is made.  
This public process 
commences after 
considerable work already 
done. Views will be 
considered and there is 
some flexibility to 
incorporate limited 
changes to the preferred 
option. 
The public is kept 
up–to date on 
progress being 
made, and some 
effort is made to 
accommodate their 
views before the 
final decision. 
Inform The policy makers give 
the public balanced 
information to help in the 
understanding of the 
problem, alternatives, 
opportunities and 
solutions. It is a one–way 
flow of information. 
There is no expectation 
that the policy would be 
influenced by public 
views, and the informing 
usually takes place after 
considerable progress 
has been made in 
developing the policy. 
This can be a once–
off process or it can 
be on–going where 
the public is kept 
up–to–date on 
progress being 
made. 
 
The descriptions given in the Table are made directly relevant to policy making. The IAP2 
spectrum will be used here because its fewer levels are readily applicable to the policy 
making approaches discussed in this thesis. The first three levels of participation (Inform, 
Consult and Involve), are different from the other two higher levels in that decision making 
is centralised with the policy makers for these levels, whereas for Collaborate and Empower 
decision making is either shared (Collaborate) or delegated completely (Empower). This is 
not to say that public input doesn’t affect decision making for these three lower levels, for as 
Zurita (2006) notes of these levels of participation: 
It is important to integrate participatory processes in policy–making as a way of 
providing input to better informed decisions, because the knowledge and the values 
of the public are included in the decision process. Those decisions are also more 
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robust, and more likely to be accepted as legitimate by society as such. But the final 
decision is still in the hands of the policy–makers and based on many other factors.  
(Zurita 2006:24) 
Whilst there are few examples of the actual Empower level of participation, the concept is 
quite straight forward in that either the statutory responsibility for decision making is formally 
delegated to a group representing the community and stakeholders, or a formal promise is 
made by the decision makers to adopt the outcomes agreed by the group. Shared decision 
making as part of the Collaborate level of participation is, however, more complex. 
Shared decision making as part of Collaborate 
level of participation  
Collaborations do not generally involve policy makers formally sharing decision making with 
the public, it is usually an implied sharing of decision making. Three key elements are 
normally needed for this to occur. The first element is that participation should occur very 
early on in the policy making process to, as McKinney and Harmon (2007) argue: 
! name problems, frame a set of solutions, take actions, and achieve desired 
outcomes, rather than limit participation to prescribed steps in an official decision–
making process. Citizens and stakeholders bring valuable information, ideas, and 
insights to the table that need to be integrated with the knowledge and authority of 
experts and official decision–makers.  
(McKinney and Harmon 2007:9) 
This early engagement builds a level of confidence in the public that decisions have not 
already been made. The second element is that participants develop a level of trust that 
their views will be listened to and acted on. As McKinney and Harmon (2007) note, 
participants are “empowered by the presumption that their input and advice will be 
considered by the decision–makers and will influence the outcome” (P. 10). This trust is 
enhanced where the policy making agency is publicly committed to the process and its 
outcomes, and the process has political support (Beierle and Konisky 2000; Todd 2002). 
The final element is that the participation process facilitates the open sharing of information 
and values, and that learning, particularly social, occurs and is seen to occur (Tippett et al. 
2005; Webler, Kastenholz, and Renn 1995; Diduck 1999). Poncelet (2001) observed that 
social learning in collaborative exercises leads to personal transformations that 
! provide important opportunities to forward environmental problem–solving efforts 
and to overcome some of the entrenched conflicts that have handicapped 
environmental decision making in the past. Though seemingly small, these personal 
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transformations may well serve as the foundation for future large–scale 
improvements in the domain of environmental management.  
(Poncelet 2001:297) 
Shared decision making in collaborations is, therefore, implied rather than actual, and 
occurs because participation begins early in the process, the decision makers are 
committed to the process, the process has political support, participants trust that decision 
makers will take into account the outcomes of the participation exercise, and all participants 
experience and observe in others some degree of social learning (transformation occurs). 
The differences between the three lower levels and the Collaborate level can be best 
summarised in terms of the distance between policy makers and the public. For the three 
lower levels, policy makers engage the public to varying degrees, but a clear boundary 
exists between the two when it comes to making key decisions. At the Involve level, whilst 
policy makers are more likely to include the views of the public in the policy, it remains the 
call of the policy makers as to what to include and to interpret what is the public view. At the 
Collaborate level the implied decision making effectively blurs the decision making 
boundary and the distance between policy makers and the public, in effect, does not exist. 
Shortcomings of the communicative approach 
This participative turn in both planning and environmental policy making has not occurred 
without criticism, with some authors expressing concern about the ability of some groups to 
be involved in decision making and the likelihood that the outcome of a participative 
exercise may not fairly represent the full range of community views (Beatley, Brower, and 
Lucy 1994; Williams 2003; Illsley 2003), whilst others are concerned that there is little, if 
any, evidence about the overall effectiveness and cost effectiveness of greater public 
involvement in natural resource management (Buchy and Race 2001). Eder (1996:203) 
raises another concern in that in some cases, greater participation may not be primarily 
about having inputs into decision making but rather it has become “a discursive medium for 
political conflicts and public debate”. Sandercock (1983:78), whilst acknowledging the 
advantages of participative approaches to planning, argues that it is best suited to local 
planning and that “in the context of the debate about the role of the Commonwealth in the 
cities, notions of participation are, at best, marginal and at worst, irrelevant”. 
Of more concern is the cursory way that advocates of the communicative and collaborative 
approaches deal with conflict. The key focus of this work is on the processes of participation 
and collaboration and the nature and extent of conflict that surround the planning and policy 
making exercises is given far less attention. Typically, as noted earlier, conflict is seen in 
largely social terms as being about competing interests and values. Forster (1999:14) sees 
managing conflicting values as the key challenge for planning where “as communities, our 
values conflict and cannot be realized” and asks that planning achieve “political plurality – 
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our caring about values” and that Information and knowledge, key inputs into the planning 
and policy making processes, are seen as socially constructed, with conflicting 
interpretations of their meanings.  
This solely social view of conflict is inadequate when dealing with environmental policy 
making where the conflict can be deeper, more complex and occur over much longer 
timeframes than many planning problems. As well, environmental policy making has added 
complexity as it often requires various levels of government to cooperate to achieve 
environmental improvements. Many modern environmental issues do not recognise national 
boundaries (are trans-boundary), for example protection of migratory species (cetaceans 
and birds) and air pollution, and to adequately address these issues national governments 
are required to work together. Climate change not only requires a global response with 
national governments working cooperatively, it also involves government across different 
levels within a nation to work together. Where international cooperation is limited or absent 
conflict inevitable emerges where, as Held (1997:310) argues,  governments “assert 
themselves nationally to protect their own interests” at the expense of achieving longer term 
environmental gains. 
So-called wicked problems emerge that typically involve deeply entrenched conflict that has 
often developed over a long period of time. McKinney and Harmon (2007) describe three 
types of natural resource management issues from least to most tractable, being: 
• Technical and practical problems where there is good and reliable information on 
the issue, there is good agreement on the nature of the problem, and alternatives 
for addressing the problem are relatively easy to identify and agree on. 
• Single dimensional value–laden problems where there is agreement on the basic 
nature of the problem but there is disagreement on how best to address the 
problem based on different values different stakeholders place on the resource. 
• Two dimensional value–laden problems where there are value–based 
disagreements on both the nature of the problem and how to resolve it. 
Central to conflict on the third and intractable (wicked) problems are: differences and 
dispute over the interests that stakeholders have in the resources; that the information 
available for decision makers is complex and confounding; and, that, as McKinney and 
Harmon (2007:5) argue, the problems “occur in a briar patch of governmental jurisdictions 
with overlapping and conflicting mandates, laws, policies, and decision–making protocols”. 
Clearly, the communicative/collaborative literature has some important shortcomings in the 
way conflict is described and dealt with. To get a better understanding of how best to deal 
with conflict as part of environmental policy making it is first important to understand the 
nature and extent of that conflict. Unfortunately, whilst there has been considerable work 
examining conflict within general government policy making and decision making, there is 
limited research specifically on conflict and environmental policy making.  Wall and Callister 
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(1995:515) claim the literature on conflict and general policy making to be “mountainous”. 
Whilst the interest in conflict in environmental policy making has increased in recent years 
(Vira 2001), a framework suitable for this thesis does not exist and it is necessary, 
therefore, to establish an appropriate theoretical framework for the policy analysis in this 
thesis, which is the purpose of this part of the section.  
Model of conflict and environmental policy 
making – three themes and one driver 
Introduction 
With some exceptions, this recent interest in conflict and environmental policy making has 
tended to focus on how policy making should address and manage conflict with little 
examination of the nature and extent of the conflict itself, with some exceptions (for 
example Chandrasekharan 1996; Schmidtz 2002). The rise of collaborative and cooperative 
policy making is, in part, a direct outcome of this interest in conflict. Authors advocating 
collaborative and cooperative policy making typically take the presence of conflict as a 
given and then describe, often through case studies, how these exercises have contained 
the conflict so as to arrive at some agreed policy position. Some even avoid the use of the 
word conflict and prefer to talk about dilemmas instead (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005; 
Margerum and Whitall 2004). 
Another stream of research into conflict and environmental policy making has involved the 
rise of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes to aid decision making; including 
mediation, facilitation, consensus building conferences, negotiation and the use of computer 
multiple criteria analysis models (Cowell 2000; Andrew 2001; Rauschmayer and Wittmer 
2006; Regan, Colyvan et al. 2006; Striegnitz 2006; Zurita 2006; Pollino, White et al. 2007). 
One useful piece of work on the extent of conflict in environmental policy making was done 
by Jackson and Pradubraj (2004), who identify four key features of environmental conflict: 
• Conflict is a result of scarcity and represents social struggles against uneven usage 
and allocation of resources; 
• Conflict reflects poor performance by governments in developing complex public 
policy; 
• Conflict involves the issues of power and rights; and 
• Conflict is an inevitable consequence of development and can be constructive. 
This McKinney and Harmon (2007) work on wicked problems was referred to above, and is 
a useful starting point here. This thesis applies the McKinney and Harmon (2007) work, with 
some modification, to identify three broad conflict themes and one overall driver. The broad 
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themes are: social, governance, and science and information. The overall driver is resource 
scarcity. 
Whilst the discussion below will show that the boundaries between these three themes can 
be blurred at times, this categorisation is useful for discussion purposes. As will be seen, 
the social themes have always been a part of environmental policy making, but modern 
policy making involves a significant deepening of the social theme and the emergence of 
the governance and science and information themes. These themes will be discussed in 
more detail below followed by a discussion of the key driver of conflict: resource scarcity.  
The social theme  
Many of the authors who have engaged in what Ebbin (2004:72) calls “the anatomy of 
conflict” identify the principle causes of conflict in environmental policy making as being 
between different groups and individuals who have different interests in the environment. 
This is expressed as the various stakeholders either holding different values towards the 
environment or different goals for its use (Shields, Tolwinski, and Kentc 1999; Vira 2001; 
Patterson, Montag, and Williams 2003; Ebbin 2004; Yasmi, Schanz, and Salim 2006). 
This focus on interests, values and goals highlights the social aspects of conflict. For 
example, Vira (2001) argues that conflict arises because 
! stakeholders have divergent interests and claims upon the environment but also, 
more fundamentally, because of differing views about what is socially desirable. An 
environmental dispute may reflect elemental differences in ideas about moral 
commitments, the more general relationship between humans and nature, and what it 
means to lead ‘the good life’.  
(Vira 2001:637) 
Fisheries management well illustrates how these different social claims generate conflict 
with commercial users expressing an economic interest, non–commercial fishers 
expressing a recreational interest and traditional (indigenous) users expressing cultural 
interests (Claytor 2000). Conflict centres on the allocation of the total sustainable take and 
how much each group of users are entitled to. The commercial fishers typically claim that 
because they supply the food needs of the whole population their needs should take 
precedence over individual recreational users. Indigenous groups usually have a lower 
demand on the total resource but because of the cultural and often spiritual connections to 
fishing, their claims are based on more deeply–held views about access rights. Problems 
and conflict with fishery and wildlife managers can emerge when the species of interest to 
indigenous people is severely depleted and already over–fished, as is the case with 
Dugongs in some places in Australia. According to the Australian Department of 
Environment and Heritage Dugongs are not only important food sources for some remote 
communities they also 
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! play a significant role in the customary economy of many communities. The 
spiritual and cultural significance of these animals is illustrated in the stories, 
traditions and contemporary activities of many coastal Indigenous communities and 
acted out in numerous ceremonies.  
(DEH 2005:3) 
Forest management has a long history of conflict with a diverse range of stakeholders 
expressing a range of often competing interests, notably: loggers (economic), recreational 
groups (recreational), indigenous (cultural) and environmental groups (conservation) 
(Castro and Nielsen 2001; Hiedanpaa 2005). Logging practices have become increasing 
controversial with conservation groups contending that logging yields are unsustainable, 
whereas local logging communities express concern about loss of jobs and impact on the 
local economies. Many forests are also catchment areas for public and private water 
supplies, and tensions emerge over the impact of logging practices and water quality. A 
more recent debate has emerged in areas where climate change causes reduced rainfall 
and recharge to surface reservoirs and groundwater aquifers. It is well known that logging 
rates can alter groundwater levels and surface water flows (see for example Pothier, 
Prevost, and Auger 2003), and increased forest thinning is being promoted as a way to 
increase both run–off and aquifer recharge to make up for declining rainfall (Fellows of the 
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering 2002). For example, the 
Water Corporation of WA (2005) has proposed to selectively thin one of the near–urban 
forest catchments in order to increase the surface run–off yield between 4–6 gigalitres 
annually. 
Coastal and near–shore marine policy making usually involves an even more diverse range 
of users with different interests and values, including tourism, fishery, agriculture, boating, 
recreational, rural development, transport (shipping and ports), industrialisation, amenity, 
views and more recently wind farms (Striegnitz 2006). The rapid growth of coastal cities 
world–wide not only put added pressure on existing coastal urban coastal areas, they also 
threaten the values of small coastal settlements not previously subject to growth pressures. 
In Australia these concerns have lead many coastal local governments to form a 
Seachange Taskforce to address the problems of urban and tourism growth on the coast 
... before the coastal character and environment that Australians love so much is lost 
as a result of the massive changes brought about in coastal Australia by the growing 
numbers of people who are attracted there.  
(Natoli 2006:5) 
Concern over coastal development outside the existing urban areas is not just about 
conflicting values but is also a deeper concern about identity and local ownership of the 
coast. Small coastal communities fear that rapid growth will change their existing character 
as the new residents bring different values, and their mere presence puts pressure on the 
existing infrastructure on what is perceived as a fragile local environment.  
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Conflict involving policy making and management of water resources is also about the 
ownership of the resource. Typically, the new resource (dammed river or underground 
aquifer) is located outside the urban area that will utilise the resource, usually because 
urban land uses degrade local water resources making them unsuitable for human 
consumption. Local users of the resource not only value the resource for non–urban uses 
(e.g. recreational) but also see the resource as being theirs. This conflict is summed up by 
Steinberga and Clark (1999) as: 
! a clear division between ‘us’ — the rural/exurban victim — and ‘them’ — the urban 
exploiter. ‘Us’ is portrayed as local, ecologically holistic, small–scale, and 
sustainable, and ‘them’ is just the opposite. ‘They’ are using ‘our’ nature for ‘their’ 
development. ‘We’, in turn, must regain control of ‘our’ nature and oppose ‘their’ 
development.  
(Steinberga and Clark 1999:479) 
Thus, the debate is broader and deeper than just conflict over different uses and values but 
one of ownership of the resource. 
Patterson Montag et al (2003) take a slightly different view of the social aspects of policy 
making conflict and argue that conflict management is on–going and never–ending. This is 
because whilst policy making can address existing different interests, these are never static. 
Inevitably, social context will change (for example, increasing urbanisation, changing 
demographics and gentrification); which causes the cultural meanings of the environment to 
also change, creating new values and goals for the policy makers to deal with. This brings 
about new problems and conflicts not previously foreseen. 
Differences in various stakeholders’ abilities to exercise power as part of policy making are 
also a cause of conflict. In cases where the level of power determines which interests and 
values prevail, and the policy outcomes that result, those with less power may seek other 
ways of influencing decisions (e.g. court action) or look to form coalitions with other 
stakeholders so as to change the power balance in their favour (Yasmi, Schanz, and Salim 
2006). 
Ebbin (2004) notes that the more participative approaches to policy making, which are used 
in part to address the conflict embedded in the particular environmental issue in question, 
have the potential to change the nature of the conflict. This is because more stakeholders 
are bought into the process bringing in a broader range of interests not previously 
expressed, existing stakeholders have to re–examine their roles within the process, and the 
rules for dealing with decision making need to be adapted. 
Another way of looking at these social conflicts is to see them as an increasing socialisation 
of the environment, where individuals and groups value the environment for more than their 
intrinsic or use values. Instead, individuals see the environment as part of some broader 
social amenity and, therefore part of their general quality of life. Seen this way, conflict over 
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environmental issues can be seen as individuals and groups seeking to either maximise 
their amenity and quality of life, or to minimise any potential loss. It is this increasing 
socialisation of the environment that has accompanied many of the modern environmental 
policy making exercises. 
The problem for policy makers is that introducing the social into environmental decision 
making brings with it matters that are both difficult to quantify and measure and are also 
difficult to resolve by simply doing more science. Significant questions emerge: how do you 
quantify values and social amenity? How do you decide which stakeholders groups lose 
amenity so that another one gains? How do you separate perception of loss and actual 
loss? 
In response to the socialising of the environment, many scientists and environmentalists call 
for a separation of the technical and political aspects of policy making with the hope that 
science can be freed of social biases, which will then better inform decision making. The 
increasing use of environmental indicators is a direct response to calls that science should 
be separate from the politics. Environmental indicators are meant to be quantitative 
measures of the state of the environment so that management and decision making are 
better informed (Bockstallera and Girardinb 2003; Rice and Rochet 2005); although some 
authors express caution over their use (Olsthoorn et al. 2001), whilst others cast doubt on 
their effectiveness on actually measuring what they purport to (Hughes 2002). 
There are other authors who call for science and politics to be integrated rather than 
separated as part of environmental decision making (Eduljee 2000; Mercer 2001). Eduljee  
calls for a new paradigm of decision making that: 
! relies crucially on a better understanding of environmental and biological 
processes and on greater sophistication, transparency and rigour in the application of 
science, but within a collaborative and consensual decision making framework.  
(Eduljee 2000:21) 
Other authors call for an approach where community values are integrated as part of the 
technical assessment, and political decision making is based on this socialised assessment 
(Bohnenblust and Slovic 1998). 
This socialising of the environment is also apparent in the setting of environmental 
standards. Environmental standards are directly related to the level of environmental 
protection people experience: the higher the standard, the higher the level of environmental 
protection and the higher the social amenity. Here, the science and any predicted impacts 
are usually clear and uncontested, but dispute occurs over what is seen as an acceptable 
level of environmental degradation or protection. Air quality standards set locally at Kwinana 
south of Perth provide a good example of this.  
Kwinana is WA’s premier heavy industrial area, with large residential areas to the north, 
east and south. Air quality standards were originally set in the 1980s but only for sulphur 
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dioxide and dust. There was little public pressure to change those standards until the mid 
1990s. A recent review of air quality standards in the area associated with a proposed iron 
ore smelter at Kwinana noted that community concern about air quality had grown and that 
standards were also being demanded for a range of other air contaminants, including 
dioxins, furans, poly aromatic hydrocarbons and heavy metals (EPA 2002). The community 
was also concerned about the cumulative effects of the whole cocktail of contaminants. 
Modern communities are becoming more aware of possible ill–effects of a range of 
contaminants, and are demanding higher levels of protection, both in terms of the number 
of contaminants of concern and the level of exposure that is considered acceptable. 
In summary, social conflict in environmental policy making is about stakeholders’ different 
interests in the environment where each holds different values and expresses different 
goals for its use. In some instances, where some of the stakeholders are local and others 
are located distant from the resource or are new to the area, ownership of the resource and 
fear of loss of identity adds further to the conflict. Power inequality between stakeholders 
adds another social dimension. Importantly, these aspects of social conflict are not new to 
environmental policy making and have been dealt with in various ways, depending on the 
level of conflict and as the nature of conflict has evolved. These conflicts can also be seen 
as an increasing socialisation of the environment, which adds further complexity to modern 
environmental policy making and adds significantly to the nature and extent of that conflict. 
Whilst this discussion on the social aspects of conflict is helpful, it does not address the two 
more recent issues peculiar to modern environmental policy making that allow these 
primarily social aspects to be played out even further through the policy making process: 
governance, and science and information. 
Governance theme 
Governance is used here rather than the more narrow term of government. Government is 
typically a collection of people vested (often through a democratic process) with the 
authority to govern a country or part thereof. It is, therefore, easily identifiable and usually 
has definable outcomes including legislation, regulations and policies. Shore (2006:719) 
argues that governance, however “is a more protean term that includes the action and 
manner of governing”. It is, therefore, a broader concept that deals with decision making 
that goes beyond just actions by individual governments.  
The focus of this study is on public rather than private governance, which can Hill and Lynn 
(2004) define as: 
! regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that 
constrain, prescribe, and enable the provision of publicly supported goods and 
services through associations with agents in the public and private sectors.  
(Hill and Lynn 2004:4) 
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Governance recognises the more complex power sharing arrangements that exit in modern 
societies that have emerged because of the trend towards more participatory democracy 
and increasing deregulation of environmental management in favour of free market and 
voluntary approaches. As a result, decision making has become more decentralised. It also 
recognises the more complex international governmental arrangements in the global 
community. For example, the European Union prefers to refer to governance rather than 
government (e.g. CEC 2001) when discussing government decision making in Europe. 
Modern policy making is also more about governance than governing, particularly where 
governments either share decision making with various groups or delegate decision making 
entirely. 
One type of governance conflict in policy making is where different government regimes 
have jurisdiction over the same resource. For example, river and catchment management 
can cut across both national and sub–national borders bringing together different ways of 
decision making, and governments with differing priorities (Hensel, McLaughlin Mitchell, 
and Sowers II 2006). This is really about the incompatibilities between political boundaries 
rather than the extent of environment problems. As Meadowcroft (2002:169) notes: 
“Environmental problems do not respect political boundaries, instead they cut across 
established jurisdictions or link discontiguous regions.” 
Pollution from industrial complexes or agricultural land uses, once released into the 
environment (air and water), become highly mobile, cross national boundaries, and cause 
adverse impacts far from the source. As noted by Sundqvist and others (2002): 
The discovery of transboundary air pollutants has not only challenged jurisdictional 
borders of the nation–state but also social and cultural boundaries, not least the one 
between science and policy.  
(Sundqvist, Letell, and Lidskog 2002:147) 
Acidification in Europe and the various governments’ responses to the problem illustrates 
the difficulty in dealing with cross–boundary environmental issues. In the 1960s scientists 
produced conclusive evidence that sulphur emissions from central Europe caused 
acidification and subsequent ecological damage to lakes in Scandinavia (Krewitt et al. 
1998). It took until 1979 before the first North American and European inter–government 
agreement to deal with acidification was agreed to, with the signing of the Convention on 
Long–Range Transboundary Air–Pollution (LRTAP). Whilst there has been considerable 
progress made since 1979, with LRTAP being expanded to include a range of other 
pollutants including nitrogen, volatile organic compounds, eutrophication and ground level 
ozone, progress to get agreement has been slow and some problems remain, for example 
agreements on dealing with persistent organic pollutants (POPs) have been particularly 
difficult to achieve. 
Some environmental problems go beyond regions and have global implications, for 
example human–induced climate change. The difficulty in reaching agreement on what 
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actions to take to address that problem reflects the incompatibility between political 
boundaries and ecological boundaries at a global scale. One of the barriers to achieving 
international cooperation on greenhouse gases has been the predicted uneven impact that 
climate change and the Kyoto Protocol will have on different nations. As President George 
Bush told ITV in Britain earlier in 2005: 
I walked away from Kyoto because it would have damaged the American economy, it 
would have destroyed the American economy, it was a lousy deal for the American 
economy.  
(AFX News Limited 2005) 
In the absence of a strong global government, cooperation between national governments 
is fundamental to addressing climate change, as the 2001 IPCC report on climate change 
(2001:29) noted: “The primary factors underlying anthropogenic climate change are similar 
to those for most environmental and socio–economic issues (and include) governance 
structures”. To date, cooperation between national governments has been slow to 
materialize. 
Appropriate geographic scale is also an issue at the sub–national and local levels of 
government. Geographically large nations like Australia, Canada and the US with federal 
systems of government often struggle to deal with catchment–related issues where the 
catchment boundaries do not match the sub–national (State) and local government 
boundaries. Frustration in getting agreement between sub–national governments to deal 
with these issues has even lead some authors to call for administrative political boundaries 
to be re–drawn to coincide with the natural resource boundary (Heikkila 2004). As Crowley 
(2001) noted of the then Commonwealth government’s primary environmental programme, 
the National Heritage Trust (NHT): 
The effective federalist aim of improved intergovernmental relations has also been 
thwarted—by unilateral federal NHT directives on the one hand, and by poor state 
environmental practices on the other. The NHT is also in danger of failing as a 
national conservation measure by failing to achieve its intended ecological outcomes.  
(Crowley 2001:267) 
The development in 1998 of Australia’s national oceans policy has also been difficult, in part 
because of a lack of agreement between governments (State and National) with 
overlapping jurisdiction. Smyth et al (2003) noted that prior to the policy’s formulation  
The management of Australia’s oceans has been the responsibility of a confusing 
myriad of state and Commonwealth government agencies, and state and 
Commonwealth legislation, regulations and management plans. The result has been 
inconsistent, inefficient and ultimately unsuccessful management of Australia’s 
marine regions.  
(Smyth et al. 2003:10) 
! BT!
The 1998 policy, at the insistence of the various State Governments, did not include a 
statutory obligation for State governments to comply with the policy, which means it will only 
be effective if the States agree to cooperate (Wescott 2000). Cooperation in the policy’s 
implementation seems unlikely as not one State Government has endorsed the policy 
(Foster and Haward 2003). 
Another source of conflict involving governance relates to the structure and operation of 
government agencies. There is a growing view that the way bureaucracies operate, and the 
way they are compartmentalised, is not conducive to good environmental management. 
The concern is that most contemporary environmental problems do not fit neatly into the 
mandate of any one agency. Consequently, environmental policy making usually involves a 
range of agencies resulting in inter–agency conflict and less than optimum environmental 
performance. Conflict can arise over: sharing of power between the agencies (Hooper, 
McDonald, and Mitchell 1999); the fragmented, uncoordinated way different agencies make 
decisions (Bellamy and Johnson 2000); and through poor coordination between regional 
and head offices within the same agency (May 1995). Some agencies are simply resistant 
to change and, as Alder argues (2001:664) “bureaucratic agencies burrow into ruts that 
keep them on courses long past their usefulness”. This inertia not only leads to less than 
optimal environmental performance, it is the source of much frustration for stakeholders, 
both from industry and the community. 
A third source of conflict involving governance relates to tensions that emerge between the 
agencies responsible for the policy and the broader community. Bureaucracies have been 
accused of being inherently biased in the way they use and interpret information (Edwards 
and Truda 1991; Towers 1997). This can simply be a bias of emphasis where technical 
bureaucrats bring a particular interpretation to a set of data or it can be bias in favour of 
certain stakeholders over others. 
Many environmental agencies struggle with the increased demands by the community and 
governments to be more consultative in their policy making and decision making. An 
independent review of Western Australia’s Department of Environment was carried out in 
2003, with one of the terms of reference being to: 
Investigate management and cultural norms and recommend appropriate reforms 
and change management to increase the level of community trust in the organisation.  
(Carew-Hopkins 2003:12) 
That review concluded that “In terms of the organisation culture the main view is that some 
parts of the combined agency had a defensive culture in its dealings with the community” 
(Carew-Hopkins 2003:1), and went on to recommend that 
The Department should finalise the Community Involvement Framework, train staff 
and continue Risk Communications training across the Department; review and 
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enhance the communications system in emergency response. A code of conduct 
needs to be developed to guide behaviour at community meetings.  
(Carew-Hopkins 2003:10) 
Decreasing public trust in both governments and their agencies is a growing problem. As 
the Commission of the European Communities’ White Paper on European Governance 
notes: 
On the one hand, Europeans want (agencies) to find solutions to the major problems 
confronting our societies. On the other hand, people increasingly distrust institutions 
and politics or are simply not interested in them.  
(CEC 2001:3) 
There is also concern about the overall effectiveness of government efforts to manage the 
environment. As Demmke (2001), from the European Institute for Public Administration, 
noted in a paper on better environment governance in Europe: 
Environmental regulation has grown over the past thirty years, and so has concern 
about regulatory failure and criticism about the inefficiencies of regulatory and 
command – and control–approaches. On the other hand, (still!) very few empirical 
facts are known about changing regulatory styles, new management approaches and 
instruments and their impact on the environment.  
(Demmke 2001:22) 
A fourth source of conflict involving governance relates to the mis–match between political 
timeframes and environmental management timeframes. Electoral cycles that last 2–5 
years are often incompatible with the times scales needed to deal with environmental 
problems. Short electoral cycles often lead to solutions that yield short term results at the 
expense of long–term environmental gains. Salinity, considered by many to be Australia’s 
most significant environmental issue (Beresford 2001), is an example of this temporal mis–
match. As the WA EPA noted in its 1998–99 Annual Report (EPA 1999:6): “The EPA 
regards salinity as the most serious environmental issue in Western Australia.” 
Dryland salinity is a particular problem in the WA's south eastern agricultural area 
(wheatbelt) where recent estimates put the area of salt–affected land at around 3.6 million 
hectares, rising to 6.5 million hectares by 2050 (Frost et al. 2001). Widespread clearing 
occurred in the wheatbelt from the 1950s onwards, with the first evidence of problems being 
reported in the 1970s (Conacher and Conacher 2000). Despite this, successive 
governments did little to halt or control clearing in the wheatbelt or to provide management 
responses to address this emerging problem. This was despite a series of reports calling for 
action, including a 1988 Legislative Council Select committee report stating “without doubt 
salinity is the most serious environmental problem facing the State today” (Legislative 
Council Select Committee on Salinity 1988:ii), and a follow up 1991 Legislative Council 
Select committee report stating:  
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There is an opportunity available to the Government, the Parliament, and the people 
of Western Australia to act decisively. Inaction will condemn our State’s environment 
to a future of rapid deterioration which will impact on the lives and living standards of 
all Western Australians.  
(Legislative Assembly Select Committee on Land Conservation 1991:i) 
The mid 1990s saw the start of a more concerted government policy response to the issue 
with the production of a draft salinity strategy in 1995 (Joint Steering Committee on Salinity 
1995), a final strategy in 2000 (State Salinity Council 2000), and a report by a taskforce set 
up to coordinate actions on salinity in 2001 (The Salinity Taskforce 2001). The 
Commonwealth Government became significantly involved in addressing the problem when 
in 2000 it committed $700 million as part of a national action on salinity. Despite this, 
criticism of governments’ inaction remains strong, for example Beresford, Phillips, and 
Bekle (2001) argue that: 
Salinity is very much a case study of the general critique about the lack of 
effectiveness of government policy–making capacity on the environment especially in 
Australia’s federal system.  
(Beresford, Phillips, and Bekle 2001:37) 
The root cause of salinity — catchment clearing — was not seriously addressed in WA until 
the late 1990s when the EPA began to recommend against clearing of remnant native 
vegetation in locations with less than 20% cover still remaining. As the EPA noted: 
Much of the South West of the State now needs extensive and high level intervention 
to restore hydrological processes at the catchment scale, and this needs to happen 
soon. Faced with this, continued clearing in these areas cannot be supported 
environmentally.  
(EPA 1999:5) 
This lack of effectiveness by successive governments can be traced directly to the electoral 
cycle and the over–riding imperative of governments to be re–elected. Issues that both 
directly affect the majority of electors and can be addressed quickly get attention ahead of 
issues affecting a small number of electors or requiring strategic long–term actions with no 
short–term benefits: salinity is one of those latter issues. Salinity is a direct problem for rural 
Australia, but only 30% of WA’s population live outside the main metropolitan area, with 
most of these in the smaller urban areas away from the wheatbelt. The Salinity Taskforce 
set up specifically by the Government to implement a salinity action plan argued that 
actions to reverse the effects of salinity “will require a long–term strategy over many years – 
beyond the normal terms of Government and probably over several generations” (The 
Salinity Taskforce 2001:19). 
To sum up, there are certain aspects of modern environmental governance that lead to 
conflict through the policy making process. This conflict has become more pronounced in 
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recent times with: the growing complexity of government and decision making 
arrangements; calls for greater participation in decision making; and the trend away from 
regulating the environment to more free market and voluntary approaches. Conflict 
emerges — 
• Where there is a mis–match of natural resource management boundaries and 
political boundaries;  
• Where there are inappropriately structured bureaucracies; 
• When growing tensions emerge between agencies and the public; and  
• Through the inability of short term political cycles to deal with the emerging 
environmental problems that require much longer timeframes to be addressed 
properly. 
Science and information 
The nature and use of science and information is becoming a significant source of conflict in 
policy making, particularly where the environmental problems are highly complex. Claytor 
(2000:1111) notes that in fisheries management conflict is escalated when the information 
upon which decisions are made (e.g. the size and geographic extent of the fish populations) 
is both limited and highly uncertain. He argues that any decision made in this environment 
can be criticised as being arbitrary and unfair and thus add to already elevated levels of 
conflict. 
Ecosystem and catchment level policy making is also characterised by both the complexity 
of the environment and a paucity of reliable data that describes how these areas function 
and react to change (Pavlikakis and Tsihrintzis 2003; Laine and Kronholm 2005; Wittmer, 
Rauschmayer, and Klauer 2006). Clarke (2002:347) argues that in these cases managers 
and policy makers “have come to confront uncertainty as a core part of their work and 
philosophy rather than as an unwelcome but hopefully temporary aberration”. 
At its simplest, conflict emerges because scientists cannot make accurate predictions about 
how the ecosystem as a whole will react to change and as a result, different views form 
about future impacts and changes. In many cases, the ecosystem or resource generates 
significant public interest because: it is either publicly owned, for example forests (Carr, 
Selin, and Schuett 1998; Steelman 2001); has a range of users and stakeholders, for 
example fisheries (Ebbin 2004); or is the home to significant urban and rural populations, 
for example catchments of coastal inlets (Colman 2002). This mix of scientific uncertainty 
and diverse social interests has the potential to generate high levels of conflict. 
Conflict can increase in cases of scientific uncertainty when: the risk to the environment of 
using trial–and–error methods is considered to be too high; development and management 
decisions cannot be postponed to facilitate further data collection because there is 
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considerable pressure for development and growth; and a consensus is needed to proceed 
(Bennett and Lawrence 2002:24). There is a real possibility that if policy makers make 
decisions based on the best available science and it turns out that the science is wrong, the 
results could be catastrophic. Policy makers are faced with almost irresolvable 
controversies and often apply risk assessments to determine the level of risk involved with 
various options as a way of managing community concern (Bohnenblust and Slovic 1998).  
Risk, by its nature, implies that adverse outcomes are possible, and so some communities 
seek to challenge risk assessments and the levels of risk calculated. In some cases, the 
community argument is based on a simple desire to have zero risk, but more and more 
communities engage their own experts or become experts themselves in risk assessment 
(Tesh 1999). In these cases, a public debate emerges where different scientists and 
experts dual over the implications of the limited data set and the resultant risks to the 
environment. Credibility becomes a significant issue where stakeholders and policy makers 
give greater weight to those scientists and experts with the greatest (perceived?) credibility. 
Writers like Ulrich Beck take this risk and uncertainty issue a step further, suggesting that 
the levels of risk generated by industrialisation are becoming increasing central to how 
society functions, to the extent that we are becoming a risk society (Beck 1991, 1995; Beck 
1998, 1999). Beck sees a risk society as being an outcome of the late industrial society. In 
early industrial societies, hazards and any resulting impacts were localised, visible, 
quantifiable and predictable. The impact of any accident could be easily addressed by 
applying more advanced technologies, and the costs associated with fixing the effects of 
any accident were easily covered by the various insurance schemes (including from the 
State via unemployment and sickness benefits). 
In a risk society, the risks are, by contrast, widespread (possibly global), invisible, difficult if 
not impossible to quantify and highly unpredictable. The impacts of any accident cannot be 
easily fixed by using more advanced technology, and the resulting costs of dealing with the 
effects of an accident cannot be recovered through insurance schemes. Examples include 
nuclear accidents, ozone depletion, climate change and release of genetically modified 
organisms. These risks have the potential to cause global annihilation. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the level of conflict elevates for risk societies. 
Another source of conflict is the challenge to the objectivity of science, and relates to a 
growing view that science and expert decision making are not the objective, value–free 
endeavours that they were previously thought to be. They are, in fact, set within the broad 
social context and values of Western thought and the narrower set of beliefs of an individual 
scientist or expert. As Huesemann (2002) argues: 
! it is intrinsically impossible to carry out objective and value–free scientific research 
and that, in fact, all environmental science is inherently biased by subjective opinions 
and values.  
(Huesemann 2002:622) 
! ER!
The implication that science may be inherently subjective suggests that truth is not absolute 
but is relative. Many scientists are concerned about this move towards relativism because, 
as Allchin (2004) notes: 
The fear among many seems to be that science will be reduced to nothing but 
politics. Social interests will be viewed as eclipsing rationality. If one cannot establish 
that science adheres to objective, universal standards for knowledge, then it cannot 
escape the awful Charybdis of utter relativism. And if there are no scientific laws, how 
could one justify laws of any kind? All will be chaos. Anarchy will reign.  
(Allchin 2004:935) 
The debate over subjectivity in science is most noticeable in risk assessments where, as 
Eduljee (2000) argues: 
The realisation that value–laden judgements and decisions permeate every facet and 
every stage of risk assessment and risk management has led to the development of 
a new paradigm which demands a pluralistic approach to risk assessment and risk 
management and for value–focused decision making.  
(Eduljee 2000:21) 
Even in the highly technical field of geographic information systems (GIS), concerns have 
also been raised about its objectivity. For example Towers (1997) notes that: 
Important GIS procedures, however, are inherently subjective and generate 
intrinsically contestable research results. Conceivably, but hopefully of lesser 
prevalence, unethical GIS practitioners may intentionally manipulate GIS to arrive at 
predetermined conclusions.  
(Towers 1997:111) 
Conflict can occur when other forms of knowledge, notably local knowledge, put forward 
during an environmental debate, are not given equal weight to scientific knowledge. In 
many cases, local knowledge is simply ignored. Local knowledge can be defined as a 
“loosely connected set of facts, skills and capabilities that are grounded in practice “(Martin 
2003:58).  
Scientists can be quick to dismiss knowledge held by local communities that derive from 
their own experiences as being biased and subjective compared to technical knowledge 
(Merrifield 1993). Indigenous people’s knowledge is often dismissed as being soft, lacking 
rigour and credibility, and based on spiritual beliefs (Ransom and Ettenger 2001). This 
leads to significant conflict where differences between Indigenous and scientific knowledge 
and the values that support them can lead to views about how a resource (e.g. a fishery) 
should be managed (Castro and Nielsen 2001). 
To sum up, science and information can be the source of conflict in environment policy 
making where: 
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• The science available to policy making is either lacking or unreliable, leading to 
great uncertainty about outcomes of policy making; 
• Risk assessment becomes the basis of decision making because of the uncertainty; 
• The scientists and the information they generate are seen as being subjective; and 
• Relevant local knowledge is devalued or ignored as part of policy making. 
The key modern driver of conflict — resource 
scarcity 
These matters are more likely to become a cause of conflict when the element of the 
environment, or resource, at the centre of the debate becomes scarce. At its simplest, 
resource scarcity is about a decreasing amount of that resource. For example, conflict 
between commercial and recreational fishers can emerge when the stock being competed 
for is limited due to reduced total stock of fish, and each user’s needs cannot be fully met. 
Resource scarcity can also occur when the total stock is not reducing. This occurs when, for 
example, a fish stock is regulated so that the total catch is sustainable but the number of 
fishers increases and existing users are unable to catch the number of fish they used to. 
There are many cases where both the quantity of resource is decreasing and the number of 
users is increasing. 
Scarcity in relation to renewable resources like water and land is not always about quantity 
available but is about the quality of the resource available (Wenche and Ellingsen 1998). 
For example, access to fresh potable water is becoming a significant issue for developed 
countries, particularly as agricultural and urban land uses degrade the quality of existing 
supplies (Brandes 2005). In WA, only thirty–two per cent of major rivers are in a largely 
unmodified state (EPA 2006). Changes include loss of vegetation in the catchment, 
damming, construction of artificial waterways and loss of water quality. In these cases, the 
issue is one of scarcity of good quality resource (rather than being quantity). 
Resources other than the traditional consumable resources can become scarce as well. 
Conflicts involving biodiversity conservation can also be viewed as a scarcity issue. As land 
clearing for urban development, agriculture and mining continues to reduce the coverage of 
native vegetation, communities are calling for the conservation of what remains: the more 
the clearing the louder the calls. In this case, the resource is not actually consumed but is 
valued in its own right, and the less there is of it the more what remains is valued. 
The use (but not consumption) of existing natural areas set aside for on–going protection 
(for example, National Parks and the coast) can be seen as a scarcity issue in that, whilst 
the size of the resource may not change, a growing population brings new users, and 
competition for the resource increases. This becomes a competition for space within a fixed 
resource and the amount of space available for each user decreases relatively as the 
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number of users increases. Of course, the competition for public space is a common 
phenomenon in urban areas and can be the source of significant conflict, either where 
existing urban spaces gets transferred from the public to the private, or where new users 
move to a new area with existing users (Madanipour 2004; Morrissey and Gaffikin 2006).  
As with consumable resources, where the decreasing availability of a quality resource 
creates a scarcity, increasing use of natural areas can lead to loss of environmental value 
through increased trampling, weed invasion, erosion, disturbance to fauna, and fires (Cole 
2001). In this way the availability of quality natural resources decreases. This can be 
particularly true in so–called wilderness areas where the mere presence of humans 
diminishes the wilderness values of the area, with or without the other losses of 
environmental values. 
In summary, conflict over a particular environmental resource (consumable or usable) is 
much more likely to emerge when those expressing an interest in that resource cannot have 
their needs fully met – in other words, there is resource scarcity. Resource scarcity can be 
about: 
• A decreasing quantity of a resource, 
• An increasing demand on a resource, and 
• A reduced quality of an existing resource (scarcity of good quality resource). 
To sum up, the case being made here is that modern environmental policy making often 
involves conflict at a level and scope (nature and extent) not previously experienced driven 
often by resource scarcity. This section of the chapter explored the nature of conflict in 
environmental policy making and proposed that this conflict can be categorised under three 
broad themes. The discussion now turns to the broad policy making approaches. 
Environmental policy making approaches  
Introduction 
These sections examine the general approaches to environmental policy making. As noted 
in Chapter 1, policy making has three elements: the way that a policy is formulated, the 
decision making process to select the policy instruments, and the general nature of the 
policy instruments used. If policy making is examined from an historic perspective two 
trends can be seen that relate to these elements and help define the policy making 
approached defined here: increasing public participation (including cases where policy 
makers share decision making with the affected public); and, a growing number of types of 
policy instruments available to policy makers.  
! EE!
Recent work by Vigar and Healey (2002) on planning and environmental policy making is 
helpful here. They identify three broad policy processes. The first (unnamed) is a type of 
iterative process, which is “the outcome of the push and pull of the interests and 
perceptions of the powerful” (P. 518). The second process type is called technocratic which 
involves an apparent rational and objective approach to arrive at the right policy outcome. 
The third process is called collaborative/deliberative/interpretive which is clearly based on 
Healey’s earlier communicative planning approach. 
From an analysis of these three elements for policy making and how they have been 
applied in the literature (i.e. the way that a policy is formulated, the decision making process 
to select the policy instruments, and the general nature of the policy instruments used) it is 
possible to identifying four broad policy making approaches, being: 
• Traditional expert–driven,  
• Ecological modern,  
• Collaborative, and  
• Adaptive–collaborative. 
The first and third approaches are directly related to Vigar and Healey’s (2002) three 
processes. Their technocratic process is similar to the Traditional expert–driven approach, 
and their collaborative/deliberative/interpretive process is similar to the Collaborative 
approach. Few other authors give much attention or coverage to Vigar and Healey’s (2002) 
iterative process, analysis of policy making as part of this research did not find any 
examples of this process being used. 
These four approaches are described in detail below. However, given the significance of the 
type of policy instrument in defining the four policy making approaches, these are described 
in some detail first. 
Policy instruments 
Overview  
Three broad categories of policy instruments are generally recognised in the literature 
(Santos et al. 2006; Osborn and Datta 2006; Schreurs 2003):  
• Command and control or regulatory,  
• Economic, incentive or market–based, and 
• Decentralised or voluntary. 
The earliest environmental policies used command and control regulatory instruments, 
which was still the dominant instrument type used in developed economies into the early 
1990s. These instruments typically involved prescribing, through legally binding regulations, 
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certain behaviours or certain environmental standards to either be achieved or not 
exceeded. During the 1980s economic instruments (for example special taxes and tradable 
permits) and voluntary mechanisms began to be used in environmental policies. An 
additional type of instrument emerged in the 1980s and became in more widespread use in 
the 1990s, which involved a move away from fixed and inflexible responses to managing 
environmental problems to more flexible and adaptive responses: these responses are 
generally called adaptive management. Each of these categories of policy instruments is 
described in more detail below. 
The command and control instruments 
The use of command and control instruments is where “authorities establish the behaviour 
that should be adopted by the actors/firms, by making it mandatory, allowing for little 
flexibility in the means of achieving policy goals” (Santos et al. 2006:101). Command and 
control instruments typically include prohibitions on certain types of product (e.g. CFCs) or 
activities (e.g. excluding certain land uses), discharge standards for key contaminants, or 
specify certain technology–based solutions. These prescriptions need to be codified in 
some statutory mechanism so as to ensure compliance, including legislation, regulations, 
statutory policies and land zoning that preclude certain land uses. 
These instruments were first used in the late 1940s and have been applied in one form or 
another since then in a variety of circumstances. Janicke and Weider (1995) published a 
study of successful environmental policies from 12 OECD countries, the majority of which 
adopted regulatory command and control policy mechanisms. The study went on to note: 
! our examples show that governmental command and control remains a strong 
instrument in environmental policy but new types of and modes of governmental 
intervention are needed and possible.  
(Janicke and Weidner 1995:21) 
Command and control instruments used prior to the 1970s were typically reactive and ad 
hoc, involved technical fixes that usually adopted end–of–pipe technology, did not address 
the fundamental cause of the problem, and gave little consideration to environmental 
impacts (Janicke, Monch, and Binder 2000). This was due in large part to there being few, if 
any, supporting laws that gave significant powers to the environmental agencies for 
enforcement and control (Marcus 1986; Szarka 2002). Today, policies using command and 
control instruments have strong legislative bases and are usually supported by well 
understood science. As Dear (2000) notes, these policies are based on a strongly rational 
and objective view where science is central to the way the environment is understood, 
decisions made and solutions to problems found.  
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Economic, incentive or market–based 
Economic based policy mechanisms are, generally, where the environment is ascribed an 
economic value and pricing measures are applied to direct resource use. In this way, the 
market decides what technical solutions specific industries apply in each circumstance. 
These mechanisms became popular with the rise of neoliberalism in Western countries (see 
discussion under the ecological modern approach below). Neoliberals called for a reduced 
role for governments in regulating industry and for the replacement of legislative command–
and–control instruments with either market based instruments (including resource valuing 
and trading) and eco–taxes, or incentive based instruments. This was particularly evident 
from the 1980s onwards (Mansfield 2006). When economic based measures are used, the 
role of governments and their agencies is restricted to setting environmental standards for 
industry to achieve, but not to prescribing how those standards are to be met.  
Resource valuing and eco-taxes, in effect, put a price on either the resources being used or 
the waste being produced. This provides a direct economic incentive for firms to reduce 
consumption of resources and waste without the need to regulate industry. Incentive based 
systems work in a more positive way. Governments can provide tax benefits for companies 
to comply with set standards of emissions and companies not complying simply don’t get 
the benefits. Incentives aren’t always directly economic. In some cases, the incentive to 
comply with government environmental standards is to avoid governments introducing what 
deLeon and Rivera (2007:685) call “more constraining and invasive government-imposed 
regulations”. 
Tradable permits are another market mechanism. Here, a cap is set on the total amount of 
a pollutant allowed to be emitted to a particular environment by a regulation. Firms can 
purchase a licence to emit amounts of that pollutant, with the total amount allowed to be 
sold no more than the cap. Firms can either trade the whole licence or any portion of the 
total load allocated to them.  
Decentralised or voluntary 
Voluntary mechanisms (called Voluntary Environmental Programs or VEPs in the US) are 
described by deLeon and Rivera (2007) as 
! self regulation agreements that can be promoted by firms, governments, industry 
associations, and/or environmental groups to compel business to enhance their 
environmental protection performance.  
(deLeon and Rivera 2007:685) 
They have been in use in the US since the 1990s and are now used in most countries, often 
to deal with greenhouse gas emission and pollution (Glachant 2007:32). The most common 
examples of VEPs in Australia are industry codes of practice. 
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Koehler (2007:689) argues that the rise of VEPs was due to a ”confluence of several 
events”, notably the introduction of more complex legislation and problems and cost of 
compliance, new technical discoveries and innovations not covered by existing legislation, 
and reduced agency budgets for regulating industry. 
The effectiveness of VEPs often gets questioned (Glachant 2007) largely because critics 
claim that there is no incentive for firms to comply. Some arguments put up as to why firms 
would willingly introduce costly environmental controls when they are not compelled to 
include: a desire to attract green consumers; such measures reduce the pressure from 
lobby groups to seek stronger legislation; to avoid future environmental liabilities; and, to 
avoid consumer boycotts by environmental interest groups (Innes and Sam 2008:272). 
Adaptive management  
Overview 
Adaptive management is an approach that deals directly with this issue of uncertainty (Luke 
2002) and differs from traditional management practices in that it is highly flexible by 
adapting to changing circumstances. Adaptive management is defined by Bennett and 
Lawrence (2002:24) as a “systematic process for continually improving management 
policies and practices by learning from the outcomes of operational programs”. One of the 
outcomes of the learning process is increased knowledge, leading to a better understanding 
of the environment being managed, and, in this way, reducing uncertainty. 
Whilst adaptive management was first applied in 1978 (Jacobson et al. 2005:1517) it has 
now become widely used to address the management of complex ecosystems, including: 
fisheries management (Marttunen and Vehanen 2004); biodiversity protection (Dallmeier, 
Alonso, and Jones 2002); catchment and marine management (Habron 2003; Clarke 2002); 
climate change (MacIver and Dallmeier 2000); and forestry (Klooster 2002). It is now 
extensively used in a variety of circumstances in Australia as well, including fisheries, water 
allocation, urban water catchments, rural catchment nutrient management, and coastal 
management (Gilmour, Walkerden, and Scandol 1999). 
Types of adaptive management 
There is no single uniform adaptive management approach used both in the literature and 
in practice. Pagan and Crase (2005:78), however, identify three types of adaptive 
management: 
• Evolutionary or trial and error — where early choices are essentially haphazard and 
later choices are made from those early choices which have proven to work; 
• Passive adaptive — where historical data or lessons learnt from similar systems are 
used and reviewed to select a preferred management approach that is most likely 
to work, with limited room for flexibility once implementation occurs; and 
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• Active adaptive — where management choices are not fixed and will change as 
new information emerges, suggesting new management measures are required. 
Several studies identify four key steps to adaptive management. First, the available data 
are collected and used to predict both the impacts of developments or changes, and the 
level of uncertainty associated with the predictions. Often, but not always, an environmental 
model is used to help make those predictions. Second, predicted impacts are then used to 
set best available management practices and/or design elements for development. These 
practices and design elements must have a high degree of flexibility built into them to allow 
adaptation later if required. Third, a comprehensive data collection and monitoring program 
is established to increase the understanding of the system and to look for evidence of 
change and adverse effects. Finally, the results of the monitoring are continually reviewed, 
any modelling adjusted and the predicted outcomes re–assessed. Consequently, 
management and design elements may need to be modified or adapted in response to 
measured or predicted changes to environmental conditions, both positive and negative 
(Lessard 1998; Parma 1998; Bennett and Lawrence 2002; Dallmeier, Alonso, and Jones 
2002; Habron 2003; Marttunen and Vehanen 2004). 
It is clear that whilst modelling is a significant component of many adaptive management 
exercises (Rivers-Moore and Jewitt 2007; Johnson and Williams 1999; Moore and Conroy 
2006), other examples place less emphasis on the modelling and much more on the 
information gathering, learning and subsequent changes to management practices (Luke 
2002; Jacobson et al. 2005; Busenberg 2004). Learning is particularly emphasised where, 
as Busenberg (2004:321) argues, the goal is to “create systematic learning mechanisms 
through which policies continually generate (and adapt to) relevant knowledge”. 
Proposed categorisation of adaptive management types 
Building on this work and reviewing the literature on adaptive management, a model is 
proposed here to explain the range of practices that are called adaptive management. This 
model recognises two dimensions of management and two critical management tools. The 
two dimensions are: level of understanding of the system to be managed; and the 
implications of making the wrong management choices. The two critical management tools 
are data collection and modelling. The nature of adaptive management will vary depending 
on how those two dimensions apply in a particular situation requiring either more or less 
intense use of these two critical management tools. This model recognises three adaptive 
management scenarios and three types of adaptive management, similar to Pagan and 
Crase’s (2005) three types. 
Level of understanding is based on two factors: the amount of direct data available on the 
system; and whether there are other similar systems that have been studied and how good 
the level of understanding of those systems is. On one extreme, there are those unique 
systems where there are little if any data available. On the other extreme, there are systems 
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where there are considerable direct data and other similar systems have been well studied 
and are well understood. Intermediate to this are those systems where little direct data 
exists but other similar systems have been well studied and are well understood. The level 
of understanding is also related to the level of conflict associated with the management of 
the system where the less understanding there is, the greater the level of conflict is likely to 
be. 
The implications of making wrong management choices relate to how sensitive the system 
is, and the environmental significance of the system. On one extreme (high) the system is 
very significant and is highly sensitive to change, so that management errors would likely 
lead to significant and irreversible environmental harm. Those changes happen so quickly 
that management choices cannot be changed before significant environmental harm 
results. On the other extreme are those systems that either have low significance and are 
so robust that wrong management decisions would show little environmental harm, or the 
change is so slow that management choices can be changed before significant 
environmental harm results. The implications of making management errors is also related 
to the level of conflict associated with the management of the system. In cases where the 
risk of significant environmental harm is large, it is more likely that the level of conflict will be 
higher. 
Data collection and modelling are the two critical tools for adaptive management. Modelling 
can be used to extrapolate from existing data to make predictions on how the system will 
respond to change and, therefore, what management measures are needed to address any 
predicted adverse changes. Data collection is needed for two reasons: to measure changes 
to the system (monitoring) and for improved understanding of the system dynamics. The 
results of the monitoring are used to check actual changes compare to modelled changes. 
Where measured changes are different from modelled changes then management 
measures need to be altered (adapted) to allow for those changes. As well, the monitoring 
and additional environmental data are used to fine-tune the model to allow for fresh 
predictions of changes and to determine the required changes to management.  
Figure 1 below shows this model and types of adaptive management.  
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Figure 1: Proposed model of adaptive management practices showing the three 
approaches and five adaptive management scenarios 
 
As can be seen, three types of adaptive management and five adaptive management 
scenarios are defined as discussed below.  
Evolutionary adaptive management is in effect trial–and–error management, where a 
management choice is applied without any knowledge of how the environment in question 
is going to respond, but the system in question is robust and usually of low environmental 
significance. A list of management options is drawn up and the first choice is made based 
on what seems reasonable and what has worked in other situations that have some 
parallels to the system in question. Monitoring is essential to measure the environmental 
response and to judge the success of the first management choice. The results of the 
monitoring and the success of the first choice also help to narrow down the original list of 
management options to those more likely to succeed. Where the first choice fails to work, 
another choice is made from the narrowed list of management options. The monitoring 
becomes the key learning mechanism. In practice, trial and error is not simply a random 
choice, and managers would likely be informed by their own experiences and the lessons 
from other similar environments. In this way, the risk of a wrong initial management choice 
is reduced. Evolutionary adaptive management is appropriate in cases where modelling is 
not readily available or is considered costly and/or unreliable, the system in question is 
relatively robust, and the risk of significant environmental harm is minimal. As a result, the 
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level of conflict is reduced even though there will be debate over what management 
measures to adopt. This is because the implications of failure of management are low. 
Passive adaptive management is where there is a large amount of existing environmental 
data, both directly related to the system in question as well as in other systems that are 
known to behave similarly to the one in question. Modelling is often, but not always, done to 
predict the likely outcomes of the expected changes. If modelling is not used then 
experience with other similar systems is used to predict expected changes. Management 
options are drawn up and evaluated, based on the modelling and/or experience in other 
systems, and a preferred management approach agreed to. The key adaptive part is the 
process that leads to the choice of the final management option, and because of the high 
level of confidence that the system will respond as predicted, there is limited expectation 
that management would need to change once implementation begins.  Monitoring is 
required not because of any uncertainty over the likely effects, but because the system is 
highly sensitive to change and usually has high environmental significance. Here, the risk of 
significant environmental harm is low but the implications of failure are high. Monitoring, 
then, provides comfort that any failure will be picked up early and management changes 
quickly implemented. The level of conflict associated with passive adaptive management 
can be high but is not related to what management measures to adopt. Conflict will centre 
on whether to proceed with the development or not given the sensitivity and significance of 
the system, as the implications of failure of management are significant. 
The two extreme points of the model (the other two adaptive management scenarios) are 
where adaptive management is not required, but for two very different reasons. In cases 
where the systems in question are robust, of low environmental significance, and there is a 
large amount of existing data (both directly related to the systems in question and in other 
systems that are known to behave similarly to the system in question) management choices 
are well known and tested, and are highly unlikely to lead to environmental harm. The level 
of conflict over both the science in support of decision making and the management options 
is relatively low. In these cases, adaptive management is unnecessary.  
On the other extreme are the cases where the systems are sensitive to change, have high 
environmental significance and there is little if any environmental data, both directly and 
from any other systems that are known to behave similarly. It can be argued that the risk of 
serious environmental harm is so great that any decisions on development affecting these 
systems need to be delayed until sufficient data have been collected to allow predictions of 
possible impacts to be at some reasonable level of confidence. Only then can management 
options be developed that can deal with the imposed changes to the system and an 
adequate monitoring system drawn up. In these cases development should be delayed until 
the data are available. As well, the level of conflict is likely to be extremely high because of 
uncertainty over the science and the implications of failure of management are so 
significant. 
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The third type of adaptive management, active adaptive management, is applied in cases 
not covered above, for example: 
• Sensitive systems of high environmental significance, and a reasonable level of 
understanding of the system; 
• Reasonably sensitive systems of moderate environmental significance, and a 
reasonable level of understanding of the system; and 
• Reasonably sensitive systems of moderate environmental significance, but with a 
poor level of understanding of the system. 
Active adaptive management requires both adaptation at the initial management selection 
phase and, more importantly, as part of implementation. As well, some form of modelling is 
normally used which can range from highly quantitative computer modelling to more 
qualitative descriptive models. Data are needed for the purposes of providing base–line 
information about the existing state of the environment and as an initial input to the 
modelling. The modelling is used to make predictions about how the environment might 
respond to certain human–induced changes, including management. The results of the 
modelling are used to adjust the design of the development and to select the management 
responses that are most likely to succeed. Monitoring is carried out as part of 
implementation to evaluate the success of management and to better inform the modelling. 
Modelling is also improved as the quantity and quality of background environmental data 
collected specifically to get a better understanding of the system increases. Where the 
measured changes are different to predicted changes, management is then adapted in 
response to these measured changes and any re–modelling is based on the new data. It is 
important to note that management changes can be either tighter or less stringent.  If the 
measured changes involve more environmental harm than predicted or allowed, then 
management is tightened. If the measured changes involve less environmental harm, then 
there is a case for more flexible management.  
These three types of adaptive management cover the full range of adaptive management 
practices described in the literature and carried out in practice, but because conflict is a key 
theme of this study, where adaptive management is referred to in the rest of this thesis, it 
will be referring to only active and passive adaptive management. 
The four policy making approaches 
The following sections cover the four policy making approaches under four main sub-
headings: overview; participation and decision making; policy mechanisms; and concerns 
and criticisms. 
! JB!
Traditional expert–driven approach 
Overview 
This approach is the oldest of the four approaches, and, as the title suggests, is dominated 
by technical policy making experts, which may include experts from industry as well as 
government. As noted earlier, this is similar to Vigar and Healy’s (2002) technocratic policy 
process.  
Participation and decision making 
The level of participation reflects the decision making process for the policy, which is highly 
centralised with the policy making experts. Early traditional expert–driven policy making had 
minimal, if any, participation and could best be described as being usually at IAP2’s (2007) 
inform, or as low as Healey’s (1997) therapy or manipulation levels, where industry and the 
broader community were provided with information about the nature of the policy already 
agreed to through a process largely internal to the policy making agency. With the rise of 
environmentalism as a strong social force in the 1970s policy makers began engaging in 
higher levels of participation, mostly IAP2’s (2007) Consult with some at Involve, but there 
was growing pressure for some level of real decision making (Collaborate and Empower). 
Policy makers were resistant to sharing decision making, largely because traditional expert–
driven policy making is an expert–based decision making process, and the broader 
community are seen as not having the necessary expertise to be included in the decision 
making. 
Policy makers can continue to use the traditional expert–driven policy making approach and 
respond to the calls for greater participation by adding more comprehensive consultation 
processes as part of policy formulation and applying a variety of specific participative 
techniques (Stirling 2006). In this way, participation can be seen as improving the existing 
policy making approaches, adds greater democracy to the process and gives greater 
credibility to the policy outcomes. Lifting participation to IAP2’s (2007) Collaborate and 
Empower levels would not occur, as it involves some level of shared decision making and 
would be a fundamental challenge to expert–based centralised decision making. 
Many agencies responded to the calls for better participation by developing new tools and 
techniques to gauge and understand community values and interests, through tools like 
multi–criteria analysis (MCA) or multi–criteria evaluation (MCE). These are, arguably, types 
of decision sharing where the community is quizzed about its views and values, to be 
included as part of agency decision making. Of course, the agency retains the decision 
making responsibility and can choose to adopt whatever it chooses from the outcomes of 
these exercises. These tools are seen as useful in situations where the policy making 
involves highly subjective decisions: for example, decisions on what mix of energy sources 
should be used to generate electricity, where there are a wide range of views within the 
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community about which type of source should be favoured over another: for example, 
renewable vs. fossil fuels vs. nuclear (Stagl 2006). Stagl (2006:55) argues that this example 
involved a deliberative workshop involving members of the pubic, representatives from the 
key stakeholder groups and relevant experts to allow participants to deliberate on the 
central issue and to provide policy makers with, amongst other matters, the “objectives that 
the public considers crucial for the provision of electricity and the trade–offs between the 
objectives”. 
Stagl (2006:55) also noted that these types of exercises can be criticised from a number of 
perspectives, for example, another objective of the above workshop was to find out about 
“the process of public debate, public information and policy making in the future and how 
information changed the participants’ attitude to electricity generation”. The notion that 
attitudes can change during participation could be interpreted as the policy makers trying to 
manipulate the public view by providing selected information rather than a genuine attempt 
to uncover community values and interests. As well, such exercises have the appearance of 
sharing decision making with the community, but the actual policy making occurs through a 
separate process that uses the information generated by the workshops to better inform the 
policy makers.  
Policy instruments 
Because the experts are the key drivers of the process, the policy instruments normally 
chosen are command and control or regulatory, although more recently evolutionary and 
passive adaptive management measures have also been used. These instruments are 
easily controllable by expert policy makers, unlike the market–base or voluntary 
instruments.  
Concerns and criticisms 
Critics of this approach like Cocklin et al (In Press) raise a number of concerns, most 
notably that command and control instruments are inflexible, interfering and inefficient. 
Adler (2001) examined three significant regulatory environmental programs in the USA: the 
Federal Superfund for cleaning up abandoned hazardous waste sites; the Clean Air Act that 
mandated the use of certain additives to fuels; and the Endangered Species Act aimed at 
protecting listed endangered species. Adler (2001:656) notes that these “are but a few 
examples of the harm caused by existing environmental programs, each of which costs the 
American people billions of dollars per year”. Alder notes (2001:659) that the key concerns 
regarding these regulatory approaches are: 
• They impose significant costs on industry and the community with minimal 
environment benefits and in some cases actually cause environmental harm; 
• Costs are inequitably distributed across the community; 
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• They divert resources away from other environmental problems where 
environmental gain could be much more significant; and 
• Whilst they can be appropriate to straightforward environmental problems, few easy 
to solve problems remain. 
There was also growing concern that the traditional expert–driven approach takes a far too 
narrow view of environmental protection. One concern was that by focusing on regulating a 
specific environment problem, other unintended environmental consequences of those 
regulatory actions emerged: for example, prohibiting one emission will force industry to 
change technology, but that change can lead to the emission of different pollutants (Burnett 
2002). Others are concerned that agencies which adopt command and control instruments 
focus primarily on the environmental benefits and give little attention to the costs and 
economic efficiency in delivering the desired environmental outcome (Ferraro 2003). 
Another concern was that once a regulatory system is established, monitoring and 
enforcement is required to ensure ongoing compliance. The cost of monitoring can be 
excessive for many smaller firms, forcing them to cease operations or forcing the regulators 
to give exemptions, with subsequent claims of uneven treatment (Osborn and Datta 2006). 
Enforcement can be difficult to achieve because of the complexities of the law and 
difficulties in interpretation (Demmke 2001), or because industries cannot keep up with the 
ever increasing number of regulations (Moreno 2001). Problems also emerge when 
enforcement is applied in an uneven and inequitable manner: for example, Firestone 
(2002:423), in a study of the enforcement practices of the US EPA noted that individuals 
“affiliated with small firms were seven times more likely than their large–firm brethren to be 
subject to penalty actions”. These smaller firms subsequently complained about being 
unfairly targeted by the regulating agencies. 
Another concern related to perceived over–enforcement where regulating agencies 
develop, over time, adversarial relationships with the industries which in turn makes it more 
difficult to gain compliance (Osborn and Datta 2006).There are those critics who call for 
greater participation in decision making and are concerned that the traditional expert–driven 
approach, with its highly centralised and expert–driven decision making, lacks transparency 
and may ignore some significant stakeholders, notably the affected communities. Agencies 
are reluctant to broaden involvement in policy making because they believe that the 
community lacks both the knowledge and the skills necessary for expert decision making 
(Santos et al. 2006). 
Despite all these criticisms, command and control instruments are still widely used 
throughout the developed world, even with the emergence of other approaches. Demmke 
(2001:26) argues that “these new instruments should not be seen as a replacement for the 
existing regulatory system and can work best when they complement existing regulatory 
programs”. 
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The ecological modern approach 
Overview 
As noted in the previous section, public concern about the environmentally damaging 
effects of industrialisation (e.g. pollution and loss of biodiversity) increased significantly in 
the late 1960s. By the 1970s the environment had become a significant political issue in 
developing countries and an emerging global issue. This is well illustrated by a number of 
international agreements signed and conferences held to address specific environmental 
issues through this period and into the 1980s, notably: 
• The 1968 UNESCO Biosphere Conference;  
• The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment;  
• The 1976 United Nations Conference on Human Settlements;  
• The 1979 World Meteorological Organization World Climate Conference in Geneva 
where human–induced climate change was the key focus;  
• The 1980 World Conservation Strategy published in by the International Union for 
the Conservation of Nature; and  
• The 1987 Montreal Protocol on managing and eliminating ozone depleting 
substances.  
This changing community view about environmental issues can be seen as the first of three 
waves of change in environmental decision making starting in the 1970s (Mol 1999). Mol’s 
second wave related to the changes in social and government institutions in response to the 
first wave change. Governments and industry responded to community concerns by 
modifying their activities and decision making to better take into account environmental 
concerns. Initially, policy responses involved tightening the existing command and control 
measures, but industry quickly became concerned that such measures would have an 
adverse impact on economic growth, are slow, inflexible, of questionable effectiveness and 
did not encourage innovation (Nicolaisen, Dean, and Hoeller 1991). The third wave related 
to a general community concern about the ability of regulatory agencies to deal with the 
emerging environmental crises/problems. 
Concurrent with these broader concerns about the environment and its management was 
the rise of neo–liberal ideas; firstly through a variety of privately funded think tanks and 
institutes — proto–neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002) — and then with the election of 
neo–liberal governments throughout the Western world (Young 2000), which, in turn, had a 
significant effect on environmental decision making, in particular, the introduction of market 
based mechanism to mange environmental impacts. Developed economies were 
undergoing significant change in response to both the emerging environmental awareness 
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in the community and the neo–liberal political change. Gibbs (2000) identified three key 
projects for policy makers in response to this change, being: 
• The restructuring of production, and, to a lesser extent, consumption, to include 
ecological goals; 
• Placing an economic value on nature and introducing tax reform to encourage more 
sustainable use of resources; and 
• Integrating environmental goals into other policy areas. 
This broad socio–economic change became known as ecological modernisation, which has 
developed into a social theory in its own right. The following section discusses ecological 
modernisation in more detail, but it is worth noting that whilst governments in the developed 
world were moving to strengthen the role of the market in economies, many in the 
environmental movement were becoming radicalised in response to the perceived (or 
actual) environmental crises and adopted a view that industrialisation, government 
regulation (and de–regulation) were the root causes of the environmental crisis, and only a 
radical shift away from industrialisation could fix the problems (Hajer 1996). 
At the heart of ecological modernisation are three key beliefs (Hajer 1995). First, that 
industrialisation and environmental protection are not mutually exclusive, and 
industrialisation needed only to be adjusted to provide better environmental protection. 
Second, industrialisation has not created environmental crises, as some of the more radical 
elements of the environmental movement claimed, but that there were merely a series of 
environmental dilemmas that could be addressed individually and solutions readily found. 
Importantly, these two beliefs were used to promote the view that solutions to 
environmental problems could be in the form of win–win or positive sum outcomes where 
both the environment and the economy benefit (Davidson and MacKendrick 2004; Revell 
2005). The third belief was that scientific methodology and technological advances were to 
be the keys to finding solutions to environmental problems: what Seippel (2000:297) has 
called “ecological rationality” as opposed to economic rationality. 
Ecological modernisation cannot, therefore, be seen as a radical departure from 
industrialisation, but as an adjustment which corrects some of its faults by embracing better 
environmental protection. Hajer (1995) argues that ecological modernisation: 
! starts from the conviction that the ecological crisis can be overcome by technical 
and procedural innovation! (I)t makes the ‘ecological deficiency’ of industrial society 
into the driving force for a new round of industrial innovation. As before, society has 
to modernise itself out of the crisis.  
(Hajer 1995:25) 
To facilitate the necessary industrial innovation significant change is required to the political 
and social institutions that support the economy. First, governments and businesses learn 
the new behaviour and language of ecological responsibility through, for example, 
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increased reporting of environmental performances and the setting of environmental goals 
(Lundqvist 2000). The importance of science in ecological modernisation is significant, as 
agencies attempt to quantify the environment and environmental performance through 
environmental and sustainability assessment and environmental and sustainability 
indicators. Other methodologies that developed during this time that reflect the ecological 
modernists’ drive to quantify the environment and environmental protection included: the 
emergence of environmental impact assessment as a significant environment decision 
making tool (Partidario 1993; Shepherd and Ortolano 1996; Arce and Gullon 2000; Cooper 
and Sheate 2002); the ever–growing number of methodologies to assess sustainable 
development (Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs and Institute for European 
Environmental Policy 2002; Becker 2004; WAPC 2005; Wiek and Binder 2005); State of the 
Environment reporting (Government of WA 1992; Commonwealth of Australia 1994); 
progress towards sustainability indicators (Bockstallera and Girardinb 2003; Hueting and 
Reijnders 2004); and the notion of ecological footprints (Lenzen and Murray 2001; Hunter 
2002; Onisto, Krause, and Wackernagel 1998). 
Finally, Mol (1999) argues that new social actors/agents emerged from the changing state–
market relationship, notably: 
• A new wave of ecologically responsible producers;  
• Specialist insurance companies dealing in environmental risks; and 
• Specialist organisations to handle the new certification and auditing requirements  
Ecological modernisation has been best studied in mainland Europe where three distinct 
phases have been observed (Mol 1999; Gibbs 2006). The first phase was typified by a 
heavy emphasis on technical innovation, involved sustained criticism of government 
performance in the area of environmental protection with calls for institutional reform, and 
saw market forces used as the best way to deliver good environmental outcomes. The 
second phase placed less reliance on technical innovation, saw a move back towards 
government intervention in providing environmental protection as a check and balance 
market mechanism, and resulted in the emerging influence of social institutions and peak 
environmental groups on decision making through enhanced participation. The third phase 
involved a focus on consumption rather than production, and also saw the emergence of 
global issues and inter–government arrangements to manage some cross–boundary 
environmental issues. 
Ecological modernisation has gained wide acceptance in many economies, including 
mainland Europe (Cook 2002; Buttel 2000; Murphy 2000) and Canada (Davidson and 
MacKendrick 2004). As Cohen (2006) notes: 
Empirical research suggests that at least among northern European countries, policy 
initiatives consistent with ecological modernization have become commonplace and 
have contributed to some notable achievements. While it is important to maintain 
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perspective, there are indications that if pursued prudently this emergent paradigm is 
capable of fostering manifold improvements in material and energy efficiency.  
(Cohen 2006:529) 
In the UK there is a growing view that the ecological modern approach adopted there is a 
weaker version (Revell 2005), whereas in the USA there is disagreement amongst 
researcher as to whether ecological modernisation has had any major influence at all, with 
some authors expressing a view that command and control instruments still dominate 
(Cohen 2006), whereas others contend that market–based mechanisms dominate 
(Schreurs 2003). Little research has been done on the extent to which ecological 
modernisation has emerged within Australia, although analysis of Australia’s climate 
change policy concluded that a weak version of ecological modernisation is at work 
(Crowley 1999; Bulkeley 2001).  
Ecological modernisation can be summarised as a community–wide change in how 
institutions, both public and private, respond to the emerging environmental 
crises/problems, but is set within a neo–liberalist political contexts that favours market 
based and voluntary policy mechanisms over agency–centred command and control 
mechanisms. 
There is now considerable research into environmental policy making since the 1990s, 
which suggests that ecological modern policy making has been adopted in a range of fields 
including: emissions trading (von Malmborg and Strachan 2005); waste management and 
recycling (Scheinberg 2003); energy efficiency and renewable energy (Wolsink 2007); and 
pollution control (Cook 2002). The key elements of ecological modern policy making are 
described below. 
Participation and decision making 
Ecological modernisation emerged at a time when public participation in all levels of 
decision making improved. Whilst those in the community saw improved participation as 
consistent with improved democracy (Patten 2001) Neo–liberal governments saw it as a 
way to ensure that government agencies were actually responding to the needs of 
individuals in the community (Pratchett 1999). Greater participation was seen as one way to 
reduce the negative effects that agencies were having on the market place (e.g. inefficient 
use of resources) by shifting the focus to individuals as consumers of the services provided 
by the agency. In these cases, better participation was not about improving democracy but 
improving the market economy. 
Ecological modernisation had a particular impact on the nature and extent of participation in 
policy making, in particular on non–government organisations (NGOs) involved in the 
environmental debate. As noted earlier, as part of the changes to the political and social 
institutions that ecological modernisation caused, governments and businesses had to learn 
the new behaviour and language of ecological responsibility. Many NGOs joined this new 
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regime of new behaviour and language but it required that they distance themselves from 
the more radical elements of the environmental movement who were vocal about the 
inconsistencies between environmental protection and economic development and refused 
to learn this new behaviour and language. These NGOs become institutionalised so as to 
better facilitate their involvement in the environmental decision making processes.  
Governments and their agencies sought to include the key stakeholder groups from 
business and the community in the policy making process and in many cases sought a level 
of participation that could be described as IAP2’s (2007) Involve, where these groups were 
active participants in the process and had on–going involvement.  This type of participation 
where only the elite of government, business and the NGOs are involved and not the 
broader community has been described as a form of corporatism (McEachern 1993; van 
Ast and Boot 2003). 
In summary, participation as part of the ecological modern policy making approach is at a 
higher level than under a traditional expert–driven approach, arguably at IAP2’s (2007) 
Involve level, but only the elite business and NGO groups are engaged, making it a 
corporatist Involve level of participation. 
Policy instruments 
As already noted, the ecological modern approach to environmental policy making favours 
the use of economic based policy mechanisms. Command and control measures are only 
used as a last resort measure as a stick to ensure industry stays within the established 
market framework.  
The shift away from the use of command and control statutory mechanisms is matched by 
the increased use of specific non–statutory government agency environmental policies. 
Ecological modernisation practitioners contend that adopting a generic policy across a 
range of similar circumstances, rather than case–by–case approaches, is an effective and 
efficient way of addressing these issues. Fundamental to this view is the assumption that 
there is a single, uniform, rational and objective truth to solving those environment 
problems. Further, the use of agency policies is seen as being both flexible to changing 
needs and providing some level of certainty where a policy, once agreed to, delivers 
predictable outcomes for subsequent decision making. And, finally, because the ecological 
modern approach is based on well defined science, it creates a belief that such policies will 
be effective: i.e. deliver a good environmental outcome. 
Concerns and criticisms 
Notwithstanding the growing application and analysis of the ecological modern approach to 
environmental policy making, acceptance of this approach in the broader community has 
not been universal. Further, some writers report mixed success of these policies. For 
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example, von Malmborg and Strachan (2005) conclude of the UK Government’s use of the 
ecological modern approach to emissions trading: 
! it seems that instead of providing a tool that effectively favours ecological 
restructuring and reform, the UK ETS leaves the government with a tool that favours 
the status quo in the long run. It hardly safeguards real emission reductions and it 
provides no signal to industry for structural change. The increasing use of ecological 
modernization vocabulary in the talk of UK climate policy–making has not been 
accompanied by related developments in policy action and development of 
appropriate policy instruments.  
(von Malmborg and Strachan 2005:155) 
Opponents from within the environmental movement object in principle to the notion of 
effectively buying the right to pollute, and raise concerns about the ethics of valuing the 
environment at all (Cook 2002). Some regulatory agencies, despite the support of the 
government of the day for the ecological modern approach, opposed de–regulation 
because they have developed specialist expertise in how to apply command and control 
mechanisms, and with the power shift from the State to the private sector considerable 
tensions within government emerged (Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins 2000). 
Some critics are concerned that ecological modernisation has been used to absolve 
industry of its responsibility to fix the environmental degradation it has caused, and masks 
the basic inconsistencies between business as usual and environmental protection (Gibbs 
2006). For, example, pricing environmental resources or putting a cost on pollution, if done 
properly, would have significant effects on the economy and the cost of some basic goods 
and services. The price of energy would need to increase significantly to reflect actual 
environmental impacts, but governments are unwilling to impose the full costs because of 
the political implications. Consequently, businesses wear some but not all of the costs, they 
are seen to be addressing the problem, but environmental degradation continues. Critics 
like Revell (2005:357) see this as bowing to consumer sovereignty where only the supply 
side of the economic equation is tackled, and ecological modernisation is seen as “a 
narrow, supply–sided approach to finding more sustainable means of achieving the same 
ends — continuing growth in consumer demand and GDP”. 
This type of criticism has led some to conclude that ecological modernisation can be both 
weak and strong (Revell 2005; Gibbs 2000; Christoff 1996), where weak ecological 
modernisation ignores the radical social and institutional changes, is less democratic and 
more technocratic, and focuses on the economic rather than the environmental. It results in 
what Christoff (1996:486) calls the “green gloss on industrial development”  without actually 
delivering sustainable environmental benefits and changes. 
Others are critical because they see the ecological modern approach as allowing 
governments to be seen to be doing a great deal but actually doing very little. A key 
promise of ecological modernisation is that it should deliver institutional change. 
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Governments can use the language and processes of ecological modern policy making so 
that is appears to the community that change is being proposed or discussed, but little 
actual change is proposed: what Davidson and MacKendrick (2004:62) call “a process of 
discursive reframing rather than institutional restructuring”. They argue that the use of 
ecological modernisation as a policy process leads to a final policy outcome that 
! is a form of reconstructive policy discourse allowing government to define away 
the contradictions between excessive resource development and environmental well–
being, rather than address concerns about the pace of development. In short, the 
government succeeded in changing what is “said” without changing what was “done”.  
(Davidson and MacKendrick 2004:62) 
Another concern is that with increasing globalisation, free market approaches can only work 
where affected governments have similar and complementary supporting regulatory 
approaches (Sonnenfield and Mol 2002). In the absence of this, businesses will simply shop 
around to find the governing regime that offers the lowest cost: that is, lowest environmental 
regulatory requirements. 
The nature and extent of participation as part of ecological modernisation has also been 
criticised by some observers. Firstly, the focus on peak or elite participation excludes local 
community and environmental groups. Further, Gibbs (2000) argues that the focus on 
market approaches and the reliance on proven science and technology result in the 
! ignoring of issues of participation and reducing the rest of society to passive 
consumers to be provided with enough information to make informed (but market–
based) choices.  
(Gibbs 2000:17) 
A final concern is that ecological modernisation has focused primarily on controlling 
toxicants and chemicals and has been unsuccessful in dealing with the broader and more 
socially problematic green issues of conservation and broad ecosystem management 
(Buttel 2000). This is in part due to the importance of science and technology to ecological 
modernists, with the science of toxicants and chemicals relatively well understood. It is also 
worth noting that whilst the issues of toxicants and chemicals raise some public debate, 
usually on a case by case basis, the primary concern of most environment groups is on 
these broader conservation and ecosystem management green issues rather than the 
brown toxicant issues. These are also the areas where conflict is most intensely felt as part 
of policy making. It will be argued below that ecological modernisation and the role of 
markets have limited relevance to environmental policy making in contexts where conflict is 
endemic. 
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The collaborative approach  
Overview  
This approach has strong parallels to Vigar and Healey’s (2002) 
collaborative/deliberative/interpretive process. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the 
collaborative1 approach to policy making and management has its parallels in the 
communicative turn in planning.  Collaborative environmental policy making involves some 
level of local decision making on the environmental issue of concern, which, as argued by 
Meadowcroft (1999),: 
! is a form of social regulation in which groups originating in different spheres of 
social life, which reflect distinct perspectives and interests, participate in debate and 
negotiation to implement a collective plan for the resolution of a specific problem.  
(Meadowcroft 1999:230) 
This collective plan is often a policy, which, according to Meadowcroft, has six central 
features: 
• The policy making process involves participants collaborating from more than one 
sector of social life; 
• The process involves representation from organized interest or groups rather than 
individual participation; 
• The groups represented are a cross section of the groups that have an interest in 
the issue; 
• The policy making process involves “discursive consensus formation” where 
members exchange ideas and experiences, learn from each other and agree on the 
nature of the problem and potential solutions; 
• Each partner agrees to take part in or contribute to actions that address and solve 
the problems; and 
• The policy includes a mechanism for reviewing the original agreements made. 
The collaborative approach has been be applied in a range of different circumstances, 
including: water catchments, (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002; Lloyd et al. 2000); forests 
(Brown 2002); urban air quality and regulating industrial emissions (Harrison 1995; 
Busenberg 1999; Poncelet 2001; Ryan 2001; Woodfield et al. 2006); the paper industry 
(Lober 1997); agriculture (Koontz 2003), (Keough and Blahna 2006; Raik, Decker, and 
Siemer 2006); fisheries management (Kitts, Pinto da Silva, and Rountree 2007); ocean and 
marine planning (Rutherford, Herbert, and Coffen-Smout 2005); and recreation in national 
parks (Daniels and Walker 1996).  
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1 The terms ‘cooperative’ and ‘collaborative’ are used interchangeable in the literature. The term ‘co–
management’ has also been used to mean cooperative–collaborative. 
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In Australia the collaborative approach is used across a range of environmental policy 
areas. The Australia Government has proposed a national cooperative approach to coastal 
policy and management, in part because of the fragmented policy and management 
responsibilities across the three tiers of government (Intergovernmental Coastal Advisory 
Group 2004). Management of salinity in Australia is now fundamentally a catchment–based 
community–centred process which is now widely acknowledged as involving a highly 
formalised collaborative approach (Curtis, Byron, and MacKay 2005). The regional forest 
agreement process, whilst highly contentious, has also been viewed as a collaborative 
exercise (Brown 2002). 
The rise of the collaborative approach has been so rapid and widespread that Koontz and 
Thomas (2006:111) suggests that if “the 20th century was the era of the administrative 
state, then the 21st century may be the era of the collaborative state”.  
Participation and decision making  
Central to the collaborative approach is the setting up of a peak working group or committee 
to facilitate cooperation and oversee policy making. Whilst policy elites who dominate 
decision making under an ecological modern approach can be represented on these 
bodies, more typically most collaborative exercises are locally based and involve local, not 
the peak, environmental and industry groups (e.g. farmers, local residents, local industry 
and fishers). There is some evidence that if the cooperation is only at the corporatist level, 
policy making will be unsuccessful (Lubell 2004). 
As noted earlier, participation in the collaborative approach goes further than just 
considerations of who should be involved in the process: there is evidence of at least 
implied if not actual shared decision making with the collaborative body. The peak 
collaborative body usually makes decisions through consensus (Innes and Booher 1999), 
and whilst it usually has an advisory and not a formal decision making role, it is politically 
very difficult for the decision making agency to ignore the consensus agreement of the peak 
body. Interestingly, in one case study of forest management in Queensland, a collaborative 
agreement that was established outside the formally established decision making process 
of the Commonwealth government, operated successfully without the need for government 
approval, and in spite of Commonwealth government disapproval (Brown 2002). 
Participation in the collaborative approach is at least at IAP2’s (2007) Involve level, but 
usually at the collaborate level where decision making is shared, either directly or implied. 
Policy instruments  
Some authors see the increased use of this approach as governments withdrawing from 
environment policy and management because of the neo–liberal changes in the 1980s (Hall 
1999; Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). Whilst this may be true in part, the key to the 
collaborative approach is that is focuses on the processes of policy making and 
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implementation rather than favouring particular types of policy mechanisms — for example 
market mechanisms — which is not what would be expected under a neo–liberal political 
framework. Where the traditional expert–driven approach uses typically highly prescriptive 
mechanism (command and control) and the ecological modern approach uses market 
based mechanisms, collaborative policy making can lead to a diverse range of mechanisms 
being agreed to, drawing from command and control and market mechanisms as well as 
other more innovative ones, depending on the specific environmental and social context 
(May 1995; Lubell 2004). Further, the incentive for stakeholders to be involved in 
collaborative exercises is about a general desire to cooperate rather than a preference for a 
market–based economic approach. In other words, industries chose to be involved in a 
collaborative exercise to achieve both social and economic outcomes whilst at the same 
time addressing the environmental concerns of other stakeholders. A primarily neo–liberal 
approach will only focus on economic outcomes. 
Concerns and criticisms 
Margerum and Whitall (2004) are cautious about collaborative exercises and identify 
several dilemmas or weaknesses of the collaborative approach. The first dilemma is the 
choice of the level of participation: that is, whether it should involve central or local groups 
and representatives. The collaborative approach favours a local over centralised process, 
where local stakeholders make placed–based policy decisions. This has the potential to 
generate a whole range of different policy and management outcomes depending on the 
location, making it difficult to create a single legislative approach to support these varying 
processes. Margerum and Whitall noted that without the strong legislative support, one of 
the key incentives for industry to be involved in and comply with the policy outcomes 
disappears. Although as one critic notes, businesses may well favour local approaches to 
centralised agency–run responses because as one company spokesperson said to the critic 
“I don't want bureaucrats telling me how to run my business; I would far prefer to take my 
chances with people from the community” (Mccloskey 1996:2). 
The second dilemma relates to the use of knowledge and the contention that on occasions 
the normally knowledge–based decision making gives way to more politically–based 
decision making. Leach et al (2002) examined 44 case studies of collaborative 
management (through formal partnerships) in catchment management and noted that few, if 
any, of these case studies collected any data to measure environmental change and policy 
effectiveness: 
Unfortunately, few partnerships conduct the long–term pre–project and post–project 
monitoring required to separate the partnership’s effects from the effects of other 
forces within or outside the watershed, or from natural fluctuations.  
(Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002:653) 
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The driving imperative in these cases was to develop an agreed policy, and the need to 
have a comprehensive knowledge base in support of policy was a secondary consideration. 
This process of marginalising the science and information threatens the credibility of the 
final policy outcomes. 
The third dilemma relates to the scale of participation. As discussed above, the 
collaborative approach favours local participation over regional and peak conservation 
groups. As McCloskey (the then Chair of the Sierra Club) noted, several problems emerge 
where only local based environmental groups are part of the participation. Firstly, local rural 
based groups may well have different environmental agendas to urban environmental 
groups. The peak NGOs may take a more strategic view of environmental protection 
whereas local groups will focus on the localised issues and be unable to make more 
strategic trade–offs. This sets up a potentially significant source of tension as the peak 
NGOs may be seen as not giving local environmental concerns the appropriate weight. 
Secondly, local environmental groups may not have the skills and experience to negotiate 
with industry and government for better environmental outcomes. Local groups often lack 
the resources to obtain additional environmental information that might be useful in the 
policy making process. The peak groups, on the other hand, are well practiced and 
resourced to take on industry and government in tough negotiations, but may not 
understand the significant local issues and may trade–off these for more strategic gains. 
Some see collaborative policy making as not being inclusive of all relevant stakeholders, 
thus threatening the credibility of the whole policy making process. For example, a study of 
participation in the management of US forests found that the logging companies were not 
always involved in the collaborative management of forests, with 26% of companies 
electing not to participate (Brody et al. 2006). Leach (2006), in a study of effectiveness of 
participation in collaborative management in catchments in western USA, found that the 
most common criticism of participants was in relation to the representativeness of those 
involved. Participants often believed that either important stakeholders were not included, or 
were included but did not participate sufficiently in the process for their input to be 
meaningful. Others were concerned the participation in collaborative exercises focus on the 
corporate elites (Pinkerton 1999). 
The fourth dilemma relates to ecological vs. political timeframes, although this can be a 
concern irrespective of the policy making approach adopted. The participants in a 
collaborative approach are usually involved for long time periods because of their direct 
interests in the environmental issue. Governments can change during these timeframes and 
bring different emphases as expressed through agency participation. This can undermine 
the trust that may have been built during the process where agreements and 
understandings achieved at one point in the policy making process are subsequently 
challenged when a government changes. 
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The final dilemma is one of resources. A collaborative approach is both time and resource 
hungry. Agencies, in particular, are often forced to reallocate resources from one 
environment priority to another, which can create tensions both within that agency and the 
environmental community affected by the resource reallocation. Collaborative participation 
also requires agency staff to use a set of skills that many do not possess, particularly those 
used to operating in a traditional expert–driven or ecological modern policy context: for 
example, negotiation and other inter–personal skills. This dilemma is further complicated 
under neo–liberalist governments which believe the extent of government involvement in 
policy making should be reduced not increased. An emerging problem is that of community 
resources. Community participation in these exercises is voluntary, and there is growing 
evidence of community burn–out and fatigue as only a few in the community are asked to 
be involved in more and more of these collaborative exercises (Bell 2004). 
Another concern for some authors is the lack of hard research done on the measured 
outcomes of collaborative exercises. One study examining the demonstrated outcomes of a 
range of collaborative exercises (Koontz and Thomas 2006) found that whilst criticisms and 
support for the collaborative approach were frequently reported in the literature, little actual 
research had been done on two critical questions: 
• Do collaborative processes produce different outputs than other processes? and 
• Do collaborative outputs produce better environmental and social outcomes?  
The study found that whilst social outcomes had generally been positive, there was little 
credible data on the environmental effectiveness of collaborative approach and 
In order for collaborative environmental management to be deemed a success, we 
must have a solid base of evidence that it improves – or at least does not worsen – 
environmental conditions when compared with other management approaches. In the 
absence of such knowledge, collaboration may do more environmental harm than 
good. Moreover, failure to establish evidence of environmental improvements might 
dissuade the use of collaboration in cases in which it could be effective.  
(Koontz and Thomas 2006:118) 
Kenney (1999) also noted that measuring the effectiveness of collaborative exercises is 
difficult, primarily because it usually takes a long time to measure environmental 
improvements in ecosystem–wide (in this case, catchments–wide) environments. He goes 
on to note that social measures of success are easier to measure, including: 
! improved relations and trust among stakeholders and managers; increased 
communication among relevant parties, including an expanded role of local parties in 
decision making; establishment of new processes of planning and management.  
(Kenney 1999:34) 
Kenney (1999) noted, however, that there is a risk that success in this area may well lead to 
a masking of the environmental performance of the exercise. He argues that: 
! TM!
Building personal relationships among historic adversaries ! encourages difficult 
issues to be ignored (as they might threaten newfound friendships), or worse yet, to 
be addressed through inappropriate compromises.  
(Kenney 1999:34) 
In short, improved relations between groups who were previously in conflict can come at the 
cost of real environmental improvement. 
It is fair to say that most studies on collaborative examples note that problems do emerge 
and need to be addressed. One of the keys to overcoming these barriers to success is the 
presence of strong leaders or policy entrepreneurs who successfully manage the required 
institutional changes (Heikkila and Gerlak 2005). These leaders act to mobilise resources, 
motivate participants, build trust, keep lines of communication going and become what 
Heikkila and Gerlak (2005:586) call the “vital spark for collective action”, thus providing the 
social capital needed for these collaborative exercises to work. 
The adaptive–collaborative approach  
Overview  
Analysis of the literature suggests that practitioners of adaptive management are in one of 
two schools, depending on the nature of the policy making adopted and the use of science. 
On the one hand, there is the expert–based school which favours the use of adaptive 
management as a tool for existing decision makers and takes a predominately scientific 
view of the information and the resulting analysis (For example: Moore and Conroy 2006; 
Busenberg 2004; Enck et al. 2006; Linkov et al. 2006; Rivers-Moore and Jewitt 2007). In 
effect, this school sees adaptive management as a scientific tool in support of the traditional 
expert–driven approach to policy making, as noted earlier.  
On the other hand there are those who contend that adaptive management needs to be 
supported by a collaborative approach involving a wide range of stakeholders and the 
broader community in decision making. Further, this school recognises a more holistic view 
of the science and information to be used as part of the process where local and indigenous 
knowledge is seen as just as important as scientific knowledge (For example: Jacobson et 
al. 2005; Gold 2002; Marttunen and Vehanen 2004; Habron 2003). The latter approach has 
been called adaptive and collaborative environmental management (Luke 2002) and 
adaptive co–management (Plummer and Armitage 2007). This combination of a policy 
making process and policy mechanism is seen by Plummer and Armitage (2007) as a 
powerful incentive to ensure institutions (public and private) learn as part of policy making, 
and powerful incentive to generate new knowledge about the environment in question and 
its management: 
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Synergies between the concepts of collaboration and adaptive management yield a 
community–based system which encompasses complex cross–scale linkages and 
the process of dynamic learning.  
(Plummer and Armitage 2007:63) 
For this reason, collaborative policy making that adopts adaptive management (called here 
adaptive–collaborative) can be seen as a different policy making approach, and is of most 
interest to this study. It will be argued below that this approach is more likely to be 
successful in dealing with highly contested environmental policy making contexts than the 
other approaches, even if those expert–based approaches (traditional expert–driven and 
ecological modern) adopt adaptive management as a policy tool. 
For clarity, the term adaptive–collaborative will be used in reference to the policy making 
approach and adaptive management will be used to in reference to the policy mechanism 
(tool or instrument).  
Proponents of the adaptive–collaborative approach identify a range of reasons why many 
modern policy making contexts do not lend themselves well to the traditional approaches 
(traditional expert–driven and ecological modern). First, most natural systems are not well 
understood with only limited environmental data available to inform policy makers. Second, 
the systems of most concern to policy makers are those that are subject to significant 
existing human pressure, and these systems are constantly changing and never reach a 
state of equilibrium. Further, given the complex nature of these systems and the natural 
variations, it was unlikely that they would ever reach equilibrium if left undisturbed anyway. 
Thirdly, community attitudes towards the management and protection of these areas are 
varied, complex and constantly changing (Pagan and Crase 2005). Critically, however, the 
key driver for the use of adaptive management is that, despite this lack of data, the 
complexity and constantly changing nature of the environment and changing community 
attitudes, delaying action until our understanding is improved is not an option because there 
is considerable pressure for development (Bennett et al. 2005:70). 
The nature of learning is more complex in the adaptive–collaborative approach. Whilst 
social learning is important (as it is in a collaborative approach), technical learning is crucial 
to the adaptive–collaborative approach and requires all participants to learn from 
experience (monitoring and modelling) so that decisions about on–going management are 
better informed. In this sense learning is on–going. As Clark (2002:1) notes, an adaptive–
collaborative approach is much more than previous iterative decision making or muddling 
through approaches (including Trial and Error and Passive Adaptive Management), and 
“advocates treating management policies as experiments, which are then designed to 
maximise learning rather than only immediate resource yields.” 
Whilst there is now considerable literature on adaptive management and a growing 
literature on the adaptive–collaborative policy making approach, there are few studies 
where success has been recorded (Jacobson et al. 2005), and doubts remain about its 
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effectiveness. To be fair, adaptive–collaborative exercises are used for the management of 
complex ecosystems which would likely take decades to show measurable environmental 
improvement, and it is likely that not enough time has yet passed for most of these 
examples for monitoring to show that improvement has or has not occurred. These doubts 
and concerns will now be discussed. 
Participation and decision making 
As with the collaborative approach, participation in the adaptive–collaborative approach is 
at least at IAP2’s (2007) Involve level, but usually at the collaborate level where decision 
making is shared, either directly or implied. In many cases the adaptive–collaborative 
approach offers an additional opportunity for community participation where the data 
collection can be complementary to the overall participation process. The community can 
be involved in collecting and contributing to the data upon which adaptive decisions are 
made. In some cases it involves training local residents in how to collect data (Dallmeier, 
Alonso, and Jones 2002), in other cases existing users are required to provide on–going 
information as part of monitoring (Klooster 2002). 
On–going involvement of the community is essential as the policy is being implemented 
because it is likely that decisions need to be made about choices of management options in 
response to the environmental monitoring (see below). 
Policy instruments 
As with the collaborative approach, certain types of instruments are not particularly 
favoured, and the initial decision on what instruments to adopt is chosen through 
collaboration. Importantly, adaptive–collaborative policies have to be flexible in that they do 
not lock in the use of certain instruments, but allow for flexibility in management responses 
so that if monitoring detects changing environmental conditions that were not anticipated, 
different or revised instruments can be employed to adapt to these changing circumstances. 
Concerns and criticisms  
For the most part, concerns relate to adaptive management rather than to the adaptive–
collaborative approach as such. Johnson (1999:2), for example, notes that there are four 
key difficulties in implementing adaptive management successfully: 
• Difficulties in developing acceptable predictive models,  
• Conflicts regarding ecological values and management goals,  
• Inadequate attention to non–scientific information, and  
• Unwillingness by agencies to implement long–term policies seen as too risky or 
costly. 
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He notes that the first difficulty is a technical one which can be overcome with more 
resources (this is discussed further below). In relation to the second and third difficulties, 
Johnson argues that these come about because of inadequate participation so that the 
conflicts over values and goals are simply not addressed, because decision makers avoid 
considering to the non–scientific sources of information. On the last difficulty, Johnson 
notes that many agencies are inflexible in dealing with new situations that carry higher than 
usual uncertainty, which Bormann et al (2007:188) argue can be a source of some 
frustration for adaptive–collaborative practitioners, where “if precaution continues to trump 
adoption, adaptive management will be hindered”. 
When faced with heightened uncertainty, these agencies prefer to apply traditional and 
known policy options rather than alternative measures that carry extra risk, even if those 
traditional options have been shown to be unsuccessful in dealing with uncertainty. 
Agencies may use the existing legislative and regulatory framework as a barrier to allowing 
alternative management options (Stankey et al. 2003; McAlpine et al. 2007). For example, 
the risk that a management regime could cause harm to a specific species or possibly lead 
to elevated levels of contaminants in surface water or groundwater is used as a reason for 
agencies to invoke regulations to block alternative actions. 
Of course, it is not just agencies that express concerns allowing more risky management 
and policy responses when faced with heightened certainty. The community and other 
stakeholders, including politicians, often use precaution as an argument not to proceed 
(McAlpine et al. 2007:588). Several authors considered these issues as a lack of 
institutional learning (Dallmeier, Alonso, and Jones 2002; Jacobson et al. 2005). Clarke 
(2002) notes that typically 
Most institutions are not very good at learning, especially when such learning would 
entail significant revision of their own goals and operating procedures. Environmental 
management institutions are no better than the norm and maybe significantly worse.  
(Clark 2002:1) 
This institutional learning difficultly can be significant when, as often happens, the 
monitoring turns up surprises, where the results do not fit the predicted modelled outcomes. 
Agencies and scientists can discount these surprises as aberrations and ignore the 
implications for the on–going management of the resource. 
Cost is also a significant issue when applying the adaptive–collaborative approach or 
adaptive management. Modelling, monitoring, data collection and analysis can be 
expensive, reporting requirements can be onerous, and time spent on the collaborative side 
of the exercise can place significant strains on all players (Lee 1999; Bormann, Haynes, 
and Martin 2007). Agency staff are often not given the necessary training and resources to 
deal with increased demands (Stankey et al. 2003). 
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Some critics hold a more fundamental concern about adaptive management and the 
adaptive–collaborative approach. As already mentioned, one of the fundamental premises 
of adaptive management is that it is the most useful tool to apply in situations where the 
catchment or resource in question is under considerable development pressure, our 
understanding of how that ecosystem works is very poor, but the pressure to develop is 
irresistible. Luke (2002) argues that adaptive management has: 
Come into being because almost everyone continues to desire the goods and 
services made possible by the global economy’s burgeoning productivity, even 
though these material outcomes are getting more difficult to realise because of either 
mass resistance to many industries’ by–products or actual physical scarcities caused 
by resource depletion.  
(Luke 2002:21) 
In short, adaptive management does not address what many see as the fundamental 
conflicts between environmental protection and continued economic growth. Worse, 
however, adaptive management is proposed as an innovative way for both industry and 
governments to be seen to address real environmental problems in a pre–cautionary way 
but the outcome will be loss of environmental quality. 
Some like Luke (2002) remain sceptical that adaptive management is really any different to 
previous management approaches: 
Adaptive management is a fairly conventional set of expert anchored 
ecomanagerialist practices, which has been made more open to popular participation 
while becoming self–certain about its own infallibility.  
(Luke 2002:16) 
Notwithstanding these difficulties and criticisms, the adaptive–collaborative approach offers 
considerable promise in dealing with environmental policy making contexts that have deeply 
embedded conflict. These benefits will now be discussed. 
Policy making approaches and conflict  
This final part of the Chapter discusses the potential for each of the policy making 
approaches to deal with conflict.  
Traditional expert–driven approach 
Social conflict 
The traditional expert–driven approach has a fundamental problem in dealing with policy 
making contexts where conflict is endemic: the prescriptive nature of the approach means 
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that to ensure compliance all the key stakeholders must agree to the nature and extent of 
the prescriptions. For this to occur, the interests, values and goals of the stakeholders must 
be in reasonable alignment. In effect, any differences in these values, interests or goals 
need to be resolved prior to implementation. The expert–based decision making typical of 
traditional expert–driven policy making will have limited success when the values, interest 
or goals of the non–experts who want to be part of the process are different from those of 
the decision makers. 
Governance 
The same can also be said in relation to governance: if there are problems with governance 
(for example, the regulatory agency is not trusted by industry or the community, or there are 
overlapping responsibilities between different levels of government), then it is unlikely that 
the policy will be successful. 
Science and information 
In relation to possible conflicts over science and information, the prescriptive nature of 
traditional expert–driven policy making means that it works best when the science in 
support of the policy is relatively clear and uncontested. If the science is unclear and the 
subject of some debate, then compliance with, and support for, the policy would unlikely be 
forthcoming. This is because the version of science used in support of the policy would be 
seen as being chosen over other versions, and those supporting those other versions are 
unlikely to support the final policy. 
Summary 
The traditional expert–driven approach could be applied successfully where levels of 
existing conflict are relatively low or the conflict can be managed and resolved prior to, or as 
part of, the policy making process. It is likely to be unsuccessful, however, in circumstances 
where there is a need for greater public involvement in decision making, where competing 
interests and values need to be resolved, where the environmental problem is complex 
involving high levels of uncertainty and/or where conflicting governance issues emerge. In 
short, the traditional expert–driven approach is unlikely to be successful in highly contested 
policy making contexts.  
Ecological modern approach  
Social conflict 
Ecological modernisation is more promising as a policy making approach in dealing with 
conflict than the traditional expert–driven approach. The shift of emphasis away from 
government regulators to other actors and market mechanisms as the means of delivering 
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environmental control is likely to encompass a wider set of interests and values, most 
notably those of industry.  In this way, the resistance of industry to comply with policy is 
reduced, thus reducing overall state–industry conflict. The inclusion of the major 
environmental NGOs within the process should also ensure that some of the values and 
interests of these groups are included within policy making. The absence of involvement 
from local community and environmental groups, however, limits the ability of this approach 
to address these more local social interests, values and goals. As well, it is likely that the 
radicalised elements of the environment movement will become more alienated by the 
corporatist approach to participation; thus, whilst conflict as part of the policy making may 
be reduced, conflict from outside the process could be enhanced. 
Governance conflict  
The ecological modern approach reduces the influence of regulators and could actually 
reduce any existing governance conflicts by avoiding the need of agency governance 
partially or entirely. Reliance on market and voluntary mechanisms can marginalise some 
governance issues that might otherwise emerge. Of course, they will not be removed 
entirely as the government still has a role to play in setting the framework within which the 
market and voluntary mechanisms are to operate. Any governance conflicts will still need to 
be addressed, but it should be possible to address these concerns more easily than with a 
traditional expert–driven approach. On the other hand, marginalising regulators so that they 
are no longer central to policy making may well create conflict within government, as these 
individuals and agencies seek to re–assert their influence within policy making. 
Science and information 
As with traditional expert–driven policy making, science is central to ecological modern 
policy making, and the concerns raised early in the discussion of the traditional expert–
driven approach apply here as well. That is: 
• Where the science is uncertain and contested, ecological modernisation requires 
that a version of the science be adopted as the central core of the policy making; 
• The version of science that is chosen will be seen by those who choose an 
alternative version of science to be value–laden (i.e. the policy makers have chosen 
one set of values over the others); 
• Any prescription (e.g. standard) selected based on the version of science chosen 
will inevitably be challenged by those who hold an alternative version; and 
• Any scientific uncertainty has to be ignored or described as background, which 
simply masks, but not addresses, the issue. 
In short, ecological modernisation requires that any uncertainty associated with the science 
be ignored and the subjective elements of decision making effectively denied.  
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The use of complex scientific methods and language to report various aspects of the 
environment (for example indicators and multi–criteria analysis) may have an additional 
effect of alienating many in the community because of this complexity. Suspicion of these 
methods is enhanced where the studies suggest environmental improvement is occurring 
but communities and individuals experience or perceive the opposite. Clearly, ecological 
modernisation gives little weight to types of knowledge that are not scientific, for example, 
the local and indigenous knowledge. The elevation of scientific knowledge over other forms 
of knowledge in contexts that are highly uncertain and contested will likely, therefore, 
enhance any underlying conflict rather than deal with it. 
Summary 
Whilst an ecological modern approach offers greater promise in dealing with highly 
contested environmental policy making contexts than the traditional expert–driven approach 
problems remain. In short, the ecological modern approach to policy making is likely to have 
limited success in highly contested environmental policy making contexts, although would 
likely be more successful than the traditional expert–driven approach. 
The collaborative approach 
Social conflict  
There is reasonable consensus amongst writers in this field that the collaborative approach 
has been used successfully in cases where there is considerable conflict on how the 
resource in question should be used and managed (Ebbin 2004; Lubell 2004). This type of 
conflict centres on the differences in values different groups have about and that resource 
and its uses. As Paulson (1998:302) notes in relation to managing rangelands in Wyoming, 
a collaborative approach “attempts to incorporate the values and interests of diverse 
stakeholders in the management of rangelands.” 
As discussed above, management of fisheries can lead to significant conflict where the 
resource is either limited or in decline. A collaborative approach in Victoria, Australia, is 
seen by Kearney (2002:212) as “a major step in resolution of conflict between commercial 
and recreational fishers in Victoria”. 
One reason that the collaborative approach can achieve success is that it can lead to 
improved trust between all stakeholders: for example, Pinto da Silva and Kitts (2006) note 
that in the case of fisheries management in the Northeast USA: 
The success of all forms of collaborative management is dependent on trust and the 
sense of partnership between different participants. Cooperative research and other 
forms of collaboration are good steps towards building the necessary trust that will 
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encourage a sense of stewardship of marine resources and enable innovative 
alternative governance initiatives to emerge.  
(Pinto da Silva and Kitts 2006:840) 
Another reason why conflict was reduced in these exercises is that social learning occurs 
(Innes and Booher 1999; Bouwen and Taillieu 2004). Daniels and Walker (1996) argue that: 
Learning (in the collaborative approach) is an inherent feature of public policy 
decision making. It is how people discover the range of public values and how those 
values can complement and conflict with each other.  
(Daniels and Walker 1996:73) 
Collaborative policy making allows different groups to interact, understand the perspectives 
of other groups with competing interests, make some concessions, get concessions in 
return and, in these ways, conflict is reduced. In a study of behaviour observed by 
participants in collaborative case studies, Poncelet (2001) made three key findings in 
relation to learning: 
• Organizational design of the partnerships provides experiences, ways of thinking 
and perspectives that few of the stakeholders have previously experienced thus 
providing the context to allow social learning, cultural production (specific to the 
group) and identity change to occur; 
• Many of the participants held similar understandings or a commonly shared cultural 
view about how the partnerships should work; and 
• Personal transformations do take place. 
Recent work by Keen, Brown and Dyball (2005) proposed a social learning framework 
within which to view participation in management and policy making, as described below. In 
this framework, learning, or the lack of it, is central to participation and defines the levels in 
the participative ladder. Six ladder levels are defined: 
• Coercing – involving a forced learning where the will of one powerful group is 
imposed on other groups; 
• Informing – one way learning where information flows from the decision making 
group to other groups; 
• Consulting – limited learning by decision makers where information is sought from 
the non decision making groups but the decision makers maintain the power to 
make ultimate decisions; 
• Enticing – shared learning amongst various groups with an interest in decision 
making but the decision makers maintain overall power and entices agreement 
from other groups through incentives; 
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• Co–learning – learning occurs at all levels as part of decision making, policy and 
plans are developed cooperatively and decision making carried out through 
negotiations; and 
• Co–acting – learning and knowledge sharing occurs within a community with 
minimal involvement from outside decision makers. Here, the affected groups 
control action and decisions outside normal decision making processes. 
Social learning is more than just the technical, science–based learning that takes place as 
part of ecological modernisation. Keen et al (2005:9). argue it is a “process of iterative 
reflection that occurs when we share our experiences, ideas and environments with others”. 
If social learning does occur in collaborative exercises then conflict, at least over values and 
interests, should reduce. Some other authors, however, sound a word of caution here. 
Lubell (2004:565), for example, warns that successful social outcomes of collaborative 
exercises (i.e. reduced conflict amongst participation stakeholders) may be symbolic only 
and that a “perception of consensus, without the behavioral follow–through” may result 
instead. Lubell is concerned that not only does consensus mask unresolved underlying 
conflict, but, more importantly, by not addressing this underlying conflict, environmental 
effectiveness of the policy is questionable. 
Governance conflict 
It is possible that governance conflict in a collaborative policy making exercise could either 
increase or be better managed, depending on the circumstances. Conflict could be 
expected to increase because collaborative approaches usually involve a shifting of 
decision making from the regulating agency to the collaborative peak group. Some 
regulators may resist this change, leading to increased tensions with the collaborative peak 
group. Most authors, however, have noted that the use of the collaborative approach has 
led to a lessening of tensions. For example, conflict in the management of marine areas 
and fisheries is often between the users and the management and regulating agencies, 
where the licensing and allocation of the resource can be seen as unfair and over 
prescriptive. Effective collaborative approaches have addressed this type of conflict, 
provided the management and regulating agencies participate in the exercise and adjust 
practices as required (Mow et al. 2007). The key here is that the regulating agencies must 
be willing to take part in the exercise and also be willing to modify the way they regulate 
depending on the outcomes of the collective decision making of the group. Where 
regulators do not willingly participate, then governance conflict will remain and possibly be 
enhanced. 
A case can be made that in examples where there is either a breakdown in governance or 
where competing governments have jurisdiction over the environment in question, the 
collaborative approach can fill the void of that breakdown in governance. Alternately, the 
collaborative approach can provide a forum for different levels of government to get 
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together to address competing interests. It is more likely, however, that the different 
governments will work out differences outside the collaborative forum, but it is the presence 
of the collaborative exercise itself which is the driver for those governments to seek 
resolution. In a similar way, tension between different agencies can also be worked out 
though the process, and the collaborative exercise provides the agencies with the 
opportunity to build trust with other stakeholders. The concerns that remain relate to the 
potential lack of resources available to key agencies to be involved in the exercise, and a 
lack of willingness of these agencies to give up some of their decision making roles. 
Science and information 
Some writers see the collaborative approach as a useful way to manage conflict over 
science and information. Heikkila and Gerlak (2005:587) argue that the conflict is over the 
science is central to most modern policy making exercises, and whilst different stakeholders 
may bring to the policy making table a range of different information and science, the 
collaborative approach “can play a key role in bringing diverse stakeholders together by 
acting as a neutralising force for value differences”. Here, conflict over science is seen as 
an extension of conflict over values. Bringing the different stakeholder groups together 
provides a mechanism to address these value–laden interpretations of the science.  
Margerum and Whitall (2004) note, however, that in many cases alternative sources of 
information other than traditional science are put into the policy making mix, which creates 
different tensions. The community participants will expect their local knowledge to be given 
equal consideration to the scientific knowledge, and be integrated in the policy making 
process (Ransom and Ettenger 2001; Ebbin 2004). As Martin (2003) notes: 
! since the 1970s, there has been a reassessment of the value of local knowledge, 
leading to calls for participatory policies and projects in which local and expert 
knowledge are brought together in complementary way.  
(Martin 2003:57) 
He goes on to note that the reluctance of experts to accommodate local knowledge is a 
significant barrier to good policy making as the experts continue to assert the primacy of 
their own knowledge and that this hinders the achievement of management objectives 
(Martin 2003:57). So, whilst the community conflict may be reduced because the 
collaborative approach allows local and indigenous knowledge to be included in the policy 
making process, the proponents of tradition scientific knowledge (the regulating agency and 
industry) may resent this equal treatment. Of course, community conflict will re–emerge if 
the local knowledge is only given token acknowledgment. 
The discussion so far assumes that there is either some consensus about the science that 
supports the policy making or that the debate is over the relative importance and usefulness 
of the different sources of information. The capacity of the collaborative approach to deal 
with contexts where there are high levels of uncertainty associated with the science is more 
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problematic. In these cases, there are likely to be differences of view about decisions that 
can be made because of this uncertainty as well as differences over how to address the 
information gap. Whilst the collaborative approach allows social learning to occur, unless 
adequate technical learning occurs to address the uncertainty issue, so that some level of 
consensus about the nature of the problems and the solutions that can be applied is 
achieved, conflict will remain. A collaborative approach can deal with the differences in 
values that form the bases of the different views on the science and information, but may 
not be able to deal with high levels of uncertainty in the science itself. 
Summary 
The collaborative approach is likely to succeed in circumstances where there is significant 
conflict over values, interests and goals. Addressing governance conflicts could be more 
problematic, but the collaborative approach offers some hope in this regard: however, 
dealing with contexts with high levels of uncertainty becomes more problematic, and unless 
adequate technical learning occurs throughout the policy making process to address the 
uncertainty. This is where adaptive management can have a role to play as part of a 
collaborative exercise. 
Adaptive–collaborative approach 
Science and information 
The adaptive–collaborative approach will have all of the advantages of the collaborative 
approach in dealing with conflicts over values and interests and governance. The use of 
adaptive management as a policy making tool means that conflict over uncertainty and 
science is dealt with directly, which the other policy approaches ignore.  It should be noted, 
however, that the three types of adaptive management identified above deal with science 
and information issue slightly differently and, as a result, any conflict. Each, though, has 
built in mechanisms that address any conflict over the science and information.  
The evolutionary approach, as noted earlier, is best applied where little, if any, 
environmental data exist, where the system is both robust and of low significance and the 
risk of significant environmental harm is very low. It is the low risk of significant 
environmental harm that normally ensures that the level of conflict is reasonably low despite 
there being likely disagreement over the science and information. 
Passive adaptive management is also used in cases where there is low risk of significant 
environmental harm because there is a high degree of certainty that the agreed 
management responses will succeed (the level of understanding of the system is high). In 
this case, however, whilst the risk of environmental harm is low, the consequence of 
management failure is significant because the system is both environmentally significant 
and very susceptible to change. The level of conflict, therefore, is much greater than with 
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the evolutionary approach and is managed by having a comprehensive monitoring system 
that would enable any unexpected impacts to be detected early and suitable changes to 
management made. In reality, conflict is not over the science but is over the value of the 
system and whether the consequences of management failure mean that the development 
should not proceed in the first place. 
Active adaptive management is used in cases where there is uncertainty about the science 
and information in support of policy making (low level of understanding of the system), and 
the system’s sensitivity to change is relatively significant (risk of significant environmental 
harm is relatively high). The levels of conflict in these cases will be high and the only way to 
move to an agreed policy response is to acknowledge that new data are needed and a 
flexible policy (management) framework is required. This gives stakeholders confidence 
that as knowledge improves and learning takes place, the policy (management responses) 
can be modified in response and the risk of significant environmental harm is reduced. 
Another advantage of the adaptive–collaborative approach is that in dealing with conflicts 
over science, the differences over values and interests that support the differences in 
science are also addressed and further reduced. As noted earlier, resolving uncertainty in a 
collaborative way reduces the likelihood that achieving a social agreement will be at the 
expense of getting a better understanding of the environmental problem in question. 
Two cautions about the ability of the adaptive–collaborative approach to deal with conflict 
and science should be noted. Firstly, all types of information — science, local and 
indigenous knowledge — need to be given adequate and fair consideration by all 
participants if the approach is to be successful. Secondly, in dealing with the uncertainty 
over science, stakeholders may engage in risk aversion activities, thus undermining the 
adaptive management process and not allowing the policy making to take its course. 
A further caution should be noted about the adaptive–collaborative approach, which is its 
ability to always deal with governance conflicts. It can be argued that an adaptive–
collaborative approach is more problematic than the collaborative approach because 
considerably more resources are required to do adaptive–collaborative policy making — 
modelling, monitoring, collecting the data and doing the analysis. This can make some 
agencies reluctant to commit to the approach and instead opt for more traditional, less 
resource–hungry approaches. Further, agencies may engage in risk aversion, as already 
discussed, which will cause increased tension throughout the process, as these agencies 
would be seen to be getting in the way of good policy making and management. 
Summary 
In short, the adaptive–collaborative approach has the capacity to deal with all of the 
conflicts that are embedded in modern environmental policy making, but success may still 
not follow because the approach requires considerable institutional change from 
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stakeholders (i.e. social learning). In the absence of social learning, the necessary technical 
learning will also not be possible. 
Chapter summary 
This chapter began with a discussion of the communicative/deliberative turn in planning as 
the starting theoretical framework for understanding how policy making can be carried out in 
highly contested contexts. It was argued that this framework has great value in 
understanding the processes involved in dealing with conflict, but that there are 
shortcomings. In particular, where the communicative/deliberative advocates see conflict 
largely as a single dimensional social problem, conflict in environmental policy making often 
involves wicked problems where the conflict is deeper, more complex and involving longer 
timeframes than most planning conflicts. As well, many environmental problems involve 
many jurisdictions and can be transnational. Consequently, the chapter went on to explore 
the nature of conflict in environmental policy making and proposed that this conflict can be 
categorised under three broad themes: 
• Social, 
• Governance, and 
• Science and information. 
It was further proposed that social conflict — differences over interest, values and goals for 
the environment — are not new in environmental policy making, but are now more deeply 
felt and firmly embedded in the policy making process. Science and information, so long the 
foundation of environmental policy making, can now be the source of conflict, particularly 
where the environment being contested is highly complex, information is lacking, 
uncertainty about outcomes is high, the very objectivity of the experts and their information 
is challenged and other sources of information (local knowledge) are not given due 
credibility in the decision making process. Add to this the potential for the breakdown of 
governance, where competing governments have jurisdiction over the environment in 
question, existing bureaucratic structures cannot adequately deal with the environmental 
problems, increased tensions between government agencies and the public (lack of trust), 
and a political emphasis on short term successes over longer term environmental gains, 
then the potential for policy failure becomes very high, particularly where this conflict is not 
seriously addressed.  
Finally, it was argued that the existence of these sources of conflict is most likely to lead to 
conflict where the resource at the centre of the conflict (consumable and useable) is scarce. 
Three types of scarcity were identified: decreased quantity of a resource, increased 
demand on a resource, and reduced quality of an existing resource (scarcity of good quality 
resource). Of course, it should not be assumed that the nature and extent of conflict in 
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environmental policy making is always so problematic, but it is those cases where conflict is 
intense that are the focus of this study.  
Four broad environmental policy making approaches were identified here. The first was 
called traditional expert–driven approach, and can be summarised as a highly centralised 
approach dominated by the expert regulators, and policy mechanisms chosen being 
predominately science–based, technical and statutory (command and control). The second 
was the ecological modern approach, which can be summarised as a shift away from an 
expert agency centred policy making to a process that is more inclusive of industry and the 
peak environmental groups and favours either market–based or voluntary policy 
mechanisms (i.e. de–regulation), but still relies heavily on science to support decision 
making. 
The third is the collaborative approach, which can be summarised as focusing on a highly 
participative form of policy making where delegations of decision making to a collaborative 
group inclusive of all stakeholders is at least implied if not actual. A whole range of policy 
mechanisms can be applied depending on what the collaborative decision making group 
decides. The fourth is the adaptive–collaborative approach, which can be summarised as a 
collaborative approach using active adaptive management to deal with the uncertainty of 
the science and information inherent in the policy making context. Adaptive management 
involves: making early management decisions based on the best available information; the 
establishment of environmental modelling and an extensive monitoring programme; on–
going review of the results of the monitoring; and revising modelling and adjusting 
management in accordance with this review. 
These four policy making approaches have some overlap with the three policy processes 
identified by Vigar and Healey (2002) (their technocratic process is similar to the traditional 
expert–driven approach and their collaborative/deliberative/interpretive process is similar to 
the collaborative approach), but this thesis provided more detailed insight in environmental 
policy making and proposes that there are two additional approaches not covered by Vigar 
and Healey’s work. 
The Chapter finished with an analysis of how each approach could deal with conflict. It was 
argued that the traditional expert–driven approach is only able to manage low levels of 
conflict, and is unlikely to be successful where: there are competing interests and values; 
the environmental problem is complex involving high levels of uncertainty; subjective 
judgments are made about the science used in support of the policy making; and/or where 
conflicting governance issues emerge.  
The ecological modern approach is more promising than the traditional expert–driven 
approach in dealing with conflict. The more inclusive approach of decision making goes 
some way to addressing the conflicting values embedded in much of environmental policy 
making, although it was noted that many within the broader community, including the more 
radicalised elements of the environmental movement, are not directly involved when this 
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approach is applied. The de–regulatory emphasis of the ecological modern approach, with 
reduced roles of governments and agencies, should ensure that governance conflicts are 
better managed than under the traditional expert–driven approach. However, as with the 
traditional expert–driven approach, science is central to ecological modern policy making, 
and the concerns raised in relation to the traditional expert–driven approach apply to the 
ecological modern approach as well. 
It was noted that the participative turn in environmental policy making leads to some 
significant improvements in the level of participation used in both traditional expert–driven 
and ecological modern approaches, but the inability of these centralised decision making 
approaches to deal with many of the conflicts that emerge remains.  
It was concluded the collaborative approach goes a considerable way to dealing with the 
deeper and more embedded conflict in environmental policy making. The collaborative 
approach can address the different values and interests directly, involves some implied, if 
not actual, delegated decision making, and can lead to governance conflicts being 
addressed either internally as part of the process or externally. The main concern raised 
about this approach is in dealing with conflict where the science is highly uncertain and 
contested. It was noted that a focus on social outcomes (resolving conflicts over values and 
interests) could come at the expense of addressing the real environmental issues.  
Finally, the adaptive–collaborative approach has the capacity to deal with all of the conflicts 
that are embedded in modern environmental policy making: 
• It has all of the advantages of the collaborative approach in dealing with conflicts 
over values and interests and governance;  
• It deals head on with the conflict where the science is uncertain and contested that 
the other approaches ignore; and 
• In dealing with conflicts over science, the differences over values and interests 
which support the differences in science are further reduced. 
There are valid concerns, however, about the ability of the adaptive–collaborative approach 
to deliver on its promise: considerably more resources are required to engage in adaptive–
collaborative policy making; all forms of knowledge need to be given fair treatment; and the 
key agencies and stakeholders could engage in risk aversion that would undermine the very 
basis of the adaptive management process. In short, in the absence of social learning, the 
necessary technical learning would also not be possible and the policy would ultimately fail. 
This analysis and the discussion in the Chapter have established the theoretical basis of the 
thesis and argued a case that in responses to the research question posed here (“what 
policy making approach is most likely to succeed in highly contested contexts where levels 
of conflict are significant, both in intensity and complexity?”) the adaptive–collaborative 
approach is most likely to deal with high levels of conflict. The remaining Chapters will 
report the research carried out to answer the research question posed of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
Overview 
To answer the research question posed here it is necessary to compare how real-life 
examples of the different policy making approaches identified in Chapter 2 perform in highly 
contested contexts. A review of the methodologies used in comparable studies has been 
carried out first. 
Review of comparable studies 
Two conclusions can be drawn from a review of previous comparative policy studies. First, 
most studies focus on success/failure of actual policies rather than policy making, the focus 
of this thesis. Consequently, the discussion below will make little reference to policy making 
evaluation. Second, the policies being compared are either from different governments, of a 
single government or agency, in a particular environmental sector (for example, waste 
management), or studying a particular policy making approach (for example the uses of 
voluntary mechanisms). Comparative studies of different governments have involved 
several governments (Jahn 1998; Janicke and Weidner 1995; Busch and Jörgens 2005) or 
as few as two (Burby and May 1998). To strengthen the analysis, these studies often apply 
quantitative measures or tools to highlight differences between governments. Jahn’s (1998) 
study comparing the environment policy making in 18 OECD countries used published 
quantitative environmental data (for example pollution levels) to create an index of 
environmental performance that enabled the policy making regimes in the countries to be 
compared. Busch and Jörgens’ (2005) study used existing databases and published studies 
to look for trends over time in how 22 specific policy innovations were taken up by selected 
European countries. The focus here was not on environmental outcomes but on the policy 
measures (innovations) used, and analysis involved comparing the policies as written and 
implemented and examined the measures used. 
 Burby and May’s (1998) study compared the environmental hazard mitigation policies of 
Florida and New South Wales. The study compared a random sample (30) of local 
governments in Florida with 127 local in New South Wales. The data collected for the 
comparison were a mix of quantitative (questionnaires) and qualitative (selected interviews). 
Comparison between the policy making approaches of the two States was descriptive 
rather than involving quantitative measures. 
One study examined the environmental policies of Greece (Lekakis 2000), using data from 
published documents, existing statistical data including databases, and a questionnaire of 
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46 key individuals. There was some quantitative comparison of the different policies, but the 
comparisons were largely descriptive. 
There are at least two studies into the US EPA policy making (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 
1990; Firestone 2002). Firestone’s study (2002) was a review of the enforcement practices 
of the US EPA in applying its policies and legislation. A quantitative statistical analysis of 
4,600 cases within the EPA’s data base allowed patterns of enforcement practices to be 
identified. 
Leach Pelkey et al (2002) examined 44 catchment (watershed) partnerships in California 
and Washington USA, and developed six evaluation criteria so that the success of the 
partnerships could be determined and comparisons made. The criteria were descriptive — 
for example, “perceived effects of the partnership on the condition of the watershed” — but, 
generally, quantitative indexes or scores on these criteria were used. For example, the 
criterion “Perceived Effect on Human and Social Capital” was measured by surveying 
catchment users and stakeholders and asking respondents to assess, using a seven-point 
scale, whether the partnership had been a source of new relationships and/or increased 
their understanding of some key issues, including: did new long-term friendships or 
professional relationships develop, did participants develop a better understanding of other 
stakeholders’ views, and did participants develop a better understanding of the bio-physical 
processes of the catchment. The survey was sent to “all participants sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the partnership to complete at least part of the questionnaire, plus 
several knowledgeable non-participant observers” (Leach, Pelkey, and Sabatier 2002). As 
well as the survey, selected key participants in each catchment were interviewed, relevant 
documents reviewed and meetings minutes analysed.  
There are several studies that examined specific policy instruments or approaches, for 
example voluntary mechanism (Alberini and Segerson 2002; Cabugueira 2001). Jones and 
Burgess (2005) examined 15 examples of collaborative management of marine protected 
areas in the UK. The main sources of data were long interviews with the project officers for 
each of the case studies and a review of existing documentation. The case studies were 
then compared by looking for common themes in the data. This analysis allowed certain 
conclusions to be made, for example that three distinct and different management 
structures were evident across the 15 case studies. 
Other comparative studies have used fewer case studies. In a study of collaborative 
management in specific geographic area (Wyoming public rangelands) Paulson (1998) 
examined 4 case studies in-depth involving long interviews (23), attendance of meetings 
and analysis of meeting minutes. Four other case studies were considered intermediate-
depth case studies where the main data sources were shorter interviews. As well, a 
telephone survey of stakeholders was carried out. Paulson (1998:304) argues that the 
choices of which case studies to study in-depth was based on purposive sampling “in which 
the researcher selects cases that are most likely to produce information to help answer the 
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question”. Here, comparisons between the case studies was descriptive based largely on 
the qualitative data, with the phone survey information used to cross reference the 
interviews as well as providing limited quantitative data. 
Ebbin (2004) examined two case studies where cooperative management was employed in 
the management of a fisheries. A qualitative approach was adopted that primarily involved 
semi-structure interviews with selected individuals who were either engaged in fishing or 
were engaged in the management of the fisheries. As well, key documents were reviewed, 
and observations made of a variety of meetings held to discuss the management of the 
fisheries. There are elements of what Kemmis and McTaggart (2000) call participatory 
action research in this study as Ebbin was directly involved in the cooperative management 
case studies as a commercial and subsistence fisher, as well as being employed in the 
processing industry. 
Choice of overall approach in this thesis 
Summarising the above review, two broad methods can be identified:  
• A review of many policies using environmental data or derived indexes so that 
quantitative comparisons between the policies can be carried out; or 
• A case study method usually involving several case studies where a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative measures is used to compare policies but the 
comparisons are predominantly qualitative. 
Irrespective of which broad method is applied (quantitative vs. qualitative) one key 
methodological question needs to be answered: how is policy making success (evaluation) 
determined?  
At first glance, the notion of measuring a successful policy seems straightforward. In its 
simplest form, a successful policy is one that actually delivers an improved environmental 
outcome – i.e. a policy is effective in achieving its objectives. If policy effectiveness was to 
be used as the sole measure of success, then studying many policies across a wide range 
of contexts would be possible (the first broad method) provided the data are either readily 
available or relatively easy to gather. Effectiveness is rarely, however, used as the only 
criterion to determine policy success, with many studies using economic efficiency in 
parallel with effectiveness to determine overall cost-effectiveness (Frondela and Schmidt 
2005; Alberini and Segerson 2002; Operations Evaluation Department of the World Bank 
2001). Including economic efficiency to measure policy success would add some 
complexity to the analysis, but may not necessarily prevent many policies being studied. A 
more significant issue relates to the validity of relying predominantly on effectiveness as a 
key measure of policy success. 
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Relying on effectiveness as a primary measure policy success raises some significant 
methodological questions, notably: 
• If improvement (effectiveness) is observed, what degree of improvement would be 
considered necessary for success? 
• Would improvement have occurred if the policy had not been implemented — i.e. is 
the policy the cause of the improvement or is it because of some other mechanism? 
• What are the unintended consequences of policy effectiveness (both environmental 
and socio-economic), how significant are these other consequences and do they 
counteract any environmental gains caused by the policy? 
• Could another approach or mechanism have delivered as good an environmental 
outcome at a lower cost and fewer other impacts?  
• Does the implementation of the policy takes resources away from other areas of 
environmental management causing environmental harm in those areas? 
Further, this thesis focuses on policy making in highly contested environmental contexts, 
and a feature of these contexts is that the nature of the environmental resource is complex 
and it maybe that environmental improvement may not be noticeable in the short term: that 
is, it would not be possible to determine quantitative effectiveness. As well, given the 
complexity of the contexts, it is likely that other policies, laws, regulations and management 
plans are in operation that will have spill-over effects into the specific policy making area. 
Separating the impacts of each mechanism will be highly problematic.  
There is a compelling case, therefore, to broaden the notion of success beyond 
considerations of measurable environmental improvement and use a range of other criteria 
(a multi-criteria method), in particular: 
• Indirect measures of effectiveness in cases where measurable environmental 
improvement is difficult to determine and where policy making of draft policies is 
being considered; and 
• Measures that relate to other indirect or direct policy impacts (socio–economic and 
indirect environmental impacts).  
Given the higher level of complexity associated with a multi-criteria evaluation method, the 
number of policies that could be examined is limited within the context of a Ph. D study and 
a multiple case study method is favoured. The choice then is one between a more 
quantitative method using effectiveness and efficiency as the criteria for comparison of 
many policies and a more qualitative approach where a multi-criteria evaluation is applied to 
fewer policies. The choice will involve the trade-off referred to by Hammersley (1999) where 
choices between quantitative and qualitative approaches will 
! often depend on the purposes and circumstances of the research, rather than 
being derived from methodological or philosophical commitments. This is because 
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there are trade-offs involved. For instance, if we seek greater precision we are likely 
to sacrifice some breadth of description; and vice versa.  
(Hammersley 1999:80) 
As well, this study is not just about policy success/failure but is about policy making 
success/failure. 
The choice, then, is as much about the purpose of the study as it is about what 
methodology to use. The multi case study approach will have the added advantage of, as 
Eisenhardt (2002:8) notes, of getting greater “understanding (of) the dynamics present 
within single settings”. So, whilst fewer policy making examples would be examined, the 
use of the multi-criteria evaluation method will involve collecting data on a range of matters 
allowing for a more detailed analysis of each policy making. It’s a choice between precision 
and breadth. The choice made here is to opt for breadth of description over precision, and 
to apply a multi-criteria evaluation method on a select number of policy making examples 
(see Chapter 4 for a description of that evaluation method). 
This use of case studies in this study is what Sarantakos (2005:221) calls an “instrumental 
case study” which is “used to inquire into a social issue or to refine a theory”. In this case, 
this study’s overall proposition and hypothesis are being tested. This study adopts, 
therefore, a naturalistic approach similar to Patton’s (Patton 2002:39), that “takes place in 
real-world settings and the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of 
interest”. 
The trustworthiness of case studies 
Overview 
Case study research is inherently qualitative (although quantitative tools can be used) 
which is often perceived by those favouring quantitative methods as being unstructured, 
exploratory and a useful first step in what should be a largely quantitative research 
exercise, and, as noted by Bryman (1999:37), is seen as a “somewhat second rate activity 
(where the) qualitative data cannot stand in their own right because they need to be 
verified”. 
Critics of qualitative research raise many concerns including that anything goes, it is 
unrepresentative, and raises significant ethical questions (Sarantakos 2005:46), but mainly 
its trustworthiness is questioned, which Seale (1999) suggests is about validity and 
reliability. Validity is both internal (has the truth been uncovered) and external 
(transferability to other contexts), whereas reliability is about consistency of findings (would 
the findings be the same if the study is repeated) and the neutrality of the research design 
and the researchers. The notion of truth here is not the positivist view of one single truth, 
! MO!
but, as Seale (1999:52) argues, is one of the “relationship between claims and evidence” 
that “at no point claims ultimate truth, but regards claims as always subject to possible 
revision by new evidence”. These four elements of trustworthiness are addressed in turn 
below. 
Internal validity 
One technique often used to enhance validity is that of Denzin’s (1978) triangulation which, 
as Silverman (2006:290) argues, is “comparing different kinds of data (e.g. quantitative and 
qualitative) and different methods (e.g. observations and interviews) to see whether they 
corroborate one another”. Triangulation has its critics largely because, as some argue, it 
assumes a positivist position that some inherent truth exists. Denzin (Denzin and Lincoln 
2000:5) himself has modified the notion of triangulation in recent times to be no longer “a 
tool or strategy for validation but an alternative to validation” that uses multiple sources of 
data to add “rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry”. The truth, then, 
is not what is common to different sources of data but the sum of it.  
Janesick (2000:381) argues that triangulation’s secondary and supporting sources of 
information are used to “capture the nuance and complexity of the social situation under 
study”. Patton (2002:447) argues that case studies should be both holistic and context 
sensitive. By holistic Patton argues that the social phenomenon being studied is both 
complex and greater than the sum of its parts, and to properly understand that complexity 
data needs to be collected from a range of sources. Again, the use of a variety of data 
sources is not about confirming the conclusions drawn from one source but is about arriving 
at a full understanding of the subject matter being studied. 
In summary, internal validation is ensured where a range of data sources are used so that 
the true breadth of the truth is uncovered. The various data sources used in this study are 
described next. 
Sources of data — ensuring validity 
As noted above, many comparative studies used quantitative indexes to compare policies, 
using published environmental data (to measure effectiveness) and surveys/questionnaires 
to develop indexes of environmental performance. For some of the examples of policy 
making studied here, published environmental data are available and were used where 
appropriate, notably where measured environmental improvement is to be used as a 
measure of policy making success.  
The possibility of using surveys was considered (to provide data for some indexes of policy 
making success), but in each policy example the number of individuals and stakeholders 
that could be surveyed was relatively small making it difficult to get a sample size large 
! MQ!
enough to allow statistically valid conclusions to be drawn or indexes to be constructed. 
Consequently, qualitative sources of data and measures of policy making success were 
used in support of the evaluations. Interviews with the key policy makers and stakeholders 
were a primary source of data for both stages this study. The selection of interview subjects 
was what Bryman (2004) calls purposive, in that they were chosen because of their 
relevance to the research topic rather than chosen at random. All individuals relevant to the 
overall topic and the individual case study were approached for an interview, although not 
all agreed to be interviewed, largely because they were of the view that they had not been 
involved in the subject or policy long enough to make any informed comment. 
The definition of a stakeholder requires some clarification at this point. Leach, Pelkey, and 
Sabatier (2002:646), in a discussion of collaborative policy making, refer to “stakeholder 
partnerships”, which consist of “representatives from private interest groups, local public 
agencies, and state or federal agencies, who convene as a group, periodically and 
indefinitely, to discuss or negotiate public policy within a broadly defined issue area”. The 
view that stakeholders include interests groups and agencies is generally accepted in the 
literature, but there is less agreement about whether to include the public as stakeholders. 
The exclusion of the public and identifying only groups and agencies as stakeholders is a 
typically corporatist view of participation. In many other cases, however, the public are 
included as stakeholders where a direct interest can be identified. For example, in a study 
of public participation in water resource management, Jonsson (2005:496) identifies four 
groups of stakeholders, which are polluters (major industries and land owners groups), 
experts (including organisations with specific expertise), government agencies (especially 
the regulators) and users (the public who either consume the water or use the resource for 
specific purposes, notably recreation). Here the public stakeholders are those who have a 
direct interest in the resource as consumers. 
Other authors see the idea of public stakeholders being those only with a direct interest in 
the resource as too narrow and see stakeholders more broadly as citizens. This debate 
about role of the public as stakeholders is what Crane, Matten, and Moon (2004:110) see 
as “either that stakeholders are citizens, or that they represent citizens’ interests”. 
For the purposes of this thesis, a pragmatic approach will be adopted in identifying 
stakeholders based on Jonsson (2005) definition: that is, stakeholders are the key interest 
groups, relevant agencies and members of the public who have a direct interest in the 
policy. For convenience, stakeholders will be those who have been involved in the relevant 
policy making or who have made a submission. 
Interviews were semi structured and long, typically lasting between 1 and 2 hours. A series 
of questions were used as starting points for discussion around the key topics of the subject 
of the interview. Impromptu follow up questions were asked to clarify answers and to 
explore other issues raised by the interviewee that were relevant to the study. This semi 
structured approach allowed for some capturing of specific data that was easily codable 
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along pre-determined categories as well as analysis that according to Fontana and Frey 
(2000:653) “attempts to understand the complex behaviour of members of society without 
imposing a priori categorization that may limit the field of inquiry”. Transcripts of the 
interviews were prepared and sent to the interviewees for checking. Once any changes 
were made, the texts were coded, responses categorised and themes identified. 
Other sources of information were notes from meetings attended, formal meeting minutes, 
file searches, and published reports. As well, topic-specific opportunistic phone and short 
interviews were used with key individuals to check certain factual information. In some 
cases, these interviews provided additional qualitative information that complemented 
information obtained from the longer interviews.  
Two of Sarantakos’ (2005) methods of document analysis were used here: descriptive and 
exploratory. First, documents were analysed for quantitative environmental data relevant to 
policy effectiveness. Second, documents were searched for what Sarantakos (2005:294) 
calls “peculiarities, characteristic attributes and trends in the text that mark the identity of 
the message conveyed through the document”. In this way the understanding of the policy 
making contexts were enhanced. 
External validity 
External validity relates to the transferability of the case studies to other contexts. This is 
also referred to as generalising, and the chances of this happening are enhanced where, as 
argued by Seale (1999): 
Thick, detailed case study description can give readers a vicarious experience of 
‘being there’ with the researcher, so that they can use their human judgement to 
assess the likelihood of the same processes applying to their settings which they 
know. 
(Seale 1999:118) 
The more detail provided in the case studies, the more likely that the reader will recognise 
its applicability to the reader’s own experiences.  
Generalising from case studies is particularly valid for studies of environmental policy where 
there is growing evidence that globalization has caused policy and legislative convergence: 
i.e. Western governments are prone to copy the success stories of other Western 
governments (Busch and Jörgens 2005), a process also known as diffusion (Tews 2005). A 
study of policies confined to either a single geographic area or environmental theme could 
have something significant to say about environmental policy making in other areas, other 
jurisdictions, both nationally and internationally. 
Transferability is enhanced where the case studies are what Schofield (2002:181) calls 
“studying the typical,” and the case studies described below, it will argued, are typical. 
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Reliability — consistency of findings 
Reliability in this context relates to the level of confidence in the data. Some of the data 
sources used here have greater inherent reliability in that they are in written form (reports, 
meeting minutes and file documents), which are usually checked and verified before 
publishing. The less reliable data are the interviews. To increase the level of confidence in 
the information in the interviews, interviewees were sent draft transcripts and provided with 
the opportunity to check them for accuracy. 
From time to time where a policy narrative was developed based on the data that was 
potentially contentious, the narrative was tested with some key stakeholders either through 
a follow-up short interview or phone conversation: what Seale (1999:61) called “member 
validation”. 
Reliability — neutrality of the researcher and ethics 
Overview 
Ensuring my personal neutrality needed careful attention for three reasons. First, I was 
personally familiar with many of the key policy makers and stakeholders interviewed as part 
of this study. Second, in my professional work prior to commencing this thesis I had worked 
with the implementation of some of the policies studied here, although my involvement in 
their development was negligible. Finally, during some of time I was carrying out the 
analysis of the data and writing up this thesis, I was employed in a position where a 
potential conflict of interest could have arisen. 
Personal familiarity 
Patton (2002:50) uses the term “empathic neutrality” to describe the ideal “cognitive and 
emotional stance” that a researcher needs to adopt so as to not become too involved with 
the subjects and, therefore, lose the ability to judge clearly the information, and not to 
become too distant so that understanding is impaired. My personal familiarity with the key 
individuals had the potential to undermine my empathic neutrality, but also had a number of 
advantages. Fontana and Frey (2000) identified seven key attributes of interviewing four of 
which are useful discussion points here. They firstly refer to accessing the setting, which is 
about gaining access. I had relatively unimpeded access to the highest level of policy 
makers including chairman of the EPA and the WAPC, as well as the most senior policy 
making public servants. In this way, the reliability of the data was enhanced.  
Fontana and Frey’s (2000) second attribute was understanding the language and culture of 
the respondents. This had already been established in most cases because I had a working 
relationship with many of those interviewed. This language and culture was readily 
transferred to the interviewees I did not know. There was a potential problem here in that I 
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may well have been seen by some interviewees as part of the culture rather than just being 
familiar with it, undermining empathic neutrality. This had the potential to create some 
barriers to open and honest interviewing, namely undermining trust and creating undesired 
informants (see below). 
Locating an informant is another attribute. As Burgess (1999) notes, informants are useful 
because they act as guides to the field of study, they can become informal research 
assistants helping locate research material and subjects, they can help interpret information 
and provide useful historical contexts. Burgess also notes that informants can present some 
problems: they can try to manipulate the researchers to a particular view or source of 
information, they require protection as their role may not be seen favourably by other 
participants, and there is a danger that researchers will exploit informants. I had several 
formal informants who were middle to low level public servants and I was careful in 
managing how I used them so as to avoid potential problems. However, a couple of 
interviewees because of my personal familiarly with them initially wanted to adopt a 
researcher-informant relationship with me. This was potentially problematic as I was keen to 
interview each of them and have their views recorded and taken into account as part of my 
considerations. This problem was averted after some careful negotiations and realigning the 
relationship. 
Another of Fontana and Frey’s (2000) attributes is Gaining trust. For most interviewees 
gaining their trust was easy as this had already been established through my working 
relationship with them. For some, however, there was some initial suspicion as my 
professional background was interpreted by some in the conservation movement as me 
being aligned to government and I did not come to the research as a neutral observer. In 
these cases I either met with the interviewee separately before the formal interview or I 
spent the first part the interview informally discussing the study and general environmental 
matters as a way of building trust. Two particular topics of discussion in these separate 
sessions were research ethics and how the study was designed and being carried out to 
ensure neutrality.  
Professional involvement with policies studied 
Having worked with the implementation of some of the policies studied here raised the 
potential for bias, in that I could have already formed a view about certain policies and 
policy making approaches. Sadler (2002) identified three types of biases: ethical 
compromises, value inertia, and cognitive limitations. 
Ethical compromises relate to possible inherent subjectivity where there is a conflict of 
interest between researcher and the agency the subject of the study, a personal 
relationship between the provider of information and the researcher, and “sloppiness” 
where, for example, an argument is made that is not substantiated by the data but based on 
personal views. There was some potential for bias in relation to the EPA, as I had worked 
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for the EPA previously, but this was dealt with because there is over two years between 
when I worked for the EPA and the commencement of this study. The potential for bias 
because of personal relationship with interviewees relates directly to the discussion above 
about informants and trust, and in addressing these issues I was able to ensure the 
appropriate distancing between myself and the subjects. Sloppiness was avoided through 
checking and cross checking themes and conclusions drawn with the information, and 
through consciously parking any views that I may have throughout the study. 
Value inertia relates to what Sadler (2002:125) calls a researcher’s “background 
knowledge, prior experience, emotional makeup or world view”. In many ways, this is 
unavoidable because, arguably, the choice of what to study in the first place is inseparable 
from all of this. The key here is one of avoiding inertia, or ensuring that personal social 
learning occurs: what Keen et al (2005:9) describe as “a process of iterative reflection that 
occurs when we share our experiences, ideas and environments with others”. 
In a research context, social learning that avoids value inertia is largely a one-way process 
where the information is reflected upon and the researcher observes and takes the 
experiences and ideas of others but at some distance. The researcher in a naturalistic study 
does not share his/her experiences or ideas. A critical test that I applied to check that inertia 
had not set in was to keep looking for surprises in the information that would then trigger 
further iterative reflection. 
Finally, cognitive limitations relate to biases that emerge because of limitations of dealing 
with information which are due to what Sadler (2002) calls our 
! inherent incapacity to deal effectively with large masses of information at once, our 
intuitive ignorance of notions of natural variability (randomness and probability), and 
our tendency to seek meaning in or impose meaning upon the world around us.  
(Sadler 2002:127) 
Sadler (2002) identifies thirteen specific elements to cognitive limitations, including: data 
overload, positive and negative instances, internal consistency, missing information, 
sampling considerations and confidence in judgements. There is a clear link here to the 
issues of validity and reliability already discussed above, and for that reason, this matter is 
not discussed further here. 
Employment and a potential conflict of interest 
Finally, during part of the writing up phase, I was employed by the State Government as the 
Independent Appeals Convenor. The key role of the position was to provide independent 
advice to the Minister for the Environment on appeals received in relations to decisions and 
other matters made under the Environmental Protection Act 1986. Critical for this study are 
the following appeal rights: 
• Against the decision of the EPA to not assess a proposal; 
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• Where the EPA is to assess a proposal, appeals against the level of assessment 
set by the EPA; and 
• Appeals against the contents of the EPA assessment report (the environmental 
assessment). 
There was a clear potential for conflict here if an appeal raised matters relevant to EPA 
policies which were the subject of this study. When the first instance of this occurred, I took 
leave from my Ph D to avoid any perception of conflict of interests. My leave ended and my 
studies recommenced when I resigned from the Appeals Convenor position. In this way any 
conflict between my professional dealings with any EPA policy and my research of that 
policy was avoided. 
Choice of policy making case studies  
Multi case studies 
Environmental policy is both broad in subject matter and multi-layered with policies applied 
at many levels (international, national, regional, sector specific, whole of government, 
portfolio specific etc.). Two options exist for narrowing the choices of the case studies for 
the first part of this work: narrow the subject matter or narrow the policy level. The latter 
option of narrowing the policy level was chosen here so that a range of policy subjects can 
be examined. The policy level that will be focused on will be environmental agency issue 
specific written policies that are best described as government agency policies, rather than 
government initiated (whole of government) policies. 
It was decided to narrow the geographic extent of the study and focus on two government 
agencies — the WA Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) and the Western Australian 
Planning Commission (WAPC). WA was chosen because both these agencies have a long 
history of environmental policy making covering a range of subject areas. The EPA is also 
typical of many of the peak environmental agencies throughout the developed world being 
responsible for the full spectrum of environment issues (although it is noted that EPA’s in 
some States of Australia just focus on pollution type issues). Such an approach makes 
drawing broader implications and generalisations from this study more valid. 
A further consideration is that policy making over the past 20 years has included contexts 
where the level of conflict has varied from low to intense and has seen the application of all 
four policy making approaches. It is possible, therefore to find several examples of each 
policy making approach being used in situations where the level of conflict varies. Analysis 
of these cases studies is described in Chapter 5. 
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A major single case study 
As well as the multi case study analysis, it was also decided to examine a single case study 
in more detail: a contemporary case study where the level of conflict was intense. This case 
study was ideal in that not only was the level of conflict intense, two separate policies were 
being developed adopting two different policy making approaches: one was a traditional 
expert–driven approach and the other was adaptive–collaborative. A specific comparison of 
the success/failure of the two approaches was, therefore, possible. This case study was 
Cockburn Sound. 
There are many examples where a single case study of environmental policy (including 
management plans) has been carried out: for example, a marine sanctuary in New Zealand 
(Hughey 2000); a single catchment area in the USA (Habron 2003); a forest area in Mexico 
(Klooster 2002); and a fishery in Finland (Marttunen and Vehanen 2004). 
Specific details of methodology 
Policy making evaluation — Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 sets the broad context for the substantive part of this thesis by identifying a 
method to determine policy making success, particularly in highly contested environmental 
policy making contexts, with a special emphasis on WA. The overall aim was to arrive at a 
set of criteria that could be applied in this study. 
First, the international literature on policy evaluation was reviewed and a summary sheet 
prepared listing the criteria applied and how popular each criterion was in the literature (see 
Tables 3 and 4 in Chapter 4). Next, the published reports related to policies of both the EPA 
and WAPC were examined, and the criteria used in any policy evaluation listed and 
summarised (see Tables 5 and 6 in Chapter 4). This was supplemented with short, focused 
interviews with the officers responsible for the policies, and searches of the relevant agency 
files to identify any additional information that supported the agency evaluations. In addition, 
the individuals who had primary responsibility for policy making from both agencies were 
interviewed to get an understanding of the overall approaches to policy evaluation. Long 
semi–structured interviews were used.  
The next part was to seek the views of the WA environmental policy makers and key 
relevant stakeholders about how they believe policy evaluation should be done. This 
information was collected through long semi–structured one-to-one interviews. The experts 
chosen for this part of the study were senior environmental policy makers in the EPA, senior 
planners in the WAPC, and key relevant stakeholders (experienced consultants, academics 
and senior representatives for the WA environmental movement). To ensure their 
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involvement in the study most participants wanted their anonymity protected not only from 
other participants but also as part of this published study. Consequently, any direct quotes 
used here are not attributed to any person. Interviews were long and semi–structured, with 
fixed questions, many open-ended, and follow-up questions were asked in cases where 
responses were not clear. The use of experts in this way is considered valid because, as 
noted by Vázquez-Ramos et al (2007:112), it can be used to “elicit perceptions or 
judgements held by experts who are knowledgeable in a specialised area”.  
The general approach to the interviews and to arriving at the final list of criteria was as 
follows: 
• Interviewees were ask to list the criteria they believed should be used to evaluate 
policy making, and to explain why they had chosen these criteria; 
• They were then shown the summary sheet referred to above and asked if they 
wanted to revised their list of criteria – some, but not all chose to make some 
modification; 
• The draft set of criteria was drawn up by the author based on the summary sheet, 
the criteria actually used in any WA policy evaluation, and the responses in the 
interviews; 
• These draft criteria and the transcript of the interview was sent to each interviewee, 
and they were offered an opportunity to make any modifications to either. Each 
interviewee was contacted directly as a follow up to ensure they had received the 
information as to ask if they would like to comment on the draft set of criteria and 
suggest any modifications. Only one person choose to make a change and this was 
to parts of his interview transcript and not the criteria. 
This last step was critical to ensure the validity of the criteria. It was concluded, therefore, 
that there was consensus on the draft set of criteria, and these became the final criteria. 
It is important to note that this thesis is interested in the broader topic of policy making 
rather than the actual policy. As will be seen in chapter 4, the policy evaluation literature 
has a strong focus on what can be called policy performance (for example effectiveness 
and efficiency) but also covers evaluation of the policy formulation process as well as policy 
content. The link between evaluation of policy and evaluation of policy making will be 
discussed and a methodology for evaluating policy making will be proposed. This emphasis 
on policy making will allow draft EPPs to be evaluated that would not be the case if the 
emphasis was on actual policy. 
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Evaluating WA environmental policy making — 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 is a detailed evaluation of the EPA’s policy making using the criteria developed in 
chapter 4. The data used were published information relevant to each policy, departmental 
file searches, short interviews with the relevant departmental officers responsible for each 
policy, and long interviews with key policy makers and relevant stakeholders. The purpose 
of the short interviews was to seek background information on individual polices not 
contained in files.  
The long interviews were with the high level policy makers in the relevant agencies as well 
as the key policy stakeholders from other agencies, policy experts and representatives from 
the main NGOs, and covered three broad areas:  
• Which environmental policies did interviewees believed have clearly succeeded or 
failed; 
• Why did the interviewees believe that the policy succeeded or failed; and 
• What were the key factors for successful policy making? 
The interviews also provided a source of material that enriched the discussion on individual 
policies. 
The potential for conflict to be a reason or cause of policy success or failure was not raised 
specifically with interviewees so as to avoid the possibility of leading responses in a 
particular way. Further, the overall proposition and specific hypothesis of this thesis was not 
revealed to interviewees. Consequently, it can be concluded that if conflict was raised by an 
interviewee, it is a significant factor for policy success or failure in the mind of that 
interviewee. 
In general, the questions were open in that interviewees were not asked to comment on 
specific policies provided as a list. Given the open nature of the questions, it can be 
concluded that when an interviewee identified a policy as either succeeding or failing, in 
their mind, success or failure was clear. Further, if an interviewee did not identify a policy, it 
can be concluded that either, in their mind, it did not either clearly succeed or fail, or they 
had no clear view one way or the other. 
Summary 
This study involves a two staged approach, with the first stage being a multi case study 
comparison of the four policy making approaches, and the second stage being a close 
examination of a particular policy making example where conflict is known to be particularly 
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intense. The high level policies of both the EPA and WAPC make up the multi case studies 
stage of this study and policy making in Cockburn Sound is the stage two case study. 
The limited multi case study method was chosen over a quantitative study of many policies 
for two reasons. Firstly, applying a multi-criteria evaluation method limits the number of 
policies that can be studied within the context of a Ph. D, and secondly I have a preference 
for breadth of coverage over precision of a limited number of factors. 
The multi-criteria evaluation method uses environmental performance information to 
determine actual effectiveness where available and qualitative sources of data for the other 
criteria including surrogate measures of effectiveness.  
The validity and reliability of this study was demonstrated through careful design, in 
particular addressing possible concerns about my neutrality. 
The specific design elements of policy evaluation and the multi case study elements of this 
study were described.  
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Chapter 4 – policy making evaluation 
Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to identify a method to determine policy making success that is 
particularly applicable where the level of conflict is significant, and has relevance to the WA 
context. As noted in Chapter 3, the international policy evaluation literature will be reviewed 
first and the findings of that review moderated to fit the WA environmental context using the 
method described in Chapter 3.  
It is important to note that the policy evaluation literature relates to policies that are 
operational (that is, have been finalised and are being implemented). There is a strong 
emphasis on criteria that measure policy performance which covers both effectiveness and 
efficiency measures. As already noted, this thesis covers the broader topic of policy making 
rather than just policies. Consequently, this allows certain draft policies (i.e. those not 
finalised) to be included: notably, those draft policies that attain some status and have some 
impact on agency decision making. Determining policy performance of these draft policies 
presents some interesting, but not insurmountable, challenges, as will be discussed. 
Review of evaluation literature 
Introduction  
Policy evaluation is done, for the most part, to determine whether the policy goals and 
objectives are being met. In practice, it has a range of other benefits including facilitating 
increased learning at an individual and agency level, and facilitating organisational change 
(Poulin, Harris, and Jones 2000). This section examines how policy success and failure has 
been determined in a range of international studies. Whilst the focus is on environmental 
policy evaluation, studies that evaluate other related subjects are included — for example, 
methods used by some funding agencies to evaluate potential projects on possible 
environmental impacts. 
One study has reviewed the general (i.e. not just environmental) policy evaluation literature 
(Thissen and Twaalfhoven 2001). The authors reviewed 33 different texts and journal 
articles and concluded that there are six broad categories of policy evaluation criteria 
depending on the stage of the policy process considered: 
• Input — related to aspects prior to the policy being initiated (e.g. reason for policy 
and availability of data); 
• Content — e.g. appropriateness of the policy subject, validity of methods used; 
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• Process — i.e. the policy formulation process; 
• Results — or specific policy measures; 
• Use — who uses the various policy measures and for what purpose; and 
• Effects — flow–on effect of the policy in other areas and other policies. 
Policy evaluation, therefore, is broader than evaluating just policy content. This is consistent 
with the requirements of this thesis, which is to determine the success of policy making, a 
broader consideration than policy content evaluation. Building on this work, a modified 
categorisation is used in this study to review the literature using the following three aspects 
of environment policy process: 
• The policy formulation process; 
• Policy content; and 
• Policy performance, both direct (performance related to objectives), and ancillary 
impacts (other environmental impacts and broader socio–economic impacts). 
General approaches to evaluation 
In reviewing the literature three general approaches to environmental policy evaluation were 
identified. The first is a general systematic approach to evaluation without setting out 
specific evaluation criteria. For example a study by Bellamy, Walker et al (2001:409) 
examined the requirements for natural resource management evaluation. They used their 
extensive experience in natural resource management to “provide a basis for presenting an 
integrative systems–based framework to guide and structure the evaluation of natural 
resource management policy initiatives. 
No specific generic evaluation criteria were proposed, as they noted that “(e)valuation of 
impact against a single criterion or overly limited set of criteria may miss important benefits 
and lead to significant cost remaining unrecognized” (Bellamy et al. 2001:409). Instead they 
described a framework that enabled evaluation criteria to be identified on a case–by–case 
basis. 
A second approach involves quantifying effectiveness, which is done through a detailed set 
of criteria, actions and indicators that measure success. For example, the Organisation for 
Economic Co–operation and Development (OECD) evaluated the environmental 
performance of member nations. The review focused on the effectiveness of environmental 
policies in the areas of pollution control and nature conservation. The evaluation is based 
on “the degree of achievement of domestic objectives and international commitments” 
(OECD Working Party on Environmental Performance 2000:3). The OECD has developed a 
detailed list of criteria to evaluate member states. For example, two of the criteria applied to 
determine progress made in addressing climate change are: 
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• Fully implement national commitments, such as emission limitation and reduction 
targets, including those established under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and 
• Expand research and assessments on the rate, timing and impacts of climate 
change on technologies to respond to it and continue to support the work of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
The third approach involves specifying a set of criteria that are to be used to compare 
various policy initiatives. These criteria can be both qualitative (degree of political support) 
and quantitative (for example, measures of effectiveness). For example, a study by Janicke 
and Weidner (1995) examined 24 cases of environmental policy world–wide using the 
following criteria: 
• Lasting effect — are the environmental gains short, medium or long term? 
• Bonus effects — are the environmental gains a direct result of the policy or as 
result of other initiatives? 
• Problem shifting — are the environmental gains achieved by shifting problems to 
other sectors? 
• Innovation — are the policy measures about resource saving or end of pipe 
solutions? 
• Efficiency — are the environment gains accompanied by economic benefits as 
well? 
The broad evaluation approach used in this study 
The first approach – the systematic approach to evaluation – is not used in this study 
because whilst it is useful in examining and evaluating individual policies in isolation, it is 
inherently subjective and case–specific, making it difficult to use when comparing a number 
of policies. If it were to be used to evaluate a number of policies, the conclusions about 
success and failure of each policy may be reasonable, but analysis of the differences 
between the policies is more difficult because the methodology used for evaluation would 
likely vary from policy to policy. Comparison would only be possible if a consistent approach 
was applied, which would require the development of a uniform set of evaluation criteria, 
which is the basis of the other two broad approaches. 
As noted in Chapter 4, relying on measures of effectiveness to measure policy success has 
problems and will not be used here. It should also be noted that the social aspects of the 
policy making cannot be ignored where conflict is deeply embedded as part of the policy 
making. It is reasonable, therefore, to also include measures of success on some social 
criteria, for example, reduced conflict.  
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For these reasons, therefore, the broad evaluation approach involving a set of criteria will 
be used in this study. The following section reviews the relevant literature. 
Qualitative criteria case studies review 
Overview 
A total of fifteen case studies using multiple criteria approach were identified, with six being 
from specific agencies, government and non government,2 and nine published in the 
academic literature3. The remainder of this section deals with these fifteen studies. 
Appendix 1 provides the detailed analysis of these studies with only the summary provided 
here. Eleven generic evaluation criteria were derived after analysis of all of these studies, 
as follows: 
• Performance effectiveness — how well the implementation of the policy delivers on 
environmental objectives; 
• Performance efficiency — related to the cost effectiveness of the policy; 
• Content relevance — whether the policy actually addresses the environmental 
issues at stake; 
• Other socio–economic impacts — whether the policy has desirable or undesirable 
effects other than environmental (i.e. social and/or economic); 
• Social equity — related to how the costs and benefits of the policy are distributed 
throughout the community; 
• Legal effectiveness/enforceability — related to the legality and practicality of the 
actions proposed; 
• Measurability — whether the policy contains mechanisms that allow for impacts to 
be measured;  
• Flexibility — whether the policy mechanisms can adapt to changing circumstances;  
• Innovation — whether the policy encourages new and innovative solutions to the 
environmental problems; and 
• Political support — whether the policy gains support from the community, key 
stakeholders and the political process; 
• Other — miscellaneous criteria used not applied in more than one study. 
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2 (McNeely et al. 1990; USEPA 1998; Evaluation Unit of the Joint External Relations Service of the 
European Commission 1999; Monitoring and Evaluation Division of the IUCN 2001; Operations 
Evaluation Department of the World Bank 2001, 2002; European Environmental Agency 1999) 
3 (Barron and Ng 1996; Economou 1992; Janicke and Weidner 1995; Barde and Smith 1997; Hughey 
2000; Cabugueira 2001; Fullerton 2001; Alberini and Segerson 2002; Enzensberger, Wietschel, and 
Rentz 2002) 
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Discussion 
Tables 3 and 4, and Figures 2 and 3 below summarise the results in Appendix 1. Table 3 
and Figure 2 show the total number of times each of the evaluation criteria have been used 
in the studies. They show the number of times each is used in the two types of studies (i.e. 
agency and academic) and the total number of times used. Table 4 and Figure 3 shows the 
number of evaluation criteria applied to each of the three aspects of policy making identified 
earlier.  
Table 3: Summary of criteria used to evaluate environmental policy 
Generic 
criterion 
No. of 
times 
used in 
agency 
studies 
No. of 
agency 
studies 
that used 
criterion 
(6) 
No. of 
times 
used in 
academic 
studies 
No. of 
academic 
studies 
that used 
criterion 
(9) 
Total No. 
of times 
used 
Total No. 
of 
studies 
that used 
criterion 
(15) 
Performance 
effectiveness 
5 5 12 8 17 13 
Performance 
efficiency 
8 5 9 7 17 12 
Content 
relevance 
7 5 2 1 7 6 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
6 5 8 6 14 11 
Social equity 1 1 4 4 5 5 
Legal 
effectiveness/ 
enforceability 
2 1 2 2 4 3 
Measurability 2 2 2 2 4 4 
Flexibility 1 1 4 3 5 4 
Innovation 0 0 3 3 3 3 
Political 
support 
7 5 2 2 9 7 
Other 1 1 2 1 3 2 
 
At first reading it might seem that columns 2 & 3, 4 & 5 and 6 & 7 in Table 3 show the same 
information. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show the number of times that a criterion type has been 
used in total. Some studies have more than one criterion that can be classified under the 
same generic criteria used here (for example four of the six criteria used in Hughey’s (2000) 
study are classified as “performance effectiveness”). Columns 3, 5 and 7 show the number 
of studies that used that type of generic criterion irrespective of how many of these criteria 
each study has. These columns are considered to be a more accurate measure of the 
usefulness and popularity of each generic criteria type and are shown in Figure 2. The 
columns in Table 4 show similar data. Figure 3 showing the number of studies that have 
applied a criterion related to each of the three aspects of policy making.  
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Table 4: Summary of criteria used to evaluate environmental policy in terms of the 
stage of the policy making process applied 
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A number of observations can be made about the above information. First, all of the studies 
use criteria other than effectiveness to determine policy success or failure, with 
(surprisingly) two studies not using effectiveness at all. The clear implication is that policy 
evaluation is considered to be more than just about effectiveness, a point already made 
here.   
Second, there are three criteria that are used by most of the studies: performance 
effectiveness (13/15); performance efficiency (12/15); and other socio–economic impacts 
(11/15). Clearly, effectiveness is a key evaluation criterion and it would be a mistake not to 
include measures of effectiveness in any evaluation. The common use of efficiency criteria 
is significant. Agencies and governments are concerned about the best use of limited 
resources, and consideration needs to be given to the cost implications of policy 
implementation. Questions such as “can other policy measures that are less expensive to 
apply give equivalent environmental outcomes?” and “could the same resources be used 
more effectively solving another environmental problem?” and “will the cost of implementing 
a policy require some trade–offs in relation to environment outcomes?” are important in this 
context. 
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Figure 2: Frequency of evaluation criteria applied across the fifteen studies 
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Figure 3: Numbers of evaluation criteria used at each of the three policy making phases for the fifteen studies 
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These questions are particularly important in biodiversity conservation. Efforts to conserve 
biodiversity often require the purchase and then reservation of areas of bushland in private 
ownership. Bushland in urban areas will be more expensive to purchase than in remote 
rural areas, which means that more bushland can be purchased in the rural areas for the 
same amount of money than in urban areas. However, the bushland available in urban 
areas may have greater biodiversity value than rural bushland. On the other hand, ongoing 
management of urban bushland can be more problematic than rural bushland given the 
proximity to residents and the impacts of excessive human use (trampling, increased fire, 
weed invasion etc.). Decisions on how to spend resources (policy implementation) may 
deliver different environmental outcomes both in the short and long–term. 
The use of other socio–economic factors in environmental policy evaluation may well reflect 
the growing influence of the sustainability debate, where the three pillars of environmental 
protection, social responsibility and economic growth are considered together (Mazza and 
Rydin 1997). Economic considerations typically dominate decision making across a range 
of portfolios with many environmental policies adopting either a traditional expert–driven 
approach or a range of economic instruments to induce environmental change. As Rammel 
and van den Bergh (2003:121) note: “traditional economic theory of environmental policy 
can stimulate unsustainable socio–economic structures and patterns”. It is not surprising 
then that policy makers are becoming concerned about the impacts of environmental 
policies other than just environmental impacts.  
Third, political support is a commonly used criterion, more so in agency studies (5/6) than 
academic studies (2/9). This emphasis in agency studies rather than academic ones likely 
reflects the political sensitivity of agencies and the general apolitical approaches used in 
academic studies. Agencies usually operate in a much more political environment than 
academic researchers and are usually acutely aware of the need to gain stakeholders, 
community and political support for the policies. Political, particularly stakeholder, support is 
often used as a criterion where environmental improvement is not observable or expected 
in the short to medium term and some measure of success is required.  
Fourth, agencies are much more interested in the content relevance of policies (5/6) than 
academic studies (1/9). This is surprising, given that both researchers and agencies should 
be interested in whether or not the policy actually addresses the subject it was designed to 
cover. Evaluation of content is usually easier to do than evaluation of effectiveness, 
particularly where environmental improvement is not observable or expected in the short to 
medium term. Evaluation of content is also about ensuring the policy is relevant given that 
social conditions and the community’s understanding of the environmental conditions may 
change over time.  
Fifth, policy evaluation focuses mostly on the performance (implementation) and policy 
content aspects of policy making, with very few criteria used to evaluate the policy making 
process: all studies used performance criteria (15/15); 12 used criteria to evaluate content; 
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and only 2 used criteria to evaluate policy making. Not surprisingly, all studies had criteria 
that evaluate the direct (environmental) impacts of policies, with 11 also assessing ancillary 
(other environmental and socio–economic) impacts. 
Finally, there is no overall consensus about which criteria to use to evaluate environmental 
policies and which stage or stages of policy making should be evaluated. In many cases the 
criteria applied will depend on which agency is carrying out the evaluation and the purposes 
for the evaluation. For example, funding agencies are more likely to be concerned about 
efficiency measures (i.e. have the funds been spent wisely?) whereas conservation groups 
might be more concerned about effectiveness (i.e. has the policy delivered on its 
environmental objectives?). 
As Thissen and Twaalfhoven (2001) note “differences in the criteria proposed can, to a 
large extent, be attributed to differences in perspectives on what is considered good policy” 
(P. 638). Put another way, the selection of which evaluation criteria to use in different cases 
is dependent upon how the agency or researcher views success and failure, which involves 
subjective, not objective, decision making. 
This clearly suggests that policy evaluation needs to be seen within a broader socio–
economic context. As Thissen and Twaalfhoven (2001) note, policy evaluation shows “the 
dependency of value judgments and associated criteria on context, time and actor–
perspective” (P641). This lack of agreement in the literature about which evaluation criteria 
to apply is unlikely to be a uniquely international phenomena, and it will be interesting to 
see if environmental policy evaluation methods used in WA show the same diversity of 
methodology. 
Conclusions from the international literature 
The review of the literature revealed that there is no consensus about which criteria to apply 
to evaluate environmental policy, suggesting that evaluation is done on a case–by–case 
basis taking into account the local socio–economic context. It is possible, however, to 
identify some criteria that are commonly used, suggesting they have some level of 
acceptance: 
• Performance effectiveness,  
• Performance efficiency,  
• Other socio–economic impacts, and  
• Political support.  
As well, most attention is given to evaluating policy content and performance with little effort 
made to evaluate policy process. 
The first criterion above addresses the fundamental concern for policy making which is that 
the policy should actually lead to environmental improvement or better environmental 
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protection. The second criterion acknowledges that resources in environmental protection 
are always limited and that policy should also be about the best use of limited resources. 
The final two criteria are particularly useful in highly contested environmental policy making 
contexts as they allow for analysis of these non–environmental issues that emerge as part 
of the policy making (other socio–economic impacts) and acknowledge that conflict 
management is likely to express itself through both stakeholder and high level political 
support for the policy. 
It is reasonable to ask at this point “How will each criterion be assessed?” This matter will 
be addressed at length at the end of this chapter, but the short answer is that it will be done 
in a qualitative manner by examining the data available. The next section of this chapter 
examines how environmental policy evaluation has been carried out in WA. 
Environmental policy evaluation in WA  
Context  
The following discussion firstly examines how environmental policy evaluation has been 
carried out in practice in WA through an examination of the relevant documentation. 
Unfortunately, most of these documents did not describe how any policy evaluation was 
carried out, and it was necessary to supplement this information with interviews with the key 
policy makers from each agency (the EPA and WAPC) to clarify the nature and extent of 
policy evaluation carried out.    
Documented policy evaluation in WA 
This section examines how evaluations of environmental policies have been, and are being, 
carried out. An examination of the relevant documentation revealed that neither the EPA 
nor the WAPC carries out formal evaluations; instead both agencies carry out reviews of 
existing policies that have been in operation for some time. The evaluation is embedded as 
part of that review and not a discrete process. Consequently, the evaluations have to be 
inferred from the documentation examined as part of this study, which revealed that only six 
EPA and three WAPC environmental policies have been subject to review and some form 
of evaluation. The six EPA policies are all Environmental Protection Policies (EPPs) and the 
WAPC policies are two State Planning Policies (SPPs) and one Region Strategy. They are: 
• The 1992 EPP for the Goldfields Residential Areas controlling Sulphur Dioxide 
emissions from industries as they affect the residential area –Goldfields air EPP; 
• The 1992 EPP for Kwinana controlling Sulphur Dioxide and dust from industries as 
they affect the residential area – Kwinana air EPP; 
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• The 1989 and 1993 EPPs to control Ozone depleting substances – Ozone EPP; 
• The 1992 EPP protecting certain wetlands (lakes) on the Swan Coastal Plain – 
Lakes EPP; 
• The 1992 EPP to protect water quality in the Peel Inlet–Harvey Estuary – Peel–
Harvey EPP; 
• The 1992 SPP to control land uses on Crown Land over the Gnangara groundwater 
mound – Gnangara SPP; 
• The 1997 SPP defining land uses buffer distances for a range of industrial land 
uses – State Industrial Buffers SPP; and 
• The 1996 Gascoyne Coast Region Strategy, setting out a broad land use strategy 
for the Gascoyne region. 
The information used for this examination included published reports, interviews with the 
officers responsible for the policies and searches of the relevant agency files. It should be 
noted here that all of these evaluations were carried out by the agency which produced the 
policy and there have been no independent evaluations of any environmental policies in 
WA, although the review of the Peel–Harvey EPP did received some independent advice on 
the effectiveness of the policy. 
The key questions in regard to the review/evaluation by the agency are: 
1. Did the review of each policy also include an evaluation?  
2. If so, how was the evaluation carried out, in particular –  
a. which stages of the policy making process were evaluated? 
b. what policy evaluation criteria were used?  
3. What were the conclusions of any evaluation? 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 below summarise this analysis for each policy. Table 5 shows which 
aspects of policy making were evaluated (i.e. process, content and performance), whereas 
Table 6 shows the evaluation criteria used. Table 7 summarises the conclusions of the 
evaluations for each policy as assessed by the agency. Detailed descriptions of these 
policies are not included here as these are more relevant to the discussion in the next 
chapter4. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Appendix 3 contains important background information on each policy. 
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Table 5: Summary of Western Australian environmental policy evaluation – aspects 
of policy making evaluated 
Policy aspect 
evaluated/Policy 
Process Content Performance 
Goldfields air EPP  ! ! 
Kwinana air EPP  ! ! 
Ozone EPP (both) ! ! ! 
Lakes EPP  ! ! ! 
Peel–Harvey EPP  ! ! 
Gnangara SPP  !  
State Industrial Buffers 
SPP 
 !  
Gascoyne Coast Region 
Strategy 
 !  
Totals 2 8 5 
 
Table 6: Summary of Western Australian environmental policy evaluation – criteria 
applied in evaluations 
Evaluation 
criterion/Policy 
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Goldfields air EPP !   !        
Kwinana air EPP !   !   !     
Ozone EPP (both) !   !        
Lakes EPP !   !        
Peel–Harvey EPP !   !   !     
Gnangara SPP    !        
State Industrial 
Buffers SPP 
           
Gascoyne Coast 
Region Strategy 
           
Totals 5 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
!
! %&'!
Table 7: Summary of policy evaluation by the agency and the critical analysis of that 
evaluation 
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. First, of the two 
agencies, the EPA makes a greater effort to evaluate its policies. Second, in general, 
evaluation is mostly a review of policy content, but some policies are also evaluated on 
policy performance (effectiveness). Of the five EPPs reviewed, effectiveness was part of the 
review for all of the policies, with the Goldfields, Kwinana and Ozone EPPs having 
demonstrated effectiveness. The EPA found it impossible to determine the effectiveness of 
the Lakes EPP, and the Peel–Harvey EPP had limited success in meeting its objectives 
(effectiveness). 
Third, the WAPC does not carry out formal policy evaluations but relies heavily on 
stakeholders to indicate whether a policy is working or not. The WAPC uses two measures 
as de facto effectiveness measures: audits of recommendations and actions, and 
consistency of downstream decision making, although no formalised process is in place to 
track these decisions. Fourth, neither agency carries out a formal evaluation of the policy 
making processes. 
Finally, neither agency was prepared to conclude that any of the policies reviewed here had 
been unsuccessful, although only one policy (the original Kwinana air EPP) was deemed to 
be successful outright with no modifications required. This is probably not surprising as the 
agency doing the evaluation was the agency responsible for the policy, and none of the 
policies have undergone an independent evaluation. 
Given the limited nature and extent of policy evaluations carried out in WA, it was decided 
to interview the key policy makers in each agency to get a better understanding of how 
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each agency carries out policy evaluations. The results of these interviews are reported 
below. 
Interviews with the key policy makers 
Introduction 
As noted above, these interviews were carried out as part of the method to establish the 
evaluation criteria to be used here. However, the interviews with the key policy makers in 
both the EPA and WAPC also revealed some useful information about the nature and 
extent of their agency’s current policy evaluation practices and is examined here. The 
people interviewed had primary responsibility for policy making and were either on the 
boards of the EPA and WAPC or were the senior officers responsible for policy in the two 
Departments that support those agencies (the Department of Environment and 
Conservation [DEC] and the Department for Planning and Infrastructure [DPI]). 
EPA 
Below is a sample of the views of the key policy makers in the EPA regarding how the 
agency does policy evaluation. 
We haven’t really done any sound evaluations of EPPs. I mean, we do reviews of 
EPPs, but I don’t think they are evaluations. And I think that it would be valuable to 
actually establish some small committees of enquiry in relation to the seven year 
reviews. To actually make a report on that EPP and on its failings and its benefits. 
Because I think that would help the system. But you see, what we tend to do is we’ve 
got an EPP coming up, we’ve got six months, let’s roll it over. 
I don’t think it [evaluation] is that difficult to do at the policy level. What is difficult is to 
convince people that they should do it, and there are two reasons. They have got to 
budget for it, it costs effort, money and time to do it in the first place. And secondly, it 
exposes the effectiveness of the instrument. As I said earlier, public policy making is 
more about having one, rather than seeing if it is effective or not, by and large" I 
don’t think it’s difficult, but I think it’s been done very poorly across the board, that’s 
my summary statement. 
This suggests two things. First, policy evaluation by the EPA involves largely reviewing the 
policy content and mostly does not go into broader questions like effectiveness and 
evaluation of the policy formulation process. When Subject 1 refers to evaluation – “I don’t 
think they are evaluations” – he/she is referring to determining policy “failings and its 
benefits”, which is another way of saying policy effectiveness. 
Second, there are three significant barriers to the EPA doing more thorough policy 
evaluation. The first one is time: whilst the EPA is required by law to review EPPs every 
! %&N!
seven years, in most cases the policy review process starts very late in the statutory cycle, 
meaning that there is usually only time to evaluate the contents of the policy. This limited 
evaluation does not deal with broader evaluation issues including policy effectiveness, and 
usually results in little, if any, content change: “we’ve got an EPP coming up, we’ve got six 
months, let’s roll it over.” 
The second barrier is lack of resources: as one interviewee noted when expanding on why 
it is difficult to do policy evaluations “it costs effort, money and time to do it in the first 
place”, suggesting that they don’t have resources available to do evaluations. The third 
barrier is clearly a political one: there is a risk that a proper evaluation may actually show 
that a policy has failed and not delivered on its policy objectives. Policy making is, therefore, 
“more about having one rather than seeing if it is effective or not, by and large”. 
To sum up, consistent with the conclusions of the evaluations of the individual policies, the 
EPA policy evaluations are limited in scope to a review of their contents, with some effort 
made to measure effectiveness in some cases, which is largely because of limited time and 
resources available. There is a reluctance to determine policy effectiveness, because the 
results of such an analysis may prove to be politically sensitive – i.e. the policy may not be 
working and achieving its objectives. However, as shown above, despite this reluctance, all 
of the EPPs reviewed have included considerations of policy effectiveness, with the limited 
scope and technical EPPs receiving the most thorough effectiveness evaluations. 
Effectiveness evaluations of the EPA's other policies has not been done. 
WAPC 
Turning to the WAPC, here is a sample of the comments of the key policy makers in that 
agency regarding their policy evaluation. 
At the moment it’s a judgement that people will make about whether they think this is 
good. We don’t actually have any formal, to my knowledge, way of judging that other 
than, I suppose, you run a review process, and you take comments and you get 
input. So, people will tell you if its good or not " At the moment, we don’t have 
anything quantitative to say, we’ve got x% of Schemes and y% of decisions have 
been made in accordance with this policy, and the result is we’ve got a better 
environment in the end because we can measure that. 
Really, there’s no system for monitoring, because the policy is essentially restrictive. 
So, what would happen if a proposal came along for residential development outside 
residential zoned land it would be refused. We wouldn’t necessarily count the number 
of refusals we got, it would simply be refused. If it’s within residential zoned land then 
the responsibility would rest with Local Government to impose the condition because 
the Commission isn’t the development control authority. Now, we haven’t at his stage 
thought of having a system for counting how many applications for residential 
development are lodged and whether the condition has been imposed. There may be 
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some value in that, but essentially, their only value there would be if there is likely to 
be a deferential application of the policy but we’re not anticipating that that would be 
the case. 
It’s quite difficult, because I don’t think we actually sit back and worry about it. 
Usually, if it’s not successful, we have to re–do it, or revise it in a rush as happens. 
Maybe every year we could do a general stock take. It’s difficult to envisage a 
comprehensive way of doing it without doing a study again.  
I suppose the difficulty with determining whether these things have been successful 
is because of the time scale involved " It’s very hard to measure really success in a 
quantifiable way. As I said right at the start, we also have a problem with timescales 
" we do the audit for the State Planning strategy because we are required to, but 
that is very much a case of “that’s been done, tick it off, that hasn’t been done” or 
whatever it is. It isn’t measuring at all whether having responded to the 
recommendations the response was good, bad or indifferent.  
Time is another factor as well. If you are talking about a strategy and land use that 
has got a horizon of 10 to 1,000 years you got to have time to reflect as to whether it 
has been successful or otherwise. What you are really measuring in the first few 
years is the unrest really. If there isn’t any, then you presume that it must be OK, but 
it’s not necessarily OK. If there is unrest then you know. But I guess that that is a fact.  
Three conclusions can be drawn from these comments. First, the WAPC policy evaluation 
process is based on the views of stakeholders and the community about whether they 
believe the policy is working or not. 
We don’t actually have any formal, to my knowledge, way of judging that other than, I 
suppose, you run a review process, and you take comments and you get input. So, 
people will tell you if it is good or not. 
What you are really measuring in the first few years is the unrest really. If there isn’t 
any, then you presume that it must be OK, but it’s not necessarily OK. If there is 
unrest then you know. 
This suggests that the WAPC has two different ways in which policy reviews are initiated. 
The first is an agency initiated review process where the community is invited to express a 
view about the policy. If the comments on the policy are generally favourable, then the 
policy is regarded as being successful and requires minimal change. The second process is 
where stakeholders and the community express a clear view that the policy is not working 
and they seek a review of the policy. The review only happens because the community and 
stakeholders seek a change to the policy. In both these cases, the key measure of policy 
success is whether the stakeholders and the broader community believe that the policy has 
worked or not. This is the same as the “political support” generic criterion established earlier 
in this chapter. 
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Second, whilst political support is used as a measure of effectiveness, it is really a 
perception of effectiveness only and the WAPC makes no obvious effort to actually 
determine effectiveness. WAPC policy makers acknowledge that they do not actually 
determine policy effectiveness and argue that the key barrier to measuring effectiveness is 
the implementation timescale for their policies. 
I suppose the difficulty with determining whether these things have been successful 
is because of the time scale involved. 
Time is another factor as well. If you are talking about a strategy and land use that 
has got a horizon of 10 to 1,000 years you got to have time to reflect as to whether it 
has been successful or otherwise. 
The third conclusion is that as well as using political support as a measure of success, the 
WAPC also uses two other key measures of success: 
• The results of an audit of the policy recommendations and actions; and 
• Decision making is being carried out consistent with the policy. 
Whilst the WAPC is doing some audits of policy recommendations and actions — “we do 
the audit for the State Planning strategy because we are required to, but that is very much a 
case of “that’s been done, tick it off, that hasn’t been done’ or whatever it is” – it has not set 
up any formal mechanisms to check that downstream decision making is consistent with 
policies — “At the moment, we don’t have anything quantitative to say, we’ve got x% of 
Schemes and y% of decisions have been made in accordance with this policy’ "”. 
To sum up, when the WAPC carries out a policy review, it uses “political support” as a 
surrogate for policy effectiveness. The long timeframes for most planning policies is the 
reason WAPC policy makers choose not to do proper effectiveness evaluation. Broader 
policy evaluation is attempted using consistency of downstream decision making and audits 
of the policies’ recommendations and actions as measures of effectiveness. 
Results of the interviews  
Introduction 
Responses from step 2 were placed, where possible, into one of the eleven categories used 
earlier in this chapter (Table 2). Where criteria could not be placed into one of these 
categories they were either placed into the other category, or where a significant number of 
interviewees identified a particular criterion, this was included as a new criterion.  
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Results 
Table 8 below sums up the analysis of the interviews following step 2 of the Delphi process 
and provides a comparison to the analysis of international studies covered earlier in this 
chapter. Discussion about comparisons to the international literature will be made later. 
Table 8: Summary of criteria that interviewees would use to evaluate environmental 
policy compared to the international studies 
Generic criterion No. interviewees who would 
use criterion (total 15) 
No. studies that used 
criterion (Total 15) 
Performance effectiveness 9 13 
Performance efficiency 2 12 
Other socio–economic impacts 2 11 
Political support 11 7 
Content relevance 6 6 
Social equity 2 5 
Measurability 0 4 
Flexibility 1 4 
Legal effectiveness/ 
Enforceability 
0 3 
Innovation 1 3 
Other 14 2 
Significant other criterion 
Changing downstream 
decision making consistent 
with policy 
11 0 
Raising awareness of the 
issue 
5 0 
Audit of implementation 
actions 
5 0 
 
It should be noted that the 14 other criteria listed in Table 8 were all different.  
Table 9 below provides a more detailed analysis of this data. It shows the evaluation criteria 
used in actual environmental policy evaluations, the views of the key policy makers in the 
EPA and WAPC, the views of relevant stakeholders and, finally, the review of 
environmental policy making worldwide. It should be noted that in this analysis the data for 
the key policy makers has not been quantified but the results are shown as an agency view 
about the criteria used in evaluations. 
Table 9 and a detailed analysis of the interviews formed the basis of formulating a draft set 
of evaluation criteria used here. The discussion below sets out that analysis. 
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Table 9: More detailed analysis of the evaluation criteria, interviewee data and 
international studies 
Generic criterion No. of times 
criterion 
used in 
actual 
environment
al policy 
reviews 
Criteria 
preferred 
by the key 
policy 
makers in 
the EPA 
and WAPC 
No. WA policy 
makers/stakeholder
s who would use 
criterion (total 15) 
No. 
internationa
l studies 
that used 
criterion 
(Total 15) 
Performance 
effectiveness 
5 ! 9 13 
Performance 
efficiency 
0 - 2 12 
Other socio–
economic impacts 
0 - 2 11 
Political support 1 ! 11 7 
Content relevance 6 ! 6 6 
Social equity 0 - 2 5 
Measurability 0 - 0 4 
Flexibility 0 - 1 4 
Legal effectiveness/ 
Enforceability 
2 - 0 3 
Innovation 0 - 1 3 
Other 0 - 14 2 
Significant other 
criterion 
0 - 0 0 
Changing 
downstream decision 
making consistent 
with policy 
0 ! 11 0 
Raising awareness of 
the issue 
0 - 5 0 
Audit of 
implementation 
actions 
0 ! 5 0 
 
Analysis 
A number of conclusions and discussion points can be drawn from the information in Table 
9 and analysis of the interviews. The first relates to the use of effectiveness as an 
evaluation criterion. Of the top four criteria used in international studies only performance 
effectiveness and political support are in the top criteria as seen by policy makers and 
stakeholders in WA. As noted previously, the EPA includes effectiveness in its policy 
evaluations, but not the WAPC. This difference is also reflected in the interviewees’ 
responses on this issue in that all of the environmental policy makers from the EPA, the 
environmental community, industry and consultants believed that effectiveness should be 
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included as a measure of policy success, whereas the planners preferred other measures. 
These responses below typify the differences. 
You really get down to the objectives of the policy and how well it met its objectives 
" That’s the more quantitative side of policy. If in Cockburn Sound the objective is to 
reduce concentrations of nutrients 20% over 20 years and you only achieve 10% 
then that’s obviously an indication of the effectiveness of the policy  
- from EPA policy maker. 
How do I measure success? It would be easy to say how many widgets are saved, 
and to a certain extent that’s it. Yes, to a certain extent it's how many wetlands or 
whatever have been saved. 
- from the environmental community. 
The success of the policy other " is really measured by, well, I think it really goes 
back to acceptance, because " if, for example, a policy is patently not working then 
there would be calls from stakeholders or others to change it ... So, I think it really 
goes back to that point about acceptance, recognition and consideration by 
stakeholders as to the effectiveness of the policy. I think this is part of the nature of 
Planning because it’s so broad and general, to introduce other than broad qualitative 
measures would be very very difficult. Not only in measuring the effectiveness of 
policy once in effect, but also in measuring the likely effectiveness of a policy when it 
is being developed, the reaction and views of others is absolutely critical. ( 
- WAPC policy maker. 
This suggests that there is a fundamental difference between the purely environmental 
policies of the EPA and land use policies and strategies of the WAPC with significant 
environmental focuses. Land use policies and strategies are likely to be complex covering a 
range of environmental issues as well as broader socio–economic issues. Environmental 
policies, on the other hand are more likely to focus on a single environmental issue. This 
complexity of land use policies and strategies makes it more difficult to measure to set up 
effectiveness measures. 
It should be noted that while most of the environmental interviewees wanted effectiveness 
measures as part of policy evaluation, not all EPA policies included direct measures of 
effectiveness in evaluations. This is because some of the EPA policies are more complex 
than others, and as one interviewee noted: 
There are some policies that are narrow and deal with something specifically, there 
are other policies, high level policies, that more lead to broad policy change and 
broad strategic direction and things and they’re a bit more subtle about how you 
measure those  
- from an environmental agency. 
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Another complication is that some EPA policies apply in areas where there are other 
policies and management measures at work, which makes it difficult to identify what has 
been the cause of any environmental improvement (effectiveness), for example: 
Let’s look at Jandakot mound [policy] " It’s not the only instrument working there of 
course, you’ve got all the Groundwater Regs as well. Picking up the signal in the 
noise is pretty hard to do. 
Several interviewees also noted the problem of timescales in measuring effectiveness as 
being a reason that other measures of success are needed, for example: 
I suppose the difficulty with determining whether these things have been successful 
is because of the time scale involved. I’m making that comment because the regional 
strategies that we’ve done " if you think about it we have only been doing them for 
about 15 years. ... The vast majority of the regional plans that now exist were, 
basically, done from the beginning of the 1990’s onwards. So, I’m mentioning that 
because most of them have a timeframe of somewhere around the 20–30 year mark 
looking forward, and for a lot of the policy prescriptions they are putting in place and 
the recommendations and actions, and all that sort of thing, it would be difficult to 
judge whether they are being successful or unsuccessful for some years after they 
actually start being implemented. The point I’m making is that at this stage in their 
lifecycle we can see whether there is something fairly obviously going right or wrong 
but the ultimate proof of the pudding, I would suggest, is some years away with most 
of them. 
This is certainly a reasonable point, and the move by the EPA to carry out State of the 
Environment reporting is a more strategic way of addressing effectiveness in overall 
environmental planning, policy making and management. As noted by the EPA, the key 
purposes of State of the Environment reporting are: 
State of the Environment Reporting (SOER) is an informing system. Its key function 
is to communicate credible, timely and accessible information about the condition of 
the environment to decision makers and the community " The SOER also analyses 
the effectiveness of policies and programs designed to respond to changes in the 
environment. This improves the targeting of resources to achieve better 
environmental outcomes.  
(EPA 2005) 
SOER becomes a more systematic way of measuring effectiveness, not just of what the 
EPA is responsible for but the sum of the environmental planning, policy making and 
management carried out by government, organisations and individuals. The effectiveness of 
individual policies within that holistic framework is more difficult to determine. 
These constraints on carrying out effectiveness evaluation have lead to the criterion 
stakeholder and political support being used as a surrogate for effectiveness. This is much 
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easier to determine through the use of surveys and analysis of pubic submissions. As well, 
stakeholders can be specifically asked whether they believe that the policy has been 
effective in delivering positive environmental outcomes. Of course, it can also be argued 
that the lack of good effectiveness evaluations shows a lack of sophistication in policy 
development and evaluation. As noted previously, policy makers may not want to know how 
effective a particular policy is, as it could either be bad news (any environmental 
improvement may not be real but a perception only) or raise awkward questions about best 
use of resources and whether other policy options should be tried instead.   
The second conclusion is that, unlike in the international studies, WA environmental policy 
makers, across the spectrum, use the criterion changing down–stream decision making 
consistent with policy as an important measure of success. This involves two matters: 
whether the agency itself, through its own subsequent decision making uses the policy and 
secondly, whether other agencies and industry that are affected by the policy change their 
decision making to be consistent with the policy. As one planner noted of decision making 
in the agency in relation to a policy considered to be unsuccessful: 
Our successful policies are ones that we use all the time. There are some policies 
that are done in our policy manual that nobody uses. It was just something that 
seemed to be good at the time. For instance, like planning over sensitive water 
management areas which was done in an era when it was important to make a 
statement about that. We produced a policy on it that’s in our manual, but nobody 
takes any account of.  
Policies that require other agencies to change decision making are considered higher level 
policies. This is particularly true of planning policies and strategies: 
It’s very hard to measure real success in a quantifiable way " but if you want to use 
just a couple of measures, and these are more qualitative measures rather than 
quantitative measures, it really is the extent to which the recommendations from 
strategies get adopted through local Town Planning Schemes (a WAPC policy 
maker) 
It could be argued that the fact that a policy gets used and changes down–stream decision 
making is really a measure of political support, in that if the policy has stakeholder support it 
will get used by other agencies in their own decision making. In this way, it is also a 
surrogate measure of policy effectiveness in that changing down–stream decision making 
can be seen as a positive outcome in that the policy is being implemented and 
environmental protection or improvement should follow. 
A third conclusion that can be drawn is that WA environmental policy makers and 
stakeholders show little interest in the other two top four criteria used in international studies 
– performance efficiency and other socio–economic impacts. The lack of interest in 
performance efficiency likely reflects the lack of emphasis on effectiveness evaluation. 
Efficiency in economic terms can be seen as “the extent to which the instrument has 
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enabled a more cost–effective achievement of policy objectives than some alternative 
measure’ (Barde and Smith 1997:24). In the absence of being able to determine 
effectiveness it is not possible to determine efficiency.  
The lack of interest in other socio–economic impacts is probably not surprising for the policy 
makers in the EPA, but is a surprising view from the planners who normally have to balance 
a range of competing interests in developing a policy or strategy. One environmental 
consultant noted of Bush Forever (a WAPC policy): 
I don’t know that the social impacts have been properly evaluated, except from a 
minority political perspective. I don’t think the economics are right. 
Finally, there are two other criteria not given attention in the international studies but are 
rated moderately highly by interviewees, being raising awareness of the issue and audit of 
implementation actions. Raising awareness relates to the educative benefits of developing 
and creating a policy, for example: 
I think the water quality ones like Peel–Harvey and Swan–Canning have succeeded 
to the point of helping change the climate of how things are done5. For example the 
combination of the EPP and SPP in Peel–Harvey has helped changed the way things 
get looked at in the Peel–Harvey catchment.  
The buffers worked because it raised the issue in the Planning system, its education 
value, and it’s been drawn on in a couple of cases.  
The first thing they [policies] do is lift awareness, that is the critical first step, and we’ll 
take that and we’ll be thankful for it. 
To sum up, the three main criteria preferred for use in evaluating policy by environmental 
policy makers and stakeholders in WA are changing downstream decision making 
consistent with policy, political support and policy effectiveness. Despite effectiveness being 
an important evaluation criterion for WA environmental policy makers and stakeholders, not 
a lot of work has been done in determining policy effectiveness. It was suggested, 
therefore, that the criteria political support and influence on downstream decision making 
are used by policy makers as de facto or surrogate measures of effectiveness. 
Identifying evaluation criteria 
This brings us finally to a discussion as to which criteria should be used to evaluate 
environmental policy making in WA in highly contested contexts. It should be remembered 
that the criteria will be used to evaluate the policy making of some draft policies, and this 
will constrain the use of some possible criteria or at least require some modification as to 
how to apply them.  
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5 This can be interpreted as a measure of success – the degree to which the problem is seen by 
people, as influenced by the policy 
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First, it is clear that policy effectiveness should be included as a criterion. For simple 
environment policies being implemented with limited scope and straightforward 
implementation mechanisms, quantitative effectiveness should be used: i.e. that there 
should be a measurable improvement in the environment to the extent set out in the policy. 
Quantitative measures of effectiveness for more complex polices are more problematic, and 
it is considered that the arguments made earlier in this chapter in this regard have merit. 
The uses of quantitative measures for draft policies are even more problematic. Therefore it 
is proposed that for these policies, where either any environmental improvement would take 
many years to be observed, and/or the implementation mechanisms are complex involving 
a number of different agencies, or implementation has yet to occur (draft policies) then the 
impact on agency decision making will be used as a surrogate of policy effectiveness.  This 
criterion is titled changing downstream decision making consistent with policy. The 
argument that it is difficult to measure actual environmental improvement and then tie it 
directly to the policy, is a compelling one, particularly for draft policies, but clearly some 
measure of effectiveness is needed. Changing downstream decision making consistent with 
policy’ has two aspects that reflect policy effectiveness as already noted. First, where other 
agencies adopt their own policies and decision making to be consistent with the overall 
policy, then environmental protection is more likely, provided that policy content is 
appropriate. Second, appropriate action by these agencies shows a level of political support 
for the policy which reflects confidence in the policy’s likely effectiveness. This latter point 
has resonance with the next criterion. This argument also holds true for draft policies, 
especially draft EPPs: as already noted in Chapter 1, draft EPPs attain an automatic level of 
authority given the high level statutory nature of any final EPP, and because most draft 
EPPs are drawn from the EPA’s project EIA work they gain of level of endorsement 
because of those assessments. 
It could be argued that changing downstream decision making consistent with policy is not 
strictly policy effectiveness as it is normally applied in the literature as measured 
environmental improvement. For clarity, this criterion will be titled policy–making 
performance, which will have two possible measures: effectiveness or changing 
downstream decision making, the choice of which depends on the nature of the policy and 
whether it is a final or draft policy. 
There is widespread support both internationally and with the WA environmental policy 
community for the use of the criterion political support and it is therefore proposed to be 
used here. Political support can be determined in several ways, notably: the ease with 
which the policy is finalised; the views of the policy making community; and the views of the 
key stakeholders. As already noted, to some extent, political support reflects a general view 
that the policy is or will actually deliver a good environmental outcome (i.e. it will be 
effective). This criterion should, however, be seen as broader and therefore different from 
policy effectiveness. Political support reflects on the policy formulation process, an area of 
policy making not well evaluated. As already argued in this thesis, appropriate and 
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comprehensive participation during the formulation of the policy not only ensures political 
support, it also ensures that the content of the policy addresses the environmental issues 
and community and stakeholder concerns. Participation also ensures that the best available 
information is provided to policy makers. 
The third criterion proposed here is content relevance. Clearly, the agencies already do a 
lot of work when they review policies to assess content relevance, which suggests that it is 
relatively easy to do. It also just makes sense: it’s important that the policy has content 
relevant to the problem at hand. Evaluating content relevance needs to be done carefully, 
particularly if the evaluation is carried out several years after the policy was finalised. Two 
questions need to be asked: was the content relevant for the time it was written, and, is the 
content still relevant today? The first question is actually about the success of the policy at 
the time it was in use, and the second question is more about the relevance of the content 
to today’s context. This takes us back to a point made in the Introduction, that the policy 
success or failure in cases where effectiveness cannot be easily demonstrated can be 
subjective, and, as well, may vary as the social contexts changes over time. It can be 
argued that a policy’s content was appropriate for the time that the policy was in use (i.e. 
was successful) but that it needs to be amended to reflect changes that have occurred 
since that time, both in relation to information available and the socio–economic context. 
The original 1989 Ozone Depleting Substances EPP, as discussed in the next chapter, is a 
good example of this.  
The final criterion recommended here is other socio–economic impacts. Whilst few 
environmental policy makers and stakeholders in WA have given much attention to this 
criterion, it is difficult to argue against its inclusion given its broad use internationally. It was 
noted earlier that policy evaluation in WA is not well developed, and one way that it can 
improve is to look at this issue of unintended consequences. Measuring these impacts may 
not be simple, but it is likely that stakeholders in a particular environmental policy will raise 
concerns about this issue (see discussion on the Lakes/Wetland EPP in Chapter 5 as an 
example). 
As well, the criterion other socio–economic impacts is particularly relevant to highly 
contested policy making contexts. Reducing conflict and social learning are important 
outcomes of policy making in these contexts and should be included in evaluations. 
It is worth finishing with a discussion on why some of the criteria have not been included. 
First, one of the most used criteria in international literature, performance efficiency has not 
been included, largely because of the difficulty in determining efficiency without doing 
quantitative policy effectiveness for all policies. As already noted, many environmental 
policies, and most of the more recent ones with highly contested contexts, are complex, 
both in terms of the issues involved and the means of implementation. Further, it is highly 
unlikely that environmental improvement will be seen in the short to medium terms. It is 
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difficult, and probably unfair to place these policies under the sort of political pressure that 
would follow, should economic efficiency need to be measured. 
The two criteria that had moderate support with policy makers and stakeholders in WA — 
raising awareness of the issue and audit of implementation actions — were also excluded. 
The first was excluded because raising awareness can be seen as an added benefit of the 
policy rather than a measure of success; further, it is difficult to actually measure. The 
second was excluded because auditing is a bookkeeping process, and the real actions that 
are relevant to the success or failure of the policy are whether other agencies and decision 
makers actually change their own policies and decisions. It is also relatively simple to do, 
and its inclusion as a measure of policy success could encourage agencies to do the easy 
work and avoid the real issues of policy evaluation. 
To sum up, the criteria recommended for environmental policy making evaluation in this 
study are: 
• Policy–making performance  
o for simple limited–scope policies that have been finalised and which have 
simple implementation measures — policy effectiveness or quantitative 
environmental improvement consistent with the policy objectives will be 
used, 
o for complex policies with long time frames for implementation and/or 
complex implementation mechanism, and for draft policies – downstream 
decision making is consistent with policy or draft policy will be used; 
• Political support — any of 
o the ease with which the policy is finalised, if at all,  
o the views of the policy making community, and  
o the views of the key stakeholders; 
• Content relevance (taking into account the appropriate socio–economic context); 
and 
• Other socio–economic impacts. 
The final step was to then send these draft criteria back to the individuals interviewed as 
part of this work to see feedback. As noted in Chapter 3, none of the individuals made any 
comment on these criteria, and it assumed that a consensus had been reached that these 
criteria were acceptable. 
A final question remains: how should these criteria be used in determining policy making 
success or failure? Put another way, does an evaluation need to show a positive outcome 
for all of the criteria for the policy making to be considered successful? It is intended that 
these criteria be seen as critical descriptors of success rather than determinants of success. 
For example, if an evaluation shows positive outcomes for the first three criteria but 
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negative outcomes on the last criteria, then that policy making can be said to be successful 
in that it delivers on performance,  has political support and is relevant to the environmental 
issue of concern, but has been unsuccessful in that it has some socio–economic costs. This 
produces a policy making evaluation process that highlights the key areas of successful 
policy making rather than allowing for some absolute statement of success or failure. It is 
argued here that these four criteria are the most critical for successful policy making. These 
criteria are, therefore, qualitative descriptors of success rather than quantitative measures 
of success. 
Summary 
The international literature on policy evaluation focuses on three aspects of policy making: 
• The policy formulation process; 
• Policy content; and 
• Policy performance, both direct (performance on objectives), and ancillary impacts 
(other environmental impacts and broader socio–economic impacts). 
Three broad approaches to evaluation are used: 
• A general systematic approach to evaluation without using fixed evaluation criteria, 
which was used primarily to evaluate single policies rather than a number of 
policies at one time; 
• Quantifying policy effectiveness; and  
• Specifying a set of qualitative criteria that are to be used to compare various policy 
initiatives. 
The third approach would seem most suitable for use here where the highly contested 
policy making context is studied. 
Whilst no consensus exists about which criteria to apply to evaluate environmental policy, 
four criteria were most commonly used, suggesting they have some acceptance in the 
environmental policy evaluation community: 
• performance effectiveness,  
• performance efficiency,  
• other socio–economic impacts, and  
• political support.  
Most attention is given to evaluating policy content and performance with little effort made 
to evaluate policy formulation process. 
In WA, nine policies have had some level of evaluation carried out (six by the EPA and 
three by the WAPC), and each evaluation was carried out by the agency that actually 
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developed the policy: that is, there have been no independent evaluations carried out. The 
review of this work allowed the following conclusions to be drawn: 
• Of the two agencies (EPA and WAPC), the EPA makes a greater effort to evaluate 
its policies; 
• Evaluation is mostly a review of policy content, but some policies had limited 
evaluations of policy performance (effectiveness); 
• The WAPC does not carry out formal policy evaluations; 
• Neither agency carries out a formal evaluation of the policy making processes; and 
• Neither agency was prepared to conclude that any of the policies reviewed had 
been unsuccessful. 
This analysis was followed up with a series of interviews with the key policy makers from 
these agencies and the following additional conclusions can be drawn: 
• Policy evaluation by the EPA involves largely reviewing the policy content and 
mostly does not go into broader evaluation questions like effectiveness; 
• There are three significant barriers to the EPA doing more thorough policy 
evaluation – time constraints, resource constraints, and that policy evaluation is not 
seen as having a high political priority; 
• The WAPC policy evaluation process is based on the views of stakeholders and the 
community about whether they believe the policy is working or not; 
• The WAPC uses political support as a measure of effectiveness, but it is really a 
perception of effectiveness only and the WAPC makes no obvious effort to actually 
determine effectiveness; 
• The key barrier to the WAPC improving its policy evaluation is the long timeframes 
of these policies and the difficulties in seeing environmental improvements in the 
short to medium term; and 
• The WAPC relies heavily on stakeholders to indicate whether a policy is working or 
not, and two de facto measures of effectiveness – audits of recommendations and 
actions, and consistency of downstream decision making, although no formalised 
process is in place to track these decisions 
Interviews with policy experts in WA were then used to arrive at a set of policy making 
evaluation criteria. Following that work, these criteria are recommended for use in 
evaluating policy making: 
• Policy–making performance  
o for simple limited–scope policies that have been finalised and which have 
simple implementation measures — policy effectiveness or quantitative 
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environmental improvement consistent with the policy objectives will be 
used, 
o for complex policies with long time frames for implementation and/or 
complex implementation mechanism, and for draft policies – downstream 
decision making consistent with policy or draft policy will be used; 
• Political support — any of 
o the ease with which the policy is finalised if at all,  
o the views of the policy making community, and  
o the views of the key stakeholders; 
• Content relevance (taking into account the appropriate socio–economic context); 
and 
• Other socio–economic impacts. 
The final question of how should these criteria be used in determining policy making 
success or failure was answered by suggesting that these criteria be seen as critical 
descriptors of success rather than determinants of success. This allows evaluation to 
highlight the key areas that have been successful rather than making some absolute 
statement of policy making success or failure: they are qualitative descriptors of success 
rather than quantitative measures of success. 
The context is now set for a detailed analysis of environmental policy making in Western 
Australia in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 — Evaluating WA environmental 
policy making 
Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis examines environmental policy making in highly 
contested contexts. The hypothesis here is that the adaptive–collaborative approach to 
environmental policy making is the approach that is most likely to be successful in contexts 
where conflict is deeply embedded as part of policy making. This chapter tests this 
hypothesis by examining the policy making of the WA EPA through an analysis of their key 
policies: the Environmental Protection Policies (EPPs). For practical reasons, the policies of 
the WAPC are not considered further in this thesis as it was considered that focusing on the 
policy making of one agency allows for greater depth of coverage and analysis. 
For each EPP studied, three key areas will be examined: 
• Identifying the policy making approach adopted based on the four broad 
approaches identified in Chapter 2; 
• Evaluating each policy making against the criteria proposed in Chapter 4; and 
• Identifying the nature and extent of conflict, and linking this to the policy making 
evaluation and the policy making approach. 
This will allow the links between conflict management, policy making approach and policy 
making success to be explored as a test for the thesis hypothesis. The final part of this 
chapter is an analysis of the overall policy making of the EPA by drawing on the individual 
policy making evaluations and additional information drawn from the long interviews with 
key individuals and individuals representing key stakeholder groups. 
As noted in Chapter 3, the data used for this analysis were: published information relevant 
to each policy, departmental file searches, short interviews with the relevant departmental 
officers responsible for each policy, and long interviews with key policy makers and relevant 
stakeholders. In part, the long interviews provided information on the political support policy 
evaluation criterion.  
Table 10 below lists all of the environmental policies that either were subject to an EPA 
review (evaluation) or where a significant number of interviewees identified it as either 
succeeding or failing. It shows the results of any EPA evaluation and the perception of 
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success or failure from the interviewees. The full list of policies mentioned in the interviews 
is provided in Appendix 2 along with a summary of the relevant interviewees’ responses6. 
Two observations can be made about Table 10. Concurrence between the evaluations of 
EPA and the interviewees’ perception of success/failure was only achieved with three EPPs 
— the 1992 Kwinana air quality EPP and the 1988 & 1992 Goldfields air EPPs. For the 
most part this was not because of disagreement between the EPA and the interviewees, but 
because the agency review did not arrive at a conclusion one way or the other about a 
policy’s success, there was no agency evaluation carried out at all, or the experts did not 
express a strong view one way or the other about a policy’s success or failure. 
Table 10: A comparison of the policy evaluation from the two sources: agency and 
interviewees’ views 
Consensus of interviewees Policy Conclusion of 
agency evaluation 
Summary No agreed 
successful 
No agreed 
unsuccessful 
Goldfields air EPPs 
1988 & 1992 
Both successful but 
modifications 
required. 
Both 
successful 
4 0 
Kwinana air EPP 1992 Successful. Successful 10 0 
Kwinana air EPP 1999 No review carried 
out. 
No clear 
consensus 
0 0 
Ozone EPP 1989 Successful but 
modifications 
required. 
No clear 
consensus 
1 0 
Ozone EPP 1992 Successful but 
modifications 
required. 
No clear 
consensus 
1 0 
Lakes EPP 1992 No conclusion but 
changes needed. 
Successful 8 0 
Wetlands EPP 2004 No review carried 
out. 
No clear 
consensus 
0 2 
Peel–Harvey EPP No conclusion but 
changes needed. 
Unsuccessful 1 4 
South West wetlands No review carried 
out. 
Unsuccessful  0 6 
Swan Canning EPP No review carried 
out. 
Unsuccessful  0 6 
 
Second, there are no policies where interviewees’ judgement of success or failure differed 
substantially, in that each of these policies is perceived to have either clearly succeeded, 
clearly failed or there is no clear view expressed. Put another way, there is no policy where 
there are a significant number of views both ways about the policy’s success or failure. As 
can be seen from Table 10, all except one policy had either zero or one dissenting view 
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6 It should be noted that whilst this chapter focuses on EPA policies, Appendix 3 also makes 
reference to the policies of the WAPC. 
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about the policy, with one policy having 2 dissenting voices. This suggests that the 
perception of policy success or failure is uniform across the interviewees. 
Policy making of 10 policies will be the subject of evaluation using the criteria established in 
Chapter 4. These 10 had sufficient information available to complete the analysis. These 
policies are: 
• The draft Western Swamp Tortoise EPP; 
• Kalgoorlie air quality EPPs (1988 & 1992); 
• Kwinana air quality EPPs (1992 and 1999); 
• Lakes EPP (1992); 
• Draft Wetlands EPP (1999); 
• Ozone EPPs (1989 & 1992); and 
• Swan Canning EPP. 
It should be noted that two of the policies evaluated were draft, not final EPPs. Some initial 
discussion as to the reasons why this is possible were mentioned in Chapter 1. Evaluation 
of the policy making of these draft policies is possible for four reasons. First, the strong 
legislative nature of EPPs gives draft EPPs a certain status within government. Second, the 
EPPs remained as drafts for several years and represented the policy positions of the EPA 
during that time. The EPA applied the provisions and principles of those draft policies 
through various assessments of individual proposals (EIA) before and during the main data 
collection and writing up of this study. In the case of the draft Wetlands EPP, the Minister 
decided not to proceed with the EPP, noting that the EPA could apply the principles of the 
draft policy through its on–going EIA of individual proposals. Third, the existence of a draft 
EPP and the application of its objectives through EIA meant that the key agencies 
responsible for downstream decision making had to choose whether to adjust their own 
decision making to be consistent with the draft policy. As will be seen below, the response 
to draft EPPs by these agencies was mixed. Finally, the evaluation here is about policy 
making and not just the contents of the EPP. The process for policy formulation and the 
process set up to make decisions about the EPP are significant elements of policy making 
and can be readily evaluated for draft EPPs. 
In the case of the Western Swamp Tortoise EPP, the final EPP was significantly different 
from the draft, suggesting that any evaluation of the policy making of the final EPP could be 
different from the draft. The final EPP had not been in operation long enough for sufficient 
data to be collected to allow policy making to be evaluated: however, based on the results 
of the evaluations of the policy making of the draft EPP, some comment will be provided on 
the final EPP.  
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Individual policy making evaluation 
Introduction 
The policy making of each policy is evaluated separately. Appendix 3 gives detailed 
supplementary information on each policy, with only the information relevant to subsequent 
discussion extracted and presented here. This information is also useful in identifying the 
policy making approach adopted and the evaluation. Each section concludes with an 
analysis of the nature and extent of conflict in the policy making, the appropriateness of the 
broad policy making approach adopted, and reasons identified by interviewees for policy 
success or failure, where sufficient information was available from the interviews. 
The data used for evaluation included the following: 
• For policy–making performance of simple limited–scope and finalised policies, the 
published results of environmental improvements on the key policy objectives were 
used, as discussed in the EPA reviews of the individual policies (see Chapter 4) or 
other sources; 
• For policy–making performance of complex policies with long implementation 
timeframes, and the draft policies, the subsequent decision making of the relevant 
agencies is examined for consistency with the EPP; 
• For political support length of time taken to finalise the policy is a consideration as 
well as documented opposition from key stakeholders primarily during the policy 
making process but also as part of any implementation. The views of the 
interviewees are also considered as they can all be considered key stakeholders; 
• For content relevance the key considerations are the extent to which the EPP in 
question required changes to its content, and the extent to which the content was 
criticised by, especially, but not limited to, the interviewees; and 
• For other socio–economic impacts documented socio–economic impacts as well as 
the views of the interviewees. 
Draft Western Swamp Tortoise EPP (1994) 
Policy description and background 
A draft EPP was released in 1994 (EPA 1994) and had as its primary aim the protection of 
the only two known habitats of a critically endangered species, the Western Swamp 
Tortoise (located just north of Perth). These two habitats are within Reserves managed by 
the State’s conservation agency, the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC), 
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but they are significantly affected by land use on the surrounding private land (see Plate 1). 
The EPP sought to control land use on private land so as to protect these habitats. 
Plate 1: Twin Swamps Nature Reserve – one of the remaining habitats of the Western 
Swamp Tortoise (Source: Garry Middle). 
 
The conservation movement had been calling for the EPA to act to protect these habitats 
for some time. As one prominent member of the conservation movement noted: 
With some of them [EPPs] there has been such a harsh battle to get them up that, for 
example the Western Swamp tortoise one, they [the EPA] just didn’t have the guts to 
actually finalise that EPP when it came down to it. I know it has been finalised now 
but it took 10 years. 
The draft EPP identified the key threats to the two habitats as being: fire; predation 
(particularly from foxes and domestic cats); changes to water quality and quantity; and 
growing human pressures because of increasing population in the catchment. The first two 
threats can be managed directly in the Reserves by providing fire breaks and using vermin 
proof fencing — although increasing human population in the area surrounding the 
Reserves does increase the risk of fires within the catchment and likely leads to an 
increased cat population (predators) as well. Increasing urbanisation of the catchment also 
has the potential to change the hydrology of the area, thus changing the hydrology of the 
Reserves and of the tortoise habitats. The increasing threats to the tortoise habitats from 
outside the Reserves are what primarily drove the EPA to initially propose that land use on 
private land should be directly controlled through the EPP. The EPP received strong 
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opposition from the private land owners, the WAPC and the affected local government, and 
it took nine years before these issues were resolved and the EPP finalised.  As one of the 
policy makers from the EPA noted: 
I think we are about to have the policy published, but there’s still a hell of a lot of pain 
and agony about land use within that area, so I don’t think it has worked too well. 
The main concern of private land owners was that the policy would put significant 
restrictions on what activities could be carried out on their properties and the extent of any 
subdivision, thus potentially either affecting farming incomes or reducing the property value 
of their land because of the subdivision restrictions. These concerns were compounded by 
the lack of any compensation for these losses and by what the land owners saw as 
inadequate consultation. Whilst most land owners were aware that the EPA was developing 
a policy in the early 1990s, the first time that land owners became aware of the proposed 
land use controls was when the draft policy was first released. This level of participation 
equates to IAP2 (2007) Consult level, or, as perceived by the land owners, at the “Inform” 
level. 
The science that supports the policy is at best uncertain and has been highly contested by 
several of the stakeholder groups. As the EPA itself noted: 
Although the relationship between groundwater, surface water flows and the swamp 
systems within the Ellen Brook and Twin Swamps Nature Reserves is not well 
understood, an examination of available information has determined approximate 
surface water catchments for the habitat swamp areas in each of the Nature 
Reserves. 
Research undertaken by the CSIRO for the DoE (Townley et al. 1997) concluded that 
the hydrology of the habitat swamps in both Nature Reserves appears to be 
dominated by a balance between rainfall, surface inflows and outflows, and 
evaporation. 
It is understood that the swamps at Twin Swamps probably fill in response to the first 
winter rains from direct rainfall and surface water runoff. Late in the winter, the 
regional water table will rise until the swamps are fed by groundwater. It is suggested 
that the rise in the water table near Twin Swamps may be at least partly due to flow 
from the east, from the Darling Scarp ".  
Development or land use changes that may reduce the quantity of water reaching the 
swamps will be detrimental to the survival of young tortoises and breeding adults.  
(EPA 2005:4.5) 
The use of the words “not well understood” “appear to be dominated by”, “It is understood”, 
“it is suggested that” and “Development or land use changes that may reduce the quantity 
of water reaching the swamps” emphasise this uncertainty. 
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After considerable consultation and many re–writes, the second draft of the EPP was 
released in 2001 (EPA 2001). It stepped back from being a land use control policy and 
instead required the following: 
• Land owners manage their land consistent with the objectives of the EPP (ways of 
management unspecified); and 
• Decision makers (e.g. WAPC and the local government) make decisions consistent 
with the objectives of the EPP (again the nature of any land use controls was 
unspecified). 
This is a significant change in the content of the EPP. The EPP was finalised in 2003 
(Government of WA 2003) with only editorial changes from the second draft, and it 
effectively delegates decisions on land use controls from the EPP to the land use planning 
agencies. These agencies are now able to make land use planning decisions as they see 
fit, subject to those decisions meeting the objectives of the EPP. The EPA produced a 
Guidance Statement for the Protection of the Western Swamp Tortoise Habitat as advice to 
decision makers (EPA 2005), to give greater guidance as to how the EPP objectives could 
be met through the land use planning process.  
This modified approach is a more cooperative environmental management regime involving 
all key decision making agencies — although the cooperation of land owners was not as 
actively sought and, therefore, not achieved. It is also a more flexible approach enabling 
relevant agencies to develop responses that are appropriate to their own decision making 
processes, including case–by–case decision making, provided consistency with the EPP 
could be demonstrated. One of the key issues was the minimum lot size allowed for future 
subdivisions. Following consultation with the WAPC and the local government, an eight 
hectare minimum lot size was agreed upon and included in the Guidance Statement, but 
not in the EPP. 
Policy making approach 
The broad policy making approach proposed for the first draft of the EPP, where controls 
were to be set on land use for private land in the catchments without the use of any 
incentives to change land owner behaviour, is typical of a traditional expert–driven 
approach. This conclusion is further supported when the participative process adopted by 
the EPA to produce the EPP is considered: it was an expert–based approach where a first 
draft was developed and released for public comment, and the distance between the public 
and policy makers referred to in Chapter 2 is significant. As noted earlier, this level of 
participation is consistent with IAP2’s Consult level.  
The final EPP is less prescriptive and was arrived out with a more consultative, cooperative 
approach. It is clearly a softening of the traditional expert–driven approach adopted in the 
original EPP, as acknowledged by the then Minister in reply to a question in State 
Parliament just after the policy’s final gazettal: 
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The recently gazetted Environmental Protection (Western Swamp Tortoise Habitat) 
Policy 2002 uses an ecosystem management approach to protect the habitats of the 
Western Swamp Tortoise. This approach is implemented by policies, protocols and 
best management practices and, where appropriate is made adaptable by monitoring 
and research. The Department of Environmental Protection, other public authorities 
and landowners are required to make decisions and take actions which are 
consistent with the Environmental Protection (Western Swamp Tortoise Habitat) 
Policy 2002. A ‘command and control’ method is not part of the EPP.  
(Edwards 2002:7116) 
Whilst it was acknowledged that the final EPP attempts to be more cooperative by 
delegating decision making to the key agencies that actually control land uses (the WAPC 
and the local government), it is difficult to argue that it is actually a collaborative approach, 
for two reasons. First, the cooperation sought by the EPA was limited to the key agency 
decision makers, the City of Swan and the WAPC, with minimal cooperation gained from 
one of the key stakeholder groups, the landowners. Second, the level of participation can 
still be considered to be at the IAP2’s Consult level where the views of stakeholders were 
considered but the decision making remained with the EPA who determined the form and 
content of final policy. The distance between the public and policy remains. The key 
agencies were consulted as part of the policy making, and in the end their views were 
accommodated. To a limited extent decision making was shared but only to the extent that 
the land use controls were removed from the EPP. This left the City of Swan and the WAPC 
to make these decisions, provided they were consistent with the objectives of the EPP, but 
it was clearly a very limited decision sharing exercise. The approach of the final EPP is best 
summarised as expert–based policy making, using voluntary mechanisms to ensure the key 
decision making agencies comply with the objectives of the policy. This is more typical of 
the ecological modern policy making approach rather than a traditional expert–driven one. 
Policy making evaluation 
The main data collection period for this study covered the time prior to the release of the 
second draft, and so only the policy making of the first draft will be the subject of detailed 
evaluation here, although some preliminary observations of the policy making of the final 
EPP will be made. Policy–making performance will be determined using the criterion 
downstream decision making is consistent with policy, because the policy is draft, is 
complex and has a long policy implementation timeframe. In this case, policy making of the 
draft EPP can be considered unsuccessful on this criterion because the key decision 
makers — the WAPC and the affected local government — refused to initiate policies 
consistent with the draft EPP. This was largely because of their strong opposition to the 
draft policy. New development proposals were either put on hold or referred directly to the 
EPA. 
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In relation to the political support criterion, policy making of the draft EPP can be considered 
unsuccessful for two reasons. Firstly, it took nine years for the EPP to be finalised and even 
then, only after a significant re–write of its contents. As one interviewee noted: 
The tortoise one of course has not yet really progressed over the last five or ten 
years because of an array of difficulties there. 
Secondly, the draft EPP received considerable opposition from stakeholders, mostly 
landowners, although the conservation movement supported the traditional expert–driven 
approach in the draft EPP. The interviewees did not have a clear view about the draft 
policy’s success — Table 10 shows only two interviewees who expressed a view that it 
failed and one that it was successful.  
For the content relevance criterion, whilst the broad content of the draft policy can be 
considered appropriate, given that it addresses a significant environmental issue (the 
remaining habitats of a critically endangered species), it is considered that policy making of 
the draft EPP was unsuccessful on this criterion because the draft EPP required a 
significant re–write before a final EPP could be agreed to, involving a significant change in 
the policy mechanism to be used. On the final criterion, other socio–economic impacts, 
policy making of the draft EPP can be considered unsuccessful in that it would likely have 
impacted adversely on private land owners without providing compensation, had it been 
finalised in this form. 
To sum up, whilst the 1994 draft EPP covered an environmental issue in urgent need of 
attention, on the content relevance criterion policy making of the draft EPP is considered 
unsuccessful. It was found that it did not succeed on policy–making performance because 
key decision making agencies did not change their decision making, consistent with the 
draft policy.  Further, it lacked political support and would likely have negative socio–
economic effects if implemented. Consequently, on all four criteria, the policy making of the 
draft EPP is considered to be unsuccessful. 
Turning to the final EPP, it is worth noting that on the criterion downstream decision making 
is consistent with the policy some progress has been made, and policy making of the final 
EPP could be considered to be successful. The City of Swan (the affected local 
government) initiated an amendment to its Town Planning Scheme in 2003 for an area of 
land within the EPP boundary. The amendment sought to include text requiring that  
Due consideration is given to the Environmental Protection (Western Swamp Tortoise 
Habitat) Policy Approval Order 2002.  
(City of Swan 2005) 
The proposed Scheme amendment was referred to the EPA and there followed a period of 
negotiation, following which the City agreed to insert additional land use controls into the 
Scheme to ensure better protection for the two habitats of the Western Swamp Tortoise, 
including the eight hectare minimum lot size for new subdivisions. The amendment has now 
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been finalised with support from both the EPA and the WAPC. This indicates that 
downstream decision making will be made consistent with the EPP, demonstrating that the 
EPP has some level of political support and would be successful on the policy–making 
performance criterion. On the other two criteria — content relevance and other socio–
economic impacts — and the broad issue of political support it is too early to make an 
assessment, but concerns from land owners remain, as can be seen from the minutes of a 
Council meeting. As officers of the City of Swan noted in their report to Council on the Town 
Planning Scheme Amendment referred to earlier: 
This raised significant concerns and anger at the time amongst many affected land 
owners as the final form of the rezoning amendment not only eliminated any 
subdivision potential but curtailed permissible rural uses.  This decision consequently 
gave rise to a number of issues, specifically requests for compensation as well as 
numerous requests for non–conforming uses for cattle and other stock.  The City has 
since issued a number of non–conforming use rights to land owners in the area who 
have been able to satisfactorily provide the necessary documentary evidence.  
(City of Swan 2005:5) 
Similarly, as one interviewee noted: 
The Western Swamp Tortoise EPP " I think we are about to have the policy 
published but there’s still a hell of a lot of pain and agony about land use within that 
area, so I don’t think it has worked too well. 
Linking policy making approach, policy making evaluation 
and nature and extent of the conflict 
The three themes of conflict are in evidence with the draft EPP. First, there are a range of 
different stakeholders holding different values for the area, including: 
• Land owners in the catchment have an economic interest in the use of their land 
and opposed the draft EPP; 
• The conservation movement has an interest in the protection of the Western 
Swamp Tortoise and supported the draft EPP; 
• The two land use planning agencies saw the draft EPP as being inconsistent with 
their land use planning objectives for the area and opposed it; and  
• The DEC, the manager of the two remaining habitats of the Western Swamp 
Tortoise had an interest similar to the conservation movement and supported the 
draft EPP. 
Differences between the policy makers and land owners are particularly noticeable. As one 
interviewee noted: 
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" it is very hard for an EPP to force land use changes, particularly where the land 
uses changes that are trying to be implemented, and this is probably more so for 
Western Swamp Tortoise ", are not supported by private land owners. Forcing land 
use changes and conservation on private land is really hard. 
Second, the differences between the government agencies that emerged during the policy 
making process (EPA, WAPC, DEC and the affected local government) suggest conflict 
over governance. One interviewee noted the interagency problems and was critical of both 
the EPA and the State Government for not standing firm in the face of this opposition – 
" they just didn’t have the guts to actually finalise that EPP when it came down to it.   
Finally, the science that is in support of the policy was clearly uncertain and highly 
contested, as already discussed. There is also a resource scarcity issue here, given the 
critically endangered status of the tortoise, and that there are only two remaining natural 
habitats. 
Consistent with the hypothesis of this thesis, the nature and extent of the conflict here 
presents a compelling case for the use of the adaptive–collaborative policy making 
approach. However, as noted earlier, the broad policy making approach proposed for the 
first draft of the EPP was traditional expert–driven. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
policy making of the draft EPP was found by the evaluation here to have failed overall. This 
supports the case made in this thesis that a traditional expert–driven approach would likely 
fail in highly contested contexts.  
The approach adopted in the final EPP was an ecological modern one, and whilst this 
approach has a greater likelihood of success than the original traditional expert–driven 
approach given the nature and extent of conflict here, it is still likely to be unsuccessful in 
the end. It is, however, noted that on the criterion downstream decision making is consistent 
with policy some progress has been made, and there is at least some support for the EPP 
at agency level. 
Kalgoorlie air quality EPPs (1988 and 1992) 
Policy description and background 
The Kalgoorlie air quality EPPs were aimed at controlling sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
in the local area by setting mandatory air quality criteria. Up until 1988 there was no control 
over SO2 emissions, with concentrations of SO2 two to four times above recognised 
standards in residential areas. This was in part due to the close proximity of the mining 
activity and processing to Kalgoorlie (see Plate 2).  
The first EPP for the Goldfields area was introduced in 1988, but was limited in both its 
scope and geographic extent. It set some broad objectives for air quality and required that 
industry control emissions and monitor air quality to meet those objectives. Industry could 
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not meet those objectives with the current operations. Whilst the 1988 EPP receive some 
initial opposition from the mining industry, it agreed to improve its roasting methods (the 
main sources of SO2 emissions), eventually closing down the three operating roasters to be 
replaced by a single roaster with SO2 scrubbing technology (EPA 1999). There was also 
considerable support in the broader community to clean up air quality in the area.  
Plate 2: An aerial photograph of Kalgoorlie showing the proximity of mining and processing 
to the town site (Source: Garry Middle). 
 
This original EPP was reviewed in the early 1990s and was replaced with a revised EPP in 
1992, and associated Regulations. This new EPP set more stringent air quality objectives in 
the form of a prescribed SO2 concentration limit — never to be exceeded (0.5 parts per 
million (ppm), one hour average) — and a prescribed SO2 concentration standard — can be 
exceeded but only for a prescribed number of times — in this case no more than 8 times a 
year (0.25 ppm, one hour average). It also expanded the extent of the EPP beyond the 
Kalgoorlie town site to include the nearby Boulder town–site, the towns of Coolgardie and 
Kambalda East, 30 and 40 kms from Kalgoorlie respectively, and the Aboriginal Mission at 
Kurrawang 15 kms west of Kalgoorlie. 
The EPP, whilst setting air quality standards to be met, did not prescribe the technology that 
should be applied to reach those standards. The criteria were to be met by controlling SO2 
emissions through the licensing of the SO2–producing industries, and subsequent 
monitoring of air quality to ensure set emission rates were leading to the desired air quality. 
Licences are issued under the Environmental Protection Act 1986, by DEC. SO2 air quality 
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monitoring is a well understood science and the results of the monitoring and conclusions 
about compliance with the standard set in the EPP are largely uncontested. The monitoring 
has been used at least once to successfully prosecute one of the mining companies for 
breaching air quality standards in 1996 (Department of Environmental Protection, Water 
and Rivers Commission, and Resources 2002:81). 
The EPP underwent further review in 2003. Both reviews proceeded with minimal 
controversy and were completed quickly — it took less than 12 months to review the 1988 
EPP and produce the final 1992 EPP. 
Policy making approach 
The policy making approach adopted for both policies is clearly a traditional expert–driven 
approach, where specific air quality standards are set and industries are licensed and 
regulated to ensure compliance. The level of participation for both policies is typically at the 
IAP2 (2007) Consult level where a draft EPP was developed and was subject to public 
comment from the key stakeholders, mostly industry, although the EPA did seek initial 
comments from members of the public through the drafting and review processes. The EPA 
determined the final EPP following its review of submissions on the draft with minimal 
external input, and the distance between the public and policy makers referred to in Chapter 
2 was significant. 
Policy making evaluation 
There is enough data available to evaluate policy making for both the 1988 and 1992 EPPs. 
Given the nature of these policies — they and final EPPs and are relatively simple with a 
limited scope and simple implementation measures — evidence of quantitative 
environmental improvement consistent with the policy objectives will be used to determine 
success on the policy–making performance criterion. The EPA noted that that since 1993, 
the standard set in the 1988 EPP had been met (i.e. there were fewer than nine 
exceedances of the 0.25 ppm per year) (EPA 1999). The 1992 EPP was, therefore, 
effective in achieving its objectives. The SO2 criteria set in the 1992 EPP have also been 
met (State of the Environment Reporting Unit 1998:45; EPA 2007:42). 
On the second criterion (Political Support) both EPPs were able to be finalised relatively 
quickly and had the support of the key stakeholders. This stakeholder support is 
demonstrated by the willingness of industry to upgrade air emission technologies. The 
interviewees also had a consistent view that the policies were successful, as Table 10 
shows, with 4 interviewees expressing a view that they had been successful. Most of those 
who did not comment on the EPPs were unfamiliar with them.  
On the third criterion (Content relevance) the EPPs address a significant environmental 
issue — the key pollutant for the region — and the content and mechanism proposed are 
supported, as reflected in the following two comments: 
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" because they are precise and directed. 
" it succeeded because " it highlighted the importance of the issue and it also 
offered a way of setting up a programme to require companies to comply " I don’t 
think the EPP itself set standards which were as tight as they should be, so in that 
sense it was relatively minor. But it set a way forward where we can deal with 
industry as a model, but we could do it better. 
On the final criterion (Other socio–economic impacts) the action of industry to invest in new 
emission control technology could be considered a significant economic impost, but in the 
end industry accepted this as part of doing business. There were, however, two positive 
socio–economic outcomes of the EPPs. First, the captured SO2 was used to produce 
sulphuric acid, which is a significant raw material for gold processing. This provided an 
economic benefit that wouldn’t have occurred without the EPP requiring controls on SO2 
emissions. Second, prior to the EPPs coming into force, air quality in the area was 
consistently at concentrations well above what is considered to be acceptable for human 
health (see Figure 4 below showing air quality at the public hospital in Kalgoorlie). Air 
quality has significantly improved since that time, meaning that the general health of the 
community would likely have improved. One interviewee summed up this socio–economic 
issue succinctly: 
One of the great attributes of the Goldfields one was that it caused investment in 
pollution control technology like the sulphuric acid plant, so that you actually ended 
up with a whole set of benefits, not just better air quality, but also a new resource – 
sulphuric acid – which was commercially viable co–incidentally while you had all the 
nickel processing. 
To sum up, both versions of the EPP had appropriate contents, were effective in attaining 
their objectives, had political support, had some significant socio–economic benefits and the 
negative socio–economic impact of increased processing costs for industry were readily 
accepted. Policy making of both EPPs, therefore, can be considered to be successful on all 
four criteria. 
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Figure 4: Changes to air quality in Kalgoorlie from 1993 to 1998 as measured at Kalgoorlie 
hospital (Source: State of the Environment Reporting Unit 1998)). 
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Linking policy making approach, policy making evaluation 
and nature and extent of the conflict 
There is little evidence of significant conflict associated with these two EPPs. The values of 
the community in relation to the EPPs were in support of improved air quality, and the 
industry changed its practices in response to, and consistent with, this community value. 
There is little evidence of any conflict around the governance of policy implementation, the 
licensing of industry, notwithstanding the one prosecution mentioned earlier. As one 
interviewee noted: 
" [The EPP] was the first one where we actually required companies to turn off 
[production of SO2]. And that’s heavy duty. 
There is also little conflict over the science in support of the policy, as the science is well 
understood and generally uncontested. As two interviewees noted of this EPP 
I didn’t have the same problems with the air quality [EPPs] because they were based 
on clear science. 
" because they were based on clear science and lines on the map. 
This low level of conflict suggests that the traditional expert–driven approach applied in both 
policies is appropriate, and, as discussed above, both policy making exercises were shown 
to be successful on all criteria. 
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Ozone EPPs (1989 and 1992) 
Policy description 
These EPPs were aimed at controlling the servicing of equipment that uses ozone–
depleting substance like CFCs to prevent their release into the atmosphere. Implementation 
of the policies is through Regulations under the Environmental Protection Act 1986, but with 
the cooperation of the industry and industry groups through joint inspections from the DEC 
and industry. Training courses were also organised in the initial implementation stages, and 
disposal points for ozone–depleting substances were established. The EPPs are highly 
prescriptive: for example, they contained clauses covering: 
• Sale of ozone–depleting substances to an unauthorised purchaser is prohibited; 
• Specific authorisation is required for both individuals and businesses to purchase 
ozone–depleting substances or alternative refrigerants; 
• A requirement for accurate record keeping in relation to the sale and purchase of 
ozone–depleting substances; 
• Specific restrictions on activities involving ozone–depleting substances; and 
• A presumption against the discharge of an ozone–depleting substance into the 
environment. 
Analysis of the submissions on the most recent review of the EPP revealed that most 
supported the 1993 EPP but sought minor changes to wording and scope. One company 
expressed the view that regulation of the industry was no longer required, but this was not 
supported by the industry groups. This broad support was reflected in the speed in which 
the Minister gave final approval to it following her own consultations (i.e. three months). As 
described in detail in Appendix 3, the science in support of the EPPs is, for the most part, 
uncontested, as evidenced by the international consensus over the 1992 Montreal Protocol, 
where 80 nations agreed to a 100% reduction of CFCs by 2000. 
Policy making approach 
The policy making approach adopted for both EPPs with its high level of prescriptions to 
control and regulate activities associated with ozone–depleting substances is clearly a 
traditional expert–driven approach but with significant cooperation from industry — although 
decision making was centralised in the policy making agencies. The level of participation 
was clearly at the IAP2’s Consult level where the views of stakeholders were considered 
but the decision making remained with the EPA who determined the form and content of 
final policy. The distance between the public and policy makers referred to in Chapter 2 was 
significant. 
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Policy making evaluation 
There are enough data available to evaluate the policy making of both the 1988 and 1993 
EPPs. 
Given the nature of these policies — they have been finalised and are relatively simple with 
a limited scope and simple implementation measures — quantitative environmental 
improvement consistent with the policy objectives will be used to determine policy–making 
performance. As noted by the EPA (Chapter 4), both EPPs met their environmental 
objectives, although the 1988 EPP was significantly out–of–date at the time of review.  
On the second criterion (political support) both EPPs were able to be finalised relatively 
quickly and had the support of the key stakeholders; in particular, the affected industries 
cooperated as part of the implementation stages of the policy. There was no clear view 
expressed by the interviewees about the policies’ success, with Table 10 showing only 1 
interviewee expressing a view one way or the other, and that view was that they had been 
successful. 
The content of the policies is appropriate (‘content relevance’ criterion), given that they 
target the key ozone–depleting substances, and the contents of the draft EPPs and 
mechanisms proposed went largely uncontested, with only minor changes made to the 
drafts. On the final criterion (other socio–economic impacts), industry was required to find 
alternatives to these ozone–depleting substances but it seemed to accept this as part of 
doing business. The actual economic cost of phasing out the use of these substances was 
minimal, as there were relatively cheap alternatives available that were just as effective (for 
example aerosol propellants).  
To sum up, both of the EPPs had appropriate content, they were effective in attaining their 
objectives, each had political support and any negative socio–economic effects of each 
EPP were minimal and readily accepted by industry. Policy making of both EPPs can, 
therefore, be considered to be successful on all four criteria. 
Linking policy making approach, policy making evaluation 
and nature and extent of the conflict 
There is little evidence of conflict associated with the policy making of these EPPs. The 
view that CFCs were causing environmental problems and needed to be replaced had 
general acceptance throughout the community. This alignment of values within the 
community was based to a large extent on the science about the impact of these chemicals 
not being in dispute. Finally, there was a single agency responsible for the control and 
management of these substances, which reduced significantly the risk that interagency 
conflict would emerge. As one interviewee noted: 
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Ozone involves a simple regulation, we know all those who use it, we bring in a law, 
we get them on–side so they understand what it is, there’s a known substitute, dealt 
with in probably a matter of minutes. 
This low level of conflict suggests that the traditional expert–driven policy making approach 
applied in the EPPs would be successful, and, as discussed above, success was shown to 
have occurred. 
Kwinana air quality EPPs (1992 and 1999) 
Policy description and background 
Kwinana is WA’s most important heavy industrial area (producing goods worth in excess of 
$6 billion a year) and is located on the eastern shore of Cockburn Sound, some 20km south 
of Perth’s CBD. It was established in the 1950s and there are now residential areas directly 
abutting the industrial area to the south and east (see Plate 3.). Air quality in these 
residential areas emerged as a problem in the 1970s when the number of new heavy 
industries in Kwinana increased significantly. 
Plate 3: The view from the beachside café strip at Rockingham (the main residential area to 
the south of Kwinana) showing the proximity of the Kwinana industrial area (Source: Garry 
Middle). 
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These EPPs were aimed at controlling SO2 and dust emissions in the Kwinana area by 
setting mandatory air quality criteria. SO2 is the more significant of these two emissions. 
The 1992 EPP had two key components, with the first part establishing three geographical 
areas around and including the industrial area, which were to have different air quality 
criteria targets. These were: 
• The industrial area, where air quality could be below that set for residential areas; 
• A buffer, non industrial area directly surrounding the industrial area where air 
quality could be below that set for residential areas but better than in the industrial 
area; and 
• Outside the buffer area where air quality would be that set for residential areas. 
The second part of the EPP involved setting up an air quality monitoring program, which 
was to be funded and managed by industry.  
The Kwinana EPP had two significant differences from the Goldfields EPP. First, The 
Goldfields EPP only dealt with SO2, whereas the Kwinana EPP also included dust. Second, 
the criteria in the Kwinana EPP were more stringent than the Goldfields EPP. Table 11 
below compares the SO2 criteria of the two EPPs. 
Table 11: A comparison of the SO2 criteria for residential areas for the Kwinana and 
Goldfields EPPs. 
EPP Standard (ppm) – 
desirable air 
quality 
Limit (ppm) 
– never to 
be 
exceeded 
Averaging 
period 
No of yearly 
exceedances of 
standard 
1992 Kwinana 0.125 0.25 1 hour Not specified 
1992 
Goldfields 
0.25 0.50 1 hour 8 
2003 
Goldfields 
0.20 0.25 1 hour 1 
 
As with the Goldfields EPP, these criteria were to be met by controlling SO2 emissions 
through the licences of the SO2 producing industries, and subsequent monitoring of air 
quality to ensure set emission rates were leading to the desired air quality. The Kwinana 
EPP was, and is, supported by air quality modelling which has been progressively 
developed and fine–tuned. The model allows the DEC (the regulator of the industry) to 
adjust total emission rates of industry to ensure compliance with the EPP (i.e. the buffer is 
maintained). In practice, most industries discharged SO2 at rates well below those 
prescribed in their licences. Industry also has considerable input into reviewing emission 
limits so as to comply with the EPPs. Through the peak industry body at Kwinana, the 
Kwinana Industries Council, a particular industry can propose a change in its allowed 
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emission rate, have that modelled for impact and then apply for a change through its 
licence. Further, in setting up the 1992 EPP, the EPA came to an agreement with industry 
that existing industries could emit SO2 to the full extent of the EPP, provided that when a 
new industry came along, existing industries would have to reduce emissions to 
accommodate that new industry (EPA 1993). This is a de facto emissions trading system. 
As one policy maker noted: 
It set the total parameters and said within that you can trade. It effectively set up an 
informal trading system which said “you, industry, can sort out and negotiate 
whatever outcomes you want to generate benefits for you collectively, but this is the 
limit, and thou shalt not go above the limit. 
Industry is responsible for the monitoring of air quality, and reporting those results to the 
DEC, although the DEC carries out its own monitoring that acts as a check on the industry 
monitoring. Industry has been very supportive of the 1992 EPP, as has been most of the 
community. As noted by one interviewee: 
" because I think there has probably been strong community support for it, a strong 
political will to have something happen. 
Notwithstanding that support, community pressure has grown for change, as discussed 
below, which is reflected in the review of the 1992 EPP. 
The implementation of the 1992 EPP began to raise significant land use planning issues, 
notably the presence of residences in the buffer area and the constraints this placed on 
industry to ensure these residents were not exposed to unacceptable air quality. In addition, 
there was growing community concern about the possible impacts from industry in Kwinana 
of other contaminants. A review of the public submissions made to the EPA in 2001 on a 
proposed new iron ore smelting plant at Kwinana revealed that concerns were being 
expressed about levels of Dioxins, furans, poly aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs), persistent organic pollutants (POPs), and heavy metals in the 
air. These concerns were raised by the two neighbouring local governments and the peak 
community and environmental groups7. 
In response, the EPA noted: 
A number of the submissions to the EPA " expressed concerns about potential 
health impacts on the community from cumulative air emissions from Kwinana 
industries.  
(EPA 2002:vi) 
Clearly, the community began to see the management of air quality in Kwinana as much 
broader and complex than concerns just about SO2 and dust. In the late 1990s, the 1992 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 These groups are the Community Networking Inc, Conservation Council of Western Australia Inc, 
Hope Valley Progress Association, Pollution Action Network, Kwinana Progress Association Inc and 
Kwinana Watchdog Group. 
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EPP was reviewed by the EPA. In its review, the EPA noted that air quality in all three of the 
areas was well below the criteria set in the EPP. In fact, the air quality in the eastern part of 
the buffer area achieved standards suitable for residential areas (outside the buffer). This 
was no accident, as there were two small town sites and many rural properties within that 
part of the buffer. In effect, the 1992 was effective in achieving its objectives and performed 
better than was required. The EPA went on to conclude that the content of the 1992 EPP 
was still relevant and not in need for change. As a result, the 1992 EPP was simply rolled 
over into the 1999 EPP, which effectively put on hold community concerns about the 
emissions other than SO2 and dust. 
The EPA was of the view that it was the role of the WAPC to address the concerns about 
incompatible land uses in the buffer area, and it worked with the WAPC to develop a 
cooperative approach to addressing these land use planning issues. The WAPC ultimately 
acknowledged it was the lead agency on this issue, and, in response, it developed the 
Fremantle Rockingham Industrial Area Regional Strategy (FRIARS) study (WAPC 2000), 
which had as two of its objectives to: 
• Resolve current land use conflicts between residential and industrial uses; and 
• Maintain the Kwinana Environmental Protection Policy (EPP) buffer policy. 
Two of the key outcomes of FRIARS were that the existing residential areas within the 
buffer were to be re–zoned to general industry and the government was to facilitate an 
immediate and rapid purchase of those residential properties in the buffer area. This was 
facilitated by the Hope Valley–Wattleup Redevelopment Act 2000 that, amongst other 
things, gave the authority to a specially established government authority to acquire 
properties in the buffer area compulsorily, thus removing residents from the buffer. This 
cooperative approach was taken a step further when the WAPC lead the review EPP, and 
the review included consideration of the appropriateness of the buffer and should it be 
extended in some areas (WAPC 2002). The WAPC review concluded that: 
The Review has identified the need to acknowledge that the Kwinana EPP buffer 
area is affected by not only sulphur dioxide emissions as identified by the DEP but 
also various other land uses, constraints and their buffers (including waste water 
treatment plants, basic raw materials areas, landfill sites, various infrastructure). This 
review therefore establishes principles and a process for redefining the buffer and 
recommends a new composite buffer to be called the Residential Exclusion Area 
(REA). The REA is designed to protect residents from emissions from the industrial 
and ancillary land uses in the area and also to protect industry from encroaching 
residential development, which may threaten their operations.  
(WAPC 2002:16) 
The EPP remains unchanged from its 1999 rolling over. 
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Policy making approaches 
The key aspects of the policy making approaches are as follows: 
• The EPPs are prescriptive in that they set air quality limits for three clearly defined 
geographic areas; 
• Their implementation involves a strong role for industry in managing the EPPs; 
• Successful implementation relies on industry working cooperatively with the 
regulator (DEC); and 
• A de facto emissions trading system has been established.  
The participation for both policies was quite extensive where draft EPPs were developed by 
the EPA for comment, but there were on–going discussions with key stakeholders, in 
particular industry, for many years prior to the release of the first draft of the EPP on how air 
quality in Kwinana was to be managed. For example, the buffer area was first proposed in 
1982 (DEC 1982) and remains largely unchanged today, and calls for environmental policy 
to address air quality in the area dated back to 1988 (KICC 1988). The stakeholders 
consulted for the 1992 draft were typically the corporatist groups, mostly industry, but there 
was considerably more interest from community groups (non–corporate) for the 1999 draft 
EPP, as discussed above. In finalising the EPPs, the EPA considered the views of 
stakeholders but the decision making remained with the EPA, who determined the form and 
content of the final policy. The distance between the public and policy makers referred to in 
Chapter 2 exists here, but the on–going discussions with key stakeholders over many years 
prior to and during the EPP policy making process and the high level cooperation with 
industry in the implementation of the EPPs, suggest that the level of participation is at 
IAP2’s “Involve” level. 
This suggests that the policy making approach adopted for both the EPPs is ecological 
modern, using regulatory command and control tools to facilitate a free market approach to 
emissions control. Whilst there is evidence of cooperation, it has been at the 
implementation level with no delegation of decision making of the EPP itself, either actual or 
implied. 
Policy making evaluation 
There are enough data available to evaluate the policy making of both the 1992 and 1999 
EPPs. 
Looking first at the 1992 EPP, given its nature — it has been finalised and it is relatively 
simple with a limited scope and simple implementation measures — quantitative 
environmental improvement consistent with the policy objectives will be used to determine 
policy–making performance. As noted by the EPA, the air quality criteria set in the 1992 
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EPP were achieved during the implementation of the policy: i.e. the environmental 
objectives were met. This view was also reflected in the interviews, for example: 
" but in terms of improving air quality, when you look at what we had in the late 80’s 
or the early 80’s to what we have now the policy has been tremendously successful. 
On the second criterion (political support) the 1992 EPP was able to be finalised relatively 
quickly and had the support of the key stakeholders, although some submissions made 
during the review did raise some significant concerns. These concerns, however, are about 
what the 1999 EPP should cover. The interviewees expressed a clear view that the EPP 
has been successful, with Table 10 showing it has a highest degree of support: nine 
interviewees expressed the view that it had been successful. As one interviewee noted: 
" the Kwinana Air policy, I would have thought that that’s been a fairly successful 
one, because I think there has probably been strong community support for it and 
strong political will to have something happen. 
Another reason why the EPP gained political support was its limited geographic extent. As 
one interviewee noted: 
It’s a policy which only affects a relatively limited number of proponents, the people 
inside the area and they’ve accepted it. 
The content of the policy is appropriate (content relevance) for the time, although concerns 
were raised about the contents of the 1999 EPP (see below). The contents of the draft EPP 
went largely uncontested, as did the mechanisms proposed in the EPP. As one interviewee 
noted of the EPP: 
 " (it) works by itself. The industry negotiates, so really that’s a relatively easy way 
for governments to manage things. 
On the final criterion, other socio–economic impacts, some issues have been raised about 
land uses within the buffer and the constraints on industry, but, again, these more strongly 
relate to the 1999 EPP. There have also been some additional benefits for those living near 
Kwinana as the EPP, whilst it was originally intended to only control SO2 and dust, the EPP 
was also used as a de facto control over  both noise and risk levels by using the air quality 
buffer as the buffer for these impacts as well. As one interviewee noted: 
It was written for SO2 but the arbitrary boundary works for noise and all sorts of things 
as well. 
To sum up, the 1992 EPP had an appropriate content, was effective in attaining its 
objectives, had political support, there were some demonstrated socio–economic benefits 
and whilst some concerns about negative socio–economic impacts were raised during the 
implementation period, these were more relevant to the 1999 EPP. Policy making of the 
1992 EPP can be considered to be successful on all four criteria. 
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Turning to the policy making of the 1999 EPP, as noted by the EPA, the air quality criteria 
are being achieved at Kwinana: i.e. the environmental objectives were met.  
Notwithstanding this, there are some concerns about the contents of the EPP raised during 
the review period. As noted earlier, this EPP is currently undergoing further review, led by 
the WAPC. This review accepted that the 1992 SO2 and dust air quality criteria should apply 
to the revised policy, but noted that the 1992 policy scope was too narrow and control of 
other contaminates should also be included. Several interviewees supported the 
broadening of the EPP, for example, one interviewee noted: 
There are questions being raised with regard to cancer levels in the Kwinana–
Rockingham localities as a result of industries, and that sort of thing. And you’re 
getting the situation, where we’re assessing a new proposal where six to nine months 
ago I would have thought that that would have been a reasonably straight forward 
project, it’s now getting a great deal of focus because of people’s sensitivity and 
concern regarding emissions. 
In addition, the WAPC review recommended that the buffer boundary needed to be revised 
in some locations. Put another way, the 1999 EPPs content needs revision, which means 
that the policy making of the 1999 EPP can be considered unsuccessful on the content 
relevance criterion.  
Another significant concern was raised in the review relating to unintended socio–economic 
impacts of the 1999 EPP, in particular, the existence of houses in the buffer area. This 
constraint means that industry is required to control its emissions so that acceptable air 
quality is experienced at the nearest residence rather than the edge of the buffer boundary, 
which means much tighter restrictions on air emissions than is actually required to comply 
with the EPP. As already noted, the process of relocating these residents is well underway 
although not fully complete at the time of writing of this thesis. 
To sum up, the 1999 EPP needs a significant review of its content, was effective in attaining 
its limited objectives, lacked political support and the negative socio–economic effects that 
emerged during the implementation period of the 1992 EPP are now significant. Policy 
making of the 1999 EPP can, therefore, be considered to be successful on the policy–
making performance criterion, but unsuccessful on political support, content relevance and 
other socio–economic criteria. 
Linking policy making approach, policy making evaluation 
and nature and extent of the conflict 
The nature and extent of conflict associated with the policy making of the 1992 EPP was 
limited, but was more significant for the 1999 EPP. The values of both the community and 
the regulator were aligned with the 1992 EPP in that both were seeking statutory control 
over air quality, and industry accepted the need for tighter regulation albeit reluctantly. As 
one interviewee noted: 
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" the people inside the area (industry) and they’ve accepted it, whether they like it is 
another matter, but they’ve accepted it, they work with it and it manages the situation 
There was considerable dispute surrounding the values associated with the 1999 EPP, with 
the community and conservation groups wanting a more broadly–scoped EPP covering 
more contaminants, whereas the policy makers proposed to keep the scope to SO2 and 
dust. Industry supported the retention of the narrow scope for the EPP. As well, many 
residents within the buffer area wanted to remain, whereas industry and the regulators had 
a view that all residents within the buffer area had to be removed. 
There was, however, little dispute over the science in support of the 1992 EPP. As one 
interviewee noted: 
The fact that you’ve got the EPP regime in place and it is really well backed by 
science, it has actually led to the sort of strategic decisions by industry and others. 
This was largely because of the limited scope of the 1992 EPP to SO2 and dust. The 
science and understanding of the impacts of these substances are relatively well 
understood and uncontested8. This changed significantly for the policy making of the 1999 
EPP where concern was raised about a wider range of contaminants, and the science for 
many of these is not well understood. This conflict has yet to be played out as the EPA has 
not chosen to include additional contaminants in the 1999 EPP. 
Governance of the 1992 EPP was relatively uncontested as it really only affected one 
agency, the DEC, and its licensing of industry. However, the land use implications of the 
EPP emerged as a significant issue by the time the 1999 EPP was released, as already 
noted. It was only when the EPA decided to work with the WAPC to deal with the land use 
planning issues that the conflict between the agencies reduced significantly. Up until that 
time, the EPA effectively controlled land use within the buffer and made it clear that it would 
not support further residential development within the buffer, which lead to the EPA using 
EIA to block any encroachments (EPA 1994). This standoff was resolved when the WAPC 
accepted the buffer defined in the EPP as the key constraint on land uses in the area when 
it initiated the FRIARS study in 1996 (ERM Mitchell McCotter 1997). This change is 
reflected in the following response by two senior WAPC planners interviewed: 
The Kwinana EPP actually, whilst it was about SO2, it actually set the planning 
requirements. Now, there has been a review of the whole planning now and the 
planning line will be sort of like the old EPP line, but it certainly won’t be an EPP line. 
It is now a planning line. So it actually moved to set planning things. So, I think it did 
make a difference. 
!
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8 It should be noted that there is a growing debate about how dust is dealt with in the EPP. It sets 
limits on relatively large sized particles (PM10 ), but there is growing evidence that smaller particles 
are of concern as well and should be addressed in the EPP (PM2.5 ). 
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I think when you look at the way that tried to protect a very complex buffer to a very 
large industrial area, the biggest in the State, I think is actually quite significant. The 
outcome has been that the State is now moved through, originating in the late 1980s, 
an area that obviously has had environmental problems associated with it, and the 
land use response has been to basically move residential land out of it. It took 10 
years to get to that point, with a separate piece of legislation, but the origin was 
actually the EPP. I think that’s been very successful. 
So, whilst industry continued to support the EPP as proposed by the EPA, there was some 
initial conflict with the land use planners, which was finally addressed by the WAPC taking a 
lead role in addressing the land use conflicts in the buffer area. The relatively low level of 
conflict associated with the policy making of the 1992 policy suggests that the ecological 
modern approach is successful, which is consistent with the finding above. 
The conflict associated with the policy making of the 1999 EPP suggests that a continuation 
of this ecological modern approach would not lead to a successful policy outcome, which is 
also consistent with the evaluation carried out above. In particular, it was not possible to 
see SO2 management in isolation from broader planning issues, and there was pressure 
growing to include other contaminates within the EPP. Arguably, the adoption of a more 
collaborative approach involving the WAPC increases the possibility of a more successful 
policy making approach. What is absent from this new approach, however, is significant 
involvement from the affected communities and community groups so that their concerns 
regarding contaminants other than SO2 and dust are included. There is little evidence of this 
to date, and decision making on the EPP is centralised in three agencies, the EPA, DEC 
and the WAPC. A truly collaborative approach would involve greater participation from the 
community and other stakeholders.  
The 1992 Lakes EPP and the draft 1999 Wetlands 
EPP 
Policy description and background 
The 1992 EPP protects numerous lakes identified in a series of maps associated within a 
defined area of the Swan Coastal Plain 100km north of Perth to 200km south of Perth (the 
Swan Coastal Plain is approximately 25–30km wide).  The EPP makes it an offence to fill, 
excavate, mine, discharge effluent into, drain into or drain out of the identified lakes without 
obtaining an exemption. The EPP includes specified penalties for any unauthorised acts.  
Exemptions were generally managed through either EIA by the EPA, or Works Approval by 
the DEC (through Part V of the Environment Protection Act 1986). The policing was largely 
left to one officer within the DEC who generally responded to case–by–case complaints 
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about breaches rather than having a program of visiting individual lakes to check for 
compliance. 
A draft EPP was released in 1991 (EPA 1991) and the proposed prohibitions caused many 
affected land owners to object to both the EPA and the Minister for the Environment about 
constraints on the use of private land during the drafting of the EPP (Walsh 1998). 
Notwithstanding these initial concerns, the EPP was finalised in less than 12 months 
following the release of the draft. 
There were some concerns about the process by which wetlands were chosen for 
protection. As noted in Appendix 3, wetlands (lakes) covered by the policy were selected for 
inclusion in this policy on the basis that they consisted of areas of standing water of 1 000 
square metres or more, as at 1 December 1991 (Government of WA 1992:6100). 
Wetlands that have a full or nearly complete coverage of vegetation (swamps) were not 
protected by this EPP. This was of greatest concern to the conservation movement and was 
addressed in the 1999 review of the policy (see below). As one interviewee noted: 
" (the Lakes EPP) was always dogged a bit by the adequacy of the data, and some 
of the lakes it was protecting were not significant environmental features. 
Plate 4 shows a highly degraded wetland that meets the criteria for protection in the EPP 
whereas Plate 5 shows a largely undisturbed wetland not protected. 
 
Plate 4: Degraded wetland that meets the criteria for protection in the EPP (Source: Garry 
Middle). 
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Plate 5: Largely undisturbed wetland (a CCW) not protected by the EPP (Source: Garry 
Middle). 
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A review of the 1992 EPP was begun in 1999 with the release of a proposed new EPP 
(EPA 1999). The draft revised EPP had three significant changes. First, the definition of 
wetlands was broadened to include seasonal wetlands and wetlands with full vegetation 
cover, rather than just lakes or wetlands containing surface water for most of the year, as is 
the case with the Lakes EPP. Second, environmental value was used as the criterion for 
inclusion for protection rather than the presence of surface water. So–called conservation 
category wetlands (CCWs) — generally those wetlands that have minimal disturbance (see 
Plate 5) — were to be protected. Third, clearing of the native vegetation was added as an 
additional prohibited activity.  These changes were widely supported by the conservation 
movement which had been calling for these changes for some time, but it also meant that 
many more wetlands would be protected than under the 1992 EPP, with many more land 
owners affected. 
There was significant opposition to these changes and this was reflected in the submissions 
received on the draft: of the 664 submission received, 547 (82.4%) were from affected land 
owners, and their key issues were: 
• The policy making process and the (perceived or real) lack of consultation, 
especially with land owners; 
• Threats to freehold property rights; 
• The need for compensation or other incentives where a wetland is listed for 
protection by the EPP; and 
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• Concerns about how the EPP would affect existing approvals involving wetlands 
that would be protected by the EPP. 
The submission to the EPA by the WA Chamber and Commerce and Industry illustrates 
some of these concerns: 
Notwithstanding the exemption provided in Regulation 8(2), basic property rights 
must be observed in the case where wetlands are given protection under the 
proposed EPP.   Land owners who have land that they could have reasonably 
expected to develop under current zoning, but will be prevented from doing so by this 
instrument, must be compensated at full market value.  
(Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Western Australia 2004) 
There was also disagreement about the definition of what is environmentally significant and, 
therefore, what wetlands should be caught up in the EPP. As noted above, all wetlands 
categorised as CCWs were to be protected by the EPP. The then Waters and Rivers 
Commission had, by the time the 1999 draft wetlands EPP was released, largely completed 
a study of mapping, categorising and evaluating the wetlands on the Swan Coastal Plain 
(Hill et al. 1996). The evaluation part of the study involved categorising wetlands into one of 
three management categories: 
• Conservation category wetlands — these are wetlands considered to be 
internationally, nationally, State or regionally significant, and other wetlands that 
have greater than 95% of their area undisturbed; 
• Resource enhancement wetlands — wetlands that have between 10% and 94% 
vegetation cover remaining or are between 10% and 94% undisturbed; and 
• Sustainable use–multiuse wetland — the remaining wetlands (highly disturbed). 
The inclusion of all CCWs for protection was strongly contested during the review period, 
especially, and not surprisingly, from groups representing the land development industry 
and land owners. The chief concerns pertained to the many wetlands not considered 
internationally, nationally, State or regionally significant, but had greater than 95% of the 
area undisturbed.  As the Urban Development Institute of Australia’s (UDIA) submission to 
the EPA noted: 
The proposition that technical criteria which have previously been used to evaluate 
conservation values of wetlands will now be changed will create significant issues 
and problems for community and industry" 
We are concerned that there is now a new set of criteria proposed, and that these 
criteria are very broad and potentially will include [on day one when the EPP is 
gazetted and has legal force] wetlands which whilst having some acknowledged 
values, are not so significant as to create the need to restrict uses as set out in the 
EPP" 
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We submit that before this EPP is finalised and gazetted, the proposed 
environmental significance criteria are subjected to more public and extended review, 
including expert peer review by a panel from government, community and industry.  
(Urban Development Institute of Australia Western Australian Division Incorporated 
2004) 
UDIA were seeking a filtering process for these 95% undisturbed wetlands so that their 
actual environmental values and significance should be considered prior to inclusion. 
Another submission from a metropolitan local government picks up the concerns about 
existing approvals: 
The City does, however, have some concerns (about the draft EPP), in particular " 
the inclusion of wetlands where planning approval for the surrounding land has 
already significantly progressed" the register should be altered to reflect the 
approvals process " or the wetlands should be removed from the register until after 
the planning process has been completed. 
The concern here is that many of these 95% undisturbed wetlands are in areas already up–
zoned and there were existing development expectations and plans for these areas that 
would likely involve significant disturbance to the wetlands. It was suggested that the EPP 
exclude these wetlands and not be retrospective in its application. 
Debate between the EPA, the Minister and affected stakeholders went on for another five 
years before a revised draft was released in July 2004 (now called Environment Protection 
(Swan Coastal Plain Wetlands) Policy.  Following a thirteen-week review period, the EPA 
forwarded a revised version of the revised draft to the Minister for her consideration. The 
Minister released this revised draft EPP for a further comment period in November 2004. 
One of the key issues raised in both the EPA’s and Minister’s review was, as the Minster 
noted (Edwards 2005:2), “ongoing concern about perceived unintended impacts on property 
owners”. In order to address this concern, the Minister established an expert review panel 
to provide advice on the “social, economic and environmental issues associated with the 
revised draft policy”. The panel published its final report in June 2005  and concluded that: 
After careful consideration, the Panel has come to the conclusion that to achieve 
wetland protection, an EPP is a necessary component of a broader package 
including incentives, land purchase, and education/information.   However, the EPP 
should only be gazetted subject to significant changes, and as one component of the 
broader required wetland protection package.  In this respect, the Panel would be 
concerned if only some of the following recommendations were to be adopted, as this 
will not achieve an equitable or satisfactory outcome for wetland protection, the 
community, and affected landowners.  
The Panel understands that the recommendations will have significant implications 
for resourcing of wetland protection for the Department of Environment.  However, 
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given the high environmental values of wetland systems, and the potentially 
significant social and economic impacts of protection, adequate resourcing directed 
to both improved management and purchase of land is required.  
(Holthouse, Arnold, and Davis 2005:3) 
In other words, the panel had significant concerns about the 2004 revised draft and that the 
EPP should be part of a wider package to include matters not possible to be covered in the 
EPP. Two recommendations of the review reflect the concern over the science that 
supported the EPP: 
Recommendation 5: That the methodology and criteria for evaluating CCWs be 
reviewed and agreed across Government as soon as possible, and that these agreed 
criteria apply within the EPP.  This process should be guided by the Wetland 
Coordinating Committee in the context of the evaluation framework which is currently 
being developed.       
Recommendation 6: That the criteria for classifying damplands are further developed 
and specified to give greater scientific clarity to identifying damplands, and that this 
information is properly communicated to the broader community.  
(Holthouse, Arnold, and Davis 2005:3) 
Two other recommendations from the panel reflect on–going concerns about the impacts on 
private land owners: 
Recommendation 12:  That appropriate planning instruments be put in place to 
ensure that registered wetlands are incorporated into Planning Strategies, and 
Region and Local Town Planning Schemes.       
Recommendation 13:  That a wetlands financial support package, similar to the Bush 
Forever financial support package, is established.  An indicative sum of $20 m over a 
five year period is proposed.  
(Holthouse, Arnold, and Davis 2005:3) 
As noted earlier, this sustained criticism of the EPP lead the Minister to decide not to 
proceed with it noting that the EPA could apply the principles of the draft policy through its 
on–going EIA of individual proposals. The EPA subsequently relied on its non–statutory 
Position Statement on wetlands as its policy position (EPA 2004). 
Policy making approach 
The policy making approach for both the 1992 EPP and 1999 draft EPP involved highly 
prescriptive controls on land uses for private land owners with nominated wetlands on their 
properties without the use of any incentives. The level of participation for the 1992 EPP can 
be considered to be at the IAP2’s (2007) Consult level where a draft EPP was drawn up 
and was subject to public comment, the views of stakeholders were considered but the 
decision making remained with the EPA who determined the form and content of final 
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policy. The distance between the public and policy makers referred to in Chapter 2 is 
significant, with decision making for the policy agency centred and expert–driven. The level 
of participation for the 1999 draft EPP is closer to IAP2’s (2007) Involve because of the 
greater number of opportunities for public input, in particular the additional public review 
required by the Minister and the independent review she set up. 
The policy making for both the 1992 EPP and the 1999 draft EPP are, therefore, typically of 
a traditional expert–driven approach. 
Policy making evaluation 
The main data collection period for this study was prior to the release of the 2004 draft 
policy, and so only the policy making of the original 1992 EPP and the proposed 1999 EPP 
will be the subject of evaluation here. Given the nature of these policies — they are 
complex with a long time frame for implementation, the implementation mechanism is also 
complex and the 1999 draft EPP was never finalised — policy–making performance will be 
determined using downstream decision making is consistent with policy9.  
In this regard, the policy making of the 1992 policy can be considered to be successful 
given that both the EPA and the DEC’s decision making was carried out during the life of 
the policy consistent with the EPP. As well, the land use planning agencies — the WAPC 
and the affected local governments — adjusted their polices to take into account the EPP, 
and subsequently changed local land use planning in response to case–by–case EPA 
assessments of proposals affecting EPP lakes. Further, the WAPC planning policy 
Environment and Natural Resources has a provision that: 
Planning strategies, schemes and decision making should " consider mechanisms 
to protect, manage, conserve and enhance " wetlands identified in any relevant 
Environmental Protection Policy.  
(WAPC 2003:2052) 
In relation to the political support criterion, the policy making of the 1992 EPP can be 
considered successful in that it was finalised relatively quickly from a first draft in 1991 to a 
final gazetted policy in 1992. As one interviewee noted: 
There was strong political support to get the Lakes policy up, it was strongly backed 
by the Conservation Movement at the time. 
Table 10 shows that the Lakes EPP also has the second highest degree of support from 
interviewees. As one interviewee noted: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 This is re–enforced by the EPA concluding that it could not determine the policy’s effectiveness 
and that its content needs considerable revision (see Chapter 4), although, this did not stop at least 
one interviewee noting that the EPP “probably still did protect a tremendous amount of lakes, under a 
lot of criticism”. 
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There was strong political support to get the Lakes policy up, it was strongly backed 
by the Conservation Movement at the time. 
The concerns of land owners were noted, they weren’t so significant as to prevent either the 
EPA or the Minister from finalising the EPP relatively quickly. 
The content of the 1992 policy (‘content relevance’) is appropriate even though the Lakes 
EPP was criticized for not protecting all of the significant wetlands: this criticism was mostly 
in hindsight as part of the review in 1999. On the final criterion, other socio–economic 
impacts, any adverse impacts on private land owners were addressed through the EIA 
process and subsequent land use planning decisions. In summary, the policy making of the 
1992 policy can be considered a success on all four criteria. 
Turing now to the policy making of the draft 1999 EPP, this policy was strongly opposed by 
the land use planning agencies, as exemplified by the response from one local government 
above, and by the fact that the downstream decision makers (the WAPC and local 
governments) did not recognise the draft EPP but continued to recognise the 1992 EPP. 
On the political support criterion, the length of time taken to get to a final decision on the 
EPP (in 2006) and that the Minister decided not to proceed with the EPP clearly reflects the 
lack of political support for the draft EPP. Further, the evidence above suggests that the 
concerns of land owners and the development industry were much greater with the 1999 
draft than the 1992 EPP, although it needs to be acknowledged that the 1999 draft EPP did 
have stronger support from the conservation movement. These land owner concerns were 
supported by the independent review, which highlighted the likely (socio–economic) impacts 
on property values and possible restrictions on land uses, should a property have a listed 
wetland. 
A case can be made that the content (content relevance) of the 1999 draft is more 
appropriate than the 1992 EPP, given the more rigorous definition of wetlands to be 
covered by the policy and the inclusion of a prohibition on clearing. The debate surrounding 
the draft EPP was largely supportive of both these changes, but the key issue of debate 
was the definition of environmental significance and, therefore, which wetlands should be 
included for protection in the EPP. As well, the failure to address compensation for loss of 
development opportunities was also a key concern. Overall, therefore, the draft EPP was 
unsuccessful on this criterion. 
In summary, the policy making of the 1999 draft EPP can be considered unsuccessful in 
that the draft EPP’s content was inappropriate, the relevant decision making agencies did 
not adjust their decision making to be consistent with the draft EPP, it lacked political 
support and it would likely have negative socio–economic effects had it been implemented. 
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Linking policy making approach, policy making evaluation 
and nature and extent of the conflict 
The above discussion suggests that conflict associated with the policy making of the 1992 
EPP was present but limited, but was much more significant for the policy making of the 
1999 draft policy. For both EPPs, conflict was initially over the different wetlands’ values 
between the conservation movement and land owners. The overall acceptance of the 1992 
EPP suggests that this conflict, whilst present, was manageable. However, the conflict was 
significantly greater with the policy making of the 1999 draft policy. Land owners mounted a 
concerted campaign that ultimately led to the Minster announcing to Parliament on 23 
August 2006 that he would not approve the new EPP, and that the 1992 EPP was to stand 
instead. 
As noted above, the definition of wetlands and their significance was an area of conflict with 
both policies, but particularly evident in the policy making of the 1999 draft where the 
methodology used to establish a wetland’s significance, and thus whether it was listed on 
the policy, was contested strongly. This conflict can be viewed in two different ways. It could 
be considered as conflict over the science in support of the draft EPP where the 
methodology used to establish a wetland’s significance was in dispute. It can also be seen 
as a conflict over values where both the EPA and the conservation movement took a view 
that all CCWs were worthy of protection whereas land owners, planners and developers 
were of the view that an additional filter was required to determine significance. 
Governance conflict was minimal with the 1992 policy, but the WAPC and affected Local 
Governments strongly opposed the 1999 draft EPP and the subsequent land use planning 
decisions that would follow from its implementation. 
As noted above, the broad policy making approach of both the 1992 EPP and 1999 draft 
EPP were traditional expert–driven, and the success of the 1992 EPP and the failure of the 
1999 draft EPP, therefore, can be explained by their relative levels of conflict, as discussed 
above. Interestingly, though, conflict was present with the 1992 EPP, especially over 
values, and it could have been expected that this alone should have lead to policy failure 
given the traditional expert–driven approach adopted. The fact that the policy making was 
successful suggests that something else could have been going on. One explanation is the 
influence of a policy champion who was able to push through the resistance of land owners. 
As will be seen later in Chapter 6, the presence of a policy champion was identified as a 
key to successful policy making. In this case, the Chairman of the EPA took a strong and 
public leadership role in the policy, and, as one interviewee noted: 
It’s fascinating looking back on the Lakes EPP, it’s just a will to get it through, with the 
personal influence of people like Barry Carbon and others who were going to get it 
through " I think it is essential to have policy champions: people who are able to 
deliver policy and sell policy to all the stakeholders and politicians. 
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Swan Canning EPP (1998) 
Policy description and background 
The Swan and Canning Rivers are the main rivers that cross the Perth Metropolitan area, 
and join to form a large estuary near the Perth CBD. This estuary is the most significant 
landscape feature of Perth and is significant for its aesthetic, recreational, commercial and 
environmental values (see Plates 6 and 7). Because of its size and location in the centre of 
the city, it is the most intensively used river system in WA. The catchment of both rivers is 
very large (see Figure 5) with most of this area cleared and used for agriculture, mostly 
broad–acre. As with most rivers set in urban contexts with agriculture being the 
predominant use in the catchments, they have elevated nutrient levels and other 
contaminants, and have been subject to increased algal blooms in recent years 
(Government of WA 2004), with the first significant algal blooms occurring in the summer of 
1993/94. The algal bloom and another significant bloom in the summer of 1997/98 lead to 
the closure of parts of the estuary to recreational activities for a few days, and the bloom in 
the summer of 2000/01 led to the closure of the whole estuary to recreational activities for 
12 days (EPA 2007).  
The government established the Swan River Trust (SRT) in 1989 to be the key planning 
and management agency for the both the Swan and Canning Rivers, although its decision 
making was limited primarily to in–river proposals such as jetties and foreshore 
developments. The significance of the estuary and growing pressures on the entire river 
system led the EPA to begin the process of drawing up an EPP in the early 1990s, with a 
first draft released in 1995 (EPA 1995), and finalised in 1998. The SRT and DEC worked 
together to produce the EPP for the EPA.  In 2007 the EPP was replaced by the Swan and 
Canning Rivers Management Act 2006. The Act also added further roles and 
responsibilities to the SRT. 
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Figure 5: Catchment for the Swan and Canning Rivers (Source: Government of WA 1998). 
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Plate 6: View of the Swan River with Perth CBD in the background (Source: Garry Middle). 
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Plate 7: View of Perth CBD across the Swan River at night (Source: Garry Middle). 
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As noted in the Gazettal notice for the EPP (Government of WA 1998:3683), its main 
purpose was to “Restore, enhance, preserve and protect the environmental quality, 
ecological processes and ecological integrity of the Swan and Canning Rivers”. The EPP: 
• Defined a set of general beneficial uses for the system as well as some general 
environmental objectives to be met so as to achieve the beneficial uses; 
• Allowed for specific water quality criteria targets to be set through regulation; 
• Required that all decision makers act to achieve those objectives;  
• Required that a comprehensive management plan be drawn up to guide the on–
going management of the rivers and catchments and the rehabilitation of the rivers, 
and the plan had to be completed and submitted to the Minister by 1 December 
1999. The EPP also set the requirements of the comprehensive management plan; 
and 
• Established some measures that would ensure the environmental objectives were 
met. 
These measures were, for the most part, very general without requiring specific actions by 
either government agencies or private individuals, for example: 
Fringing vegetation within the policy area should be managed by taking into 
consideration the following factors " 
In determining whether the ecological processes are being maintained within 
protected waterway or protected watercourse regard shall be had to whether " 
There were a few exceptions where clear actions or prohibitions were set out, for example: 
In order to protect the beneficial uses of the policy area – 
(a) wastewater treatment plants should not be established or operated to 
discharge wastewater (directly or indirectly) into protected waterways or 
protected watercourses unless the discharge " 
The EPP did not set out specific land use controls and made no direct reference to private 
land owners. The EPA recognised very early that a cooperative approach was needed to 
achieve the EPP’s objectives, which was highlighted in a presentation in late 1994 by one of 
the key officers in DEC advising the EPA on the draft EPP (Bott 1994), where he noted that: 
'Command–and–control' approaches have been shown to be an effective form of 
management when point sources of pollutants can be readily identifiable. However, 
the downside of promoting command–and–control measures, or prescriptive 
Environmental Protection Policies (that is, a policy which stipulates acceptable and 
unacceptable practices), to the management of diffuse sources of pollution is the 
subsequent loss of management flexibility " The management approach being 
promoted (in this EPP) is one of intergovernmental cooperation and integration.  
(Bott 1994:82,83) 
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As the preamble to the EPP notes: 
The Government of WA " is aware that the development of environmental protection 
programmes and management–orientated research is required and stresses the 
importance of, and the need to promote, cooperation in that development and 
research. 
(Government of WA 1998:3681) 
A Comprehensive Management Plan was presented to the Minister by 1 December 1999, 
consistent with the requirements of the EPP, but the EPA recommended that it be revised 
before release for public comment. That Comprehensive Management Plan was never 
released for public comment, and it is not clear why. Instead, in 2004 Riverplan was 
released which was titled “Comprehensive Management Plan and Implementation Strategy” 
(Government of WA 2004). This followed a period of increased government interest in the 
management of the river system in the early 2000s. 
As well, the Swan–Canning Cleanup Program Action Plan (Swan River Trust 1999) was 
also produced subsequent to the finalisation of the EPP which set water quality targets for 
each of the tributaries of the Swan and Canning Rivers for both nitrogen (N) and 
phosphorus (P). Riverplan built on these targets to propose a range of biophysical 
indicators are parameters to be measured and reported on that reflected the environmental 
health of the system and progress being made towards meeting the key N and P targets. 
Riverplan did not set performance criteria for these indicators and parameters but noted 
that: 
The final environmental values and environmental quality objectives, indicators and 
associated criteria will be developed and reviewed by the relevant agencies and 
community representatives.  
(Government of WA 2004:7) 
Science is central to the EPP and Riverplan. Both documents require that monitoring of 
nutrients and other contaminants be carried out, indicators of environmental health be 
established and that limits (targets) be set on the level of these contaminates in the rivers. 
Riverplan steers away from setting specific management approaches and adopts an 
adaptive management approach where it is recognised that: 
The variability of natural systems and our incomplete knowledge of the river and 
catchment processes require that management of the Swan and Canning rivers 
should be adaptive, improving in response to knowledge gained through monitoring 
and research.  
(Government of Western Australia 2004:11) 
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Policy making approaches of the EPP and Riverplan 
It is reasonable to conclude that the EPP attempted to be a collaborative approach, as it 
avoided the traditional expert–driven approach of requiring specific land use controls, and 
instead set out a cooperative framework for on–going management. The problem with the 
EPP is that whilst it tried to mandate cooperation, there was significant resistance from 
some government agencies. As one senior WAPC planner noted of the EPP: 
(It) is meant to require a whole lot of other planners and people that do things (in the 
catchment) to take the EPP into account, but that ownership and recognition of the 
EPP being a tool for these people to use is not there. 
A representative of the conservation movement noted that 
The agencies maintained that they were actually doing some coordination, but if you 
look behind the scenes they weren’t and they haven’t been doing it. 
As well, the level of participation can be considered to be at the IAP2’s Consult level where 
a draft EPP was drawn up and sent out for public review, the views of stakeholders were 
considered but the decision making remained with the EPA who determined the form and 
content of final policy. The distance between the public and policy makers referred to in 
Chapter 2 is significant in this case. 
Riverplan is a whole–of–government agreement on how to manage the river system 
cooperatively. A senior officers’ group has been established involving all the key agencies, 
to ensure implementation of the plan. The plan proposes that formal agreements be 
established between the EPA and the key agencies responsible for implementation to, in 
effect, guarantee cooperation. It took 6 years for the cooperative approach envisaged by 
the EPP to eventuate. 
The EPP also proposed an adaptive management approach in achieving policy objectives, 
and Riverplan re–enforces the need for an adaptive management approach by setting as 
one of the key management framework principles the following: 
Recognising the variability of natural systems and our incomplete knowledge of river 
and catchment processes requires that management of the Swan and Canning 
Rivers should be adaptive, improving in response to knowledge gained through 
monitoring and research. 
(Government of WA 2004:11) 
The above discussion suggests that identifying the actual policy making approach of this 
EPP is not as simple as with the other EPPs. It could be argued that the approach has 
many of the elements of an adaptive–collaborative approach. It recognises the need for a 
cooperative approach between the key agencies and the broader community, as well as 
requiring that adaptive management measures be used as part of implementation. As well, 
the two key agencies cooperated in the development of the EPP — DEC and the SRT —  
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but the cooperation of other key stakeholders, notably local governments, land owner and 
the large number of community and industry groups, was not sought through the EPP 
process. The limited extent of cooperation needed for the EPP and the “Consult” level of 
participation is not consistent with the adaptive–collaborative approach. 
The EPP is really a tool that mandates cooperation using the statutory powers of the EPP 
rather than being a process where cooperation is finally achieved. More importantly, the fact 
that the EPP met opposition from some key agencies and that it took six years to develop 
Riverplan suggests that the cooperation in the development of the EPP was very limited. As 
well, whilst the EPP identified the need for adaptive management, the EPP itself was not 
adaptive but highly prescriptive. In summary, the limited cooperation achieved during the 
policy making with participation only at the at IAP2 (2007) Consult level, suggests that the 
EPP is a traditional expert–driven approach that mandates cooperation and adaptive 
management for implementation.  
On the other hand, Riverplan adopts an adaptive–collaborative policy making approach. In 
particular, it recognises the need for a range of agencies and the community groups to work 
cooperatively to achieve a healthier river system. The participation involved in the formation 
of Riverplan required for its implementation will be extensive, involving many community 
groups and the key agencies. The Senior Officers Group set up to oversee the 
implementation of Riverplan has representatives from 11 government agencies, WA Local 
Government Association, the Swan and Avon Catchment Councils, and the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry. As well, formal agreements are required between the EPA and 
over 25 management groups, community groups and government agencies. This extensive 
participative process and the formal agreements suggests that decision making is shared, 
both directly and implied, which is consistent with the  IAP2’s (2007) Collaborate level of 
participation. 
As well, Riverplan recognises the need for adaptive management because of the inherent 
" variability of natural systems and our incomplete knowledge of river and 
catchment processes requires that management of the Swan and Canning Rivers 
should be adaptive, improving in response to knowledge gained through monitoring 
and research.  
(Government of WA 2004:11) 
The EPP and Riverplan as a policy making package 
Because the EPP and Riverplan were designed to work as complementary policies, it is 
more appropriate to view the EPP and Riverplan as a policy package. In this case, the 
package is dominated by Riverplan because it is the key implementation tool. The package, 
therefore, should be seen as adopting a predominately adaptive–collaborative policy 
making approach. 
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Policy making evaluation of the EPP 
This section evaluates the policy making of the EPP in isolation and does not consider 
Riverplan. It was not possible to evaluate Riverplan because insufficient time has passed 
since its introduction for data to be available relevant to its performance. Given the 
conclusion made at the end of the last section, this may not be fair as both the EPP and 
Riverplan should be seen as a policy package. Notwithstanding this, the evaluation of the 
EPP in isolation does provide some useful insights relevant to this study. 
Given the nature of the EPP — it is complex with a long time frame for implementation and 
the implementation mechanism is also complex — criterion policy–making performance will 
be determined using downstream decision making is consistent with policy criterion. The 
lack of cooperation from the key decision makers, the WAPC, affected local governments 
and other government agencies, meant that few if any policies were initiated by those 
agencies in response to the EPP for many years following the finalisation of the EPP. The 
WAPC (2006) did finally produce an SPP for the Swan and Canning Rivers at the end of 
2000, but it only made passing reference to the EPP where it requires local governments to 
ensure that the SPP: 
" together with the Swan Canning Rivers Environmental Protection Policy and other 
relevant State and local policies, are to be taken into account by the relevant decision 
making authorities when plans and development proposals within the area to which 
this policy applies are determined.  
(WAPC 2006:5704) 
Further, it took 6 years after the gazettal of the EPP for Riverplan to be developed. As one 
interviewee noted: 
I’m on the Swan River Trust, and it’s not a policy that’s referred to very frequently by 
the Swan River Trust or the Commission (WAPC). 
It can be concluded, therefore, that the EPP was unsuccessful on the performance 
effectiveness criterion. 
On the political support criterion, the length of time taken to finalise the policy (three years) 
reflects the concerns about the policy and suggests that the policy making has been 
unsuccessful on this criterion. As well, the interviewees expressed a clear view that the 
policy failed: Table 10 shows 6 interviewees expressed a view that it failed and none that it 
was successful.  
Evaluation of the policy making of the EPP on the content relevance criterion is a little more 
complex. The EPP addresses a significant environmental issue, given that Swan and 
Canning Rivers are in need of considerable attention to avoid significant algal blooms. As 
well, the EPA itself makes reference to it when assessing new proposals within the 
catchment, recognising that it sets the broad environmental quality objectives for the system 
(for example: EPA 2007), although it makes direct reference  to the water quality targets set 
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in the Swan–Canning Cleanup Program Action Plan for the actual assessment (Swan River 
Trust 1999).  
Several interviews criticised the content of the EPP claiming that it is too general and is 
difficult to interpret. The following comments on the EPP reflect these concerns: 
I wouldn’t have a clue what it is. I think I know what it is trying to do but I cannot see 
that there is any programme in place to do anything about it " is just too broad, too 
general and isn’t targeted in a way which tries to influence behaviour of particular 
decision makers, for instance. I’m not sure where the Planners see it, and yet they 
are a fundamental driver in terms of achieving your outcomes" 
!
If you look at the Swan–Canning, statement by statement, you can’t disagree with it. 
What does it mean? How do you translate it? It’s one of those problems with that 
policy is that it is meant to be something that a whole lot of other Planners and 
people that do things and take into account. But that ownership and recognition of 
EPPs being a tool for these people to use is not there. 
!
" is very general. It relied, in terms of the implementation mechanism, on the 
preparation of a programme of actions which has not eventuated" 
This may in part explain why the EPP was slow to be implemented: the relevant agencies 
simply could not work out what they had to do. The idea of ownership was raised by 
interviewees, which relates to getting the cooperation to implement the policy, for example: 
“But that ownership and recognition of EPPs being a tool for these people to use is not 
there.” The clear over–riding theme here is that there is concern about the EPP’s 
implementation: the content was unclear and insufficient guidance was given to the 
agencies required to carry out the policy. 
It could be argued, therefore, that because little direct reference is made to the EPP other 
than as a high level guiding document, and that other policy documents are more directly 
applied and referred to, the content of the EPP is not relevant and, therefore, on this 
criterion the policy making of the EPP can be considered unsuccessful.  
On the final criterion, other socio–economic impacts, the policy making of the EPP can be 
considered successful given that the EPP was aimed at government agencies, and private 
land owners were not directly affected by it. The nutrient targets set in the Swan–Canning 
Cleanup Program Action Plan are having an impact on new developments in the catchment 
where drainage and stormwater management now has to be best practice, which is not 
necessarily required of developments outside that catchment (see discussion in Wungong 
development in the next section). Indirectly, therefore, the EPP is affecting the cost of new 
developments in the catchment.  
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To sum up, whilst the EPP had no discernable other socio–economic effects, policy making 
of the EPP can be considered unsuccessful on the policy–making performance, content 
relevance and political support criteria. 
Linking policy making approach, policy making evaluation 
and nature and extent of the conflict 
There is a fairly high level of conflict associated with the policy making of this EPP. There is 
no doubt that the river is valued for a whole range of reasons by a large number of 
individuals and groups with diverse interests. As Riverplan notes of the river system: 
It is the most intensely used river system in Western Australia and is highly valued by 
the community for its aesthetic, recreational, commercial and environmental 
importance. These many, and sometimes competing uses are placing increasing 
pressure on the rivers.  
(Government of WA 2004:1) 
As well, several of the interviewees identified the existing conflict over the different values, 
for example: 
I think you are dealing with a much larger area and a much larger group of 
stakeholders who do not have a common position. 
However, this conflict over values was played out through the implementation of the EPP, 
particularly through Riverplan, rather than through the EPP. This reflects the overall low 
public interest in the EPP, which is directly related to the EPP being focused on government 
and agency actions rather than setting controls on private land uses. 
The science in support of the management of the system is poorly understood and at times 
highly contested (Government of WA 2004) which is typical of river systems world–wide set 
in urban contexts, but a review of the documentation shows that there was very little debate 
on these matters as part of the policy making for this EPP. This is largely because the EPP 
deals with high level environmental objectives which were generally easily agreed to. The 
contentious issues of water quality criteria and management targets to be achieved were 
left to later documents: Riverplan (Government of WA 2004) and Swan–Canning Cleanup 
Program Action Plan (Swan River Trust 1999). 
This debate and the contested nature of the science that supports setting water quality 
criteria and management targets is reflected in a recent assessment by the EPA of a large 
proposal for residential development at Wungong. This is within the catchment of the 
Canning River covering approximately 1500 hectares of land, and is currently used for a 
range of rural uses (EPA 2007). There is still significant scientific uncertainty as to whether 
the change of land use would lead to an improvement in water quality in the Canning River. 
The EPA noted that: 
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" deterioration in water quality from (urban) development cannot be ruled out 
because modelling and experience do not yet allow confident prediction that water 
quality can be managed adequately. There is a knowledge gap regarding the 
performance of BMPs (Best Management Practices) under Western Australian 
conditions, and concerns about the mobilisation of nutrients already in the system. 
Infiltration of stormwater may be associated with eventual mobilisation of nutrients 
and possibly other contaminants in groundwater.  
(EPA 2007:15) 
The debate over the science supporting the management of the Swan and Canning Rivers 
will continue for some time yet. 
The governance of the river system as proposed by the EPP cuts across many agencies, 
State and Local, and whilst the EPP attempted to provide greater coordination of these 
agencies and their management, little success has been achieved to date. As noted in one 
of several recent management plans for parts of the system: 
The feedback gathered from Local Government and State Government agencies 
indicate that these authorities often have different approaches/objectives to the 
management of the rivers due to different departmental requirements and priorities.  
(Hassell Ltd 2006:5) 
The interviewees also noted the problems of governance and the conflict that exists, for 
example:  
" of course the Swan River one, there are so many agencies that are involved in the 
management of the Swan, and the Swan River Trust’s jurisdictional area is really only 
the foreshore, and it has made it quite hard for them. I think, to really coordinate 
management. 
There remains significant conflict over the governance of the system. 
To sum up, whilst there is considerable conflict between different stakeholders over the 
management of the river system (i.e. values), and the science that supports management is 
both uncertain and highly contested, very little of this conflict emerged in relation to the 
policy making of the EPP. These conflicts are being played out through the implementation 
of the EPP through Riverplan. The key conflict that was played out through the EPP, and 
has been resolved through the implementation phase, was governance and the lack of 
coordination between the relevant government agencies. Whilst the EPP attempted to 
address this conflict specifically, it was not substantially addressed until 2004 with the final 
release of Riverplan. 
As noted above, the proposed approach of the EPP — adaptive–collaborative — was 
correct given the nature and extent of conflict here, but, as argued above, because the EPA 
tried to mandate cooperation the actual approach adopted was traditional expert–driven (in 
effect, mandated collaborative). Consistent with the hypothesis in this thesis, given the 
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nature and extent of conflict that surrounds the management of the Swan and Canning 
Rivers, a traditional expert–driven approach would fail. This is reflected in the findings 
above where it was concluded that, whilst the EPP had no discernable direct other socio–
economic impacts, it was found to be unsuccessful on the performance effectiveness, 
political support and content relevance criteria.  
Whilst an evaluation of Riverplan has not been carried out here, it is consistent with the 
hypothesis in this thesis that Riverplan would be successful as it facilitates cooperation 
through its highly participative processes and formal agreements (there is at least implied 
decision sharing) and adopts an adaptive management framework — it is, in effect, an 
adaptive–collaborative approach. 
Overall assessment of EPA’s policy making  
Introduction 
Table 12 summarises the above analysis and gives a useful overall evaluation of EPA’s 
policy making. Four key conclusions can be drawn from the data and the analysis in the 
previous sections and are discussed in detail below: 
• The EPA has had mixed success in its EPP policy making; 
• There is a direct relation between the EPA’s successful policy making and level of 
conflict, in particular, policy making in highly contested contexts were all 
unsuccessful;  
• The second conclusion provides some support to the hypothesis in this thesis; and 
• A new model of environmental policy making seems to be emerging that has 
considerable promise in dealing with highly contested policy making contexts. 
• As will be seen, a significant issue that emerges from this discussion is that despite 
recent policy failure in contexts where conflict is significant, the EPA has been slow 
to use a policy making approach that would more likely succeed in these highly 
contested contexts. To examine possible reasons for this, the key individuals within 
the EPA and individuals representing key stakeholder groups involved in the policy 
making in WA were interviewed. The relevant material from those interviews is 
discussed and some key conclusions drawn. 
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Table 12: Summary of the analysis of environmental policies 
Policy Nature and 
extent of 
conflict 
Policy 
making 
approach 
Study Evaluation EPA 
evaluation 
Draft 
Western 
Swamp 
Tortoise 
EPP 
Values – 
significant; 
Governance – 
significant; 
Science – 
significant 
Traditional 
expert–
driven. 
Performance effective – 
unsuccessful; 
Political support  – 
unsuccessful; 
Content relevance  – 
unsuccessful;  
Other socio–economic 
impacts  – unsuccessful 
Not 
evaluated 
Kalgoorlie 
air quality 
EPPs – 
1989, 1992 
Values – low; 
Governance – 
low; 
Science – low 
Traditional 
expert–
driven. 
Performance effective – 
successful; 
Political support  – 
successful; 
Content relevance  – 
successful;  
Other socio–economic 
impacts  – successful 
Successful 
but 
modification
s required 
Ozone 
EPPs (1989 
& 1992) 
Values – low; 
Governance – 
low; 
Science – low 
Traditional 
expert–
driven. 
Performance effective – 
successful; 
Political support  – 
successful; 
Content relevance  – 
successful;  
Other socio–economic 
impacts  – successful 
Successful 
but 
modification
s required 
1992 
Kwinana air 
quality EPP 
Values – low; 
Governance – 
low; 
Science – low 
Ecological 
modern. 
Performance effective – 
successful; 
Political support  – 
successful; 
Content relevance  – 
successful;  
Other socio–economic 
impacts  – successful 
 
 
Successful 
1999 
Kwinana air 
quality EPP 
Values – 
significant; 
Governance – 
moderate; 
Science – 
significant 
Ecological 
modern. 
Performance effective – 
successful; 
Political support  – 
unsuccessful; 
Content relevance  – 
unsuccessful;  
Other socio–economic 
impacts  – unsuccessful 
Not 
evaluated 
1992 Lakes 
EPP 
Values – 
moderate; 
Governance – 
low; 
Science – 
moderate 
Traditional 
expert–
driven. 
Performance effective – 
successful; 
Political support  – 
successful; 
Content relevance  – 
successful;  
Other socio–economic 
impacts  – successful 
 
No 
conclusion 
but changes 
needed 
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Policy Nature and 
extent of 
conflict 
Policy 
making 
approach 
Study Evaluation EPA 
evaluation 
1999 draft 
Wetlands 
EPP 
Values – 
significant; 
Governance – 
significant; 
Science – 
significant 
Traditional 
expert–
driven. 
Performance effective – 
unsuccessful; 
Political support  – 
unsuccessful; 
Content relevance  – 
unsuccessful;  
Other socio–economic 
impacts  – unsuccessful 
Not 
evaluated 
1998 Swan 
Canning 
EPP 
Values – low; 
Governance – 
significant; 
Science – low 
Traditional 
expert–
driven (a 
mandated 
collaborativ
e approach  
Performance effective – 
unsuccessful; 
Political support  – 
unsuccessful; 
Content relevance  – 
unsuccessful;  
Other socio–economic 
impacts  – successful 
Not 
evaluated 
 
Mixed success of EPA policy making  
 Of the ten EPPs and drafts to have their policy making evaluated used here, six can be 
considered successful overall (successful on all four criteria), with the remaining four 
unsuccessful (unsuccessful on at least three out of the four criteria). There was one EPP 
where the evaluation carried out here differed from the EPA — the 1999 Kwinana air quality 
EPP — where the EPA determined it had been successful, whereas the study evaluation 
concluded that it had been unsuccessful overall. It should be noted, however, that five 
EPPs have not been subject to an EPA review or evaluation.  
The difference in evaluations for the 1999 Kwinana air quality EPP can be explained 
because of the narrowness of the EPA evaluation which relied solely on performance 
effectiveness as the only criteria for measuring success. The study evaluation noted the 
EPP was successful on the performance effectiveness criterion, but was unsuccessful on 
the three additional criteria. The evaluation methodology used in this study, it is strongly 
contended, is a better measure of policy success/failure. As was argued in Chapter 4, 
relying solely on effectiveness as a measure of success has significant problems. 
Policy making success and conflict 
There is a direct relationship between successful policy making and low levels of conflict: 
or, put the opposite way, the policy making of those EPPs that have involved significant 
levels of conflict have all been found to be unsuccessful. A reasonable explanation for this 
is that the policy making approaches adopted for all of the EPPs have either been 
traditional expert–driven or ecological modern, and, as has been postulated in this thesis, 
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these approaches are likely to be unsuccessful in policy making contexts where conflicts 
are high. 
There is a chronological relationship here as well. Those EPPs initiated in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s have all been successful, whereas the two EPPs that were initiated in the 
late 1990s (Western Swamp Tortoise and Swan Canning) were both found to be 
unsuccessful and two of the early EPPs reviewed in the late 1990s were also found to be 
unsuccessful. These early EPPs addressed environmental problems that were relatively 
uncontested and where there was considerable community support for policy action: Ozone 
EPP, Kalgoorlie and Kwinana air quality EPPs. Most of the remaining areas of 
environmental policy making are more likely to be highly contested. As well, community 
expectations and values have changed over time, which accounts for the conclusion here 
that whilst the 1999 and 1992 Kwinana air quality EPPs were identical, the policy making of 
the 1992 EPP was found to be successful whereas the policy making of the 1999 EPP was 
found to be unsuccessful — it was effective in attaining its limited objectives, but its 
contents were considered to be too narrow, it lacked political support and there were 
demonstrated negative socio–economic effects.  
The EPA, therefore, did not adequately recognise or address the increased level of conflict 
associated with the policy making of the later EPPs and did not change its policy making 
approach accordingly. Instead, it remained with policy making approaches it was familiar 
with and which had been previously successful. 
 The Lakes EPP can be seen as perhaps an anomaly here in that the level of conflict was 
reasonably high, but the EPP can be seen as successful even though it adopted a 
traditional expert–driven approach. One possible explanation for this, as noted above, is the 
influence of the policy champion, the then chairman of the EPA, but some caution must be 
used here. Firstly, the influence of a policy champion has not been tested here and it is not 
put forward here as a possible explanation. Further, the presence of a policy champion in 
this case may have been influential in the policy outcome, but the level of conflict 
associated with the 1992 lakes EPP can be considered moderate compared with the level 
of conflict associated with more recent policy making. It is unclear, therefore, that having a 
policy champion in cases where the policy making approaches were traditional expert–
driven and ecological modern would have lead to successful policy outcomes.  
In defence of the EPA sticking with the traditional expert–driven and ecological modern 
policy making approaches, it could be argued that the nature of EPPs, being statutory 
policies that are in effect legislation in their own right, only lend themselves to these highly 
prescriptive approaches. Consequently, the EPA is constrained in its policy making. There 
is, however, one significant problem with this argument. 
If the above analysis is looked at historically, it can be seen that the EPA began to 
recognise the need for more collaborative approaches to policy making in the later EPPs — 
Swan Canning, Western Swamp Tortoise and the 1999 Kwinana EPP. The problem is that 
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the EPA did not adopt a collaborative approach to the process of drawing up the EPPs. The 
approach was highly centralised with the EPA and the officers supporting the EPA, and the 
participation was at best at IAP2 (2007) Consult level: that is, the EPA did not share 
decision making with interested stakeholders. So, if the EPA was aware that a collaborative 
approach was needed, and was of the view that EPPs could only use traditional expert–
driven and ecological modern approaches, an option for the EPA was to not use the EPP 
mechanism and opt for a non–statutory policy. This would free up the EPA to develop policy 
making in a collaborative manner rather than attempting to mandate it as part of policy 
implementation. The recent initiative of the EPA to develop non–statutory SEPs as an 
alternative to EPPs is perhaps a sign that the EPA is of the view that EPPs have limitations. 
There is, however, and alternative argument in that the EPA could have adopted a more 
participative policy making approach where the public is involved more often and very early 
in the policy making process before key decisions about the EPP are made (for example, 
before a draft is developed). There is no statutory requirement that prevents a more 
participative approach typical of IAP2 (2007) Involve level or even Collaborate level, so that 
decision sharing is effectively implied. It has been the practice of the EPA to adopt an 
expert–centred, limited participation process to policy development. It is possible that if the 
EPA adopts a participative approach to developing an EPP typical of IAP2 (2007) Involve or 
Collaborate levels the outcome could be an agreement to use command and control or free 
market mechanisms in EPPs, or that adaptive management measures should be applied. 
Implications for the research question 
As noted in Chapter 1, the research question examined here is: “what policy making 
approach is most likely to succeed in highly contested contexts where levels of conflict are 
significant, both in intensity and complexity?” Implicit in this question is that some policy 
making approaches are more likely to succeed in highly contested contexts than others. 
The above analysis shows that in all its policy making the EPA adopted either a traditional 
expert–driven or an ecological modern approach, irrespective of the nature and extent of 
the conflict, and that in each case where conflict was high the policy making was shown to 
be unsuccessful. This is consistent with the argument made in Chapter 2 that neither of 
these approaches would be successful in cases where conflict is significant.  
The particular focus of this thesis is the adaptive–collaborative approach to environmental 
policy making, and it was argued in Chapter 2 that this approach has the capacity to deal 
with all of the conflict embedded in modern environmental policy making. Whilst no EPP 
adopted this approach, the Swan–Canning EPP and Riverplan policy package is an 
adaptive–collaborative policy making approach. Unfortunately, there is insufficient data 
available to do an evaluation of this policy making, but this policy package arrangement 
represents an evolution in environmental policy making and is more likely to be successful 
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as it is primarily an adaptive–collaborative policy making approach. This new model is 
discussed in detail next. 
A new model of environmental policies? 
Despite the failure of the more recent EPPs, and if a broader perspective is taken, the 
recent policy making of the EPA shows some promise in dealing with conflict. The final 
Western Swamp Tortoise EPP and the subsequent policy making and decision making of 
the WAPC and City of Swan suggest that land use planning will be done in the catchment in 
a manner that should protect the two remaining habitats of the Western Swamp Tortoise, 
consistent with the EPP. Unfortunately, it took considerable time to get the cooperation of 
these two agencies, and it required a significant re–write of the EPP to achieve this. As well, 
the involvement of land owners has been limited.  
Similarly, there is some indication that the Swan–Canning EPP, taken as a package with 
Riverplan, would be successful. In this case, there was a clear intention that the EPP and 
the management plan would work together from the outset, with the EPP setting the broad 
policy objectives framework as well containing a list of the key issues to be addressed by 
the management plan.  
The model that seems to be evolving here is one where an EPP and a more prescriptive 
implementation policy are developed together so as to be complementary. The 
implementation policy could be non–statutory with a less stringent process for initial 
approval and for any subsequent changes. The EPP sets high level objectives as well as 
dealing with specific non–negotiable issues (for example, not–to–be–exceeded targets). 
The implementation policies would contain the detailed policy and management measures 
that seek to achieve the objectives in the EPP. This model builds on the success of some 
earlier EPPs — the Kwinana and Kalgoorlie air quality EPPs — pairing the EPP with the 
licensing processes of the DEC, where the EPPs set the overall objectives and air quality 
criteria and the licences prescribed industry specific emission rates and management 
measures. The model can be called concurrent–complementary. 
Two clear differences can be seen between these earlier EPPs and later ones. First, the 
level of conflict with the earlier EPPs was significantly lower than the later ones. Second, 
the main technical advice to the EPA on the EPP came from officers in the DEC who were 
also involved in managing licences of industry through the implementation of the EPPs. In 
this way, the cooperation of the downstream decision making agency was ensured. If this is 
the evolving model for future policy making by the EPA, then it needs some refinement to 
be successful in the highly contested context. 
First, both policies (the EPP and implementation policy) should be developed concurrently 
rather than sequentially. In this way, the links between the two can be better ensured, and 
all stakeholders can understand the overall policy context as policy making proceeds. 
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Second, a highly participative process would be needed to allow both policy instruments to 
respond to community and stakeholder values and issues. If only one policy is subject to 
significant public involvement then only one policy can properly claim to represent those 
values and interests. For example, if the EPP is developed in the usual expert and agency–
centred way and the implementation policy is subject to significant public input, there is a 
real risk that each will be based on different value sets, which would result in the links 
between the two policies being weaker and the overall package much less effective as a 
result. This participative process should commence very early on in the policy making 
process before any significant decisions about either policy are made, and decision making 
can truly be shared with stakeholders. 
A concurrent process will also help overcome any governance conflicts and allow the 
debate over any uncertainty over the science to be played out through the policy making 
process and be taken into account in both policies. This process would ensure that the 
policies are complementary, in that the EPP sets the agreed objectives as well as specific 
non–negotiable matters that need a statutory basis for enforcement. These would need to 
be the subject of agreement through the policy making process and could include: 
• Geographic boundaries to apply to the policies; 
• Defining which agencies need to be involved in addressing the environmental 
problem which is the subject of the policy making; 
• Empowering the implementation policy; 
• Establishing a management framework; 
• Agreed environmental standards or targets; and 
• Exclusion of certain activities. 
In this way, the EPP sets the agreed environmental outcomes and leaves the process and 
mechanisms for achieving these outcomes to the implementation policy. Where the science 
in support of setting standards or targets is uncertain and agreement cannot be reached, 
these would be excluded from the EPP and left to the implementation policy. The 
implementation policy can contain any adaptive mechanisms and contain flexibility policy 
and management measures. It has the advantage over an EPP in that it is easier to change 
where new information or modelling suggests changes are needed. 
The Western Swamp Tortoise and Swan–Canning EPPs achieved complementary 
outcomes in the end, but the processes used to get there lacked the necessary 
collaboration, and the two levels of policy were not developed concurrently. As well, the 
EPPs were not subject to sufficiently inclusive participation and decision sharing processes. 
It is interesting to note that the major case study covered in Chapter 6 attempted to use this 
concurrent–complementary policy making model, and is one of the key reasons why it was 
selected for detailed study. 
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The above discussion suggests that the EPA is aware that a more collaborative approach is 
required, but has to date been slow to fully embrace this approach. It may be that risk 
aversion behaviour (referred to in Chapter 2) is at work here (Stankey et al. 2003; McAlpine 
et al. 2007). Risk aversion is where agencies, when faced with heightened uncertainty, 
prefer to apply traditional and known policy options rather than alternative methods that 
carry extra risk even if those traditional options have been shown to be unsuccessful in 
dealing with uncertainty. It may also be that the EPA has some institutional learning to do 
(Dallmeier, Alonso, and Jones 2002; Jacobson et al. 2005). To return to the Clark quote 
used in Chapter 2 on institutional learning: 
Most institutions are not very good at learning, especially when such learning would 
entail significant revision of their own goals and operating procedures. Environmental 
management institutions are no better than the norm and may be significantly worse.  
(Clark 2002:1) 
To be fair, the EPA’s successful policy making has involved traditional expert–driven and 
ecological modern approaches, so risk aversion is not surprising, and based on this, the 
EPA may believe that sufficient institutional learning has occurred. The next section 
explores the possible reasons why the EPA has been slow to fully embrace a collaborative 
approach to policy making in highly contested contexts.  
Key elements of successful policy making 
Introduction 
One of the question asked of the interviewees was what do they see as the key elements of 
successful policy making. Appendix 4 summarises the responses by listing the elements 
identified by the interviewees and the number of times each element was identified. Table 
13 below shows those elements or attributes identified by eight or more interviewees. 
Conflict, the central theme of this study, was directly referred to by only six interviewees. 
Possible reasons why conflict was not rated more highly as a key element of successful 
policy making will be postulated later in this chapter. Analysis of these seven attributes 
suggests that they can be categorised as one of two types. The top three attributes are 
higher level considerations, and analysis of the interview responses suggests that there is 
an underlying tension about how environment policy making should be carried out, which 
may in part account for the EPA’s lack of success in policy making in highly contested 
contexts. These are the policy making approach attributes. The remaining four attributes 
can be considered lower order issues about the details of the policy making processes 
rather than considerations of overall approaches. Discussion of these attributes is not 
included in the main part of this thesis but is included as Appendix 5. This was done 
because, whilst they raise some issues relevant to environmental policy making in general, 
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they are of little relevance to policy making in highly contested contexts. The conflict 
management/avoidance attribute will be discussed. 
Table 13: Summary of the main attributes of successful policy making as identified in 
the interviews 
Attribute of successful policy making No of Interviewees who 
identified that attribute 
Participation 13 
Good science/information 12 
Political stakeholder acceptance/support of 
issue 
10 
Resources 9 
Clear & limited scope  9 
Implementation thought through 9 
Policy champions 8 
Conflict management/avoidance 6 
 
Participation 
Overview 
Appropriate participation was identified as a key element of environmental policy making by 
all except two interviewees. Comments of the following nature were typical: 
Some of the key elements of success, I suppose, were: the consultation process, 
definitely; the skill of the practitioner of the consultation process. 
Interviewees commonly used the word consultation to mean the more generic participation 
as used in the literature. As noted in Chapter 2 consulting has a particular meaning when 
considering the full spectrum of participation levels as defined, for example, by Healey 
(1997). Three themes about participation emerge from an analysis of the interviews: 
• Role of participation in policy making; 
• Political benefits of participation; and 
• Adequate participation as a reason for policy success. 
Role of participation in policy making 
The interviewees saw the role of participation in policy making in different ways, ranging 
across the full spectrum of participation opportunities, as these interview excerpts illustrate: 
Because at the end of the day, consultation is about gathering information, about 
assembling it and coming to some decisions " 
 
! %#M!
Not only advising stakeholders in the community about our policies but also a 
rigorous process in taking in considerations, submissions into account. You don’t only 
inform, you receive comments, and you have a process for considering those 
comments " 
 
Public policy and participatory democracy – it’s to negotiate not impose " I don’t 
think you can develop properly public policy without being inclusive about it, for 
exactly the same reason we have been talking about – power is shared; 
I think we can reach a happy medium where community are genuinely partners with 
government in the way decision making happens in natural resource management. 
 
It is important to note that interviewees were responding at the general level and not a 
policy–specific level. Consequently, responses reflect the interviewee’s preferred overall 
approach to environmental policy making and the role of participation. Two different views 
can be seen from these responses. The first interviewee sees participation at the lower end 
of the IAP2 (2007) participation spectrum at the Inform level, whereas the next interviewee 
sees it at the Consult level. Both these views are consistent with a traditional expert–driven 
or ecological modern approaches to policy making, where input from the community is 
either minimal (traditional expert–driven) or corporatist (ecological modern). The last two 
interviewees see participation at a higher level where there is some sharing of decision 
making, typical of the more participative collaborative and adaptive–collaborative 
approaches. 
It should be noted that whilst most of those who held the view that participation should be at 
IAP2 (2007) Inform or Consult levels were from government agencies, there were some 
from outside government who held this view. Similarly, whilst most of those who held the 
view that participation should be at IAP2 (2007) Involve or Collaborate levels were from 
outside government, there were some from within government agencies who held this view. 
These biases are not really surprising as it is often the community who lobby for greater 
engagement in government decision making and government decision makers have the 
most to lose where decision making is shared. 
Political benefits of participation 
Several interviewees were of the view that an adequate participation process carried out 
during the policy making process gives greater authority and credibility to the policy and 
makes it more likely that it will be agreed to by relevant decision making authorities and 
government. For example: 
But I guess the strongest and weakest argument that the community put forward is, 
“we hadn’t been consulted”, and it’s strong because politicians listen to it and it’s the 
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weakest because it’s usually wrong " and my experience is that Ministers will 
always come to you and say, “you haven’t consulted”, and it’s very easy to 
demonstrate how we have done it, and that usually satisfies them. 
 
Obviously, more weight is given to a policy which has been through a process of 
public consultation and public scrutiny. 
 
But the main thing (regarding participation in policy making) is the legitimacy of the 
policy. That is something that has become more important over the years " Well, 
they accept it because it’s been through a process. You can say, “well, basically, 
industry supports it, we’ve got a letter from the HIA, we’ve got a letter from UDIA, 
Local Government supports it, WALGA has said this, and, basically, we’ve got 
submissions from vested interest groups who’ve said this. We haven’t been able to 
satisfy that but there’s a reason for it.” At least nobody’s been bypassed. So, you can 
go to the (Planning) tribunal on that basis and they say, “well, obviously it’s a policy 
that’s been well researched, it’s not a secret policy, everyone knows about it, 
everyone has been given the opportunity to influence it, so it seems to be on balance 
as good you can get. We’re not likely to come up with something better, we’ll take it 
seriously.” 
This issue of legitimacy is significant in defining and achieving successful policy, and it 
seems achieving this legitimacy is, for some policy makers, the most important reason for 
having a participatory process. This is consistent with views expressed in the literature 
about the reasons for better participation in decision making (Stirling 2006). As argued by 
Patten (2001:222): “democratic legitimacy really depends, above all else, on the character 
and quality of public deliberation and on the relationship between public deliberation and 
state decision making”. 
There are two ways to look at this. The first is that getting political legitimacy requires 
addressing and managing conflicts, and that the nature and extent of participation allows 
this conflict to be addressed. As argued by Holzinger (2001:72), conflict resolution is “tied, 
however, to elevated expectations concerning increased participation, procedural justice, 
and greater transparency”. This is   consistent with both collaborative and adaptive–
collaborative approaches to policy making. The second way is that participation is seen as a 
process of legitimising what the policy makers have already decided upon, and the 
participation process allows policy makers to argue that a policy has been endorsed by the 
community. This is what Stirling (2006:96) calls “‘strong justification” where “there is a 
desire to justify a particular decision outcome that may be favoured by decision makers for 
entirely different reasons”, where participation is designed “in such a way as to condition the 
favoured outcome”. 
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In this case, participation is at best IAP2 (2007) Inform level but is really Healey’s (1997) 
Tokenism and is used to support traditional expert–driven and ecological modern 
approaches to policy making. This could be considered reasonable where levels of conflict 
are low, but where conflict is high, a tokenistic approach would not deliver stakeholders 
support and political legitimacy because the source of conflict has not been dealt with. 
Adequate participation as a reason for policy success 
Finally, whilst participation was the most commonly quoted attribute of successful policy 
making, participation was only once noted in relation to specific polices as a reason why a 
specific policy was successful. Whilst this seems surprising and almost contradictory at first 
glance, a likely explanation is that the adequacy or otherwise of participation causes other 
strengths or weaknesses to emerge in the policy: put another way, participation is a tool 
through which other attributes of policy success or failure emerge. Examples include 
political support, where participation is necessary to gain both political and stakeholder 
support, and raising community awareness where a good participation process would aid in 
the social learning that can occur as part of policy making. 
Good science and information 
The availability of good science and information was identified by all except three 
interviewees as a key attribute of successful policy making. Analysis of the interviewees’ 
responses suggests that whilst good science and information is a significant factor for good 
policy making, there are two schools of thought about what the scope of science and 
information should be in policy making and, consequently, how environment policy making 
should be carried out. 
Interviewees seem to have two diverging views about the nature of science and information 
as part of policy making. The first view is typified by the following responses:  
I think we always work first and foremost from good strong principles of science in 
terms of environmental resources which are identifiable and real. 
 
" [information is] absolutely fundamental, I think. Particularly for the natural resource 
area where you got to know where it is, what you’ve got left, what condition it’s in, 
how much of it do you need. 
 
I think a strong base, scientifically, and it’s got to be based on good science or good 
background information so you are moving forward from a sound basis. 
These responses reflect a view that traditional science is central to policy making where 
technical experts and hard science are crucial for a good environmental policy. It is 
probably not surprising that many of the interviewees saw a strong and central role for 
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science, given the tendency of the EPA to favour traditional expert–driven and ecological 
modern policy making approaches. Whilst many of the interviewees were not EPA 
members or staff, there is history of, and preference for, this type of environmental policy 
making in WA, both within the EPA and in the broader policy making community. 
These same interviewees were likely to express another view, which is that science adds 
legitimacy to the process, as the following comments reflect: 
The science gave it credibility, even though some scientists no doubt would argue 
with methodologies and other things, but I think that combination lead to a situation 
where it was difficult for people to argue too conclusively against what the 
recommendations were. 
 
Based on research: obviously, if a policy is based on specific research which is 
carried out in a proper way then it will carry more weight than one which is written as 
a policy but there is no background to it. It might appear as a, kind of, good idea but if 
there’s no research behind it I would say that it would carry less weight. 
Legitimacy is a significant issue for government agency policy makers where policies 
require political support in order to get final approval. It is interesting that another key 
element of successful policy making is stakeholder and political support (discussed next). 
The credibility of the science is seen as one way to get that support.  
Some of these traditionalists expressed frustration that sometimes science gets politicised, 
and, as a result, becomes a secondary consideration in policy making. For example: 
" one of the things I identified as limiting the role of science and the influence of 
science in policy making is where you have a high level of conflict the issues 
becomes politicised. The whole policy process is then dominated by what you can 
get over the line, and the socio–political forces, rather than the Science which gets 
forgotten, and you end up getting a policy that you get out the other side that 
everyone can live with, and often, like with the South West Ag Wetlands EPP, the 
policy is so limited that it’s not really worth the pain. 
Whilst this is recognition that gaining acceptance requires more than just doing good 
science, it reflects a view that there is really a misunderstanding of the science rather than a 
disagreement about the science. This is an important point and re–emphasises a similar 
point made above, that these interviewees are of the view that all that is needed to get 
stakeholder acceptance is to better inform them about the policy and the science that 
supports it. In effect, politics has gotten in the way and has blocked this understanding. 
There were, however, interviewees who take a different view about science, and see that 
the science itself can be the problem. For example, the limitations of science were noted by 
some interviewees: 
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Science is a good answer for scientists and it’s possibly why it has worked there, but 
if you use science for people who are non–scientific, it can be really problematic. For 
example people might say, “you’re telling me that there is no contamination here but I 
saw the smoke, I have to live here and I’m still worried about it.” " Perhaps it is the 
understanding, and that is not to say that you can’t help someone else understand 
the science with enough work, but obviously that’s going to take more time and more 
effort for them to get their heads around it, and so on. 
Others noted some of the latent subjectivity involved in some science and its application. 
For example: 
Science at the cutting edge is rarely black and white. Science is subject to 
interpretation like everything else. When you choose a standard, do you choose 500 
or 550? Well, it’s a human value judgement. If you say, “we’re choosing 550 because 
that’s the point at which 50% of the test animals or the humans within a kilometre will 
die”, it’s another value judgement — 40%, 50% or 60%. So it’s that recognition and 
the ability of our people to, and it’s another hobby horse for me, understand the 
application of science for itself and the importance of value judgement, and their two 
separate roles, and to bring them together, that makes for success or failure. And 
where we fail, Bellevue’s a great example, is where we’ve gone out and said, “no, 
these are the scientific answers, we’re the experts, and there’s no problem and don’t 
worry about it.” Everyone over here said, “well we really don’t understand it, but we 
live here and we saw the smoke and the drums and we don’t like it.” 
These interviewees tended to see science and information as being broader than just the 
traditional science. For example: 
Things either fall into the adequacy of the research in the first place and the 
adequacy of the understanding of the issues and the options and the concerns " A 
lot of things fall into research, really, and that depends on the nature of the issue and 
what sort of research that you do. And whether it’s something you can pick up by 
going to a place and staying there for a couple days or whether it really means 
interviews, surveys and that sort of gathering of information. You just got to be in a 
position when you can say, “well, I know enough” 
 
You actually need to do a bushland inventory and that analysis of how much you 
need to get the adequate representation. Get the community view in there as well, 
pick up some of the amenity, local bushland, aesthetic, cultural heritage type aspects 
to it as well the biodiversity and other environmental things. 
This view does not discount the role of traditional science and research, but suggests that 
local knowledge, community values (interviews and surveys), and non–scientific information 
(amenity and cultural heritage) have a place in policy making as well. These interviewees 
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are less likely to see traditional science as being central to policy making for the reason 
identified above. They note that human values need to be taken into account and these can 
rarely be defined in black and white, quantitative terms. Importantly, the subjectivity of the 
science needs to be acknowledged, as does the role of other sources of information. 
These two views reflect the debate in the community (noted in Chapter 2) about the 
objectivity or subjectivity of science and its role in policy making (Allchin 2004; Huesemann 
2002). As argued by Smith and Kelly (2003): 
In technologically advanced societies, scientific knowledge has commonly come to 
enjoy special status, often being directly equated with ‘truth’. In the last 30 years this 
perspective has been increasingly challenged, and there is a growing acceptance 
that scientific and technological expertise as used in decision making is neither 
necessarily disinterested nor objective ... This has lead to on–going demands for 
mechanisms to integrate different forms of knowledge in the science–policy process, 
and to extend public involvement in policy debates.  
(Smith and Kelly 2003:323) 
There are two competing forces at work here. One where there is, as noted by Steel et al 
(2004), an  
.. increasing emphasis among decision makers, interest groups, and citizens alike on 
the importance of more science–based environmental policy at local, regional, 
national, and international levels of governance”, which is opposed to a growing 
sentiment in some communities that “scientific information may itself be biased; and, 
other types of policy actors, information, and values are more important in arriving at 
sensible public choices”. 
(Steel et al. 2004:1) 
It is not surprising that the interviewees who expressed the first view about the role of 
science in policy making also saw participation as being at IAP2 (2007) lower end of the 
participation scale, mostly at the Inform level. This suggests that these policy makers see 
getting stakeholder support as an exercise of convincing stakeholders that the policy is 
legitimate because the science is good: Stirling’s (2006:96) “‘strong justification”. These 
interviewees would also likely favour traditional expert–driven and ecological modern 
approaches to policy making. 
Similarly, interviewees who favoured the second view about the role of science in policy 
making also saw participation as being at IAP2 (2007) higher levels of Involve and 
collaborate, and would likely favour a collaborative approach to policy making. 
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Political and stakeholder acceptance and support  
It is probably not too surprising that a majority of interviewees raised this issue, given the 
highly political nature of environmental policy making. Appendix 5 gives a full discussion of 
this attribute, but the key issues relevant here relate to problems of governance in policy 
making.  
Some interviewees saw the lack of stakeholder support for policy implementation, mostly 
from key agencies, as a key reason for policy failure, despite there being some initial 
agreement that the policy should proceed, for example: 
" this is part of the reason for the failure, divided responsibility for it. I think that’s 
probably the simplest explanation for the failure of it. You’ve had different agencies 
responsible for different bits of it, and you haven’t had a willingness for the agencies 
to cede ground to the other agencies. “Blow the Ag Department, we won’t help them, 
we’re in charge of this.” Turf war sort of stuff. 
This turf war issue was raised several times by the community interviewees. It was also 
evident that there was tension between the EPA policy makers and those from the WAPC, 
particularly where there was an overlap between environmental policies and planning. This 
was evident in both the Western Swamp Tortoise and Wetlands EPPs cases.  The South–
West Agricultural Wetlands EPP was singled out by several interviewees as a particular 
example of turf wars preventing successful policy making. For example: 
.. with the Ag wetlands one, there is a jurisdictional competition or conflict between 
agencies as well. And I know that over the Agricultural one there was a heap of 
discussion between agencies about it. 
 
You also had turf war happening between the agencies, and the whole thing is so 
watered done that in the end of the day you get one wetland in it, which I think is a 
nature reserve anyway. It’s going to sit on the shelf and be useless 
The fact that these tensions emerged at the implementation stage suggests that inter–
agency conflict had not actually been dealt with, but had been put to one side so as to get 
the policy approved, suggesting an on–going governance conflict. Several interviewees 
argued that it was important that the agencies that will have to implement the policy as 
downstream decision makers support the policy. For example: 
" maximise your ownership, particularly of those people who are either going to be 
positively or negatively affected by the policy. I mean, if they can own it, then you’ll 
get a much better compliance and implementation of it. 
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And of course that includes the consumers, but also the people who are going to 
perhaps make it happen if there is a development involved, the people who are going 
to make the development happen and work. 
Local government was identified by some interviewees as being particularly important as 
downstream decision makers for SPPs, for example: 
" then making sure that the local authorities are directly involved and support it. I 
mean, they don’t have to support every last letter of it " but you would like to think 
that through their involvement in the preparation of the SPP that they have a high 
degree of ownership to help to implement and interpret it. 
It was generally accepted that enlisting these agencies’ support was critical in getting a 
policy implemented. 
Conflict management and avoidance attribute 
As indicated in Table 13, the need to address conflict and its management was not seen by 
many interviewees as a significant issue in successful environment policy making. A sample 
of the comments made in relation to conflict and policy making are: 
The other key element is the ability of the policy makers to deal with the conflict. 
Conflict management came up in my work as being really, really critical. If you don’t 
deal well with the conflict, you can have policy that avoids, that has low conflict it’s a 
lot easier to be successful. But you generally find that the low conflict policies are the 
motherhood ones that are arguably not that effective anyway. Dealing with the 
conflict I think is, and it gets back to stakeholder acceptance. 
 
And, this is related to why do policies fail, because, I think often, to a large extent 
politicians are not prepared to get in there and try and resolve conflicting issues. If 
you look at probably one of the main ones we have had over the last decade is land 
clearing. Politicians, because of the issues of equity and the like, have just pushed 
their heads in the ground and say, “we’ll look, we’ll let the thing bungle along” with no 
side having a clear way forward. I think politicians often do not take on the 
responsibilities they should do in trying to resolve differences between competing 
sectors and between different community considerations. 
 
There are no real common themes that emerged from the analysis of the comments, but 
two specific observations can be made. First, there was a tendency of interviewees to see 
conflict as a negative factor, in that it is mentioned in relation to policy failure rather than 
policy success. The inability of policy makers to address the conflict was one reason for 
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failure, whereas there was no direct reference to good conflict management and policy 
success: 
" and, this is related to why do policies fail, because, I think often, to a large extent 
politicians are not prepared to get in there and try and resolve conflicting issue " 
" I think sometimes they [planning policies] avoid confronting the conflicting issues, 
which comes back to my other point about no processes for getting resolution 
between conflicting community requirements " 
Second, there are a couple of comments that suggest that some policy makers may not 
actually get conflict and policy making. One interviewee saw conflict management as 
working against good science and leading to a compromise policy being produced: 
" I identified as limiting the role of Science and the influence of Science in policy 
making is where you have a high level of conflict the issues becomes politicised. The 
whole policy process is then dominated by what you can get over the line, and the 
socio–political forces, rather than the Science which gets forgotten, and you end up 
getting a policy that you get out the other side that everyone can live with, and often 
" is so limited that it’s not really worth the pain" 
This comment was made in relation to the 1999 wetlands EPP, and, as already noted, there 
was not only conflict over values, there was also conflict over the science. The affected 
community may well argue back that the science wasn’t forgotten, it was challenged and 
the science of the policy makers was simply not accepted. The fact that the EPP is 
considered unsuccessful may be a reflection that the policy makers did not see conflict over 
the science as being significant. 
Two views of policy making — a barrier to 
better policy making 
This discussion suggests that there are two distinct views within the environmental policy 
making community in WA about how policy making should be carried out. One view sees 
that good hard science is central to good policy, that non–traditional sources of information 
have limited value, and participation during policy making should be at the lower of IAP2 
(2007) Inform and Consult levels. This can be called a science–focused view of policy 
making. This view sees science as critical for a policy to gain legitimacy, where the validity 
of the science needs to be asserted. Participation, therefore, is the process of 
communicating the validity of the science in support of the policy. In this way, both 
stakeholder and political support will follow. This view sees that policy making should adopt 
either a traditional expert–driven or ecological modern approach to policy making. 
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The other view sees some weaknesses in the use of science in policy making (it has 
limitations and is not as objectives as it claims) and that social values and non–traditional 
sources of information have a significant role to play. This can be called a participation–
focused view of policy making. Participation should be at a higher level, either IAP2 (2007) 
Involve or Collaborate levels, with ideally some shared decision making. This view sees that 
gaining both stakeholder and political support involves dealing with concerns about the 
policy that either go beyond the science or are about the science itself. This view sees that 
policy making should adopt either a collaborative or adaptive–collaborative approach to 
policy making. 
Following up on comments made in relation to participation, it should be noted that whilst 
most of those who held the science–based view were from government agencies, there 
were also some from outside government who held this view. Similarly, whilst most of those 
who held the participation–focused view were from outside government there were some 
from within government agencies who held this view. Of course, these two differing views 
can be accommodated in modern environmental policy making, depending on the context. 
Where conflict is minimal and the science in support of the policy is relatively uncontested 
then either a traditional expert–driven or ecological modern approach should prove 
adequate, and allocating additional resources to a comprehensive collaborative approach 
may not be warranted. Where conflict is significant and the science uncertain and 
contested, then a collaborative or adaptive–collaborative approach is required.  
The concern is that these views are in competition and are about the way that policy making 
should be done, irrespective of the context. The predominance of the science–focused view 
within the EPA, the early successes of the EPPs, and risk aversion, would explain why the 
EPA is slow to move away from traditional expert–driven or ecological modern approaches 
in cases where the levels of conflict are significant. The emerging participation–focused 
view about policy making primarily from outside the EPA, but also from within, is pushing 
the EPA towards more collaborative approaches to policy making as observed earlier in this 
chapter, but not yet far enough to fully embrace this approach where appropriate. 
Institutional learning within the EPA has some way to go, and as argued by Poncelet 
(2001), further learning may only occur once the EPA engages fully in a collaborative 
exercise, which would 
" provide important opportunities to forward environmental problem–solving efforts 
and to overcome some of the entrenched conflicts that have handicapped 
environmental decision making in the past. Though seemingly small, these personal 
transformations may well serve as the foundation for future large–scale 
improvements in the domain of environmental management. 
(Poncelet 2001:297) 
Institutional learning may also need to be extended to recognising and managing conflict. 
The relatively low importance that interviewees placed on conflict, as part of policy making, 
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suggests that many policy makers in WA have yet to come to terms with the significance of 
conflict in policy making, and until they do, environmental policy making in these contexts 
will continue to fail. This is a significant conclusion. The low hanging fruit of environment 
policy making (cases where conflict is minimal) have already been picked, and many of the 
remaining areas requiring policy responses are highly contested. The tendency has been 
for policy makers to blame failure on a range of process type issues rather than ask the 
fundamental question: is the actual policy making approach adopted appropriate? It follows, 
therefore, that unless policy makers recognise this and adjust their policy making 
accordingly, continued policy failure is the most likely outcome. 
Finally, the use of a collaborative approach would also help address the governance issues 
raised here, especially the turf war issue. 
Summary 
The above analysis goes some way to answering the research question here: what policy 
making approach is most likely to succeed in highly contested contexts where levels of 
conflict are significant, both in intensity and complexity? The review of policy making by the 
EPA showed that its policy making in cases where conflict was low were successful, but in 
cases where conflict was significant, policy making failed. It was noted that in all cases the 
policy making approaches adopted were either traditional expert–driven or ecological 
modern, which, consistent with the analysis in Chapter 2, would explain the policy failures. 
It was argued that, despite the failure of the policy making of the EPPs in contexts where 
conflict was significant, the recent policy making of the EPA shows some promise in dealing 
with conflict. This was because the EPA developed its EPPs more collaboratively, resulting 
in the emergence of new policy model. This model involves two separate policies developed 
together so as to be complementary: an EPP which sets the sets high level objectives and 
deals with specific non–negotiable issues; and a more prescriptive implementation policy 
containing the detailed policy and management measures that would achieve the objectives 
in the EPP. These policies can be called concurrent–complementary. 
Two distinct views exists amongst key policy makers in WA about how policy making should 
be done, based on the role of science as part of decision making and the level of 
participation that should be achieved. The predominance of the science–focused view of 
the key players within the EPA, and the success the EPA has had using the traditional 
expert–driven and ecological modern policy making approaches has encouraged the EPA 
to be risk–adverse and stick largely to traditional expert–driven and ecological modern 
policy making approaches. However, the emerging participation–focused view, primarily 
from outside the agency, is moving the EPA towards more collaborative policy making 
where appropriate.  
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The policy making approach of particular interest in this thesis — the adaptive–collaborative 
approach to environmental policy making — was not directly studied in this part of the 
research as none of the EPPs used the adaptive–collaborative approach. The case study 
covered in the next chapter is one where significant conflict was present, a concurrent–
complementary policy making model is adopted, and an adaptive–collaborative policy 
making approach applied. 
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Chapter 6 – Case Study 
Overview and significance of Cockburn Sound 
This chapter covers the case study of contemporary environmental policy making set in a 
highly contested policy making context. It involves the environment of Cockburn Sound, 
which is a large marine embayment approximately 20 kms south of Perth (Figure 6). 
Cockburn Sound has a range of significant environmental values, including ecological, 
commercial fishing, recreational boating and recreational fishing. There are significant 
growth pressures on the Sound, with a rapidly growing nearby residential area, growing 
recreational use in the Sound and several new industrial projects proposed for its shores. 
The health of the Sound began to deteriorate rapidly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and 
considerable conflict emerged about how best to plan and manage Cockburn Sound. 
Following nearly thirty years of research into the Sound and growing community concern 
about its health, the State government recently initiated a new management and policy 
framework for Cockburn Sound centred around two government agency polices: an EPP 
developed by the EPA, and an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) developed by the 
Cockburn Sound Management Council (CSMC), a cooperative peak management body 
made up of representatives of the key stakeholders (see below). These two policies will be 
the focus of discussion and analysis in this chapter. 
This Chapter has five major sections, which generally follows the approach taken to the 
analysis of environmental policies in Chapter 5. The first section provides important 
background information and sets the context for the case study by outlining the relevant 
biophysical elements of Cockburn Sound, providing the history of human use of the Sound 
and describing the history of relevant government policy and decision making. The second 
section provides specific details of both of the policies, and the third section explores the 
nature and extent of conflict at Cockburn Sound as the context for policy making. The fourth 
section describes the policy making approach adopted in each case. The final section 
provides a detailed evaluation of the policy making using the criteria established in chapter 
5 and relates policy making approaches to policy success/failure and the level of conflict 
associated with Cockburn Sound.  
Chapter 3 provided the details of the overall methodology used in this study. The key data 
sources used in this case study were: 
• Extensive interviews with the key stakeholders at Cockburn Sound, in particular, 
the members of the CSMC; 
• File searches; 
• Document searches (e.g. reports, newsletters, websites, news reports); 
! %$P!
• CSMC meeting minutes; 
• Observations made at CSMC meetings; and 
• Observations made at public meetings held during the preparation of the two 
policies and follow–up, opportunistic interviews with participants. 
Analysis and conclusions here are based on consideration of all of the data sources and 
selected quotations are used to highlight the arguments being made. They were chosen 
because they were either typical of many other responses or because they highlighted a 
particular issue of interest. 
 
Figure 6: Location of Cockburn Sound, including Owen Anchorage (Source: Cockburn 
Sound Management Council website) 
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Background and context  
Biophysical context of Cockburn Sound 
The mainland and islands that form the boundaries of Cockburn Sound are part of the 
sandy Swan Coastal Plain, which is a series of dunal ridges of varying ages of up to 1 
million years old. The current WA coastline was formed following a rapid rise in sea level 
around 10,000 years ago (D.A. Lord & Associates Pty Ltd and PPK Environmental & 
Infrastructure Pty Ltd 2001). The sea level rise was enough to fill the deep basins between 
elevated limestone ridges, part of which has become Cockburn Sound, which is 16 km long, 
9 km wide with its central basin 17–22 m deep.  
The marine waters of the WA coast are strongly influenced by the Leeuwin Current, which 
has its source at the equator. The waters of this current are warm, clear and relatively low in 
nutrients. Prior to European settlement the rivers that flowed to the coast carried relatively 
low volumes of water and low quantities of nutrients. These two factors plus the absence of 
any significant ocean water movements from the west means that the coastal waters of 
Western Australian are very low in nutrients by world standards (D.A. Lord & Associates Pty 
Ltd and PPK Environmental & Infrastructure Pty Ltd 2001). 
Low levels of nutrients in marine waters do not favour the production of phytoplankton. 
Instead, seagrass is the main marine primary producer, forming vast meadows on the 
sandy banks and gardens on the reefs. Seagrass will only grow in the shallower waters 
where sufficient amounts of light can penetrate to the seabed. Seagrass meadows were the 
dominant primary producer in Cockburn Sound prior to the 1970s (Figure 8). The fauna in 
these waters are dominated by benthic species10 that feed directly or indirectly on the 
seagrass, and species that feed on the detritus11 found in the deeper basins between the 
seagrass areas. 
Human use, management and early policy responses  
Cockburn Sound is the most significant and intensively used marine embayment in WA 
(EPA 1998) and is subject to a diverse range of competing interests. It is a significant 
habitat for a range of marine species, some exploited for commercial purposes, estimated 
to be worth nearly $2 million a year. It is an important recreational boating and fishing area. 
Its eastern shores contain the State’s most important heavy industrial area producing goods 
worth in excess of $8.7 billion a year (KIC 2005), and the northern part of the rapidly–
growing coastal town of Rockingham (since 1966 the population has grown from 2,500 to 
over 80,000). Garden Island, which forms the western boundary of Cockburn Sound, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Fauna species that live on and within the ocean or seabed. 
11 Dead and decaying material. 
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houses the Stirling Naval Base. A total of almost 1000 ships arrive in Cockburn Sound each 
year either servicing the industrial area or arriving at the naval base. As well, the sand 
banks in the northern portion of Cockburn Sound (also known as Owen Anchorage) have 
significant deposits of shellsand, caused by a combination of accretion of material eroding 
from nearby limestone reefs and accumulation of skeletal material from shelled marine 
fauna that inhabit the nearby seagrass meadows (Searle 1985). The calcium carbonate 
content in these banks is around 92% (D.A. Lord & Associates Pty Ltd 2000). These 
shellsands are dredged and used as the main raw material for the production of lime. 
Finally, the north eastern shores of the Sound house the State’s main ship building area 
(Jervoise Bay). Figure 7 shows the location of these key uses of the Cockburn Sound. 
Up to the 1960s, Cockburn Sound was used primarily for recreation and commercial fishing, 
but in 1954 the first major industry, an oil refinery, was established on the eastern shore. 
Between 1954 and the mid 1970s another five major heavy industries were established at 
Kwinana, and today there are over 30 heavy and supporting industries on the shores of 
Cockburn Sound. During the mid 1970s, the Commonwealth Government constructed a 
rock–based causeway to connect the southern tip of Garden Island to the mainland to allow 
better access to the naval facilities: two bridges were included with the causeway structure 
to allow marine water to flow through the Sound, although their efficiency in allowing 
adequate flushing of the Sound has been questioned (DAL Science and Engineering Pty 
Ltd 2002). Up until 1984, treated human effluent was discharged directly into the northern 
section of the Sound.  
The first sign that the ecology of Cockburn Sound was under stress was the loss of the 
seagrass. It is estimated that since 1954 seagrass cover has reduced by 80% 
(Environmental Resource of Australia Pty Ltd 1971) – see Figure 8. The main cause of this 
loss is reduced light reaching the seagrass caused by increased phytoplankton growth in 
the water and algae growing on the seagrass leaves as a result of nutrient discharge into 
the Sound and the reduced flushing because of the causeway (Department of 
Environmental Protection 1996). Industrialisation also led to reduced public access to 
beaches and increased competition within the Sound between commercial shipping and 
recreational boats.  
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Figure 7: Location of the main land uses associated with the use of Cockburn Sound. 
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Whilst nutrients were the main concern with regards to the loss of seagrass, other 
discharges into the sound were also of concern, including heavy metals, oils and other 
hydrocarbons from industry, TBT (tri–butyl tin) from shipping, faecal and other materials 
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from stormwater drains from the urban catchments, and cooling water. Up to the late 1970s 
discharges of these wastes were not well controlled. 
Figure 8: Seagrass decline in Cockburn Sound (Source: Kendrick et al. 2002) 
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In response to concerns about the decline in the health of Cockburn Sound a significant 
environmental study of the Sound was initiated by the Government commencing in 1976, 
with its major findings being presented in 1979 (DEC 1979).  The study was a significant 
scientific undertaking examining water quality, flora, fauna and human uses of Cockburn 
Sound. Two of the key conclusions were: 
• Recommended water quality criteria for the Sound should be adopted12; and 
• Industry should make efforts to significantly reduce waste discharges into the 
Sound. 
Industry, under pressure from the Department and through more restrictive licences, 
responded to the study by significantly reducing their waste discharges into the Sound 
during the early 1980s (Department of Environmental Protection 1996) which continues to 
the current day. As well, the government established a comprehensive water monitoring 
program. Nutrient discharges to the Sound are thought to have been reduced from around 
2000 tonnes per year in 1978 to around 300 tonnes in 2000 (WRC 2001). Groundwater is 
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12 Later proposed in a follow up report (Marine and Estuarine Water Quality Criteria Working Group 
1981) 
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now believed to be the main cause of contamination, and its main sources are from diffuse 
and more difficult to control land uses such as market gardens and residential areas. In 
effect, the 1979 report acted as a policy document by providing the framework for 
subsequent decision making. 
Table 14 below shows the reduced discharges by industry into Cockburn Sound between 
1978 and 2000. 
Table 14: Changes in industrial discharges by industry into Cockburn Sound 
(Source: D.A. Lord & Associates Pty Ltd and PPK Environmental & Infrastructure Pty 
Ltd 2001) 
Contaminant input (kg/year) Year 
Arsenic Chromium Copper Mercury Lead Nickel Zinc Oil 
1978 Unknown 2,065 3,809 105 3,259 571! 8,557 363,540 
2000 34 1 600 2 16 79 1,077 4,557 
 
Whilst efforts to improve the health of Cockburn Sound continued, there was growing 
community concern about the health of all of the coastal water in the Perth region. From 
1986 to 1989 the DEC funded a study of the nutrient dynamics of Perth’s coastal waters, 
which in turn lead to a more substantial study from 1991 to 1994 called the Southern 
Metropolitan Coastal Waters Study (Department of Environmental Protection 1996). That 
report made a number of key recommendations, including that: 
• Licences issued to industries discharging into Cockburn Sound require further 
reductions in the quantities of pollutants going into Cockburn Sound; 
• A formal coordinated management arrangement be set up to enable better 
management of Perth’s coastal waters; 
• An EPP be developed for Perth’s coastal waters; 
• Five environmental quality objectives be adopted; and 
• Environmental quality criteria be adopted that would ensure that the environmental 
quality objectives were met. 
Whilst this report covered all of the coastal waters south of Perth, Cockburn Sound became 
the focus of attention, both for the community and policy makers, primarily because it is the 
most intensively used marine embayment in Western Australia (Department of 
Environmental Protection 2001). During this time a difference of view about the importance 
of Cockburn Sound became obvious between the policy makers and the broader 
community. The policy makers focused on water quality and seagrass issues, whereas the 
community wanted the human use aspects of the Sound addressed — that is, recreational 
uses (swimming boating etc.), fishing (commercial and recreational) and industrial uses. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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These latter issues were made more significant in the light of success in improving water 
quality in the Sound and a halt to the loss of seagrass.  
In part this difference of view emerged because the mandate of the environmental agencies 
(the EPA and DEC) does not include broader socio–economic concerns and no agency with 
that broader mandate had been involved in policy making for Cockburn Sound. The 
Southern Metropolitan Coastal Waters Study (SMCWS) produced at least 136 publications 
and small reports (see Directory of Publications in the main SMCWS report - Department of 
Environmental Protection 1996).  
The EPA (1998), in response to the community’s and its own concerns about the health of 
Cockburn Sound, produced a report in 1998 that provided “strategic environmental advice 
on the cumulative impact of infrastructure proposals on the water quality and marine 
ecology in the Sound” (P. 3). In arriving at its advice, the EPA organised a series of 
workshops with key stakeholders, decision makers and scientific experts with knowledge of 
the Sound. The key relevant conclusions of the EPA are: 
• Whilst it was possible to provide a qualitative assessment of the likely cumulative 
impacts of the proposed infrastructure developments, the lack of relevant scientific 
information means that quantitative predictions of ecological changes that could 
occur are not possible;  
• On–going research into the ecology of the Sound and the possible impacts of 
further developments are needed; and 
• A management structure involving representatives of the Government and the 
community (including industry) be established to coordinate management of the 
Sound and its catchment is required. 
The first two conclusions will be returned to later, but in response to concerns about 
governance at Cockburn Sound, the government proposed a new policy and governance 
framework, described in detail in the next section. 
Descriptions of the two policies  
Overview of the policy and governance framework  
Within 12 months of the 1998 EPA’s report being released, the State Government, on 
advice of the EPA, agreed to three initiatives aimed at better management of Cockburn 
Sound: 
• Setting up of the Cockburn Sound Management Council (CSMC) to coordinate on–
going management of the Sound and its catchment; 
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• The CSMC to prepare and implement an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) 
to guide management of the Sound and its catchment with high level stakeholder 
involvement in its preparation; and 
• The EPA to prepare an EPP that, as well as addressing the key environmental 
issues for the Sound, would provide the statutory authority for the EMP. 
This framework is an extension of, and improvement to, the evolving policy model referred 
to in Chapter 5 where an EPP and a more prescriptive and complementary implementation 
policy are developed — concurrent–complementary policies. The CSMC is a significant 
addition to the model in that it establishes a formal collaborative mechanism through which 
both the EPP and EMP will be implemented. The CSMC is made up of 23 members 
representing community, recreation and conservation groups, industry, State, 
Commonwealth and Local Governments, and has an independent Chair. It has no decision 
making powers but works to coordinate agency decision making in the catchment and 
Sound, oversees research, provides a forum for information sharing, and coordinates 
community (including industry) actions that impact on the Sound. It was formally established 
in 2000 with its first meeting in August of that year. 
This model had an inherent fatal flaw, in that the EPP could only be limited to providing 
environmental protection with minimal coverage of socio–economic concerns whereas the 
CSMC and the EMP would need to address the broader socio–economic concerns of all 
stakeholders in the Sound. This flaw became apparent in a debate over the legality of the 
EPP, as discussed later. 
First drafts of the EMP and EPP were released in December 2001(CSMC 2001; EPA 2001), 
and both finalised in January 2005. The EMP was finalised relatively easily, but the 
progress of the EPP was much more complicated (see next section). The EPA had 
originally proposed to release a draft EPP in June 2001, with a scheduled gazettal date for 
the final EPP set at March 2002 (EPA 2000:8). This timetable was shown to be too 
optimistic for the EPP, but was not for the EMP. 
Supporting the draft EPP were the following documents: 
• An explanatory document (Department of Environmental Protection 2001); and 
• Draft Environmental Quality Criteria and supporting information (EPA 2001). 
Following consideration of the submissions on the draft EPP and supporting documents the 
EPA produced a revised EPP for consideration by the Minister in November 2002 (EPA 
2002), along with a revised supporting document (EPA 2002). Concerns were subsequently 
raised about the legalities of the EPP (see discussion later) which ultimately lead the EPA 
to conclude that a statutory EPP that would have any value or relevance could not be 
written for Cockburn Sound. On advice of the EPA, the Government chose not to proceed 
with the EPP and instead released a revised policy for Cockburn Sound in the form of a 
non–statutory draft State Environmental Policy (SEP) in October 2004 for comment 
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(Government of Western Australia 2004). This was the first of this type of environmental 
policy, and to date remains the only one. 
The content of the draft SEP had only minor changes from the last draft of the EPP. A final 
SEP was released in January 2005 with few changes from the draft (Government of 
Western Australia 2005). 
The EPP/SEP 
The aims of the EPP (EPA 2000) were: 
• Establish environmental values (EVs) both ecological and social, environmental 
quality objectives (EQOs) and environmental quality criteria (EQC) for Cockburn 
Sound; 
• Identify a program to protect EVs; 
• Provide for the integration of environmental planning and management of the 
Sound and catchment by giving statutory authority to relevant government agencies 
to act to protect Cockburn Sound; 
• Establish the authority and roles for the EMP and CSMC; and  
• Provide a mechanism for regular reporting on progress in reaching the objectives.  
These translated into the following policy “purposes” in the final SEP: 
 (a)  to declare, protect and maintain the environmental values of Cockburn 
Sound; 
(b)  to abate pollutants and restrict activities that diminishes the 
environmental values of Cockburn Sound; 
(c)  to establish a program to protect and enhance environmental quality to 
support the environmental values of Cockburn Sound; 
(d)  to give effect to the environmental quality objectives and the 
environmental quality criteria for Cockburn Sound; and 
(e)  to give effect to the Environmental Management Plan for Cockburn 
Sound.  
(Government of Western Australia 2005:1) 
One ecological EV (ecosystem health) and three social EVs (fishing & aquaculture, 
recreation & aesthetics, and industrial water supply) were proposed in the draft EPP. The 
focus of the EPP was to be on both water and sediment quality within Cockburn Sound. 
These values and associated objectives were set by the EPA based on work it had done on 
the values and objectives for all of Perth’s coastal waters, which itself was subject to wide–
ranging consultation (EPA 2000). 
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Table 15 below shows these EVs and EQOs in the final SEP. The EQCs are to act as 
benchmarks to assess whether the EQOs are being met and the EVs protected. They were 
to: 
" provide clear and scientifically justifiable limits to the level of ecological change 
considered acceptable, and hence set the bounds within which we must operate to 
ensure that current and future activities are ecologically sustainable. (EPA 2000:7) 
Two types of criteria that make up each EQC were proposed: 
• Environmental Quality Guideline (EQG) — triggers that if exceeded require specific 
investigations be carried out to determine if the Environmental Values are at risk. 
Some management actions may be required; and 
• Environmental Quality Standard (EQS) — additional triggers that if exceeded 
indicates that the EV has been compromised, and management action is required 
to address the exceedance. 
The EQCs would prove to be the most contentious part of the policy making process and is 
discussed in detail in the following section on conflict and policy making. All of the versions 
of the EPP and SEP had mechanisms that were predominately command and control. The 
full version of the final SEP (Government of Western Australia 2005) is included as 
Appendix 6 for reference, and some of the most significant clauses are shown below to 
illustrate the command and control nature of the policy. 
Table 15: Proposed EVs and EQOs Cockburn Sound (Source: Government of 
Western Australia 2005). 
Value Environmental Quality Objective 
Ecological 
Ecosystem Health The level of ecological protection to be maintained for ecosystem integrity is 
described in terms of structure (e.g. biodiversity, biomass and abundance of 
biota) and function (e.g. food chains and nutrient cycles). The level of 
ecological protection is set out in the EQC reference document at one of 
three levels – high, moderate or low. 
Social 
Maintenance of seafood for human consumption, such that seafood is safe 
for human consumption when collected or grown. 
Fishing & 
aquaculture 
Maintenance of aquaculture, such that water is of a suitable quality for 
aquaculture purposes. 
Maintenance of primary contact recreation, such that primary contact 
recreation (e.g. swimming) is safe. 
Maintenance of secondary contact recreation, such that secondary contact 
recreation (e.g. boating) is safe 
Recreation & 
aesthetics 
Maintenance of aesthetics, such that the aesthetic values are protected. 
Industrial water 
supply 
Maintenance of industrial water supply, such that water is of suitable quality 
for industrial water supply. 
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The use of the words “declare”, “protect” and “give effect to” in the policy purposes (see 
earlier) are strongly directive and typical of the command nature of many of the clauses. 
The control part of the policy relates to the setting of EVs, EQOs and the EQCs through 
reference to the following: 
The environmental quality criteria — 
(a)  are established in the Environmental Quality Criteria Reference Document for 
Cockburn Sound (2003–2004), Environmental Protection Authority 2005 (as 
amended and published from time to time by the Environmental Protection 
Authority following public consultation); and 
(b) apply to the protected area through the decision schemes shown in 
Schedules 4 to 6. These are referred to in the table over.  
(Government of Western Australia 2005:6) 
The EQVs are the most significant references for on–going management of the Sound and 
the SEP gives no flexibility here: “The protection of the environmental values is to be 
achieved by the taking of management actions to meet the environmental quality criteria” 
(Government of Western Australia 2005:9). The SEP is also highly directive of what the 
CSMC is to do in implementing the EPP, for example: 
(3) Where the Cockburn Sound Management Council becomes aware of an 
exceedance of an environmental quality standard — 
(a)  the Cockburn Sound Management Council will report the exceedance to 
the Environmental Protection Authority and the Minister for the Environment 
as soon as practicable. 
(Government of Western Australia 2005:8) 
The SEP provides some minor elements of flexibility and adaptability to the CSMC in that it 
requires the CSMC to 
" investigate, monitor, review, report and continually improve on the achievement of 
environmental objectives, criteria and targets where appropriate in accordance with 
the Environmental Management Plan and the Policy. 
(Government of Western Australia 2005:10) 
Other than this the SEP is highly prescriptive but makes no direct reference to the types of 
specific management mechanisms that should apply in the EMP, and the use of, for 
example, market mechanisms and adaptive management would be consistent with the 
SEP, provided those EOs are achieved. 
The EMP  
As a preliminary step in preparing the EMP, the CSMC commissioned a consultancy firm to 
write a report to establish the existing state of the Cockburn Sound environment (D.A. Lord 
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& Associates Pty Ltd and PPK Environmental & Infrastructure Pty Ltd 2001). This report 
formed the technical basis for the preparation of the EMP. The 2001 draft EMP contained 
the following five point action plan for the implementation of the EPP: 
• Protecting the environmental values of Cockburn Sound; 
• Facilitating multiple use of Cockburn Sound and its foreshore; 
• Integrating management of the land and marine environments; 
• Coordinating research and investigations; and 
• Monitoring and reporting on performance.  
The first part is to build on the EVs, EQOs and EQCs to be set in the EPP/SEP. The EMP 
proposed that the CSMC would be responsible for monitoring water quality, checking for 
compliance with the EQCs and coordinating any action for non–compliance. It proposed 
that where a guideline or standard is exceeded the CSMC would coordinate investigation 
into the cause. If a guideline is exceeded the CSMC would work with the relevant agency to 
assess the risk to Cockburn Sound the exceedance poses, and if the risk is high then the 
CSMC would work with that agency to identify and implement an appropriate management 
response. If a standard is exceeded and the source is a licensed premise, the CSMC would 
work with the relevant agency to ensure suitable management is implemented to reverse 
the exceedance and repair any damage as required. If the source is a diffuse land use then 
a cooperative response was proposed to ensure land use practices are improved (for 
example working with the horticulture industry to improve fertilizer usage). 
For each EV, an interim report card was published (see Figure 9 for an example) showing 
four levels of management response: monitor only, investigate where a guideline is 
exceeded, action where standard is exceeded or research where the state of the Sound for 
that item is unknown. Each is then followed with some key recommendations for action. 
The draft EMP went beyond the more narrowly focused draft EPP by addressing the 
management of multiple uses of the Sound and foreshore. Four uses were proposed: 
• Natural and cultural uses — terrestrial and marine habitats, and European and 
Indigenous heritage; 
• Recreation and commercial — fishing, water activities, beach uses, aquaculture 
and nature–based tourism; 
• Industrial — including ports; and 
• Defence — recognising Stirling Naval Base. 
Seven management areas were proposed (Figure 10) and relevant multiple uses identified 
for each (Figure 11). There were a number of recommendations made for each multiple 
use. 
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Figure 9: Interim report card in the draft EMP for ecosystem health in areas where a 
moderate level of protection is to apply (Source: CSMC 2001) 
!
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Figure 10: The seven EMP management areas (Source: CSMC 2001) 
 
The development of these multiple uses will be returned to later to illustrate the level of 
participation involved in the preparation of the EMP. 
The draft EMP went on to make some recommendations for integrating management of the 
land catchment with management of the Sound, coordinating research, and monitoring and 
reporting on performance. It finished with a proposed format for an implementation strategy, 
to be completed for the final EMP.  
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Figure 11: Multiple uses proposed for each management area in the draft EMP (Source: 
CSMC 2001) 
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The main issues raised in submissions on the draft were: 
• Remediation of groundwater; 
• The need for a social oral history; 
• Public access to monitoring data; 
• Strong support for independent monitoring and reporting; 
• The boundary of Cockburn Sound should be extended to include Owen Anchorage; 
and 
• The EMP should embrace a principle of no net loss. 
The last matter created considerable debate within the CSMC and will be covered 
separately in the discussion on conflict and policy making in Cockburn Sound. The final 
EMP was released in 2005 with the key changes from the first draft being: 
• Updated Report Cards (2004); 
• The draft made reference to a principle of “no net loss of ecological or social 
functions in Cockburn Sound” for new developments, which was replaced in the 
final version with “Guidelines for Development Affecting the Shoreline and Seabed” 
(see discussion below); 
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• The recommendation in the draft that industry should ensure that marine fauna is 
not drawn into seawater intakes, or that if they are trapped they are removed before 
harm comes to them, was removed from the final EMP; 
• The final EMP had the following additional recommendations – 
o a social and oral history be completed of Cockburn Sound, 
o industry be encouraged to develop best management practices for waste 
water discharges, and 
o remediation of contaminated sites be encouraged; 
• A web–based system be developed to allow public easy access to monitoring data, 
report cards and related management strategies; and 
• The implementation strategy was finalised including a description of the action, 
output, expected outcome, agency responsibility and timeframe for starting and 
completing the action. 
The multiple uses allowed in each management area remained largely unchanged for the 
final EMP (see later discussion). The change to “no net loss of ecological or social functions 
in Cockburn Sound” is significant and discussed further below. The other changes can be 
considered minor, which suggests that the draft EMP was a very good representation of the 
existing community and agency views and concerns about the management of Cockburn 
Sound. This is reflected in debates that took place at the two community forums held during 
the public review period for both the draft EPP and EMP. The question and answer 
sessions were dominated by debate about the EPP and specific proposals affecting 
Cockburn Sound, with only one brief mention of the EMP. The most likely reason why the 
draft EMP required so few changes was the comprehensiveness of the participative 
process undertaken for its preparation, as discussed later. 
The clauses in the EMP are a mixture of both command and control and adaptive. The EMP  
has many specific directives for action, for example: 
14. Conduct site specific studies in the Mangles Bay and Kwinana area to determine 
sources of stress to seagrass meadows (CSMC, DoE, WRC, CoR, KIC: 2003 – 
2005). 
15. Specify mooring and anchorage types and locations which minimise seagrass 
damage.  
(CSMC 2005:16) 
This is typical of management plans where clear guidance to those actually managing and 
planning the Sound is required. The EMP (CSMC 2005) set a primarily cooperative process 
for its implementation: 
In implementing the Plan, the Management Council will draw upon the skills, 
experience and legislative powers of its broad membership, which includes 
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representatives of the general community, recreation and conservation groups, 
industry, Defence and local, State and Commonwealth government agencies.  
(CSMC 2005:5) 
The key adaptive elements of the EMP relate to the implementation of the EQCs. The 
CSMC (2005) is to coordinate the monitoring of the EQCs, and compare the monitoring 
data against the EQCs to “determine if key biological, chemical and physical indicators are 
within limits” (P. 9). As mentioned earlier, where a guideline or standard is exceeded the 
CSMC would initiate an appropriate management response, especially where a standard is 
exceeded. Specific management actions are not included in the EMP and would be 
determined on a case by case basis depending on the extent of the exceedance and the 
nature of the source of the contamination. This, then, is the adaptive part of the EMP where 
the monitoring results determines the need for any action and, if so, what management 
response is needed. 
Based on the model of adaptive management proposed in Chapter 2, the type of adaptive 
management used in Cockburn Sound is best described as passive adaptive where: 
• There is an adequate and comprehensive amount of existing environmental data on 
Cockburn Sound (although it is important to note the earlier comments of the EPA 
in relation to uncertainty about the cumulative impacts of new proposals for the 
Sound); 
• Actual modelling is not used, as the managers are of the view that Cockburn Sound 
is relatively well understood and there is a high level of confidence that the system 
will respond as predicted. There is limited expectation that management would 
need to change once implementation begins;  
• Broad management options were drawn up and evaluated as part of the drafting of 
the EMP, and a preferred overall management approach agreed to, although the 
specific management actions where exceedances of EQCs are detected will be 
determined on a case by case basis; 
• Monitoring is required, not because of any uncertainty over the likely impacts, but 
because the system is highly sensitive to change and has high environmental 
significance; and   
• The level of conflict associated with Cockburn Sound is high (see later discussion), 
which is largely associated with issues of whether or not to proceed with the 
developments being considered for Cockburn Sound, and because the implications 
of failure of management are significant. 
The fact that a comprehensive ecological model is not used as the basis for management 
decision making means that active adaptive management is not being used, which reflects 
the relative agreement about how Cockburn Sound operates as an ecosystem. The conflict 
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over the science was largely over what EQCs should be set, and not over how Cockburn 
Sound might respond to stress and change. 
The nature and extent of conflict at Cockburn 
Sound  
Cockburn Sound and resource scarcity 
As noted in Chapter 2, conflict in environmental policy making emerges in situations of 
growing resource scarcity. It will be argued here that the most recent pressures on 
Cockburn Sound can be seen as a resource scarcity issue where Cockburn Sound (the 
marine water and the foreshore and beaches) can be seen as a useable resource, with the 
three resource scarcity issues identified in Chapter 2 present here: decreasing quantity of 
the resource (loss of some areas of Cockburn Sound for public use), increasing demand on 
a resource (growing number of users and competition for space) and loss of a good quality 
resource (mostly deteriorating water quality). 
From the mid 1990s onwards, there were a number of new proposals that caused 
community concerns about the on–going management of Cockburn Sound, and the 
Sound’s ability to continue to provide for the range of existing uses. Those proposed 
developments were: 
• A new breakwater to provide sheltered waters for the Jervoise Bay ship building 
and marine support industries (1996); 
• Short–term expansion to shellsand dredging in Owen Anchorage involving 3.7 
million tonnes of shellsand over three years (1996); 
• A significant expansion to Jervoise Bay ship building and marine support industries 
including significant land reclamation and additional breakwaters (1999); 
• A long–term expansion of existing shellsands dredging in the Owen Anchorage 
involving 90 million tonnes of shellsand over about 35 years (2001); 
• Stage 1 of a private port at James Point (2002); and 
• A desalination plant to provide potable water for the Perth metropolitan area (2002). 
As well as these formal proposals there were two other proposals that were in the later 
stages of planning but were yet to be formally proposed: 
• A plan by the Fremantle Port Authority to construct a new harbour north of James 
Point to supplement the existing Fremantle port; and  
• A new marina and associated residential and commercial developments at Mangles 
Bay.  
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As can be seen from Figure 7, over half of the foreshore and beach areas of the eastern 
shores of Cockburn Sound are within the industrial areas, and only the beaches in the south 
are readily available for public access. All of the beach areas within the northern industrial 
area (Jervoise Bay) have been removed to allow for shipbuilding infrastructure (see Plate 
8), and many of the beaches in the Kwinana Industrial area cannot be easily accessed. 
Further, public access to the beaches adjacent to the larger industrial plants is discouraged 
because of concerns about public health and safely in the event of an accident (see Plates 
10 and 11). This has not stopped people using these beaches for a range of uses, including 
fishing, horse and dog exercising and swimming.  
An emerging problem is that many of these new developments will require land that is 
adjacent to the foreshore and beaches and, once constructed, would likely lead to a further 
loss of beaches that can be accessed by the public. The existing public foreshore and 
beaches in the south of Cockburn Sound are already heavily used and the removal of these 
industrial beaches will put added pressure on the non–industrial beaches. In effect, the 
beach resource in Cockburn Sound will become scarcer.  
As well, these new and proposed developments compete with the existing users for the 
marine areas of Cockburn Sound. For example, many of these developments will bring 
increased boat and ship traffic to the Sound, increasing the risk of accidents between these 
larger vessels and the considerable recreational boating traffic. As one community 
representative of the CSMC noted: 
There’s the navigational issue. If shipping movements get too great in there, there will 
be some physical conflict, because people who use boats are not necessarily 
mariners. They don’t know all the rules and that is actually one of the important 
factors I believe about Cockburn Sound and that is it is a training ground.  
Reducing community access to areas of Cockburn Sound was a common theme raised by 
community members of the CSMC at their meetings. For example, at a CSMC meeting on 5 
April 2002, a community member expressed anger over plans for a proposal to build a new 
port in Cockburn Sound which would include a boating exclusion zone not only within the 
port boundaries but also a buffer zone surrounding the proposed port, and that this would 
inevitably lead to the loss of recreational areas within the Sound. Another community 
member raised concerns that increased ship movements would likely lead to boating 
exclusion zones around the major shipping routes within the Sound. 
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Plate 8: The industrial area at Henderson in the north east corner of Cockburn Sound 
showing the reclaimed foreshore (Source: Garry Middle). 
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Plate 9: Kwinana Beach within the Kwinana industrial area (looking north) (Source: Garry 
Middle). 
!
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Plate 10: Sign at Wells Park adjacent to Kwinana beach, within the Kwinana industrial area 
(Source: Garry Middle). 
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On a similar theme, the southern public beaches are also subject to pressures, with a 
growing residential population, and increased tourism development adjacent to the 
foreshore bringing more visitors to the beaches (see Plate 11 showing new short–term 
apartment accommodation being built on the foreshore). By the late 1990s the EPA become 
concerned that the health of Cockburn Sound was further declining, and there was a 
significant potential for further incremental environmental loss with each of these new 
developments proposed for the Sound. To quote the EPA directly: 
A series of such developments along the shallow margins of the Sound would clearly 
result in extensive habitat modification, and together, they may have the potential to 
affect water circulation, water quality and ecological function over a broader portion of 
Cockburn Sound " 
(EPA 1998:3) 
The EPA was concerned that the natural habitat of Cockburn Sound would become both 
further degraded and scarcer. Reduced water quality would also have implications for other 
users of the Sound, including: 
• It could reduce both the recreational and commercial fish take; 
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• Poor water quality, particularly involving environmental health aspects 
(bacteriological and viral) could lead to beach closures13; and 
• Increased phytoplankton in the water (including full scale algal blooms) leading to 
reduced visibility affecting some of the tourism operations in the Sound (for 
example, swimming with the dolphins). 
In summary, Cockburn Sound can be viewed as a scarce resource with some portions of 
the Sound being removed from the public domain (access to beaches), increasing 
competition (more users) for the existing space that is Cockburn Sound, and decreasing 
good quality resource (loss of environmental value and loss of water quality). As noted by 
one stakeholder 
Whilst there have been some tensions between many of these different uses and 
interests, open conflict was minimal up until the mid 1990s, arguably because 
Cockburn Sound was not seen as a scarce resource and was able to provide 
adequately for these differing uses. The loss of seagrass was seen by many 
environmentalists and the EPA as a matter of concern, but Cockburn Sound was 
providing adequately for a range of human uses with many seeing the seagrass 
concerns as an inevitable outcome of increased social value of the Sound. 
Plate 11: New short–term accommodation units on the foreshore of Rockingham beach, on 
the south–east shore of Cockburn Sound (Source: Garry Middle). 
!
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13 This occurred at Palm Beach during the data collection phase of this thesis (a beach to the south–
east of the Sound within the Rockingham residential area). 
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Social conflict 
Introduction 
The following comments by two interviewees sum up the level of social conflict at work in 
Cockburn Sound.  
The Sound as an entity or as a body of water, or coastal environment or whatever 
you want to call it, because there are so many competing issues or competing users 
or organisations that want to use it for so many different activities, there is bound to 
be conflict. 
Because there are so many different interests in Cockburn Sound, each with their 
own objectives and agenda that realistically we could never set out to make 
everybody happy. It’s just not going to happen, that’s the reality of the situation. 
Unfortunately it’s not a win, win, win situation; Cockburn Sound probably never could 
have been like that, and certainly the way it is now with industry and defences and 
ship building and commercial and recreational fishing and just general passive and 
active recreational activities, it can never be that way. There’s always going to be 
winners and losers and there will be some people that are going to be losers and 
they won’t be happy with their part. 
As already noted, Cockburn Sound is the most intensively used marine embayment in WA 
and is subject to a diverse range of interests from ecological, commercial and recreational 
fishing, recreational boating, heavy industrial area, a backdrop for a rapidly growing coastal 
residential area and the home of an important Naval Base. Of course, the presence of this 
range of different values does not necessarily imply that conflict exists. The discussion 
below, drawing on the interviews, explores the extent of that conflict by focusing on four 
areas: the beach and public access; lack of trust towards industry in the Sound; a 
fundamental difference over what the long–term objective for the Sound should be; and 
differences of view over a no net loss principle for development in the Sound. 
Beach and public access as a source of conflict 
The EPA (1998) noted the significant community concern that future developments in 
Cockburn Sound could “further restrict access to beaches and coastal waters along the 
mainland coast of the Sound” (P. 3) 
Here are the views of two community members of the CSMC in relation to beaches and 
access: 
" and some people are angry because there won’t be any beaches left in Cockburn 
Sound, so how do you fix and what do you do about that? 
Beach access, yes, the primary one, but also boat access, and also access to parts 
of the Sound they want to get to. Certainly the community sees denial of access as 
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only exaggerating mistrust. If the access is there, even if it is not used, it will help the 
community to trust industry. 
There is a view in both industry and government that reduced beach access is a simple 
reality as Cockburn Sound continues to develop. As noted by one industry person: 
" and the biggest gripe from the community is that from Woodman Point to Kwinana 
Beach it’s pretty much all going to be Industrial. Actually, that’s pretty much the way 
it’s going to turn out. There’s not much that existing industry has had a role in: that’s 
government policy. Those plans have been in place for a long time. 
This suggests that there is recognition that reduced beach access is a source of conflict 
within Cockburn Sound. Interestingly, however, not all stakeholders recognised the 
importance of the issue for the community, as this exchange with one interviewee 
illustrates. The interviewee was exploring the five key issues form Cockburn Sound: 
SUBJECT: I mean, everybody agrees on what the big five issues are. Everybody 
knows it is habitat loss, fishing pressure – what are the other ones? 
GARRY MIDDLE: Beach access? 
SUBJECT:  No, not in Cockburn Sound. The big five for marine ecosystems in 
general, I’m pretty sure it is habitat loss, fishing pressure, eutrophication is one of 
them, contaminants inputs are another, introduced species, that’s the other big one. 
Whilst this lack of recognition of the beach access issue is a minority view amongst the key 
stakeholders, it does point out the on–going problem the community faces in having many 
of its concerns recognised by other stakeholders and policy makers. 
A question of a lack of trust of industry in Cockburn Sound 
The comments of the second community member in the previous section suggest that there 
is an underlying community mistrust of industry at Cockburn Sound. This is reflected in the 
following comments from an industry representative:  
" a lot of the issues from the community groups were really issues that rise from a 
point of view that, “we don’t trust the bastards.” And so a lot of the issues that 
concerned the community people that were involved really came from a point of view 
of, “basically, we’ve got no trust, they said so many things over the years, it’s never 
happened, we’re outvoted, we haven’t got enough representation.  
The mistrust, for the most part, relates to industry being the primary cause of the loss of 
environmental quality in Cockburn Sound, mostly through the loss of seagrass and 
recorded spills and discharges into the Sound that have lead to the closure of parts of the 
waters of Cockburn Sound. There is also a view of some recreational boat–owners and 
fishers that total fish take is reducing and that industry is the main cause of the declines by 
causing water quality problems. The following comments illustrate these concerns. 
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From an industry representative: 
" but also take into account that there are a lot of people out there who will grizzle 
and say look at industry and raise the fist because they don’t catch quite as many fish 
as they did 20 years ago. 
From a government agency representative: 
 " but it’s access to the foreshore and access to the water, because no doubt as the 
population grows and more people get boats it starts to get crowded out there. If you 
can get rid of BP and a few others then there’s a little bit more water to be had. It 
doesn’t mean you’re going to catch any more fish, you actually catch less.  
Conflict of the future vision for Cockburn Sound  
The conflict over fishing and fish takes raises a significant and fundamental issue that is at 
the heart of the conflict over Cockburn Sound: conflicting visions as to what ecological state 
should Cockburn Sound be returned to in the long term. The following comments illustrate 
this: 
I guess there are a few questions to ask. Is the seagrass actually able to recolonise? 
What time scale is that likely to occur? And the danger is that if you push the primary 
producers, which are now phytoplankton, too low your secondary production will 
suffer. And in my opinion, that is one of the key values that the community sees, is 
catching fish. You can go and swim anywhere, but they all want to catch fish in a 
sheltered waterway. It’s not a prized area, really, for its swimming because there are 
plenty of magnificent swimming beaches. But what its real prize is that it is a 
sheltered waterway where you can get out there in a small boat. 
The issue here is that the replacement of seagrass as the dominant primary producer has 
not necessarily reduced the net primary production of the Sound, with some experts 
expressing a view that it has actually increased. If this is the case then net secondary 
production (notably fish) should also have increased. The net result is that the species mix 
of marine fauna, especially fish, would have changed since 1954 (Hyndes 2004), but the 
sustainable catch of fish and other seafood may have increased as well. The implication for 
policy makers is that returning the Sound to water quality that favours the growth of 
seagrass rather than phytoplankton would achieve a conservation objective but could come 
at a cost to a social objective related to recreational and commercial fishing. Such an 
outcome would lead to further resource scarcity and an inevitably increased conflict.  
These two differing objectives for the Sound are a source of conflict that has become 
central to policy making for Cockburn Sound, as reflected in these comments: 
I think the opinion has been, certainly made public, that one of the objectives is to 
have the system in such a state that if the seagrass want to recolonise all that area 
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they can. Now, one of the questions is, “what is that magic number that would or 
wouldn’t allow the seagrass to recolonise?” 
There are people around, in my opinion, that really no level of contamination, 
enrichment, eutrophication or whatever term that you want to use, is acceptable. 
There are some of them around the place who would prefer that it was 1954 again 
and the Sound is in that state. 
The health of Cockburn Sound was raised at the annual community forums with some 
members of the community wanting the Sound returned to its conditions prior to the 1950s. 
A question from the floor asking why the impacts on Cockburn Sound cannot be reversed 
and why industry cannot be removed from the Sound received considerable applause at 
one meeting (meeting notes and observations from community forum held on 12 February 
2002). This conflict over what the long–term environmental vision was particularly played 
out in the debate about EQCs, as discussed below, with those wanting a return to pre–
development conditions pushing for tighter water quality criteria and industry wanting more 
relaxed criteria. 
No net loss principle 
Both the Consultative and draft EMPs made reference to a secondary principle14 of no net 
loss of ecological or social value. This issue was only discussed in passing at CSMC 
meetings prior to the release of the draft EMP, but was raised in some of the public 
submissions and created considerable debate at CSMC meetings following close of 
submissions. It is not clear why the matter went largely uncontested prior to consideration of 
public submissions, but a probable explanation was that members were focusing on the 
multiple uses part of the EMP (see later discussion).  
The debate was triggered, in part, because of the EPA’s emerging policy on environmental 
offsets. This issue was first raised by the EPA in 1999 as an “overall environmental benefit” 
principle in relation to its policy on clearing of native vegetation (EPA 1999), which was 
modified two years later to include a wetland banking system (EPA 2001), and later 
developed as a broader offsets policy (EPA 2004, 2006, 2007). 
The no net loss principle was meant to apply to new developments in Cockburn Sound that 
would inevitably cause a loss of environment quality, but could be approved subject to an 
off–setting benefit to the Sound. Examples could include the following: 
• A proposal that would include some dredging and subsequent loss of seagrass 
could proceed if it funded seagrass rehabilitation in another area of the Sound 
(direct offset) or fund or carry out research into seagrass rehabilitation (contributing 
or indirect offset); and 
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14 Not one of the seven Principles referred to early on in the documents, but was labelled a ‘principle’ 
in the text i.e. “Ensure proponents of future development proposals are guided by the principle of no 
net loss of ecological or social function of Cockburn Sound.” (P16) 
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• A proposal that lead to a loss of beach could proceed subject to the proponent 
creating a new artificial beach as part of the proposal (direct offset) and doing 
rehabilitation and restoration works on a public beach subject to significant erosion 
(contributing offset). 
The June 2002 CSMC meeting spent over an hour discussing the issue and of over two 
hours at its July meeting. It was the community members and those representing the NGOs 
who were most concerned about the EPA policy position and what the EMP might say 
about offsets. The following key issues were raised in those debates: 
• Several members wanted the word net to be dropped and the principle should 
become a no more loss principle. Industry did not support this and believed they 
could operate within an offsets decision making environment. 
• Concern was raised about how an appropriate offset could be defined and agreed 
to, as it would be difficult to actually get a like for like offset: for example what area 
of replanted seagrass should be required to offset the loss of an area of mature 
seagrass meadow? 
• Should no net loss be interpreted as allowing a trade–off between the two values, 
for example could a loss of ecological value be offset by an increased social value? 
• One view was that the principle needs to go beyond the general and be carefully 
and fully developed so that proponents of future developments cannot get around 
the intent of the principle by mis–interpreting it. 
• An alternative view was that a detailed policy position could never be agreed upon 
and would waste a lot of the CSMC’s time and energy so it was better to agree on 
some high level aims and allow case–by–case assessment. 
After the second meeting, CSMC officers were asked to develop a draft set of Guidelines 
for achieving the no net loss principle, taking into account the issues raised in the 
discussions. A draft set of Guidelines was tabled at the September 2002 meeting (see 
Figure 12). The debate on these draft Guidelines was again lengthy and the community and 
NGO members reiterated their concerns raised at the previous meeting. In the end, an 
agreement was reached at that meeting. The notes I made from that meeting sum up the 
debate and final outcome succinctly: 
Member 1 (Conservation Council) expressed concerns about no net loss. He doesn’t 
want a trade–off thing but a no net loss thing i.e. it should not be that 9ha of bushland 
is lost to be offset by 9ha of degraded bushland within a regional park being 
rehabilitated – this is an environmental buy out. GK (Chair) did make it clear that 
CSMC was not a decision maker but provides advice, and that much progress has 
been made on this issue pushing some people’s boundaries in CSMC but he 
recognized that it may not go as far as people like Phil would like to go. 
! '%M!
The no net loss debate was an interesting test for the Council. There was a 
convergence of views between community members and industry/govt members 
about the issue in the end despite there being apparent differences at the start. 
Community members agreed and accepted impacts would occur if development did 
take place and that no loss was unreasonable. Industry/govt agreed that the CSMC 
needed a fairly high bar for this issue in the first place so that developers know they 
have to do a lot to get CSMC tick for it. 
There was an obvious give and take from both sides of the debate which delivered the final 
agreement. As the debate unfolded, the members representing industry and government 
conceded that any offset had to be significant and meet a very high standard of 
accountability and transparency (the fairly high bar) which was met with the concession by 
the community and NGO members that it was unrealistic to expect a no loss outcome for 
development. This is an excellent example of social learning occurring, as referred to in 
Chapter 2 in the discussion on the collaborative policy making approach (see Poncelet 
2001 for example). 
As can be seen from Figure 12 and the resolution of the CSMC, the CSMC agreed to 
guidelines but allowed members to suggest some wording changes to staff and that, if on 
reflection and consultation with their groups or agencies, members found that the guidelines 
could not be supported, the matter could be raised again at the next meeting. A final draft 
EMP was presented to the November meeting with a slight re–worded set of Guidelines, 
and was accepted with only a minor change to the wording of the inside cover. The 
changes noted above relate to the multiple uses were also included. The final guidelines 
are shown in Figure 13 over the page. The final Guidelines have some differences 
compared to those agreed to at the November CSMC meeting, but they are insubstantial 
and minor wording changes, rather than changes to the intent of the Guidelines. 
This issue created conflict at two levels. First, many community members opposed further 
development in the Sound in principle, and to discuss the idea of a no net loss principle was 
outright anathema — although in the end an agreement was reached. Second, because of 
the non–specific nature of the final Guidelines, there is likely to be considerable debate and 
likely conflict on a case–by–case basis as individual developments are discussed and what 
offsets should be required.  
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Figure 12: Copy of draft no net loss guidelines tabled at the September 2002 CSMC 
meeting. 
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Summary 
The above discussion illustrates that there was, and still is, considerable social conflict 
surrounding Cockburn Sound, with four significant examples discussed in detail: reducing 
beach access; significant community mistrust of industry; a fundamental difference over 
what the long term management vision for the Sound should be; and the no net loss 
principle. The next section examines the nature and extent of governance conflict. 
Figure 13: Copy of final no net loss guidelines in the final EMP (Source: Cockburn Sound 
Management Council 2005:15). 
!
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Governance 
Two areas of governance will be explored here: the historic arrangements and the 
governance proposed by the new decision making model (the EPP, EMP and the CSMC). 
Given that the health of Cockburn Sound deteriorated significantly from the 1950s to the 
early 1980s, it is reasonable to suggest that the environmental governance up until that time 
was unsatisfactory. Up until the mid 1980s the major industries that established on the 
shores of Cockburn Sound were controlled in large part by individual State Agreement Acts 
that gave little attention to environmental controls, although they were still subject to 
requirements of the existing legislation. These industries covered by State Agreement Acts 
were: 
• Oil refinery — Oil Refinery (Kwinana) Agreement Act 1952; 
• Steel production — Broken Hill Proprietary Steel Industry Agreement Act 1952, 
Broken Hill Proprietary Company's Integrated Steel Works Agreement Act 1960;  
• The alumina refinery — Alumina Refinery Agreement Act 1961 and Alumina 
Refinery Agreements (Alcoa) Amendment Act 1987; 
• Nickel refinery — Nickel Refinery (Western Mining Corporation Limited) Agreement 
Act 1968; 
• Cement works — Cement Works (Cockburn Cement Limited) Agreement Act 1971; 
• Fertiliser and chemical works — Industrial Lands (CSBP & Farmers Limited) 
Agreement Act 1976. 
The environmental management approach applied to these industries was to set restrictions 
on the concentrations of emissions that were discharged from the industrial plants through 
stacks (gaseous emissions) and outlet pipes into Cockburn Sound (for liquid waste) with no 
consideration given to total loads and impact on the receiving environment. Environmental 
controls involved end–of–pipe solutions rather than reducing emissions. Up until 1971, 
there was no overall environmental protection Act, with the various areas of environmental 
protection spread across various different Acts (for example, air quality was covered by the 
health Acts). In 1971, the first consolidated environment protection Act came into force, 
which allowed the environmental regulator to control discharges for the first time. The 
problem for regulators was the lack of science and understanding of the various 
environments which was the subject of significant discharges, in particular Cockburn 
Sound. What was missing according to the DEC (1979) was: 
A set of guidelines to water quality objectives, properly developed and adopted, 
which define concentrations, load, or other characteristics for water quality 
parameters relevant to the protection of beneficial uses of the Sound.  
(DCE 1979:25) 
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Put simply, there were no water quality standards set for Cockburn Sound and there was 
little if any control on what was being discharged into the Sound. As noted above, 
industries’ discharges into Cockburn Sound reduced significantly during the 1980s, which 
was in response to an improved understanding of the Sound, a more active regulatory 
agency and more environmentally aware industries. Concerns about the governance in 
Cockburn Sound remain today. As one community representative of the CSMC noted: 
Cockburn Sound is such a complex area. There are so many different departments 
and so many different laws that relate to it.  And every department thinks that its 
stake is the most important one. 
For the most part, stakeholders were supportive of the new overall approach to planning 
and managing the Sound, although concern was expressed that it had taken a long time to 
have these arrangements in place. Another community representative on the CSMC 
expressed these concerns: 
I would be slightly embarrassed that it’s taken this long to come up with some kind of 
mechanism or for them to suggest that there is a need to have some kind of 
coordinating entity which is, not so much safeguarding the environmental quality of 
Cockburn Sound, but is in a position to make recommendations to government as to 
the environmental state of Cockburn Sound, the activities that impact upon the 
environmental qualities of Cockburn Sound and what needs to be in place in order to 
manage, if you like, those competing climates. So, I think there may be a bit of an 
issue in terms of why hasn’t it happened sooner, which they may take personally or 
they may not take personally, but that is the way I think I would be leaning if I was 
them. 
Part of the concern is that many of the community stakeholders hold a view that the 
government held off putting these arrangements in place until after all the important 
development decisions had already been made. For example: 
The critical time for the Cockburn Sound Management Council to have been formed 
would have been in the late 1970s. The fact that it hasn’t been formed until the late 
1990s into the 2000s, I think that a lot of the hard yards have already been done. It’s 
(the CSMC) really there just to keep it on track. 
There is a suggestion here that these new arrangements are tokenism and that with or 
without the EPP, EMP and the CSMC, Cockburn Sound would be managed in the same 
way. 
The decision not to proceed with the EPP and to instead adopt a non–statutory SEP was of 
particular concern to the conservation movement. These concerns were raised as early as 
February 2002 at a community forum, and as peak conservation group, the Conservation 
Council of WA, reported at the time in its newsletter under the banner headline “State 
Environmental Policy on Cockburn Sound Lacks Teeth”: 
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This is a vastly inferior document to the previously promised Environmental 
Protection Policy (EPP). It has none of the legal powers of an EPP.  
It has been claimed that Drafting difficulties with the Cockburn Sound EPP " meant 
that an alternative instrument was needed, one that is underpinned by the recently 
expanded powers of the Environmental Protection Act.  The Council is seeking legal 
advice on the matter.  
(Conservation Council of WA 2004:4) 
As noted earlier, the community groups are considerably distrustful of industry and wanted 
a strong regulatory regime to ensure compliance with the agreed EQCs. The change to the 
SEP is seen by the conservation movement as a significant downgrading of the proposed 
regulatory regime, which suggests that conflict over governance issues will continue with 
the new decision making process.  
Science and information — the contest over the 
EQCs 
Setting the EVs and EQOs was relatively uncontentious, partly because much of the work 
had been done through the Perth Coastal Waters studies (EPA 2000), but also because the 
EVs and EQOs are narrative and descriptive rather than quantitative. The EQCs, on the 
other hand, are more prescriptive and are quantitative values that would have to be 
complied with had the EPP been finalised. In the event that a non–compliance with an EQC 
standard is detected, and had the EPA policy stayed as an EPP, it would have been 
mandatory for certain actions to be carried out. For example, an industry found to have 
caused the exceedance would have to carry out remedial actions to undo the exceedance. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the EQCs became the main focus of debate and conflict 
during the policy making period for both policies, but most notably the EPP. As one 
stakeholder noted: 
I think setting up the environmental quality objectives and the values was quite a 
good process. Quantifying it has been the problem because a lot of these levels for 
different pollutants and particularly the biological parameters have been very difficult 
to quantify because there just aren’t any standards around. I think that has been one 
of the difficulties. It has been easy enough to identify what the objectives and values 
are that we want to protect or enhance, but then finding quantitative measures to be 
able to measure the achievements or otherwise has been a lot harder. How do you 
actually measure the success in maintaining the area as a fishing nursery for 
example, and what range of species do you have to look at, that sort of thing. 
And another: 
It’s the criteria side that has been pretty blinkered. 
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It also explains why, once the decision was made to change the EPP into a non–statutory 
SEP, opposition from industry to the EQCs largely dissipated. 
The debates around the EQCs began very early on in the process before a draft EPP was 
released. The EPA flagged the general approach it would take towards setting the EQCs in 
early briefings of the CSMC in late 2000, and many of the stakeholder groups expressed 
concerns about that approach. In response, the EPA and CSMC jointly organised a number 
of workshops in February 2001 to discuss some of the key technical issues associated with 
EQCs. These workshops mainly involved the key Cockburn Sound stakeholders, but 
independent scientists (including some from the CSIRO and the USA) were invited to 
provide input on the issues where there was disagreement. The debate continued during 
the four years it took to produce a final SEP. 
There were five inter–related elements to this debate, discussed in more detail below: 
• The boundaries for the zones of protection; 
• EQCs for potentially toxic substances; 
• What should the reference site be for Cockburn Sound for nutrient levels;  
• The Chlorophyll a guidelines for each zone; and 
• The implications of a legally binding EPP and enforcement of EQCs. 
The first four were clearly technical, but the debate over the legalities of the EPP was really 
the key driver of the debate. On the first of these elements, the draft EPP proposed that the 
waters of Cockburn Sound could be categorised into three levels of protection with different 
EQCs to apply — high, moderate and low. The EQC supporting document gave specific 
details of the proposed EQCs for both the high and moderate zones.  
Figure 14 below shows the proposed boundaries between the high and moderate zones, 
with low zones around the point source discharges to be defined at some later time shown 
on the map. The degree of exemption given to the low zones from the criteria set for the 
moderate EQCs for social values, and the extent of the zones, were to be subject to case–
by–case assessment.  
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Figure 14: Proposed high and moderate protection zones for the waters of Cockburn Sound 
in the 2001 draft EPP (Source EPA 2001). 
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Not surprisingly, the boundaries for the low protection zones were of particular interest to all 
stakeholders, especially industry. Industry wanted larger low protection zones to allow for a 
larger mixing zone for its discharges into the Sound. The Conservation Council of WA 
wanted the low protection zones restricted to 1% of the Sound (Siewert 2002), but some in 
the conservation movement wanted no low protection zones and for industry to treat 
effluent to at least moderate protection zone standards prior to discharge. Those concerned 
about beach access were concerned that low protection zones would be adjacent to some 
important beaches thus preventing swimming in those areas. Boat users, especially 
recreational fishers, and the aquaculture industry wanted to minimise the low protection 
zones to maximise the areas available for their use. As one stakeholder representing 
industry noted: 
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But even the mixing zones, that concept has caused some grief with some 
community activists. They just don’t like the idea that there will be a contaminant 
coming out of the end of a pipe at concentrations above what might be acceptable for 
Cockburn Sound as a whole allowing for that, and they are pretty small mixing zones. 
So that’s part of the EPP which has caused grief. 
And, as one government agency (not environmental) representative noted: 
The big area that we have talked about as a department in terms of changes to the 
policy has been the mixing zones, where we have said that we don’t accept the way 
that the mixing zone process was done. We think that it should just be a simple case 
of accepting that if you put an effluent out, there has got to be a mixing zone and you 
manage that mixing zone. And the policy as it stands now actually can be anti–
environmental because you could have a situation where it makes sense to put a 
pipeline out into the deeper waters of the Sound, and the way the policy is written 
now you can’t. You have to put it in the near shore waters, which seems bit perverse.  
Following consideration of the submissions on the draft EPP and supporting documents, the 
EPA made the following key changes to the EPP and EQC document in its 2002 revised 
draft EPP (EPA 2002): 
• The low Ecological Protection Areas were not specified but were to be limited to 
less than 5% of the total water area of Cockburn Sound. The exact boundaries 
were to be negotiated on a case–by–case basis; 
• Case–by–case removal of certain social values in specific low Ecological Protection 
Areas; and 
• Ports, harbours and marinas were to be categorised as a moderate protection area, 
although it was acknowledged that some EQCs could not be attained in these 
areas and variations from these EQC were to be assessed on a case–by–case 
basis. 
The final SEP (Government of Western Australia 2005) identified five areas of Low 
Ecological Protection around discharge pipes, with a total area of 52.6 ha being only 4.2% 
of the total area of Cockburn Sound (see Figure 15). These Low Ecological Protection 
areas were to be reviewed by the EPA two years after the publishing of the SEP. 
The second key element was the EQCs for potentially toxic substances. The key reference 
document for the EQCs was the Australian and New Zealand Guidelines for Fresh and 
Marine Water Quality (ANZECC and ARMCANZ 2000) published by Australian and New 
Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) and Agriculture and Resource 
Management Council of Australia and New Zealand (ARMCANZ). The point of contention 
was what species protection values should apply — that is, what percentage of species 
would be expected to be protected given a certain level of a particular contaminant in the 
water. Four levels are proposed in the ANZECC and ARMCANZ Guidelines: 99%, 95%, 
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90% and 80%. The EPA originally proposed that the 99% should apply to all toxicants, 
whereas industry pushed for a combination of the 99% species protection values for 
substances with the potential to bioaccumulate and then 95% species protection values for 
the remaining contaminants. Not surprisingly, the EPA position was supported by the 
conservation and community groups. 
 
Figure 15: High, moderate and low protection zones for the waters of Cockburn Sound in 
the final SEP for Cockburn Sound (Source: Government of Western Australia 2005) 
!
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After considerable debate, the SEP adopted the industry approach for guidelines for the 
potentially toxic substances, using a combination of the 99% and 95% species protection 
values rather than the DEC and conservation movement preferred 99% species protection 
values for all toxicants. 
The third key element was where should the reference site for Cockburn Sound be — that 
is, what marine area should be considered to be the base–line target for water quality. The 
2001 draft EPP proposed that the nearby Warnbro Sound be chosen. Opponents of this 
choice (mostly industry) pointed out that Warnbro Sound was mostly a Marine Park with a 
primary purpose of conservation and it was an unfair benchmark for Cockburn Sound, 
which could not be expected to ever reach these levels of nutrients because of the intense 
human uses of the water and surrounding catchment. 
One of the scientists involved in the debate made the following comments on the use of 
Warnbro Sound as the reference site: 
To this day I do not like it. I think it is completely inappropriate for water quality " 
Water quality depends so much on flushing characteristics: it’s pure physics. And to 
compare a completely open embayment and use that as your reference site to 
something that is really a semi–enclosed area, and to also apply guidelines derived 
from Warnbro Sound to semi–enclosed harbours within a semi enclosed embayment 
is just not appropriate " To this day this position is causing on–going problems in 
managing the areas. 
The community groups took a different view, wanting the water quality in Cockburn Sound 
to be returned to near pristine condition so as to facilitate the re–establishment of seagrass 
in the Sound. In the end, the final SEP kept Warnbro Sound as the reference site for 
Cockburn Sound. 
The fourth key element was Chlorophyll a guidelines. The 2001 draft EPP proposed that the 
Chlorophyll a guidelines (µg L–1) should be as follows: 
• High protection – 0.802; and 
• Moderate protection – 1.031. 
Industry wanted 1.2 to apply to both the High and Moderate protection zones, whereas the 
conservation groups and Recfishwest (the peak recreational group in WA) supported the 
guidelines as proposed by the EPA (Recfishwest 2003). 
The 2002 revised draft EPP proposed more relaxed Chlorophyll a guidelines of 0.9 for High 
protection zone and 1.2 for the Moderate protection zone. The Chlorophyll a guidelines in 
the final SEP were different again, reverting to 0.8 for the High protection zone but set an 
even more relaxed guideline for the Moderate protection zone of 1.3. The following 
comments from two of the stakeholders reflect the intensity of the debate over the 
Chlorophyll a guidelines: 
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There’s been trenches dug too quickly with the EPP. The argument over the 
chlorophyll levels and the nitrogen targets in the EPP I really think is splitting hairs. 
You got a situation where the DEP people want 0.8. The industry people want 1.2 for 
chlorophyll because that’s based on their understanding as to what’s happening in 
Warnbro Sound. And then you got David Fox coming in and saying, “well, 1.0 is a 
pretty good number for these reasons based on Australia wide experience.” The 
difference between 0.8 and 1.2 is 3/5 of 5/8 of a gnat’s piss, when you think about it! 
When you talk about chlorophyll you’re talking about the accuracy of the 
measurement and the spatial distribution of chlorophyll in a water body when you 
take samples. If I was in control I would have grabbed David Fox’s 1.0 just like that 
and said, “that’s what we’ll go for”, because there’s a scientific basis for that which we 
all can agree to. But the DEP guys won’t back off the 0.8, and so you got this standoff 
over that. 
 
You’ve had industry looking at where they really find it unacceptable and so they get 
in a focus on the science of that bit. Chlorophyll is a good example. They wheeled in 
(a consultant) to demonstrate that 0.8 was a crock and it should be 1.2. They haven’t 
really had a look at, if you like, the balance of the science across the whole EPP. 
They’re just using it as a tool to get their own way. 
The first stakeholder is clearly concerned that the debate over the Chlorophyll a guidelines 
is between duelling scientists, which, as noted in Chapter 2, can occur when the science is 
uncertain and, therefore, contested. The second stakeholder is concerned that industry, in 
pushing for the more relaxed 1.2 figure, had a particular agenda, notably, to allow discharge 
of nutrients at higher levels than would be allowed if the Chlorophyll a guideline was 0.8. 
The final element was whether a statutory EPP could or should be legally drafted to provide 
protection for Cockburn Sound, and was touched on in the previous Governance section. 
This is directly related to the issue of science and the EQCs, as one stakeholder noted: 
Yes I think that is one of the real challenges that’s come out of this. It’s identified the 
fact that the science is so lacking, and this is possibly the first time in WA at least if 
not in Australia we’ve tried such an ambitious type of EPP to measure the health of a 
marine ecosystem and to try to determine whether we are succeeding in maintaining 
or improving it. Scientifically it’s quite challenging " I guess, to some extent that is 
why the EPA and the Council step back from being too tough with the actual 
standards that they are setting because there is so much uncertainty in the standards 
and if you tried to take someone to Court and prosecute them for breaching a 
standard then it would be pretty hard for the government to prove in Court that that 
was a sensible standard or that it was based on good science at this stage. 
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As another stakeholder noted: 
I think one of the problems the EPP is going to run into as well which I haven’t 
mentioned yet in translating it into Crown law language. You’ve been involved in the 
process so you know what’s happening now; they’ve only just got a workable draft 
now but I have heard that normally it takes 20 drafts to actually get something that 
everybody’s happy with. And that’s just the EPP, that’s not the EQC reference 
document. They haven’t even started on the EQC reference document and that’s 
going to give the lawyers some extreme headaches. There are times when I even 
wonder if it’s ever going to see the light of day. 
The concern was that there are some significant implications for industry and government if 
the EQCs became legally enforceable through an EPP. First, the monitoring to date 
suggests that some of the EQCs were currently not being met and that the DEC would need 
to either tighten licences further or take action against industry irrespective of whether 
industries were complying with their licences. As one stakeholder noted of the nitrogen 
guideline: 
You are aware for example that the national water quality management strategies 
marine guidelines are exceeded every winter completely naturally off Perth coastal 
waters for nitrogen, it’s just dumb, that’s the natural system giving signals, it’s got 
nothing to do with anthropogenic influence, it’s just because of algae and the 
composting of those in the surf zone, and nitrogen levels go through the bloody roof, 
it’s all natural. 
Second, there was concern that because there were so many potential contaminants 
requiring EQCs, considerable effort would go into monitoring to ensure compliance but 
some of these potential contaminants represent low risk to the Cockburn Sound 
environment. As one stakeholder noted: 
Probably my biggest concern is that I can perceive there would be occasions where 
the standards would be exceeded and a great deal of management effort would have 
been expended trying to address them, possibly, when they are not real issues in the 
first place. Or, even if they are issues, probably not the key issues. I guess I perceive 
that a whole lot of money would be spent on things that are probably not the ones of 
primary importance. 
This concern remained, and considerable debate over the next two years took place within 
the EPA and Government about how and when to use EPPs, whether one was appropriate 
to the protection of Cockburn Sound, and if not, what form should a policy take. The details 
of that debate and the associated legal technicalities are not relevant here. 
A final concern was that the EPP would be constrained to dealing only with environmental 
matters and had limited scope to address broader socio–economic concerns. As noted 
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earlier, however, both the CSMC and the EMP would address these broader issues. The 
problem was that it was proposed to use the EPP to give legal standing to both the CSMC 
and the EMP, and advice emerged during the process that this could not be done. 
In the end, because of these concerns about the legalities of the EPP, the EPA abandoned 
it in favour of a non–statutory SEP, and an alternative mechanism was used to give legal 
standing to the EMP and CSMC (through the Water and Rivers Commission Act 1995). 
To sum up, the keys points of contention involving the EQCs were resolved in the SEP as 
follows: 
• The 2001 draft EPP made reference to the need for some Low Ecological 
Protection Areas but did not identify any locations. The SEP showed the locations 
of five Low Ecological Protection Areas but the total area was below the 5% 
recommended in the 2002 draft EPP — a gain for industry. 
• The 2001 draft EPP proposed that the 99% species protection value should apply 
to all toxicants, but the SEP used a combination of the 99% species protection 
values for substances with the potential to bioaccumulate and the 95% species 
protection values for the remaining contaminants — a gain for industry. 
• The 2001 draft EPP proposed that the reference site for Cockburn Sound should be 
Warnbro Sound, and this was retained for the SEP — arguably a gain for the 
community and conservation groups but really represents a no change outcome. 
• The 2001 draft EPP proposed that Chlorophyll a guidelines should be 0.802 µg L–1 
in the High protection areas and 1.031 in the Moderate protection areas, whereas 
the SEP adopted 0.8 for the High protection area and 1.3 for the Moderate 
protection area — arguably a gain for the community, conservation groups and 
industry. 
• In response to the legal concerns raised, the policy was changed from a statutory 
EPP to a non–statutory SEP — a clear gain for industry and a loss for the 
conservation movement and community groups. 
On balance, it appears that industry did better out of the participation process on the EPP 
than did the community and conservation movement. The debate over the EQCs (the 
science) was both intense and lengthy and to some extent has not really been resolved. 
The implications for industry of the EQCs have been significantly reduced now because the 
final policy is non–statutory, but this has enhanced the concern of the community and 
environment groups that no matter how good the EQCs are, they are not legally binding. 
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Summary of conflict associated with Cockburn 
Sound policy making 
The above discussion makes it clear that there is significant conflict associated with policy 
making for Cockburn Sound. The three resource scarcity issues identified in Chapter 2 are 
present with: the loss of some areas of Cockburn Sound for public use; increasing demand 
on resources with a growing number of users; and, competition for space and loss of good 
quality resource through the deterioration of water quality. There is still considerable social 
conflict surrounding Cockburn Sound, notably in regard to: reducing beach access; 
significant community mistrust of industry; a fundamental difference over what that long 
term management vision for the Sound should be; and the no net loss principle. There has 
been a history of contested and poor governance arrangements in the Sound leading to the 
environmental problems, and whilst the new governance arrangements are seen as an 
improvement, some concerns remain, notably the non–statutory nature of the SEP. 
The science surrounding the draft EPP was fiercely contested, especially the EQCs, and 
whilst the change to a non–statutory SEP has relieved some of that conflict, the debate 
about what some of the EQCs should be remains. 
The policy making approaches adopted 
Introduction 
In deciding the policy making approaches adopted for Cockburn Sound, the three key 
considerations are the descriptions of the two policies in the second section in this chapter, 
the level of participation achieved for each policy and the extent of any decision sharing that 
has occurred, which is described next. 
EPP/SEP participation and decision sharing 
The participation process the EPA applied for the development of the EPP was quite 
different from the other EPPs. Here, instead of drawing up a draft EPP for public review 
using the experts within the DEC and minimal external consultation, the EPA embarked on 
an extensive period of public consultation prior to the release of the first draft. As noted 
earlier, this involved discussions with the CSMC and holding a number of workshops to 
discuss some of the key technical issues associated with EQCs. During the four years it 
took to finalise the SEP, the EPA provided numerous briefings to the CSMC and the annual 
community forums. 
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It is likely, therefore, that the level of participation for the EPP/SEP is higher than the IAP2’s  
(2007) Consult and is either Involve or Collaborate. The relevant parts of Table 2 of Chapter 
2 summarising IAP2’s spectrum are shown below showing three descriptors of the 
participation process. 
Table 16: The portion of IAP2’s participation spectrum summarising the Involve and 
Collaborate levels of participation (Source: International Association for Public 
Participation 2007). 
Participation 
level 
Aim of participation 
 
Input into policy making  Follow up 
Collaborate Policy makers work 
directly with the public 
through a partnership 
approach to ensure that 
views are incorporated 
into all parts of the policy 
making process 
Alternatives developed 
jointly with the policy 
makers and the views and 
recommendations of the 
public are included to the 
maximum extent possible 
On–going 
involvement of the 
public. Where views 
and 
recommendations of 
the public are not 
included the reasons 
are clearly 
communicated to the 
public. 
Involve Work more directly and 
continuously with the 
public to ensure the views 
are understood and taken 
account of during the 
process. Policy makers 
and public work 
separately. 
Participation happens 
much earlier in the policy 
making process and input 
used to help the policy 
makers develop options 
that reflect in part the 
views of the public. Final 
policy decision made by 
policy makers in isolation 
Alternatives 
developed by the 
policy makers and 
interim decisions 
made that reflect the 
policy makers’ 
understanding of 
community views. 
 
On the first descriptor of participation level in Table 16, the Collaborate level of participation 
involves a partnership approach, and whilst the EPA engaged in a partnership with the 
CSMC, there were no partnerships with the stakeholders that make up the CSMC. In this 
case, the partnership approach was very limited. There is, however, clear evidence that the 
EPA committed to, and carried out, continuous engagement with the public and worked 
hard to understand and take into account the views of stakeholders through the process. 
This is evidenced by the key concessions given to some stakeholders involving the highly 
contested EQC issue, notably industry (level of species protection and low ecological 
protection areas), but did not give any ground on other key issues (the reference site and 
Chlorophyll a guidelines). 
On the second descriptor, the EPA did not develop alternatives with stakeholders: instead it 
began the stakeholder engagement with a clear view about what the EQCs should be. The 
participation did, however, begin much earlier in the process than for other EPPs, and, 
consistent with the Involve level of participation, the final SEP was developed and agreed to 
by the EPA in isolation: it retained the sole discretion on the decision making for the final 
SEP prior to its final transmission to the Minister. One stakeholder summarised the process 
this way: 
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If you look at what’s come out, and go back and look at the Southern Metropolitan 
Waters Study report, a lot of it was taken out to basically put into the EPP ... We were 
certainly allowed to comment on the numbers, but, as I said, the outcomes were pre–
determined. There wasn’t a blank piece of paper to start off with. What you need to 
come to the table with is a blank piece of paper and no baggage. 
On the final descriptor, there is evidence that the EPA communicated its decisions to 
stakeholders throughout the process via attendance at CSMC meetings and public forums. 
The various drafts of the EPP/SEP reflected in part the EPA’s understanding of 
stakeholders’ views and concerns, which is typical of Involve level of participation.  
In summary, the level of participation could not be described as Collaborate as partnerships 
were limited and policy alternatives were not initially developed jointly with the other 
stakeholders. The final SEP did, however, demonstrate that the EPA had taken into account 
stakeholders’ views and there was on-going engagement with stakeholders throughout the 
process. On this basis, the level of participation was IAP2’s  (2007) Involve. Decision 
making for the SEP remained with the EPA and the Minister and was not shared with key 
stakeholders, not even the CSMC. This is consistent with the Involve level of participation. 
EMP participation overview and key issues 
The process of engaging the public in the preparation of the EMP was far more participative 
than the EPP/SEP in three ways. First, the CSMC is made up of individuals who represent 
various community and conservation groups as well as government agencies, whereas the 
EPA is made up of five individuals who are appointed by the government because of their 
expertise rather than because they represent an organisation or community group. 
Consequently, the CSMC has on–going two–way interaction between the board and the 
members’ organisations, which are the key stakeholder groups for Cockburn Sound.  
Second, the CSMC meetings were held in open sessions, although there was provision for 
a closed session for particularly sensitive matters. Interested members of the public could 
attend and track the progress of the EMP’s development. The EPA meetings, on the other 
hand, were closed to the public. CSMC meetings also provided members of the public with 
the opportunity to find out about progress being made on the EPP and the CSMC received 
updates from the EPA at every meeting.  
Finally, the overall process in developing the EMP had significant input from the members 
of the CSMC as well as the officers that support the CSMC, compared to the input of EPA 
members on the EPP/SEP.  As the Acknowledgements section of the draft EMP noted: 
This document was prepared by the Cockburn Sound Management Council. 
Members of the Management Council gathered information, identified the main 
issues and developed the objectives and recommendations.  
(CSMC 2001:ii) 
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And, as one CSMC member noted: 
We went through the Cockburn Sound Management Council, we had a couple of 
sub–groups, we went over and over and over it until we fine–tuned it. 
The more hands off approach of the EPA was largely due to their higher work load and the 
need, therefore, to delegate the work to the officers of the DEC. The EPA, as the peak 
environmental agency, was involved in the development of several policies at this time as 
well as considering many major new proposals which were the subject of environmental 
assessment (EIA). The CSMC had as its chief focus for several years the development of 
the EMP and EPP. 
It is evident that a more inclusive less expert–based process was used in the development 
of the EMP compared with the EPP/SEP. As well, the EMP was finalised well ahead of the 
EPP/SEP (late 2002), but the CSMC believed that it should not release the final EMP until 
the EPP/SEP was also finalised for pragmatic reasons. As one CSMC members noted in an 
interview in 2003: 
Now we probably couldn’t have done the EMP much quicker and we are in a position 
now where we ideally " would be finalising it now and going out, but we can’t finalise 
the EMP until the EPP is finalised. That hamstrings us a little bit but we have taken 
the approach, which I think is a pragmatic one, where we are putting out the, I forget 
what it’s called but it has a prefix, the EMP. We were basically putting it out knowing 
that 95 percent of the EMP isn’t going to be changed, no matter what the EPP is. 
There were three issues of particular concern to many members which they wanted 
particular involvement in: managing the various multiple uses of Cockburn Sound; the 
principle of no net loss of ecological or social functions in Cockburn Sound; and the 
aesthetic criteria. The first two issues were addressed in detail by the members of the 
CSMC. The debate over the “no net loss” issue was covered earlier as an example of 
conflict. The debates and processes surrounding the multiple use issue are described in 
detail below as it provides a useful insight into the participation process for the EMP. The 
aesthetic criteria issue was addressed primarily through a specialist consultant and will not 
be discussed further here. 
Participation in developing the EMP multiple uses 
The officers supporting the CSMC began work on a draft EMP late in 2000 in consultation 
with officers of the EPA. The CSMC received its first briefing on progress at a meeting in 
December 2000. Managing potentially conflicting uses within the Sound was of particular 
concern to most CSMC members, so five working groups were established in early 2001, 
including CSMC members as well as officers, to work on the multiple use section of the 
EMP. The key task of the groups was to identify the multiple uses appropriate for each 
management area (see Figure 13). The working groups reported their findings to the April 
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meeting noting in particular where there was disagreement on whether a particular use 
should be allowed in a management area. These areas of disagreement were addressed at 
the next meeting in May, giving members the opportunity to consult with the agencies and 
groups they represented.  
At the May meeting the officers presented an interim multiple uses table based on the 
outcomes of the working groups’ deliberations — see Figure 16. This table dealt with the 
disagreements in two ways. First, in three cases, the CSMC formed a view that it had 
insufficient information to identify whether that multiple use should be allowed or not in an 
area and so these were marked in the table with a G. The decision on whether to allow that 
use or not was delayed until that information became available. The other approach was to 
give a multiple use a conditional approval by identifying it as a secondary use but include a 
‘c’ indicating that level of use is conditional.  What this really meant was that there was 
remaining disagreement between stakeholders about the level at which, if at all, that use 
should be allowed: for example, the Kwinana area (where the heavy industries are located) 
notes Recreation and Commercial as a conditional use because the industry groups would 
prefer the public not be allowed to use those beaches for public safety reasons, whereas 
the community were pushing for full access because these beaches are the closest ones to 
nearby residential areas. 
The contents of the table were re–considered at the September meeting of the CSMC 
where officers presented a near complete version of the EMP titled a Consultative Draft 
(CSMC 2001). Two of the three areas where information gaps existed previously were 
resolved, and a minor change was made to some of the Defence Multiple Use, changing 
some of the Incompatible uses to Not Applicable (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 16: Copy of interim Multi Use and Management Areas Table for Cockburn Sound 
(Source: Minutes of the May Meeting of Executive of the CSMC). 
!
The CSMC agreed to release the report for public comment subject to some minor 
changes. The key differences between the multiple uses tables of the consultative draft and 
the actual draft15 were: 
• Cape Peron was removed as an area as it is outside the actual Cockburn Sound 
basin (to the west of the causeway); 
• The Conditional uses have been dropped reflecting agreement of the CSMC of all 
these uses; 
• Challenger Cliffs had Natural and Cultural use elevated from Secondary to Primary 
uses; and 
• A new code was introduced for the Secondary uses for Recreational and 
Commercial within Garden Island and Kwinana industrial area where legal 
constraints apply to those uses. 
The third change has a particular victory for the conservation movement and reflected the 
changed status of the area and inclusion into a conservation park (see Plate 12). The 
officers briefing note attached to the report recommended that: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Figure 13 shows the version of the table in the draft EMP. 
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It is proposed to establish a “working group” of the Council to deal with any issues 
that may arise from the September meeting or subsequent written comments. The 
“working group” would ultimately be responsible for the endorsement of the 
“Consultative Draft” Environmental Management Plan. 
Figure 18 shows is a copy of the multiple use table from the final EMP which is unchanged 
from the table in the draft EMP (see Figure 11 earlier in this chapter). 
!
Figure 17: Multi Use and Management Areas Table from “Consultative Draft” of the EMP 
(Source: CSMC 2001) 
!
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Plate 12: Challenger Beach Cliffs with the Kwinana Industrial area in the background 
(looking south) (Source: Garry Middle). 
!
Figure 18: Copy of Multi use and Management areas Table for Cockburn Sound from the 
final EMP (Source: CSMC 2005) 
!
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Summing up — level of participation and decision 
sharing achieved with the EMP 
Taken at face value, the process undertaken by the CSMC in developing the EMP could be 
seen as IAP2’s  (2007) Consult level. Table 17 shows the relevant row of Table 2 in 
Chapter 2 where IAP2’s full spectrum is described. The CSMC did no formal external 
consultation in developing the draft EMP, prior to its release for public comment. The public 
was kept up to date on progress being made on the EMP through the forums, and only 
limited changes were made following the public comment period. This would, however, be a 
simplistic and inaccurate assessment of the actual level of participation. 
Table 17: The portion of IAP2’s participation spectrum summarising the Consult level 
of participation (Source: International Association for Public Participation 2007). 
Participation 
level 
Aim of participation 
 
Input into policy making  Follow up 
Consult The policy makers seek 
feedback from the public 
on current analysis, 
alternatives or interim 
decisions already made 
before a final decision is 
made.  
This process commences 
once some work has 
been done towards 
developing a policy 
especially policy options, 
and a preferred option is 
usually put forward. Views 
on the options will be 
considered and there is 
some flexibility to 
incorporate limited 
changes to the preferred 
option. 
The public is kept 
up–to date on 
progress being 
made, and some 
effort is made to 
accommodate the 
views expressed by 
the public before 
final decision. 
 
As noted earlier, the composition of the CSMC and the meeting process provided 
considerable opportunity for the key stakeholder groups to provide input into the 
development of the draft EMP. The establishment of the working groups developing the 
multiple uses, and the extensive discussion and ultimate agreement reached on the no net 
loss Guidelines reflects the level of participation by these groups. The extent of participation 
can accurately be called implied shared decision making, as described in Chapter 2. The 
fact that few changes were made to the draft EMP reflects the level of agreement reached 
through the drafting process between the stakeholders.  
The process followed for the development of the multiple uses demonstrates that on a key 
issue, the stakeholders were involved in the development of alternatives prior to reaching 
agreement on the final table of multiple uses. As I observed the Chairman saying at the 
June 2002 CSMC meeting: 
It’s not our plan, it’s the community’s plan. 
A possible concern could be that this participation process only involves the peak NGOs 
and would be, in fact, a corporatist approach to participation typical of ecological modern 
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policy making. There are two reasons why this conclusion is invalid. First, two of the 
members the CSMC are selected from the broader Cockburn Sound community and do not 
represent stakeholder groups. Secondly, the key issues raised by the community during the 
review period were either already of concern to the members, or were given considerable 
attention by the CSMC prior to finalising the EMP: for example, the no net loss issue and 
the need for a social oral history. Clearly, the way the members interacted with their groups 
and agencies, and the responses to issues raised in the forums and public submissions 
reflected a highly participative rather than a corporatist approach. 
Based on the three descriptors of participation levels in Table 16 for the Collaborate level: 
• Because the keys stakeholders were represented on the Council feed back to those 
groups and the community was ensured. This meant that the CSMC worked directly 
with the public through a partnership approach. In this way, the views of the 
stakeholders were incorporated into the EMP; 
• Specific policy alternatives were developed jointly with the stakeholders and the 
views and recommendations of the public are included to the maximum extent 
possible, as the example of the multiple uses illustrates; and 
• There was on–going involvement of, and communications with, the public 
throughout the process. 
To sum up, the level of participation for the EMP was more typical of IAP2’s (2007) 
Collaborate level where decision making is shared with the stakeholder groups. 
Conclusion about the policy making approaches 
adopted 
The policy mechanisms of the EPP/SEP are predominately highly prescriptive command 
and control measures with a level of participation best described as Involve, which is the 
highest level of participation achieved for any EPP. So whilst policy making is a reasonably 
participative approach involving significant early involvement of key stakeholders, in the end 
it must be seen as largely a traditional expert–driven policy approach, but with a much 
improved level of participation.  
The policy making approach of the EMP is clearly more participative than the EPP/SEP and 
it is fair to conclude that it is collaborative in its overall approach. As described earlier, the 
policy mechanisms used in the EMP were a mixture of command and control and adaptive 
(passive), but the most significant and politically sensitive measures are those that related 
to the EQCs, which are adaptive. In summary, the policy making approach adopted for the 
EMP should be considered adaptive–collaborative. 
It should be noted that in Chapter 5 in the discussion on the Swan Canning EPP and 
Riverplan it was argued that EPP and Riverplan should be seen as a policy package 
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because they are complementary and that implementation is dependent on both policies 
working together. Consistent with this argument, the Cockburn Sound SEP and EMP should 
also be considered as a policy package. Further, taking into account that the EPA policy 
ended up in a non–statutory form thus reducing its significance, and that the EMP has 
become the chief focus on the policy implementation phase, it is considered that the overall 
policy making approach for the package is dominated by the EMP, which makes the whole 
package predominantly an adaptive–collaborative approach. 
It is worth noting that little emphasis is given by stakeholders to the adaptive part of the 
policy package and most of the focus is on the collaborative part. In the interviews, when 
asked to comment on the policy making approach adopted, only one stakeholder made 
reference to the adaptive component and all stakeholders made clear reference to the 
collaborative nature of the policy and policy making process. This is probably because 
passive adaptive approaches are used in cases where conflict over the science, whilst 
present, is not significant, and the problem is not seen as wicked. This is also aided 
because the overall policy is no longer statutory, transferring the conflict over the science to 
conflict over governance (i.e. compliance with the EQCs cannot be mandated and can only 
be achieved though cooperative actions). The significance of both social and governance 
conflicts means the focus for stakeholders will be on the collaborative components to 
address these conflicts. 
Policy making evaluation 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 proposes four broad policy evaluation criteria: 
• Policy–making performance; 
• Political support; 
• Content relevance; and 
• Other socio–economic impacts. 
The policy–making performance criterion recognises three types of policies: simple limited 
scoped policies that have been finalised where measurable environmental change would be 
expected in a short timeframe; more complex finalised policies where environmental 
improvement could only be expected in the medium to long term; and draft policies. It was 
proposed to use different measures of performance effectiveness depending on the type of 
policy, as follows: 
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• For simple limited scoped policies that have been finalised with simple 
implementation measures — quantitative environmental improvement consistent 
with the policy objectives will be used, and 
• For complex policies, with long time frames for implementation and/or complex 
implementation mechanisms, and draft policies — downstream decision making is 
consistent with policy. 
Based on the discussions above, the two policies for Cockburn Sound are highly complex 
with long time frames for implementation, and it is appropriate, therefore, to apply the latter 
performance effectiveness criterion. There will, however, be a discussion of the data 
available on the health of the Sound, given that a significant part of its management 
involves comprehensive on–going monitoring and annual reporting. This discussion will 
demonstrate the point made in Chapter 4 about the difficulty in achieving short–term 
environmental improvements in these circumstances. 
In summary, the data used for evaluation include the following: 
• For policy–making performance the subsequent decision making of the relevant 
agencies is examined for consistency with the policies; 
• For political support length of time to finalise the policy is a consideration as well as 
documented opposition from key stakeholders, primarily during the policy making 
process but also as part of any implementation. As well, the views of the 
interviewees are also considered as they can all be considered key stakeholders; 
• For content relevance the key considerations are the extent to which the policies 
required changes to their content during policy development, and the extent to 
which the content was criticised, especially, but not limited to, by the interviewees; 
and 
• For other socio–economic impacts documented socio–economic impacts as well as 
the views of the interviewees. 
Consistent with the position taken in the last section that both policies should be seen as a 
package, the policy making will be evaluated as a package. As noted by one stakeholder: 
Look I think overall the EMP is probably better, but I don’t think that one could exist 
without the other. 
It is worth noting, however, that stakeholders held different views about the two policies, 
and each had different levels of political support. Some stakeholders had different views 
about the content relevance of each and there was greater concern raised about the socio–
economic impacts of the then draft EPP than the EMP. As summed up by one stakeholder: 
" I think the EMP could easily be successful. The EPP, we’ll wait and see. 
Consequently, whilst the evaluation will be of the two policies as a package, the differences 
of the two on each criterion will be noted as part of the discussion. 
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Policy–making performance 
Measurable environmental change 
The CSMC publishes the annual State of Cockburn Sound reports, and the most recent one 
makes the following conclusion: 
Based on the best available information, expert advice and the analysis of 13 
monitoring programs in 2006–07 we can report that there has been no significant 
deterioration in the overall health of Cockburn Sound since monitoring began in 2000. 
The CSMC’s initiation, coordination and management of remedial or preventative 
action have contributed to the continuing health of the Sound. 
(CSMC 2007:3) 
This conclusion raises two questions: does “there has been no significant deterioration” 
mean that there has been some deterioration; and does “the continuing health of the 
Sound” mean that the Sound is overall healthy? On the first question, Table 18 shows the 
exceedance of both EQC guidelines and standards for both the 2007 and 2005 State of 
Cockburn Sound reports. It should be noted that Table 18 only shows the EQCs where 
either a guideline or standard was exceeded in at least one of the two years covered. Of the 
78 EQCs reported on for Cockburn Sound, only 15 had any exceedance. 
Of the EQCs where a conclusion can be drawn16, six showed no change, two showed 
improvement and three showed deterioration. Taken on face value, it could be argued that 
overall there was a net deterioration in Cockburn Sound between 2005 and 2007; however, 
this requires some careful analysis. Of the three EQCs that showed deterioration, two of 
these were about TBT in three small areas outside of Jervoise Bay, all within the moderate 
protection zones (see Figure 19). 
One of the key areas where improvement had been detected was in seagrass shoot density 
in the broader high protection area. Given the significance of seagrass to Cockburn Sound 
and the relatively localised areas where TBT was found to be a problem, the improvement 
in seagrass density far outweighs the problems with TBT. The conclusion of the 2007 report 
(CSMC 2007)  that there has been no significant deterioration in the overall health of 
Cockburn Sound seems reasonable, then, and it also points out the difficulty of making 
these judgements when dealing with a large number of environmental indicators of 
ecosystem health and a relatively short time frame since policy implementation. 
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16 There were no data on 5 EQCs in one of the years referred to in Table 18. 
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Table 18: Comparing exceedances of the EQC for Cockburn Sound for 2005 & 2007 
EQC Exceeded 
2005 
Exceeded 
2007 
Change 
Ecosystem Health in Areas of a High Level of Protection (Broader area of Cockburn Sound) 
Seagrass Shoot density Guideline No 
exceedance 
– below 
Guideline 
Improved 
Organometallics (TBT) No data – 
research 
needed 
Standard No conclusion 
can be drawn 
Ecosystem Health in Areas of a Moderate Level of Protection outside Jervoise Bay Harbours 
Organometallics (TBT) in sediment No 
exceedance 
– below 
Guideline 
Guideline Deteriorated 
Organometallics (TBT) in snails No 
exceedance 
– below 
Guideline 
Standard Deteriorated 
Ecosystem Health in Areas of a Moderate Level of Protection at Jervoise Bay Harbours 
Chlorophyll ‘a’ – physical and chemical 
measure – north harbour 
Guideline Guideline No change 
Light Attenuation  – physical and chemical 
measure – north harbour 
Guideline No data – 
research 
needed 
No conclusion 
can be drawn 
Light Attenuation  – physical and chemical 
measure – south harbour 
Guideline No data – 
research 
needed 
No conclusion 
can be drawn 
Phytoplankton Biomass (Activity) – 
Chlorophyll ‘a’ – north harbour 
Standard Standard No change 
Organometallics (e.g. TBT) in sediment – 
north harbour 
Guideline Guideline No change 
Organometallics (e.g. TBT) in sediment – 
south harbour 
Guideline Guideline No change 
Organometallics (e.g. TBT) in snails – north 
harbour 
Not reported Standard No conclusion 
can be drawn 
Organometallics (e.g. TBT) in snails – south 
harbour 
Not reported Standard No conclusion 
can be drawn 
Safe Seafood for Eating 
Thermotolerant faecal coliform levels in 
water 
Guideline Standard Deteriorated 
Algal Biotoxins Guideline Guideline No change 
Clean Waters for Swimming and Boating 
Bacterial Enterococci Standard Guideline Improved 
 
On the second question, given that only 16 of the 78 EQCs reported on had any 
exceedance, the conclusion of the 2007 report that the Sound continues to be healthy 
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seems to be supported. Based on these monitoring data, it would not be possible to draw 
any conclusions within this small timeframe as to whether these policies had actually had 
any measurable effect on Cockburn Sound as a whole. Further, as noted in Chapter 3 
(methodology) when discussing the use of effectiveness in highly complex contexts, both 
from an ecological perspective and a policy/political one, questions like “Would 
improvement have occurred if the policy had not been implemented?” need to be 
considered. This is particularly relevant here because as noted earlier in this chapter, some 
progress had been made prior to the establishment of the CSMC in better regulation of 
industry and a significant reduction of the amount of nutrient entering the Sound had 
already occurred. 
Figure 19: Locations in Cockburn Sound where the EQC for TBT deteriorated between 
2005 and 2007 (moderate protection zone) (Source: CSMC 2007) 
!
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Policy making performance – downstream decision making 
There have been some significant achievements in relation to downstream decision making 
related to the EMP and SEP. First, one of the recommendations of the draft EMP was that 
the three affected local governments each develop a local land use policy to apply to the 
catchment. Work began on this in 2000, but a formal joint working group was not 
established in 2002, and little progress was made until 2003 when the CSMC took a more 
active role. It was proposed that these local governments work cooperatively to develop a 
single policy that would then be endorsed separately by each Council. The first step was 
the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the three Councils 
agreeing to develop a single policy document. The MOU was formally agreed in August 
2003 with a final local policy endorsed by all three Councils in August 2004 (CSMC et al. 
2004). The policy applies to all new and changes to land use within the Cockburn Sound 
catchment that has the potential to export nutrients to the Sound. The policy identifies a 
range of land use with the potential to export nutrient, sets management requirements for 
that land use and has recommended land use controls (conditions of approval)17. 
Another matter relates to the exceedance for bacterial Enterococci EQC in 2005 at 
Rockingham and Palm beaches. In response to a direct request from the CSMC, the State 
Department of Health and the City of Rockingham undertook a survey to identify the likely 
sources of this contamination. Two initiatives followed. First the two agencies agreed to 
combine and coordinate their beach monitoring programs, to provide better and more 
effective coverage of possible trouble spots. Second, the City of Rockingham spent 
$150,000 in 2006–07 to improve stormwater management in the sub–catchments that were 
the likely sources of this contamination by reducing direct outflows of stormwater to the 
Sound (see Plate 13).  
A third decision making initiative related to unregulated boat moorings in Cockburn Sound. 
There are many boats moored in the shallow and protected waters of Cockburn Sound, 
notable Mangles Bay in the south east of Cockburn Sound, with many of these located over 
remaining seagrass meadows. The anchors can scrape across the seabed removing 
seagrass (see Plates 14 and 15).  
In 2005, consistent with the EMP, officers of the CSMC began working with the Department 
for Planning and Infrastructure (DPI) to introduce controls on mooring in these sensitive 
areas. On 17 August 2007 the Minister for Planning and Infrastructure declared Cockburn 
Sound a Mooring Control Area which included a temporary ban on new moorings in the 
Mangles Bay area. Existing moorings are now better regulated to improve the standard of 
moorings so as to reduce the impact on seagrass. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 It should be noted that as part of the more active role of the CSMC in the development of this 
policy, I was asked to be involved in the process and the working party meetings to facilitate a 
cooperative approach to the development of the policy. 
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Plate 13: Stormwater drainage outlet at Rockingham Beach discharging directly into 
Cockburn Sound (Source: Garry Middle). 
!
Plate 14: Boats moored in Mangles Bay, south–eastern end of Cockburn Sound. The darker 
water areas are seagrass meadows (Source: Garry Middle). 
!
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Plate 15: Aerial photograph of Mangles Bay clearly showing boat moorings and associated 
loss of seagrass (Source: Google Earth) 
!
 
Next, in response to the exceedance of the TBT EQC in and surrounding Jervoise Bay, the 
CSMC requested that the DEC investigate the likely sources of TBT and take any action 
appropriate. The DEC responded by carrying out an unannounced audit of the boat 
maintenance industries at Jervoise Bay (TBT is a boat antifouling agent). The use of TBT is 
not completely banned in WA, but its use on vessels less than 25m is banned and a licence 
is required to use it on larger boats. Whilst it was found that all industries were using TBT 
free agents, there were several inappropriate management practices being carried out, 
including poor management of wash–down water that could potentially contain TBT. The 
DEC organised a workshop for these industries to identify better management practices, 
and indicated that in the future action against poor management practices would be taken. 
Finally, the DEC and industry continue to work together to ensure licensed discharges into 
the Sound do not cause breaches to the EQCs. These examples show that downstream 
decision making is consistent with the EMP/SEP. Further, all of the CSMC members 
interviewed indicated that they would cooperate to implement the EMP and ensure their 
own agency’s decision making would be consistent with the EMP. This suggests that the 
policy making of these policies can be evaluated as being successful on the performance 
effectiveness criterion. 
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Political support 
As noted earlier in this chapter, both policies were finalised at the same time, January 2005, 
over four years after the first draft was released in December 2001. Table 19 provides the 
information on the time it took to finalise the other EPPs covered in Chapter 5 and 
compares this to the time taken to finalise these Cockburn Sound policies. 
The policies with successful policy making were completed relatively quickly, less than two 
years, with the Swan–Canning EPP taking three years, one year less than the Cockburn 
Sound policies. The evaluation of the policy making of the Swan–Canning EPP concluded 
that the length of time taken to finalise the EPP combined with the views of interviewees 
meant that the policy making of this EPP was unsuccessful on this criterion. However, in 
relation to the Cockburn Sound policies, it was noted that it was the EPP that caused the 
delay in the finalisation of both policies, with the EMP ready to be finalised around two 
years ahead of the EPP.  A further complicating issue is that once the decision was made to 
change the EPP to a non statutory SEP, opposition to the SEP largely disappeared and the 
SEP was finalised relatively quickly, some four months after the draft was published. 
Table 19: Time taken to finalise the policies covered in Chapter 5 and the Cockburn 
Sound policies 
Policy Evaluation on political support 
criterion 
Time taken to finalise 
policy 
Draft Western Swamp 
Tortoise EPP 
Unsuccessful. 10 years 
Kalgoorlie air quality EPPs – 
1989, 1992 
Successful. 1–2 years 
Ozone EPPs (1989 & 1992) Successful. 1–2 years 
1992 Kwinana air quality 
EPP 
Successful. 1–2 years 
1999 Kwinana air quality 
EPP 
Unsuccessful. Review incomplete – 1992 
EPP rolled over. 
1992 Lakes EPP Successful. 1–2 years 
1999 draft Wetlands EPP Unsuccessful. Review incomplete – 1992 
EPP rolled over. 
Swan Canning EPP Unsuccessful. Three years 
Cockburn Sound SEP/EPP 
and EMP 
(see later in chapter) Four years 
 
These differential views are reflected in the views of stakeholders, where there was 
unanimous view that the EMP would be successful, but the EPP received a largely sceptical 
evaluation. Here are some of the views typical of the stakeholders: 
The EMP was actually put together by the practitioners, if you like: the people who 
have to make it work. ... We all thought generally that that’s probably a pretty good 
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way to go. " I think the EMP could easily be successful. The EPP, we’ll wait and 
see. 
 
I think the EMP is likely to be successful. Essentially, the EMP is a management plan 
and it wouldn’t matter whether it was attached to an EPP or not " It’s a doing 
document that sets out everybody’s role in meeting the objectives of the EPP ... The 
EPP, my perception of it, and it is a perception, is that’s it’s probably been delivered a 
bit too much from the top down, and there probably hasn’t been as much consultation 
as there might have been. 
 
I think the EMP has a better chance of working because there was more involvement 
by all stakeholders right up front. There wasn’t an EMP produced in 1996. I wouldn’t 
say it was a blank sheet of paper but it was a more inclusive process and all the 
stakeholders were given a chance to help direct the outcome " Whereas I think the 
EMP wasn’t a blank piece of paper but it certainly had a lot less paragraphs on it in 
terms of how much was already locked before you got into the process. I think that 
with the EPP more was locked in than with the EMP. 
 
The EPP, I’m not convinced it will work. I think it’s too complicated in terms of the 
targets and standards, if you like, the EQCs. I think they are way too comprehensive 
for any ordinary group of people to even get their heads around much less measure 
and monitor them. 
Finally, as already noted above, there was considerable opposition to the draft EPP, largely 
because of the EQCs and the legally binding nature of an EPP. 
It follows from this discussion that the EMP has considerably more political support than the 
draft EPP and that in isolation the policy making of the EMP could be considered successful 
on this criterion and the policy making of the draft EPP unsuccessful. The change to the 
SEP may not necessarily increase its political support because, whilst industry opposition to 
the policy largely disappeared with the change, the conservation and community groups 
expressed considerable concerns about the SEP’s non–statutory nature. In considering 
whether the policy making of these two policies as a package has been successful on this 
criterion, and given the mixed success of each individually, it is important to identify which 
policy is the most significant to the stakeholders and as an implementation tool. As already 
noted in the previous section on the policy making approach, it is compliance with the EQCs 
(the health of the Sound) and the implementation of the EMP that is of most concern to the 
broader community and the key stakeholders. The EMP has as its focus ensuring the EQCs 
are met and it covers the broader socio–economic issues of concern to stakeholders not 
able to be covered by the EPP. On balance then, the EMP is of greater significance to 
stakeholders than the SEP, and, therefore, because the EMP can be considered to have 
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political support, the policy making of the policy package can be considered to be 
successful on the political support criterion. 
Content relevance 
The key area where the content of the two policies was contested was the EQCs, and whilst 
industry still oppose some of the aspects of the EQCs in the final SEP, there has been 
broad support for the implementation of the EMP and the reporting against the EQCs. 
Whilst there were some general concerns raised by stakeholders regarding the EPP, they 
were not widespread: for example: 
Yeah well I guess my view is that the EPP is a bit old style regulation, I think we 
could have been more progressive and more forward looking, you know at the very 
least maybe not making it a criminal penalty but just setting up some system of social 
contracts for the sort of things we are talking about " and I think the scope and if you 
like governance models driving out of the EPP, are the thing that I would have liked 
to have seen changed: a bit of innovation there. 
 
The EPP, I’m not convinced it will work. I think it’s too complicated in terms of the 
targets and standards, if you like, the EQCs. I think they are way too comprehensive 
for any ordinary group of people to even get their heads around much less measure 
and monitor them. 
The content of the EMP, because of the more participative way it was developed, has the 
broad support of the Cockburn Sound community and received only passing criticism from a 
few stakeholders. Overall, then, it can be concluded that the policy making of the policy 
package is successful on the criterion of “content relevance”. 
Other socio–economic impacts 
 The implementation of the SEP and EMP has, and will continue to, impose additional 
burdens on some of the key players, notably: industry will be expected to continue to 
contribute to the monitoring of Cockburn Sound; where breaches of EQC standards are 
detected, the responsible industry will have to improve management to ensure compliance; 
and, resources will need to allocated to deal with diffuse sources of contamination (for 
example, stormwater) where problems are identified. As well, the implementation of the no 
net loss principle will impose additional cost for proponents of new developments in the 
Sound. 
These policies will impose additional socio–economic costs to some key players, but this 
needs to be weighed against the net benefits to the community of having a better managed 
and healthier Cockburn Sound. Based on the responses from the community and NGO 
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representatives on the CSMC, and responses at community forums, these additional costs 
are part of doing business in the Sound, and Industry and Local Government have also 
accepted this. This is similar to observations made in relation to the Kalgoorlie and Kwinana 
air quality EPPs in Chapter 5, where the increased cost to industry of complying with the 
EPP was not seen as being excessive or of significant concern. As well, the benefits of 
improved air quality for the broader community were seen as out–weighing these additional 
costs to industry. 
Overall, then, it can be concluded that this policy making of the policy package is successful 
on the criterion other socio–economic impacts. 
Discussion 
Summing up the above analysis, the policy making of the policy package of the SEP/EMP 
can be considered successful on all four criteria — although of the two policies, the EMP 
has more political support than the SEP. The success of this policy package is consistent 
with the hypothesis in this thesis that the adaptive–collaborative approach to environmental 
policy making is the approach that is most likely to be successful in contexts where conflict 
is deeply embedded as part of policy making. As was argued above, there are all three 
types of conflict present associated with policy making in Cockburn Sound, and the 
Cockburn Sound resource is becoming scarcer. The policy making approach was shown to 
be adaptive–collaborative (passive adaptive), based predominately on the EMP’s approach. 
The policy evaluation found that the package was successful on all four criteria. 
Consideration of the draft EPP in isolation provides further support for the hypothesis. The 
policy making approach of the draft EPP was shown to be a traditional expert–driven policy 
approach, it met significant opposition from some key stakeholders, and the evaluation 
above shows that it would have not been successful on at least one criterion — political 
support. Had the EPA pursued the statutory EPP approach, all subsequent decision 
making, including the EMP itself, would likely not have followed (Performance effectiveness 
criterion). The change to a SEP is recognition of this.  
It was argued in Chapter 5 that, preceding the Cockburn Sound policy making exercise, the 
EPA was beginning to do policy making more collaboratively, but it had yet to embrace a 
fully collaborative approach. The predominance of the science–focused view of the key 
players within the EPA, and the success the EPA has had using the traditional expert–
driven and ecological modern policy making approaches encouraged to the EPA to be risk 
averse and stick largely to traditional expert–driven and ecological modern policy making 
approaches. It was concluded from this that the EPA still had some institutional learning to 
do in respect of policy making in these highly contested contexts. The Cockburn Sound 
example shows that the EPA has progressed in this regard: it adopted a higher level of 
participation for this policy than for any other previous policy making exercise, at IAP2’s 
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(2007) Involve; and, the decision to change from a statutory EPP to a non–statutory SEP 
enabled most of the conflict over the EQCs to be diffused, although the conservation and 
community groups had some concerns over this move. This is an encouraging 
development. 
Summary 
This chapter discussed at length a specific case study of environmental policy making in a 
highly contested policy making context — Cockburn Sound. This was done to further test 
the hypothesis of this thesis that the adaptive–collaborative approach to environmental 
policy making is the approach that is most likely to be successful in these contexts.  A policy 
package was developed for Cockburn Sound which involved an overall SEP (it was 
originally proposed to be an EPP), which set the environmental values and objectives for 
the on–going management of the Sound and set specific EQCs, and an EMP which set out 
how the EQCs were to be achieved. The CSMC was also established to provide a 
collaborative forum policy development and the ongoing management of Cockburn Sound. 
It was shown that there is significant conflict associated with policy making for Cockburn 
Sound with the three resource scarcity issues identified in Chapter 2 being present (loss of 
some areas of Cockburn Sound for public use, increasing demand on resources with a 
growing number of users and competition for space and loss of good quality resource 
through the deterioration of water quality).  Four significant examples of social conflict were 
provided (reducing beach access, significant community mistrust of industry, a fundamental 
difference over what the long term management vision for the Sound should be and the no 
net loss principle) to demonstrate that the level of social conflict at Cockburn Sound was, 
and still is, significant. It was argued that there has been a history of contested and poor 
environmental governance of the Sound leading to the environmental problems, notably the 
loss of sea grass, and whilst the new governance arrangements are seen as an 
improvement, some concerns remain, notably the non–statutory nature of the SEP. It was 
shown that the science surrounding the draft EPP was fiercely contested, especially the 
EQCs, and the debate about some of them continues. 
It was shown that the overall policy package adopted an adaptive–collaborative approach 
and, consistent with the thesis hypothesis, the policy making was evaluated as being 
successful on the four criteria established in Chapter 4. As further support to this 
hypothesis, it was noted that the draft EPP (the precursor to the SEP) was a traditional 
expert–driven policy approach (although with a much improved level of participation) and 
that, if evaluated as a separate policy making exercise from the EMP, the policy making 
would have been unsuccessful on two of the criteria — performance effectiveness and 
political support. 
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Finally, it was argued that the EPA, the peak environmental agency in WA, has continued 
its institutional learning in its policy making in highly contested contexts by moving towards 
fully embracing a collaborative approach to its policy making. 
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Chapter 7 – Implications of the study 
Overview 
This study started with perhaps a none too surprising proposition that some policy making 
approaches are better suited to highly contested contexts than others, and went on to 
proposed that an adaptive–collaborative approach would most likely succeed where conflict 
is both intense and broad. Whilst the environmental policy making of the Western 
Australia’s peak environmental agency (the EPA) was the focus of this work, it was always 
intended that this study would have something to say about environmental policy making 
more generally. This is possible because environmental governance and the key issues in 
WA are typical of most of the developed world.  
Improving the understanding of environmental 
policy making in highly contested contexts 
This thesis proposed a theoretical perspective for studying environmental policy making and 
conflict consisting of two elements. The first was an examination of the nature and extent of 
conflict in policy making and,  based in part on work by Jackson and Pradubraj (2004) and 
McKinney and Harmon (2007), three broad themes with one key trigger were identified. The 
three themes were social; governance; and science and information. Resource scarcity was 
defined as having three possible components: decreasing quantity of that resource (e.g. 
loss of bushland); increasing demand on the resource (e.g. more users); and reduced 
quality of an existing resource (e.g. loss of water quality). 
The second component was to propose that environmental policy making can be 
categorised into one of four broad approaches: traditional expert–driven, ecological modern, 
collaborative and adaptive–collaborative. It was argued, and then demonstrated through an 
analysis of the policy making of the EPA, that these four broad policy making approaches 
had different degrees of success depending on the level of conflict present, with the 
collaborative and adaptive–collaborative approaches shown to be the most successful in 
these contexts. In contrast, where either traditional expert–driven or ecological modern 
approaches were attempted in cases of significant conflict, policy failure occurred — 
although in one case where a traditional expert–driven approach was applied and the level 
of conflict was relatively significant, policy success occurred; this exception will be returned 
to later. 
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This analysis drew on the international literature and should prove to be a useful model for 
studying environmental policy making in highly contested contexts in developed countries 
other than Australia. 
Understanding of an agency’s learning though 
its on–going policy making 
A key part of this thesis was to study the policy making of a single environmental agency 
(the WA EPA) as part of testing the thesis hypothesis. The results of that analysis could be 
typical of environmental agencies throughout the developed world. 
There is a chronological order associated with the EPA’s policy success and failure, with 
the early policy making largely successful and the more recent ones largely unsuccessful. 
The early EPPs were either traditional expert–driven or ecological modern, and whilst they 
were shown to be successful, the level of conflict was relatively low in these cases. This 
success reinforced the view of many of the policy makers within the EPA that a process 
described as science–focused would continue to be successful which led to continued use 
of traditional expert–driven and ecological modern approaches, even though the more 
recent contexts involved significant levels of conflict. Whilst it was clear that significant 
technical learning had occurred to match the complexity of the environmental issues at 
stake, agency institutional (social) learning did not keep up. It was clear that the EPA did 
not pay enough attention to the growing conflict associated with these newer policies, and 
the continued preference for traditional expert–driven and ecological modern approaches to 
policy making led to policy failure. 
There was an emerging counter view to the science–focused view that science was not as 
significant to policy making and more participative processes were required. This view was 
held by stakeholders who were mostly outside the EPA, and encouraged the EPA to adjust 
its policy making. By the late 1990s and early 2000s the EPA was developing a new policy 
making model for these more contested contexts involving two complementary policies: an 
overarching EPP; and a subsidiary implementation policy. This was called a concurrent–
complementary model. In the two examples where this model was applied, the subsidiary 
policies were developed using a collaborative approach but the EPA adhered to an expert–
driven approach, although it was noted that in the case of Cockburn Sound the EPA was 
more participative in the policy development phase. Clearly, institutional learning occurred. 
This new model of policy making does not seem to have been reported elsewhere in the 
literature and could prove to be a useful model for other agencies. The process whereby the 
EPA arrived at this new model should also be of broader interest. The tension between the 
two views about how policy should be developed (science–focused and participative–
focused) led to important institutional learning and improved policy making by the EPA. 
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Understanding a key barrier to successful 
policy making  
One of the key barriers to social learning by the EPA was that it did not have an adequate 
policy evaluation methodology, which meant that it was largely unaware of the success or 
otherwise of its policy making. Where the EPA carried out policy evaluation it was on 
performance effectiveness, which, as argued in this thesis, is not only extremely 
problematic for complex policies with long time frames for implementation where actual 
environmental improvement or degradation may take many years to become apparent, but 
is too narrow a focus and avoids consideration of broader issues — for example, 
unintended socio–economic effects. As well, the EPA policy evaluation was carried out 
internally and may be viewed as not being completely objective.  
Robust and objective policy evaluation is an important feedback tool for policy making 
agencies and this study proposed a flexible, relatively simple and robust policy evaluation 
methodology that was used to evaluate the policies of the EPA. 
Understanding adaptive management 
The adaptive–collaborative policy making approach is a particular focus of this study, and it 
was noted that the notion of adaptive management, the critical policy tool for this approach, 
had a range of meanings in the literature. This study developed a model of adaptive 
management, based in part on work by Pagan and Crase (2005), which involved: a matrix 
involving level of conflict;  implications of failed management; level of understanding of the 
system in question; and the need for mathematical modelling and monitoring (see Figure 1). 
The model is well suited to most environmental policy making contexts and should be a 
useful tool for decision makers when planning a policy making exercise. 
Against the trend — successful policy making 
in contested contexts using the traditional 
expert–driven approach 
It was noted earlier in this chapter that there was one example of EPA policy making where 
a traditional expert–driven approach was used successfully in a context with relatively high 
levels of conflict: this was the Lakes EPP. It was noted that there was a high profile and 
active policy champion, and that this person was able to overcome the lack of an adequate 
participative process and push the policy through to approval. Whilst this is a useful lesson 
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in policy making, it needs to be interpreted with some caution. When the policy was to be 
reviewed in the early 2000s, the revised policy received considerably more opposition than 
the original EPP (developed in the early 1990s). This was largely because the revised 
policy was planned to be more comprehensive and cover many more wetlands. It is 
unlikely, therefore, that a policy champion could have possibly overcome this level of 
opposition and conflict without a more collaborative approach with the key stakeholders and 
starting with a policy blank sheet. It was argued in this thesis that the fact that the EPA 
adopted a less participative traditional expert–driven approach was the reason for policy 
failure. The best we can conclude from this is that a policy champion can facilitate an easier 
policy making process, but cannot be expected to crash through entrenched conflict without 
adopting a collaborative approach. A policy champion may crash through low–to–moderate 
levels of conflict only. 
Understanding policy making scenarios 
involving highly contested contexts 
Introduction 
A key message that can be taken from this research is that the policy making approach 
should match the nature and extent of conflict associated with the exercise. Based on the 
results and analysis of this thesis it is possible to identify five policy making scenarios and 
matching policy making approaches, as described below. 
Minimal conflict 
This is where there are minimal levels of social, governance of science and information 
conflict. It may be that there are few competing stakeholders, there is relative agreement 
amongst the stakeholders, and/or the resource in question is not scarce. Governance 
arrangements are relatively simple, usually involving one or only a few agencies within a 
single level of government. Where several agencies are involved across more than one 
level of government, the existing governance arrangements are well integrated. The 
resource or ecosystem subject to policy making is well understood with little debate about 
the nature of the problem and how to address it. 
In these cases, both traditional expert–driven and ecological modern approaches would 
likely be successful. A collaborative approach would be excessive, given the resources 
involved. Passive adaptive management may be appropriate in support of the command 
and control or market mechanisms applied if the system is highly sensitive to change. 
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Social conflict dominates 
This is where there are significant levels of social conflict but conflict in relation to 
governance of science and information is minimal. Here, there would be many competing 
stakeholders and strong disagreement about how the resource should be used and 
managed. As well, the resource in question is considered scarce. Governance 
arrangements are relatively simple as described above, and whilst the resource or 
ecosystem subject to policy making and the problem would be well understood, there is 
considerable debate about how to address the problem based on the different values the 
stakeholders hold for the resource/ecosystem. 
In these cases, a collaborative approach would be required, with a particular emphasis on 
involving the key stakeholders in the decision making process. The aim of the participative 
process is to address the conflict between stakeholders and to seek solutions and policy 
measures that address the problem but have a level of support from stakeholders. The role 
of the governance agencies would be to provide advice on the types of policy mechanism 
available to address the problem. A range of policy measures could be applied, including 
command and control or market mechanism, and passive adaptive management may be 
appropriate if the system is highly sensitive to change. 
Governance conflict dominates 
Here the levels of social and science and information conflict are relatively low, but conflict 
over the governance of the resource or ecosystem is significant. There would be few 
competing stakeholders and relative agreement about the nature of the problem, largely 
because the resource or ecosystem subject to policy making is well understood and not 
considered scarce (although the poor governance arrangements could be a threat to the 
resource).  
Governance arrangements, however, are relatively complex involving several agencies 
and/or more than one level of government. Typically, the existing governance arrangements 
are not well integrated, and consequently there is poor management of the resource or 
ecosystem.  
In these cases, a collaborative approach would be required, with a particular emphasis on 
involving the key agencies rather than community stakeholders. The aim of the participative 
process is to work through the competing and overlapping jurisdictions, and to seek policy 
measures that address the problem and facilitate integrated decision making. Again, a 
range of measures could be applied including command and control or market mechanism. 
Passive adaptive management may be appropriate if the system is highly sensitive to 
change. 
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Social and governance conflict dominates 
These situations involve a combination of the last two scenarios. The critical point is that 
whilst the resource or ecosystem in question is usually well understood, there is 
considerable debate about how to address the problem, based on the different values the 
stakeholders hold for the resource/ecosystem and there is confusion about the governance 
arrangements for any of the chosen policy mechanisms. 
In these cases, a collaborative approach would be required to address both the conflicts 
over the competing values held by stakeholders and the competing and overlapping 
governance jurisdictions. The aim of the participative process is not only to address these 
conflicts but is also to seek solutions and policy measures that address the problem, to 
obtain a level of support from stakeholders and to facilitate integrated decision making. The 
collaborative approach would involve both the key stakeholders and the agencies 
responsible for governance working together to seek agreed policy outcomes. Again, a 
range of measure could be applied including command and control or market mechanism, 
and passive adaptive management may be appropriate if the system is highly sensitive to 
change. 
Social, governance and science and information 
conflict 
This scenario differs from the last in that the resource or ecosystem subject to policy 
making and the nature of the problem are both poorly understood. There is not only 
considerable debate about how to address the problem based on the different values the 
stakeholders hold for the resource/ecosystem and confusion about the governance 
arrangements for any the chosen policy mechanisms, but there is considerable debate, 
uncertainty and disagreement about how the system would respond to any policy or 
management measure. These are the truly wicked problems. 
In these cases, not only is the collaborative approach described in the last scenario 
required, the technical experts and those with local knowledge must be part of the 
participative process. Active adaptive management would likely be required to address the 
uncertainty, which makes the overall policy making approach adaptive–collaborative. 
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Final word 
This thesis started with Neil Young and an observation about the way we plan and manage 
the environment. It’s fitting to finish with another quotation from the legend himself: 
 ‘In the field of opportunity 
It's plowin' time again. 
There ain't no way of telling 
Where these seeds will rise or when 
I'll just wait around 'til springtime 
And then, I'll find a friend 
In the field of opportunity 
It's plowin' time again.’ 
Field Of Opportunity – Neil Young. 
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Appendix 1 — Details of the policy evaluations 
reviewed in Chapter 4. 
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This Appendix provides the details of the analysis carried out on the policy evaluation 
literature which is the basis of the discussion in the first part of Chapter 4. 
Section 2 describes the assessment methods used by agencies, both government and non 
government to evaluated policies or projects with environmental impacts. Section 3 
describes methods used by independent researchers in the policy assessment. Two tables 
are used to present the information in Sections 2 and 3. The first table summarises the 
references and the area of policy evaluation each is applied to. The second table describes 
the evaluation criteria applied using the following headings: 
• Evaluation criterion name used in the work; 
• A description of each criterion; 
• A suggested generic descriptor of the criterion (i.e. type) to be used later in 
summarising the various evaluation approaches; and 
• Criterion category (i.e. the stage of the policy making process being evaluated). 
The generic evaluation criteria were derived after analysis of all of these studies. It is 
proposed here that the evaluation criteria can be typed as either: 
• Performance effectiveness – how well the implementation of the policy delivers on 
environmental objectives; 
• Political support – whether the policy gains support from the community, key 
stakeholders and the political process; 
• Performance efficiency – related to the cost effectiveness of the policy; 
• Content relevance – whether the policy actually addresses the environmental 
issues at stake; 
• Other socio–economic impacts – whether the policy has impacts (positive and 
negative) other than environmental (i.e. social and/or economic); 
• Social equity – related to how the costs and benefits of the policy are distributed 
throughout the community; 
! '"N!
• Legal effectiveness/enforceability – related to the legality and practicality of the 
actions proposed in the policy; 
• Measurability – whether the policy contains mechanism that allow for impacts to be 
measured;  
• Innovation – whether the policy encourages new and innovative solutions to the 
environmental problems; 
• Flexibility – whether the policy mechanisms can adapt to changing circumstances.; 
and 
• Other – miscellaneous criteria used not applied in more than one study. 
-"#./0%+1#0234*3&,(%#
A total of six policy evaluation methods are covered from agencies that are both 
government bodies and non government organisations. Table 1 summarises the agency 
assessment methods and Table 2 is a summary of the criteria applied. 
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Agency name Agency 
type 
Reference Name 
used in 
Table 2 
Year Application 
International 
Union for 
Conservation of 
Nature and 
Natural 
Resources, 
World Resources 
Institute, 
Conservation 
International, 
World Wildlife 
Fund (USA) and 
World Bank 
 
NGO Conserving the World’s 
Biological 
Diversity”(McNeely et 
al. 1990) 
IUCN 1990 1990 Evaluate 
biodiversity 
strategies and 
actions plans. 
USA 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency 
Govt Policy Planning to 
Reduce Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions 
(USEPA 1998) 
USEPA 
Greenhous
e 1998 
1998 Evaluate policy 
measures to 
reduce 
Greenhouse Gas 
emissions. 
 
European Union 
(EU) 
Govt Defining Criteria for 
Evaluating the 
Effectiveness of EU 
Environmental 
Measures (Anon 1999) 
EU 1999(1) 1999 Evaluate the 
measures 
undertaken by 
member States to 
implement the 
EU’s 
environmental 
legislation 
 
EU Govt An Evaluation of 
Phare–financed 
Energy and 
EU 1999(2) 1999 Evaluation of 
environmental 
programmes 
! '"O!
Environmental 
Programmes 
(Evaluation Unit of the 
Joint External 
Relations Service of 
the European 
Commission 1999). 
supported by the 
EU in its Easter 
Block members. 
Agency name Agency 
type 
Reference Name 
used in 
Table 2 
Year Application 
IUCN NGO Draft IUCN Evaluation 
Policy (Monitoring and 
Evaluation Division of 
the IUCN 2001) 
IUCN 2001 2001 Evaluation of 
policies, plans and 
programmes 
aimed at 
conserving 
biological diversity. 
The World Bank Govt Guidelines and Criteria 
for OED Project 
Evaluations 
(Operations Evaluation 
Department of the 
World Bank 2002, 
2001). 
WB 2001/2 2001 
& 
2002 
Evaluation of its 
lending 
programmes and 
its environmental 
policies and 
programmes. 
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Assessment 
Name 
(Table 1) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria type 
ICUN 1990 Not specified The degree to which 
the policies are 
prepared by those 
responsible for 
implementation 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
making 
process 
 Not specified Degree of political 
support 
Political support Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Not specified Degree of financial 
support 
Political support Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Not specified Extent to which policy 
addresses real needs of 
the affected area or the 
mandate of the involved 
institutions 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
content 
! '"P!
 Not specified Effectiveness of 
implementation 
mechanisms in policy to 
ensure actions are 
followed up 
Measurability Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Not specified Degree to which policy 
contains actions which 
address the problems 
the subject of the policy 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
content 
Assessment 
Name 
(Table 1) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria type 
USEPA 
Greenhouse 
1998 
Effectiveness 
in reducing 
Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions 
Measurable changes in 
Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Private sector 
costs and 
savings 
Cost to, and saving for, 
the private sector 
because of 
implementation of the 
policy 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performance 
– ancillary 
 Public Sector 
Costs 
Costs (and benefits) of 
implementing the policy 
for the relevant 
Government agencies 
 
Performance 
Efficiency 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Institutional 
capacity 
Are the targeted 
institutions capable of 
carrying out policy 
measures 
 
Institutional 
capacity 
Policy 
content 
USEPA 
Greenhouse 
1998 (cont) 
Enforceability Relevance and 
practicality of any 
enforceability measures 
 
Legal 
effectiveness/ 
Enforceability 
Policy 
content 
 Economic 
efficiency 
Cost effectiveness of 
policy measures 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Social equity Are costs and benefits 
shared equally 
Social equity Policy 
performance 
– direct and 
ancillary 
 Political 
support 
Degree to which policy 
measures are 
supported politically 
and by the community 
 
Political support Policy 
content 
 Legal 
constraints to 
its operation 
Are they legal 
impediments to any of 
the policy measures 
Legal 
effectiveness/ 
Enforceability 
 
Policy – 
content 
 Ancillary 
benefits and 
costs 
 
Unforeseen benefits 
and costs 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performance 
– ancillary 
USEPA Measurability Does the policy contain Measurability Policy 
! '"#!
Greenhouse 
1998  – cont 
measures to enable 
policy performance to 
be evaluated 
 
content 
 Flexibility Is the policy able to 
easily adapt over time 
as circumstances 
change? 
 
Flexibility Policy 
content 
Assessment 
Name 
(Table 1) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria type 
EU 1999 Effectiveness Achievement of policy 
objectives in both 
environmental impacts 
and changing behaviour 
of the target agencies 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Relevance Extent to which 
objectives address the 
issue or problem 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
content 
 Efficiency Achieving objectives at 
lowest cost 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Utility Changes to net social 
welfare, both intended 
and unintended 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performance 
– direct and 
ancillary 
EU 1999 (2) Efficiency Relates to the level of 
inputs to achieve 
outputs. Includes cost 
benefits analysis and 
other qualitative 
measures 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Effectiveness In achieving specific 
environmental 
objectives, in changing 
subsequent measures, 
and in changing target 
organisation’s 
 
Performance 
effectiveness 
 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Impact Of programme in other 
non–targeted areas 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts  
Policy 
performance 
– ancillary 
 Sustainability The degree to which 
the general working 
environment is 
supportive of the 
programme's continuity 
 
Political support Policy 
performance 
– direct 
EU 1999 (2) 
– Cont 
Relevance The extent to which the 
policy should meet its 
objectives 
 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
content 
IUCN 2001 Relevance Relevance of the policy 
to the organisation’s 
goals  
 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
content 
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 Effectiveness Extent that the policy is 
meeting objectives and 
is performing well 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 
 Efficiency Using resources cost–
effectively 
Performance 
Efficiency 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 
Assessment 
Name 
(Table 1) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria type 
 Impact The additional changes 
that occur because of 
the implementation of 
the policy, on target 
agencies and non–
target agencies, 
additional effects – 
environment 
&socioeconomic 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performance 
– ancillary 
 Sustainability The degree to which 
the general working 
environment is 
supportive of the 
policy’s continuity 
Political support Policy 
performance 
– direct 
WB 2001/2 Relevance of 
objectives 
The extent to which the 
objectives are 
consistent with the 
needs of the 
programme and the 
institutions applying the 
programme 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
content 
 Efficacy The extent to which 
objectives are achieved 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Efficiency The extent to which the 
programme delivers on 
its objectives with cost 
and benefits compared 
to alternatives 
 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performance 
– direct 
 Sustainability The likelihood that the 
programme will deliver 
benefits given the 
general working 
environment (political 
and social) the 
programme has to 
operate within 
 
Political support Policy 
content 
 Institutional 
Development 
Impact 
The extent to which the 
programme leads to a 
more efficient, equitable 
and sustainable use of 
institutional human, 
financial, and natural 
resources – intended 
and unintended 
 
Performance 
Efficiency 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performance 
– direct and 
ancillary 
! '""!
 Outcome The extent to which the 
major objectives were 
achieved efficiently. 
This is an overall 
evaluation taking into 
account relevance, 
efficacy and efficiency. 
 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performance 
– direct and 
ancillary 
Assessment 
Name 
(Table 1) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria type 
WB 2001/2 – 
cont 
Bank and 
Borrower 
Performance 
Relates to procedural 
and process 
performance of both the 
Bank and the borrower 
N/A N/A 
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Table 3 summarises the assessment methods used by researchers reviewed and Table 4 is 
a summary of criteria used. 
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Reference Application 
Economou (1992) Evaluation of environmental policy making at the national level in 
Australia. 
Janicke and Weidner (1995) Evaluation of 24 case studied in environmental policy world–wide 
Barron and Ng (1996) Evaluation of various solid waste management policy instruments 
Barde and Smith (1997) Evaluating the economic instrument used by the OECD countries to 
deal with environmental protection. 
Hughey (2000) Evaluation of the operation of a Dolphin wildlife sanctuary in New 
Zealand 
Fullerton (2001) Evaluation of environmental policy in general 
Cabugueira (2001) Evaluating voluntary agreements in environmental policies. 
Enzensberger, Wietschel et al 
(2002) 
Evaluating policy instruments to apply in selecting to encourage the 
use of wind energy. 
Alberini and Segerson (2002) Evaluating voluntary environmental programmes 
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Reference 
(Table 3) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria 
type 
Economou 
(1992) 
Stakeholder 
agreement 
Were all the stakeholders 
in the policy making 
process are satisfied with 
the outcome 
Political 
support 
Policy 
making 
process 
 Real 
environmental 
improvement  
Where real environmental 
improvement can be 
shown quantitatively 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
Janicke and 
Weidner 
(1995) 
Lasting effect Are the environmental 
gains short, medium or 
long term 
Performance 
effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Bonus effects Are the environmental 
gains a direct result of the 
policy or as result of other 
initiatives 
 
Performance 
effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Problem shifting Are the environmental 
gains achieved by shifting 
problems to other sectors 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
 Innovation Are the policy measures 
about resource saving or 
end of pipe solutions 
 
Innovation Policy 
content 
 Efficiency Are the environment gains 
accompanied with 
economic benefits as well 
 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
Perception of 
effectiveness 
In dealing with the 
problem or meeting 
objectives 
 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
content 
Barron and 
Ng (1996) 
Compliance 
monitoring/enfor
cement 
Are there Policy measures 
which measures/monitor 
outcomes reliably and 
cost effectively 
 
Measurability Policy 
content 
 Ease of 
implementation 
Using existing 
technologies and 
management systems 
 
Content 
relevance 
Policy 
content 
 Least financial 
cost 
Lowest cost option chosen Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
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 Robustness/Flex
ibility 
Policy contains measures 
which retain effectiveness 
under a range of 
economic and technical 
conditions 
 
Flexibility Policy 
content 
Reference 
(Table 3) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria 
type 
Barron and 
Ng (1996) – 
cont 
Broader 
Macroeconomic 
Impacts 
Adopting policy measures 
that are compatible with 
fostering growth and 
containing inflation 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
 Equity Does the policy address 
the distributing cost and 
benefits fairly 
 
Social equity Policy 
content 
 Ecological 
impacts 
Policy implementation 
would lead to the least 
impact on affected 
ecosystems through the 
implementation of waste 
management measures 
 
Performance 
effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Economic 
efficiency 
Using full cost benefit 
analysis 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
Barde and 
Smith (1997) 
Environmental 
effectiveness 
Delivery of a positive 
environmental outcome 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Economic 
efficiency 
Cost effectiveness of 
policy compared to 
alternatives 
 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Administration 
and compliance 
costs 
 
For both government and 
industry 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Taxation benefits If policy measures require 
new taxation measures 
then other taxes could be 
reduced 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
content 
 Wider economic 
effects 
Including employment, 
trade and distributional 
effects 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
 Dynamic effects 
and innovation 
Ability of policy measures 
to deliver innovative 
solutions 
Innovation Policy 
content 
 Soft effects  A broad category of 
difficult to measure effects 
like attitude changes, 
capacity building etc 
 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
Hughey Equity and Does the policy address Social equity Policy 
! M&'!
(2000) fairness distributing cost and 
benefits fairly 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
 Impact 
minimisation 
Reducing impacts on 
those negatively affected 
by policy measures 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
Reference 
(Table 3) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria 
type 
Hughey 
(2000) – 
cont 
Achieving short–
term 
environmental 
gains 
Does the policy deliver 
environmental benefits in 
the short term? 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Achieving 
longer–term 
environmental 
gains 
Does the policy deliver 
environmental benefits in 
the longer term? 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Positive benefits 
to other 
environmental 
programmes 
Will the policy measures 
lead to other 
environmental benefits, 
including capacity building 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
 Cost implications 
for other 
programmes 
Do the policy measures 
pull resources away from 
other areas of the 
environment? 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
Fullerton 
(2001) 
Economic 
efficiency 
Related to cost benefit 
analysis 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Administrative 
efficiency 
Government costs to 
administer the policy and 
industry compliance costs 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
 Monitoring and 
enforcement 
Policy needs to ensure 
that evasion of any policy 
measures are avoided 
through appropriate 
monitoring, readily 
measurable outputs as 
well as adopting 
measures that deal with 
avoidance and evasion. 
 
Measurability 
Legal 
effectiveness/ 
Enforceability 
Policy 
content 
 Political and 
ethical 
considerations 
The policy must be 
politically feasible and fit 
within the beliefs and 
ethics if the community to 
which it is to apply 
 
Political 
support 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Equity and 
distributional 
effects 
Costs and benefits to be 
shared in an equitable 
manner 
Social equity Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
 Other distortions To the operations of the 
market economy need to 
be identified and 
considered 
 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
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 Flexibility and 
dynamic 
adjustments 
Policy measures should 
be flexible enough to 
respond to changing 
circumstances without the 
need for actual policy 
changes 
 
Flexibility Policy 
content 
Reference 
(Table 3) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria 
type 
Cabugueira 
(2001) 
Static efficiency Capacity of policy to 
minimise short term costs 
 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 
 Dynamic 
efficiency 
Capacity to promote 
appropriate technological 
changes as well as 
flexibility, creating a co–
operative approach and 
increasing environmental 
awareness 
 
Other Policy 
content 
 Effectiveness  Ability to meet 
environmental objectives 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Equity In terms of distributing 
costs and benefits 
 
 
Social equity Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
Enzensberg
er, Wietschel 
et al (2002) 
Effectiveness Degree to which policy 
objectives are meet 
Performance 
Effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Static Efficiency Highest outcome per 
capital involved in the 
implementation. 
Transaction cost need to 
be considered as well. 
 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Dynamic 
Efficiency 
Policy measures which 
promote innovative 
efficient outcomes rather 
than favouring existing 
efficient solutions 
 
Innovation Policy 
content 
 System 
conformity 
Policy instruments should 
comply with the existing 
market and legal systems. 
 
Legal 
effectiveness/ 
Enforceability 
Policy 
content 
 Practicability Dealing with regulation 
and control requirements 
Legal 
effectiveness/ 
Enforceability 
Policy 
content 
 Flexibility This is applicable when 
the existing technical 
and/or regulatory and/or 
political environment is not 
known or uncertain 
Flexibility Policy 
content 
! M&N!
 
 Impact on 
economic 
development 
Additional economic 
benefits or impacts of the 
affected region 
 
 
Other socio–
economic 
impacts 
Policy 
performanc
e – 
ancillary 
Reference 
(Table 3) 
Criteria name Description Suggested 
generic 
descriptor(s) 
Criteria 
type 
Alberini and 
Segerson 
(2002) 
Effectiveness In providing environmental 
protection 
Performance 
effectiveness 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
 Efficiency Does the measure 
achieve an outcome more 
efficient than an 
alternative measure 
Performance 
efficiency 
Policy 
performanc
e – direct 
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 Appendix 2 — Details of policy evaluation 
from Western Australian policy makers and 
interviews 
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Environmental Policy No Interviewees 
who perceived 
policy succeeded 
No Interviewees 
who perceived 
policy failed 
No Interviewees 
who did not refer 
to policy 
Lakes EPP 8 1 6 
EPA Land clearing Guidance 4 0 11 
Kwinana air quality EPP 9 0 5 
System 6 1 1 13 
Guidance 33 2 0 13 
Leeuwin–Naturaliste SPP 7 0 8 
Bush Forever 3 1 11 
Kalgoorlie EPP 4 0 11 
Peel–Harvey SPP 7 2 6 
FRIARS 1 0 14 
Gas pipeline guidance 1 0 14 
Greenhouse gas guidance 1 0 14 
Cockburn Sound EPP 4 0 11 
Western Swamp tortoise 
EPP 
1 2 12 
Ozone EPP 1 0 14 
Gnangara Crown EPP 2 1 12 
Odours Guidance 3 0 12 
Risk guidance 1 0 14 
Noise guidance (stationary) 2 0 13 
Jandakot SPP 4 2 9 
Wetlands EPP 1 2 12 
Transport Noise guidance 1 1 13 
Minerals and petroleum 
MOU 
1 0 14 
All EPA Guidances 1 0 14 
Air quality 1 1 13 
ERN SPP 2 0 13 
Coastal SPP 1 0 14 
Basic raw materials SPP 1 0 14 
Poultry SPP 1 0 14 
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Environmental Policy No Interviewees 
who perceived 
policy succeeded 
No Interviewees 
who perceived 
policy failed 
No Interviewees 
who did not refer 
to policy 
WSUD policy 1 0 14 
Shark Bay Strategy 2 0 13 
Gascoyne 1 2 12 
Gnangara SPP 1 2 12 
Peel Harvey EPP 1 4 10 
SW Ag EPP 0 6 9 
Southern River Structure 
Plan 
0 1 14 
Industrial Buffers SPP 1 7 7 
All coastal policies 0 2 13 
Swan Canning EPP 0 6 9 
Salinity 0 3 12 
Kimberley Region Plan 0 1 14 
!
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Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased reason(s) 
1 if we didn’t have that policy there would be a lot less 
wetlands now and certainly the level of awareness 
about wetlands beyond just the EPP ones may not 
have grown either 
Effective in protecting 
wetlands 
Raised awareness 
2 No reason given  
3 Where they (EPPs) have been coupled to a normal 
on–going resourced activity within a Department, for 
example, the air ones and the Ozone one, and 
indeed the Lakes one because that was coupled with 
EIA, the EPPs have delivered. 
Where a clear implementation 
process has been identified. 
5 And the reason why it worked was because it was 
draconian, at a time where although there was a lot 
of sympathy for wetlands no one was really 
protecting wetlands" 
by far the majority of wetlands on the EPP have been 
protected because no one is prepared to touch them 
A statutory policy with clear 
controls. 
Effective in protecting 
wetlands 
7 The Swan Coastal Plain Lakes EPP was both a 
policy and a plan in a sense because it identified the 
areas that were to be protected, and that’s way it 
was successful. 
But for its time, it set a benchmark, and this was 
what the review of it and upgrade to wetland was 
meant to be. You image doing the wetlands EPP 
back when the Lakes EPP was done. When you 
talking about things that weren’t in the mindset of the 
broader community about what a wetland was, 
you’ve still got arguments about underground 
wetlands, or damplands as they call them 
Clear policy in that areas to be 
protected were clearly 
identified. 
It was politically acceptable – it 
didn’t go too far. 
12 But at least it provides a framework within which the 
EPA can assess other wetlands initiatives 
Provides a broader framework 
for wetland protection 
! M&#!
Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased reason(s) 
  It’s put wetlands on the critical path in that they are a 
factor to be considered, and there is an analysis 
which must take place and you can’t pass to the next 
step until you’ve finished that. So it’s brought them 
up into the agenda. 
Raised awareness about 
wetlands; 
Wetland protection part of 
decision making process 
15 I think in terms of raising awareness and the need to 
consult over wetlands, that’s been a really useful 
policy 
Raised awareness about 
wetlands; 
Wetland protection part of 
decision making process 
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Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased reason(s) 
1 In term of improving air quality, when you look at what we 
had in the late 80s or the early 80s to what we have now 
the policy has been tremendously successful.  
I think the regime that it set up and the approach to 
licencing has been really successful in improving air 
quality is very measurable 
Effective in improving air 
quality 
Clear regulatory process 
established 
2 because they are precise and directed Clear and targeted 
regulatory process 
established 
3 Where they have been coupled to a normal on–going 
resourced activity within a Department, for example, the 
air ones and the Ozone one " the EPPs have delivered 
Where a clear 
implementation process 
has been identified 
4 because I think there has probably been strong 
community support for it a strong political will to have 
something happen 
Politically acceptable 
5 Now that you have got the Kwinana industries through 
KIC relatively organised internally, it (the policy) works by 
itself. The industry negotiates, so really that’s a relatively 
easy way for governments to manage things. 
Clear implementation 
process has been 
identified that is industry 
self regulated 
6 It’s a policy which only affects a relatively limited number 
of proponents, the people inside the area and they’ve 
accepted it, whether they like it is another matter, but 
they’ve acceptable it, they work with it and it manages the 
situation 
Limited in extent and 
scope – targeted. 
9 because they were based on clear science and lines on 
the map 
Good science and 
targeted scope. 
12 I think when you look at the way that tried to protect a 
very complex buffer to a very large industrial area, the 
biggest in the State, I think is actually quite significant. 
The outcome has been that the State is now moved 
through, originating in the late 1980s, an area that 
obviously has had environmental problems associated 
with it, and the land use response has been to basically 
move residential land out of it. It took 10 years to get to 
that point, with a separate piece of legislation, but the 
origin was actually the EPP. I think that’s been very 
successful 
Caused a downstream 
decision making authority 
to make decisions that 
protected the 
environment. 
14 You asked me did I think air quality in Kwinana has got 
better worse or unchanged, I would have thought that it 
has got better. 
Effective in improving air 
quality 
! M&$!
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Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased 
reason(s) 
1 overall the framework and approach it set up will be viewed in the long 
term as being really good 
Provides an 
overall 
framework for 
decision making 
7 I think it has avoided a lot of future controversy. 
At the broad level across the whole region it said, “these areas need to 
be preserved for the following purposes, these are the limits of 
development in these areas, special rural in these areas because we 
want to preserve the character of the area”, that was its overall thing.  
And there was also additional lands bought into the National Park 
Dealt with 
conflict. 
Provided clear 
prescriptions for 
land use 
9 It showed a plan, and on that plan it’s got land uses where you can and 
cannot do things 
Provided clear 
prescriptions for 
land use 
10 An incredible amount of consultation. I mean, Leeuwin–Naturaliste 
started in 1994, if I remember rightly, with a workshop, or better 
described as a gathering, as I remember, upstairs in the Margaret River 
Hotel, with all and sundry. That was something that was very much 
driven by David Carr and the South–west regional Planning Committee 
at the time. And, it developed from there. The SPP wasn’t finalised until 
1999. So, it was a 5–year process which is long by even the standard 
of some of our regional planning documents. But it took that length of 
time because of the amount of consultation. I think there was 
consultation before the draft. There was consultation on the draft and 
then there was more consultation before the final version. Because it, 
sort of, got converted from, what you might describe as a normal 
strategic planning document into a Statement of Planning Policy. Of 
course, Statements of Planning Policy have their own requirements for 
consultation. So, there was consultation all over the place. There were 
3 or 4 periods formal periods of public consultation. The guys from up 
here as well as the Bunbury office they just spent hundreds of hours 
consulting. And I think because of that, and obviously because that 
consultation involved lots of stakeholders both at a group and in 
individual situations, they managed to get hold of the vast majority of 
the issues that needed to be addressed. 
Adequate 
participation; 
A policy 
champion; 
Adequate time; 
Incremental 
policy 
development; 
Adequate 
resources. 
11 It has bought some form, some consistency, and whilst there are 
difficulties in its application because of clashes in time with other 
planning instruments, it never the less has been effective 
Guide to 
decision making 
and consistency 
of that decision 
making  
12 it tries to reconcile all the various interests, identifies areas that should 
have a viticulture focus, identifies areas that have got a horticulture 
focus, identifies areas that have a conservation focus, and then areas 
where you can actually put development  within certain guidelines. 
People talk a lot about a balanced approach towards Planning and 
development, but I think it’s an area where there was a legitimate 
attempt to do that, and I think it’s been pretty successful, as an overall 
framework. There is pressure on individual places within it, but I guess 
at a regional level you’re never going to solve all the local problems. 
Provided clear 
prescriptions for 
land use; 
Balance 
approach 
15 But I think they were quite genuinely trying to come up with an 
approach, an overall planning approach for that area because they saw 
that is turning into a dog’s breakfast. There was heaps of development 
pressure down there. I don’t necessarily agree with all of the outcomes 
but I think that that was a fairly genuine attempt. That overarching thing 
was not a bad attempt 
Provided clear 
overall 
framework for 
land use 
decision 
making. 
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Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased reason(s) 
2 It is the thing against which it will all be tested and 
that happened to be through an SPP " which I 
think was quite a good blueprint for future action 
Provides an overall framework 
for decision making 
3 I think they have certainly worked in a Planning 
sense, they have certainly had an influence and 
set directions in a Planning sense. How have they 
worked in terms of environmental outcomes, 
which is the probably behind your question? 
I don’t know. Furthermore, I don’t know if anyone 
can tell you. It’s a bit disheartening, but I don’t 
know anyone who can tell you the answer. 
" it has certainly worked in influencing lots sizes 
and lot density and the number of septic tanks per 
hectare etc, and it certainly has help influence 
land clearing and other things 
Provides an overall framework 
for decision making 
8 That’s partly because they were a response to an 
issue at the time, so there was a real need and 
purpose for them. But, also they were fairly clear 
in their objectives and policy measures, so there 
was a fair degree of clarity which meant that they 
were fairly readily capable of implementation 
Responded to a real need. 
Provides a clear overall 
framework for decision making 
9 It addressed the mechanism to take account of 
the environmental objectives. The environmental 
objectives were set out in the EPP and the SPP 
didn’t have to detail all the environmental 
objectives, but it cross–referred to them and was 
a mechanism to take them into account. 
Provides an overall framework 
for decision making that took 
into account the environmental 
objectives. 
10 because by their nature, we have been quite 
deliberate in choosing what we have SPPs for 
Targeted to a real need. 
11 I presume by the length of time that is has been 
there and the reference I see to it in different 
publications or strategies that have unfolded over 
the years, such as the Peel Region Scheme, and 
you read the studies done in the 1990s in the 
South West development strategies or SWOT, 
those sorts of things you get a reference to it, so 
obviously people who are preparing things think it 
is sufficiently important to quote in recognition of 
the authorities they have had to consult 
Referred to in other planning 
documents – influenced 
down–stream decision 
making. 
12 I think the debate on the management of the 
Peel–Harvey catchment became more 
sophisticated after that particular SPP came out. 
And, it was probably a product of its time, I 
suspect. It probably needs to be looked out again 
in light of the Planning initiatives that have 
occurred the construction of the Dawesville cut, 
which the SPP actually predated. I think overall 
that was probably successful 
Appropriate for the time. 
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Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased reason(s) 
1 It is very hard for an EPP to force land use 
changes, particularly where the land uses 
changes that are trying to be implemented " are 
not supported by private land owners. Forcing 
land use changes and conservation on private 
land is really hard 
Tried to force land use 
changes on private land 
without political support 
2 " it suffered from the implementation of it being 
so, by its very nature, diffuse " 
... it got a little bit difficult or the community wasn’t 
involved enough or there wasn’t ownership 
enough and I think the fact that Agriculture wasn’t 
able to give it ongoing consideration with total 
amount of support from higher up the line 
because they saw it as not part of their core 
business eventually and it lead to difficulties 
Imprecise. 
 
Lacked political support. 
3 Anything that requires behavioural change at the 
landscape level is tough" The best examples are 
is where you have people out there working with 
the community on a personal basis, and they’re 
the ones where we’ve had some quite good 
success. 
Wasn’t supported by 
resources of the relevant 
agencies. 
5 Peel–Harvey started with very good intentions but 
has been completely, I think, undermined, 
probably by ignorance and being ignored. If the 
objectives of the EPP have been achieved it has 
been more by co–incidence, I believe, than 
making sure that all of the decision making 
authorities within the catchment are heading in 
the same direction. 
The other thing for Peel–Harvey is that there has 
been no investment by government. In fact, any 
investment they had has been largely withdrawn. 
The local presence through the Pinjarra 
catchment centre has gone, the centre has gone, 
and, in fact, the local people are saying that there 
is no support 
Wasn’t supported by relevant 
decision makers and lacked 
resources for implementation. 
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Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased reason(s) 
1 It is very hard for an EPP to force land use 
changes, particularly where the land uses 
changes that are trying to be implemented " are 
not supported by private land owners. Forcing 
land use changes and conservation on private 
land is really hard 
A minister that wasn’t going to force a policy 
through unless there was land owner veto. You 
also had turf war happening between the 
agencies, and the whole thing is so watered done 
that in the end of the day you get one wetland in 
it, which I think is a nature reserve anyway. It’s it 
going to sit on the shelf and be useless 
Tried to force land use 
changes on private land 
without political support. 
2 In so far as it again relies upon really nominations 
to produce an outcome, and it’s not even seen by 
CALM as to be necessarily a way to go which 
provides greater protection, environmental 
protection, for their wetlands in their reserves in 
the area that’s covered by the EPP. 
those that are diffuse, that don’t have community 
and Government ownership as the piece of 
legislation required to give effect to a problem 
you’re unlikely to get successful outcome 
Lacked agency and political 
support. 
3 Where they haven’t been directly coupled with 
another programme that’s been resourced they 
haven’t 
Not supported by an 
implementation programme or 
appropriate resources. 
4 But I don’t think there is a strong community 
expectation or desire with it and I don’t think there 
is any political support for it at all 
Lacked agency and political 
support. 
7 And all that was really presented to Government 
to sign off on the day was the problem not the 
solution " And you’ve got the private land 
owners and developers out there saying, “you’re 
going for my farm dam, you’re going for my whole 
property, you’re going for all the cleared 
palusplain – you can’t do that. " But the 
frustration I have always experienced is that when 
you get the case–by–case assessments, or the 
subdivision that comes in, you’ve no context 
within to ask, “well, how important is this? 
Lacked agency and political 
support and does not give 
clear guidance to decision 
makers. 
!
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Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased reason(s) 
1 It doesn’t work well for existing situations where 
all the difficult ones are it’s a bit problematic. 
Doesn’t deal with the difficult 
problems especially existing 
land uses 
4 It’s so general. I think sometimes they avoid 
confronting the conflicting issues, which comes 
back to my other point about no processes for 
getting resolution between conflicting community 
requirements 
Not specific and too general. 
Doesn’t deal with the difficult 
problems, especially existing 
land uses 
7 Obviously, there’s problems there with efficiency 
of land use, as well as equity – who’s paying for 
the buffer? Not such a big issue in a Greenfield 
situation because you are not impacting on what 
the range of uses are. Once you get into built up 
areas, then sometimes the spill over effects of 
someone’s operation on someone else’s land is at 
the cost of that adjoining land owner. 
A lot of those issues weren’t teased out very well 
in the SPP, and, again, it didn’t come up with 
solutions. It just said, “these are issues 
Doesn’t deal with the difficult 
problems, especially existing 
land uses 
8 It is unclear both in its form and content and it. In  
many ways it attempted to be too broad, too far 
reaching by including not only industry but a 
whole range of infrastructure and activities that 
could have of–site impacts. By attempting to be 
too broad it became too general and of limited 
value 
Not specific and too general. 
 
9 Nobody understands what’s in it. Everything is in 
it, because people said, “put in that, put in that”. 
It’s almost so difficult to know yourself what’s in it 
even if you’re close to it, you can use it for 
everything but on the hand that can be its undoing 
as well. It’s got to be far more precise 
So, it needs to be fairly simple so they know 
where they stand. They can’t be in a situation 
where basically they’ve got to read through 100s 
of pages of policy every time they come up with 
an application, they’ve got too much work to do 
Too complicated 
10 I think it’s a bit unclear as to what it’s trying to do Unclear 
11 it was pretty hard to arrive at anything which could 
be implemented reasonably 
Implementation unclear 
!
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Subject 
No 
Quote Paraphrased 
reason(s) 
3 Anything that requires behavioural change at the landscape 
level is tough 
" The best examples are is where you have people out 
there working with the community on a personal basis, and 
they’re the ones where we’ve had some quite good 
success. 
Wasn’t supported by 
resources of the 
relevant agencies. 
5 I wouldn’t have a clue what it is. I think I know what it is 
trying to do but I cannot see that there is any programme in 
place to do anything about it " 
Is just too broad, too general and isn’t targeted in a way 
which tries to influence behaviour of particular decision 
makers, for instance. I’m not sure where the Planners see 
it, and yet they are a fundamental driver in terms of 
achieving your outcomes 
Unclear. 
No implementation 
strategy 
Too general 
Lacks political support 
7 If you look at the Swan–Canning, statement by statement, 
you can’t disagree with it. What does it mean? How do you 
translate it? It’s one of those problems that that policy is 
that it is meant to something that a whole lot of other 
Planners and people that do things take into account. But 
that ownership and recognition of EPPs being a tool for 
these people to use is not there. 
Unclear 
No political support 
8 Is very general. It relied, in terms of the implementation 
mechanism, on the preparation of a programme of actions 
which has not eventuated 
Too general 
No implementation 
strategy 
14 Probably that government hasn’t implemented it. Without 
having it in front of me, the policy on its own doesn’t, as I 
understand it, compel a programme of works, and the 
programme of works is the critical thing and that to me 
should come first 
Lacks political support. 
No implementation 
strategy 
15 I think that they haven’t implemented that as much as they 
could do. I think that they are now getting the River Plan 
which was announced yesterday, they are taking that more 
seriously, but that hasn’t been taken as seriously as it 
should have been. 
the Swan River one, there are so many agencies that are 
involved in the management of the Swan, and the Swan 
River Trust’s jurisdictional area is really only the foreshore, 
and it has made it quite hard for them. I think, to really 
coordinate management. 
Lacks political support 
No implementation 
strategy 
Lack of coordination 
between agencies 
!
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Appendix 3 — A description of the Western 
Australian and Perth environment, as a 
background to a consideration of the relevant 
environmental policies (Chapter 5) 
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This Appendix is a background to the discussion of environmental policy evaluation in the 
Western Australia given in Chapter 5. In that Chapter five EPPs, two SPPs and one 
Regional Strategy currently being reviewed or recently reviewed were analysed, being: 
• Environmental Protection (Goldfields Residential Areas) (Sulphur Dioxide) Policy 
and Regulations 2003, which replaced the original EPP Gazetted in 1988; 
• Environmental Protection (Kwinana) (Atmospheric Wastes) Policy and Regulations 
1999, which replaced the original EPP Gazetted in 1992; 
• Environmental Protection (Ozone Protection) Policy 2000, which replaced the 
original EPP Gazetted in 1992; 
• Environmental Protection (Swan Coastal Plain Lakes) Policy 1992 now to be called 
the Environmental Protection (Swan Coastal Plain Wetlands) Policy;  
• Environmental Protection (Peel Inlet – Harvey Estuary) Policy 1992; 
• Gnangara Groundwater Protection SPP; 
• State Industrial Buffer SPP; and 
• The Gascoyne Coast Regional Strategy. 
It was noted in Chapter 5 that some readers may be unaware of the nature of the 
environment in Western Australia and Perth, and a detailed description would be useful to 
help understanding. This Appendix provides that background. As well, this Appendix 
contains some background information for each of these eight policies. 
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The geology of WA can be summarised as consisting of two very old granite based blocks 
(over 2.6 billion years) found in the east and central areas, overlain in places with coastal 
sedimentary basins of more recent age (440 to 150 million years): some of these 
sedimentary have been metamorphosed. In the coast zone there are a series of recent 
coastal dunes overlaying these dominant features. The majority of WA’s population lives in 
the coastal region on the west and south–west coastal areas, which is the focus of the 
remainder of this discussion. 
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The western and southern edges of the granite blocks have been highly active sheer zones 
with many fault lines, the most notable being the Darling Fault. The Darling Fault runs for 
about 1,000 kilometres, from just north of Shark Bay, east of the Perth metropolitan area to 
south of Cape Leeuwin generally parallel to, and several kilometres inland from, the existing 
coastline in the north (Figure 9). It is considered to be one of the largest geological 
structures in Australia. 
The Darling Fault line became active about 200 million years ago when significant vertical 
movement occurred. Sea level changed several times since that time which contributed to 
the build up of sediments west of the Scarp and a changing coastline growing gradually 
westwards. This sedimentary basin is called the Perth Basin, which is about 1000 km long, 
65 km wide and up to 15 km deep. This basin extends out to the sea beyond the current 
coastline, and has been covered by more recent sediments at and near the existing 
coastline. Another sedimentary basin, the Carnarvon basin, adjoins the Perth basin at its 
northern extension.  
About 3 million years ago, a new era of coastal sedimentation occurred resulting in a series 
of coastal plains overlying the sedimentary basins and the granite blocks.  The most 
significant of these coastal plains is the Swan Coastal Plain which lies over the top of the 
Perth Basin. The Swan Coastal Plain is a combination of sand and sediment that has been 
washed down from the granite land forms to the east or deposited from the ocean. The 
Plain in its entirety extends from near Geraldton in the north to Dunsborough in the south 
(Figure 9). Most of the Perth metropolitan area and the outer urban areas are located on the 
Swan Coastal Plain. In the near Perth Region, the Swan Coastal Plain’s eastern boundary 
is the Darling Scarp, approximately 25kms from the coast. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! M%P!
S,/*'0#P7#R0%0'34#/0(4(/1#(:#M."##8(*'+07#R0(4(/,+34#8*'201#(:#
M0=&0'%#.*=&'34,3#C06=,&0"#
 
 
The Swan Coastal Plain has four geomorphic units running roughly parallel to the existing 
coastline, increasing in age from the coast (Figure 10). They are: 
• Quindalup Dunal system – 0–10,000 years old (Holocene Era) made up of cream 
coloured calcareous sands. There is a significant Quindalup dunal system in 
Rockingham area is called the Becher Plain and tends to be a low lying series of 
dunes parallel to the coast; 
• Spearwood Dunal system – 10,000–2 million years old (Pliocene Era), made up of 
yellow brown sands or varying thickness over Tamala limestone. Where there has 
been no recent accretion (i.e. forming Quindalup dunes) the limestone is at the 
coast (e.g. Burns Beach). This system extends several km off shore and forms 
chains of islands and reefs running parallel to the coast. The limestone point at 
Cape Peron is also part of that chain. (Note: as discussed above, this is similar to 
the limestone landform at Leeuwin–Naturaliste). 
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• Bassendean Dunal System – likely to have been formed in the late Pliocene Era (2 
million years ago). The dunes tend to be gently undulating made up of well 
bleached white–grey sands; and 
• Guilford Formation or Pinjarra Plain – this is a lowing lying, flat area made up of a 
mixture of sand and clay which is a combination of material washed off the Darling 
Scarp to the east and material blown inland from the dunes in the west. The clay 
nature of these soils and the generally low relief means that they are naturally 
poorly drained and hold surface water for most of winter. 
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Most of the rain that falls on the sandy Quindalup, Spearwood and Bassendean dunes 
infiltrates through the soil structure rather than runs off the surface. The presence of clay 
and other impervious material close to the surface traps the water infiltrating through the 
soil close to the surface and produces a series of superficial groundwater aquifer that 
underlays these dunes. This groundwater discharges to the ocean to the west or to one of 
only a few watercourses that dissect the Swan Coastal Plain. In winter, the rate of recharge 
is greater than the rate of discharge causing the aquifers to mound in several places, the 
most important being the Gnangara (just north of Perth) and the Jandakot (just south of 
Perth) mounds. These aquifers are also exploited for a range of commercial uses (e.g. 
horticulture) and public water supply. 
The water table of the superficial aquifer is very high in many places, particularly in winter, 
and many of the swales between the dunes are low enough to have the water table at or 
near the surface for all or part of the year causing the formation of many freshwater 
wetlands.  
Whilst most of the rain that falls on the Swan Coastal Plain infiltrates through the soil, there 
are a number of significant seasonal water courses (rivers) that cut across the plain. The 
majority of the catchments of these rivers are from the granite based landforms to the east 
of the Darling Scarp. These rivers act as discharge features for the superficial ground water. 
Two significant rivers pass the Perth area – the Swan and Canning. These join into one 
wide tidal estuary near the CBD. 
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The vast size of WA means there are four distinct climate zones: tropical summer monsoon 
zone in the very north (Kimberley); cyclone prone areas that are otherwise hot and dry in 
the coastal areas south of the Kimberley (Pilbara and Gascoyne); temperate climate with 
dry summers and winter rain (South West and south coastal); and hot dry arid interior (State 
of the Environment Reporting Unit 1998). Over two thirds of the State receives less than 
250mm annually. 
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The majority of WA’s population lives on the Swan Coastal Plain in the south west of the 
State: consequently, most of the environmental problems occur in this region. The sandy 
nature of the soils, the presence of superficial groundwater, the seasonally rainfall and a 
range of inappropriate land uses have lead to a range environmental problems. These 
problems have driven many of the environment policy making initiatives in WA. Other 
environmental problems have arisen as a result of modern industrialisation, mostly pollution 
related. Many of these environment policies are the subject of discussion in the following 
sections. 
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The Goldfields residential area cover the Kalgoorlie–Boulder area, some 600km east of 
Perth, the capital City of WA (Figure 11), with a population of around 30,000 (WAPC 2002). 
The Goldfields area refers to the land surrounding and including the Kalgoorlie–Boulder 
residential area, which is rich in gold deposits. Gold mining in the area dates back to the 
late 1890s. Today the Kalgoorlie–Boulder area is the centre of gold roasting for the area. 
Nickel is also mined and roasted in the area. Kalgoorlie–Boulder has one large gold roaster 
and one nickel roaster. 
The gold and nickel ores contain high levels of sulphur, and the roasting process 
(essentially heating ores concentrates to 600 0C in air) produces sulphur dioxide (SO2). SO2 
acts directly on the human  respiratory system causing coughing, wheezing and shortness 
of breath, and can also cause damage to buildings and natural ecosystems (Department of 
Environment 2003). The levels of SO2 in Kalgoorlie–Boulder’s atmosphere became a 
concern in the 1980s leading ultimately to statutory controls over emission levels through 
the EPP. 
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A full history of the environmental problems at Kwinana is described in Chapter 5, and only 
a brief overview is provided here. Kwinana is the major heavy industrial area in WA, and is 
located some 35kms south of Perth. As with many heavy industrial areas throughout the 
world, air quality in and near the industrial area can be poor and below acceptable 
standards. At Kwinana, SO2 has been the most significant air quality issue. In the late 
1970s Government agencies began to raise concerns about SO2 levels, with the main 
sources being a power station and an alumina refinery burning heavy oil with high levels of 
sulphur, and an oil refinery (WAPC 2002). 
Two scientific studies were initiated in the 1970s and early 1980s to look at air quality in 
Kwinana and two of the industries that were the source of SO2 emissions significantly 
reduced their emissions by changing fuel source to natural gas (the power station) and by 
installing sulphur recovery technology (the oil refinery). Despite these changes and initial 
improvements in SO2 levels, the concentrations of SO2 experienced in nearby residential 
areas began to rise again in the late 1980s (EPA 1999). The EPA responded to this by 
initiating an EPP for Kwinana, which was finally Gazetted in 1992. 
L"#O3+E/'(*%)#&(#&<0#>%2,'(%90%&34#@'(&0+&,(%#UYZ(%0#
@'(&0+&,(%V#@(4,+1#-TTT#
Ozone (O3) gas is found in the upper levels of the atmosphere and has an important role to 
play in controlling the levels of ultraviolet (UV) radiation reaching the Earth’s surface. Ozone 
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absorbs the ultraviolet radiation producing oxygen gas and a free radical oxygen atom. The 
free radical oxygen usually finds another free radical atom producing another oxygen 
molecule. In this way, the amount of UV radiation striking the Earth’s surface is minimised. 
Increased UV radiation reaching the Earth can causes a range of impacts including 
increased rates of skin cancer and cataracts, impaired immune systems in humans, 
damage to forests and aquatic species, and to a decrease in crop yield (De Winter-Sorkina 
2001). 
Certain industrial chemicals when released into the atmosphere also react with ozone, 
reducing the amount of ozone available to absorb UV radiation. The most notably of these 
chemicals are Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which were extensively used in refrigerators 
until the late 1980s. Whilst concerns were raised by some scientists in the 1960s about the 
impact human activities were having on the ozone layer, it wasn’t until the mid 1970s that 
the scientific community as a whole supported these concerns and sought political action to 
halt the decline (Rowlands 1993). In the early 1980s, some countries took unilateral action 
to reduce the release of CFCs, and in 1985 the first international agreement was drawn up 
– the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone layer. This was a voluntary 
agreement, but in 1987 the first binding agreement was signed by 27 countries, including 
Australia – the Montreal Protocol. This was a limited agreement based on the science of the 
day and was restricted to reducing the release of certain CFCs by 50% by 1999. By 1992, it 
was clear that more rapid action was required and that other substances had to be 
controlled. This lead to significant review of the Treaty, including a 100% reduction of CFCs 
by 2000, and this time 80 nations signed up. 
In 1989 the (then) Australia Environment Council adopted a national strategy for Ozone 
protection providing a timetable for the phasing out of ozone–depleting substances in 
Australia. WA was the first State to ban use of ozone–depleting substances through a ban 
on CFCs in certain aerosols through the Environmental Amendment Regulation, 1988.  This 
was followed by an EPP in 1989, originally titled Environment Protection (Ozone–Depleting 
Substances) Policy, which was reviewed in 1993 and then again in 2000. 
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Protection of wetlands has been a high priority for the EPA since its inception in 1971 (EPA 
1993). Up until the early 1990s, the EPA adopted an informal approach to wetland 
protection through the adoption of non–statutory policies. However, in 1991, in response to 
the continued loss of wetlands, the EPA decided to produce an EPP to ensure that: 
No more filling in, mining, excavation, pollution or changes in drainage capable of 
reducing or destroying the values of wetlands on the Swan Coastal Plain will take 
place than is absolutely necessary.” (EPA 1991:1) 
! M'%!
The EPP was finalised in December 1992 and was titled “Environmental Protection (Swan 
Coastal Plain Lakes) Policy”. The use of the word lakes in the title reflects the type of 
wetland that was protected under the EPP. Wetlands (lakes) covered by the policy were 
selected 
for inclusion in this policy on the basis that they consisted of areas of standing water 
of 1 000 square metres or more as at 1 December 1991. (Government of Western 
Australia 1992:100) 
Wetlands that have a full or nearly complete coverage of vegetation (swamps) were not 
picked up by this EPP. 
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The Peel–Harvey estuary is situated on the Swan Coastal Plain approximately 75 kms 
south of Perth, and is important for a range of ecological and human purposes. It is a 
significant habitat for waterbirds and is listed under the Ramsar Convention. Most of the 
Swan Coastal Plain portion of the estuary is flat lowlying land with the high watertable at or 
near the surface. Consequently, development of the catchment for agricultural purposes 
required a significant drainage network. There are now some 1,400 km of drains in the 
catchment on the Swan Coastal Plain (Kinhill Engineers Limited 1988). The drainage 
system substantially increased the volume of water entering the estuary. In addition, the 
sandy nature of these soils on the Swan Coastal Plain meant that much of the fertilizer 
applied to the soils to enhance crop growth was not easily assimilated into the soil structure 
and ended up in the groundwater, and subsequently in the estuary via the drainage system. 
The poor flushing in the estuary meant that nutrients began to accumulate in the sediment 
and water column. 
It wasn’t long, therefore, before the estuary began to show the signs of nutrient enrichment 
– excessive algal growth. The earliest recording of excessive algal growth was probably in 
1946 and was likely to have been a “macro–algae” species (Hodgkin et al. 1980). This 
algae was mostly of nuisance value as it tended to float on the surface and clog fishing nets 
and boat propellers. 
By the late 1960s macro–algae became less dominant and a Cladophra species became 
more prevalent. This species provide more than nuisance value as it washed up on the 
beaches and created a foul smell as it decomposed. During the 1970s another algae 
species began to be observed in greater quantities: Nodularia. This is a green–blue algae 
species which is known to be toxic. The occurrence of this species and the community 
concern it generated, forced government agencies to recognise that the estuary’s health 
was in poor shape. 
From the 1980s onwards, the EPA became involved in the management of the estuary and 
its catchment and the development of a range of policy responses, including the 
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development of an EPP in 1992. The EPP was part of a range of statutory measures 
affecting both private land owners and Government agencies in the catchment. The main 
other statutory mechanism was a comprehensive set of Environment Conditions set by the 
Minster for the Environment in 1989 on the advice of the EPA to apply to relevant 
Government Ministers and their Departments to ensure the protection of the estuary. 
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As noted in Section 5.2.2, most of Perth is located on the sandy Swan Coastal Plain. 
Underlying the plain is a series of superficial groundwater aquifers that mound in certain 
places when the rate of recharge through infiltration from rainfall is greater than the rate of 
discharge to the ocean and major watercourses. Groundwater makes up over 50% of 
Perth’s water needs, both private and public water supply (Water and Rivers Commission 
2001). The most significant of these is the Gnangara mound, in the northern Perth region 
(Figure 11).The Gnangara mound covers 2,200 square kilometres, contains an estimated 
25.6 billion kL of water, and receives around 320 million kL of recharge each year, of which 
200 million kL is used privately and 79 million kL used for public water supply (WAPC 
2001). 
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These aquifers are extremely vulnerable to pollution because of the sandy nature of the 
spoils that make up the Swan Coastal Plain. These soils do not easily retain any chemicals 
that end up in the soil (e.g. through fertiliser and herbicide application). Consequently, when 
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water falls on the soils through rain or irrigation, these chemical are readily carried through 
the soil structure, ending up in the aquifer. 
The majority of the land over the central part of the mound is government owned (Crown 
land), whereas most of the land on the fringes of the mound is privately owned. The main 
land uses are forestry and conservation. The original SPP that applied to the Gnangara 
mound was titled “Statement of Planning Policy No 3 – Gnangara Mound Crown Land” and 
was Gazetted in 1992 to apply, as the name suggested, to Crown land only. It was 
produced to complement the EPA’s Gnangara Crown Land EPP, in recognition that there 
were many significant and use planning the implications associated with the EPP. 
Controls are also needed on the private land areas of the mound that would also be used 
for abstraction of groundwater, either now or in the future. As mentioned earlier, the EPA 
initiated an EPP for private land, but was never finalised (EPA 1992). Protection of 
groundwater in Perth became a significant political issue during the 1990s, culminating in a 
Parliamentary Select Committee report released in late 1994 (Western Australian 
Legislative Assembly 1994). Among other things, the Select Committee recommended that: 
A Land Use and Water Management Strategy be produced for the Gnangara Mound. 
This strategy should be produced through a ‘whole–of–government’ coordinated 
approach" (Western Australian Legislative Assembly 1994:286). 
The government endorsed this approach which effectively put an end to the need for an 
EPP on private land. Instead, the WAPC released a draft Gnangara Land Use and Water 
Management Strategy (GLUWMS) in 1999 (WAPC 1999), which was finalised in 2001 
(WAPC 2001). 
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A buffer around an industrial area can be defined as: 
all the land between the boundary of the area that may potentially be used by an 
industrial land use, and the boundary of the area within which unacceptable adverse 
impacts due to industrial emissions on the amenity of sensitive land use are possible. 
(EPA 2004:12) 
It is the area of land around and industrial plant or estate where impacts could be 
unacceptable for sensitive land uses, including residential. The first formally declared buffer 
was for the Kwinana industrial area, which was reflected in the Kwinana EPP (above). 
There were a number of other land uses that were of concern to the EPA because they 
were producing impacts beyond the boundary of the operations, notably poultry farms, 
market gardens, wastewater treatment plants and rendering works plants. In the early 
1990s, the, then, Department of Environmental Protection began work for the EPA defining 
recommended separation distances between a range of these types of land uses and 
residential areas. The purpose of this work was to avoid situations where residential areas 
and located near potentially polluting land uses, and was to be in the form of advice to the 
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planning agencies, notably the WAPC, when making land use planning decisions around 
these types of land uses.  
Not surprising, the WAPC became interested in this work and decided to produce a SPP to 
provide a policy framework for its own decision making and that of local government. This 
SPP (titled State Industrial Buffer Policy) was Gazetted in May 1997 (WAPC 1997), which 
was followed by the release of a draft EPA Guidance Statement (titled Industrial–
Residential Buffer Areas, Separation Distances) (EPA 1997). 
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The Gascoyne coast is in the far north–west of WA. It extends around 400 km from 
Exmouth to Carnarvon (Figure 12). This coastline is a nationally significant tourism area 
(Ministry for Planning 1996), because of the variety and quality of the natural features found 
there. The significant natural feature is the Ningaloo reef, a coral reef around 270 km in 
length in the northern section of the Gascoyne coastal region, and is the largest fringing 
coral reef in Australia (EPA 1999). Ningaloo reef is particularly important because it is 
located relatively close to the shore forming an enclosed, narrow and relatively shallow 
lagoon varying in width from 200 m to 6 km and with an average depth of only 4 m (Preen 
et al. 1997). 
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The area has a number of significant coastal environmental planning issues, including: 
• Impacts from illegal and uncontrolled camping; 
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• Sustainable fishing takes from both recreational and commercial fishing; 
• Management of existing settlements and provision of infrastructure (water, power 
and treatment of human effluent) because of growing tourism numbers; 
• Protection of high conservation areas including terrestrial national parks and 
Ningaloo reef; 
• Roads; 
• Sustainable agriculture on pastoral stations; and 
• Cyclones and flooding. 
The WAPC produced its first regional strategy for the area in 1996 (Ministry for Planning 
1996) tiled “Gascoyne Coast Regional Strategy”. In the late 1990s, the Shires of Carnarvon 
and Exmouth received funds from the Commonwealth Government to review the southern 
portion of the 1996 strategy: a draft strategy was released for public comment in 2001 
(SMEC Australia P/L 2001). This draft strategy proved to be highly contentious with over 
1200 submissions received made up of 296 individualized submissions, 6 different form 
letters signed by from 343 different people and 4 petitions signed by 605 people. In 
response the WAPC intervened and took over the review, which became the Carnarvon–
Ningaloo Coast Regional Strategy and covered the entire area of the 1996 strategy 
(Department for Planning and Infrastructure 2004). A discussion paper titled “Future 
Directions: Sustainable Tourism and Land Use Scenarios for the Carnarvon–Ningaloo 
Coast” preceded the draft strategy (Department for Planning and Infrastructure 2003). 
As one of the policy makers involved in the reviews noted: 
I think the Gascoyne Coast strategy " as it happens, that’s to all intents and 
purposes being reviewed at the moment through what started off as the Carnarvon 
Coastal strategy, but that’s really now transforming itself into what it, for all intents 
and purposes, a review of the Gascoyne Coast strategy 
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Appendix 4 — Details of the criteria interviewees identified for good policies and 
policy making 
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Appendix 5 — Discussion of the remaining 
attributes of successful policy making noted in 
Table 12, Chapter 5 not discussed. 
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It could be argued that this attribute is really two separate attributes of political support and 
stakeholder support, and a couple of interviewees made that clear distinction, as reflected 
in the comments below, where the first interviewee refers to the policy stakeholders 
whereas the second clearly refer to the politicians who have to approve the policy at the 
end of the process. 
Probably the reality is that unless you get reasonable acceptance often the policies 
don’t deliver, or that they get so cut down that they can’t deliver on what their original 
objectives were ! And I guess the more we think and talk about it probably that 
stakeholder acceptability is pretty critical. The more I think about it the more 
important that is going to be. 
 
That you’ve got political commitment to it ! If you look at the Public Drinking water 
(policy), it was highly important and influential. What we did in implementing the 
recommendations was pretty easy really. We didn’t have to worry about policy 
commitment at the top end of government, because it was given down from there. 
Most, however, used both stakeholder and political support as a single attribute and did not 
make a clear distinction, for example 
I think for policies to be effective it’s difficult if you don’t have strong community 
expectations or desires and you don’t have strong political support. I think that they’re 
fairly important things upfront. 
One of the key reasons why stakeholder and political support were seen as strongly linked 
was that political support is often predicated on stakeholders providing their support. The 
politicians are usually the final decision makers for a policy and will be very sensitive to 
community views, usually expressed as the views of keys stakeholders. 
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Many of the interviewees who identified political and stakeholder support as being linked 
were professional policy makers, and can be seen as primarily about getting the policy 
finally agreed to, for example: 
And so it has to have Ministerial backing. It has to really have community and 
government backing, because, you know as well as I do, that an EPP is like a piece 
of legislation it has to go through, well the normal practice is that the Minster will take 
to Cabinet. And you know the way Cabinet works, it almost works on the power of 
veto, and if somebody says “no no, not on your life” then it goes back again and it will 
sit there, not necessarily rejected, but just simply sits on the shelf, and so on and so 
forth.  
 
The other key element is the ability of the policy makers to deal with the conflict. 
Conflict management came up in my work as being really, really critical. If you don’t 
deal well with the conflict, you can have policy that avoids, that has low conflict it’s a 
lot easier to be successful. But you generally find that the low conflict policies are the 
motherhood ones that are arguably not that effective anyway. Dealing with the 
conflict I think is, and it gets back to stakeholder acceptance.  
The community however, tended to put as much focus on the getting support for the policy 
once operational (as well as getting agreed to in the first place), for example: 
I think one of the key things is political commitment to the outcomes through the 
allocation of resources but meaningful commitment. So that people are confident that 
if they are in place they will be enforced. 
This difference in view is probably not surprising because many of the professional policy 
makers are not involved in implementation whereas the community has an interest in both 
policy making and implementation. 
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Some interviewees saw the lack of stakeholder support for policy implementation, mostly 
from key agencies, as a key reason for policy failure, despite there being some initial 
agreement that the policy should proceed, for example: 
this is part of the reason for the failure, divided responsibility for it. I think that’s 
probably the simplest explanation for the failure of it. You’ve had different agencies 
responsible for different bits of it, and you haven’t had a willingness for the agencies 
to cede ground to the other agencies. “Blow the Ag Department, we won’t help them, 
we’re in charge of this.” Turf war sort of stuff. 
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This turf war issue was raised several times by the community interviewees. It was also 
evident that there was tension between the EPA policy makers and those from the WAPC, 
particularly where there was an overlap between environmental policies and planning. This 
was evident in both the Western Swamp Tortoise and Wetlands EPPs cases.  The South–
West Agricultural Wetlands EPP was singled out by several interviewees as a particular 
example of turf wars preventing successful policy making. For example: 
with the Ag wetlands one, there is a jurisdictional competition or conflict between 
agencies as well. And I know that over the Agricultural one there was a heap of 
discussion between agencies about it. 
 
You also had turf war happening between the agencies, and the whole thing is so 
watered done that in the end of the day you get one wetland in it, which I think is a 
nature reserve anyway. It’s it going to sit on the shelf and be useless 
The fact that these tensions emerged at the implementation stage suggests that inter–
agency conflict had not actually been dealt with, but had been put to one side so as to get 
the policy approved, suggesting an on–going governance conflict. 
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A couple of interviewees expressed concerns that some professional policy makers tended 
to work in isolation and either ignored, or were unresponsive to, the socio–political context 
within which the policy is being formulated. For example: 
I’m all for the view that things will be done in orderly fashion if indeed it has the 
direction from the political masters rather than bureaucrats trying to decide their own 
agendas.  That’s not to say the fact that political people have to do everything but 
things will work if indeed the whole of government wants it to work. If in fact you 
simply have it being a view down the line somewhere that thing should work, then it’s 
more difficult. 
This suggests that some interviewees see some policy makers as focusing too much on the 
environmental aspects of a policy and avoiding the broader socio–political context within 
which the policy is being formulated. This view was typically expressed by interviewees who 
were not the professional policy makers or were policy makers from another agency. It may 
be that this view is a criticism of the policy making practices of the EPA. 
@"14#$&%(='1'9,=,1%('1.(9,%%$19(*%'+,-"#.,/*(*300"/%(
This criticism of ignoring the political context could also be interpreted as policy makers not 
addressing the conflict that arises as part of the policy making process. This focus on the 
environmental aspects by policy makers means that broader concerns raised by other 
stakeholders are not given adequate attention. This is a refinement of the observations 
made in the previous section (science and information). It was noted there  that some policy 
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makers are of the view that science is the key to good policy making and that all that is 
needed is a better informed public and any existing conflict will disappear. For example: 
The other key element is the ability of the policy makers to deal with the conflict. 
Conflict management came up in my work as being really, really critical. If you don’t 
deal well with the conflict, you can have policy that avoids, that has low conflict it’s a 
lot easier to be successful. But you generally find that the low conflict policies are the 
motherhood ones that are arguably not that effective anyway. Dealing with the 
conflict I think is, and it gets back to stakeholder acceptance  
Here, the environment is seen in scientific terms with minimal consideration to any of the 
social values or interpretation of science or the environment. 
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Several interviewees argued that it was important that the agencies that will have to 
implement the policy as downstream decision makers support the policy. For example: 
maximise your ownership, particularly of those people who are either going to be 
positively or negatively affected by the policy. I mean, if they can own it, then you’ll 
get a much better compliance and implementation of it. 
 
And of course that includes the consumers, but also the people who are going to 
perhaps make it happen if there is a development involved, the people who are going 
to make the development happen and work. 
 
Local government was identified by some interviewees as being particularly important as 
downstream decision makers for SPPs, for example: 
! then making sure that the local authorities are directly involved and support it. I 
mean, they don’t have to support every last letter of it ! but you would like to think 
that through their involvement in the preparation of the SPP that they have a high 
degree of ownership to help to implement and interpret it. 
It was generally accepted that enlisting these agencies’ support was critical in getting a 
policy implemented. 
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The nine interviewees who raised the resource issue represented both the policy making 
approach views (‘schools’), and there was very little to differentiate the responses. The 
resource issue was raised in relation to why policies fail (i.e. a lack of resources) and why 
others succeeded (i.e. adequate resources given to them). For example: 
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I think you got to resource policy development reasonably. One of the best ways you 
can set yourself up for failure is to come out with a grand plan for policy and not 
resource it because it will soon unravel. 
 
And, at the end of the day, the hard questions will come back to government and 
saying, “one of the reasons why is because we haven’t got the resources to do it”, or 
“we haven’t got the information to deal with it”, which is another resources question. 
 
So it’s resources to develop them in the first place, resources to implement and 
commitment to implement. 
As the last interviewee noted, the resources issue is about two aspects: policy development 
and implementation. For the most part, interviewees noted that the resource issue for policy 
development was about resourcing participation, for example: 
And you have also have got to very strongly support the community’s participation. I 
mean actively support. I don’t mean just have consultative committees and meet 
once every quarter. You have got to actually involve the community in a real sense, 
which might mean that you actually fund something. You fund their participation 
 
So, there was consultation all over the place. There were 3 or 4 periods formal 
periods of public consultation. The guys from up here as well as the Bunbury office 
they just spent hundreds of hours consulting. And I think because of that, and 
obviously because that consultation involved lots of stakeholders both at a group and 
in individual situations, they managed to get hold of the vast majority of the issues 
that needed to be addressed. 
Overall, there was a generally accepted view that adequate resources were need to enable 
policy success. 
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This attribute covers two broad topics: successful policies tend to be those which are written 
in a very clear and precise way (the policy document is clearly written); and, the policy 
scope has clear limitations, either in relation to the issues covered or the geographic extent 
it is applied to. Again, the nine interviewees were from both policy making approach 
schools. Typical responses were, on successful policies: 
Clarity and precision: they’re very important considerations. You have to spell out 
clearly what you mean and what the policy is about. 
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you actually have to have a policy which is clear and targeted ! And so you need to 
have a very clear problem which is very targeted in terms of solutions with a set of 
deliverables which you can be confident of doing. 
 
They have been successful because there is a degree of precision about the 
outcomes.  They are more than United Nations Statements.  They’ve actually got with 
them a requirement to work and a sufficient identification of how they’re going to 
work, and sufficiently focused for them to work.  
Whereas comments on unsuccessful policies were typically:  
And, in many ways (a failed policy) attempted to be too broad, too far reaching by 
including not only industry but a whole range of infrastructure and activities that could 
have of–site impacts. And, by attempting to be too broad it became too general and 
of limited value. 
 
It’s almost so difficult to know yourself what’s in (a failed policy) even if you’re close 
to it, you can use it for everything but on the hand that can be its undoing as well. It’s 
got to be far more precise ! So it became a monster. And it’s became a monster 
that nobody understands what’s in it. 
One of the key reasons given why policies need to be clear and precise with limited scopes 
is to provide clarity to all the stakeholders involved in the policy making process: for 
example – 
Well I think you have to set up the terms of reference which are particularly clear and 
relate to the community’s perception of the issues at stake and the problems to be 
solved, so that the team that is gathered to consider those terms and respond to 
them comes back with equally clear solutions and recommendations. 
 
Once you clearly identify the issues, then at least you can focus on what sort of 
prescriptions might be appropriate to address those issues. Unless you do that 
upfront, I find that you just start to wander all over the place and end up with a very 
unfocused document. Which actually leads me to make the remark that some of our 
documents have been a bit too unfocused and as a consequence come up with lots 
of recommendations, lots of actions that a whole myriad of agencies or stakeholders 
are responsible for implementing and they are just impossible to monitor. And 
because there are so many, you also find difficulty with prioritising and that sort of 
stuff, and eventually people just, sort of, flop and run out of steam, and the whole 
thing just tends to become rather unsatisfactory in terms of how it is being handled. 
The arguments put in support of greater clarity can be summarised as follows: clarity makes 
it easier for the stakeholders and the broader community to understand the policy making 
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and makes it easier to identify and deal with their concerns. Limiting the scope also limits 
the number and type of stakeholder who needs to be involved in the process. 
The other key reason given as to why policies need to be clear and precise with limited 
scopes is to do with implementation, so that managers and downstream decision makers 
have clear guidance as to how to operate and implement the policy: 
But, also they were fairly clear in their objectives and policy measures, so there was 
a fair degree of clarity which meant that they were fairly readily capable of 
implementation. 
Many interviewees were of the view that a clearly written policy with a limited scope was a 
critical factor in determining policy success. 
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This attributes covers the general view that a policy should not just focus on the agreed 
objectives but addresses the means of achieving those objectives, which means giving 
consideration to how the policy is to be implemented. To some extent, this relates to the 
policy being properly resourced and having a clear focus and scope so that downstream 
decision makers and managers are clear about what they need to do (the previous two 
attributes).  Typical responses here are:  
I guess any of these policies are only as good as their implementation. 
 
You’ve got to have some clear mechanism of implementation. You need to create 
that mechanism and define that mechanism as you are going through the 
development of the policy. So part of the solution to the problem is in fact the process 
of implementing an outcome. 
 
I think you really do (have to address implementation). It doesn’t mean that you have 
to solve it, but you’ve got to be aware of what’s required to give effect to this ! The 
bit about being aware of the implementation realities and requirements, I mean, I 
think is important. 
As with the previous two attributes, these concerns were raised by both policy making 
schools, and the concerns related to whether implementation was thought about and not 
about which particular implementation measures are being proposed. 
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Interviewees saw a policy champion is an individual (or individuals) who continue to lobby 
and argue for the need to have a policy. 
I think that in terms of preparation as opposed to implementation you do need 
someone who is prepared to push it. 
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It was probably to the credit of some people like (names given) and some of those 
who really understood the issue (banning agricultural clearing). And people in the 
broader conservation group of the farmers, who continued to push the issue which 
drove it to the position we got to.  
When you get committed, passionate people in development, patient capital, 
intelligent capital, ethical capital, passionate consultants, designers, whatever, you 
can create great outcomes whatever the rules are. 
 
The idea that policy champions are important further emphasizes the political nature of 
environmental policy making. It suggest that in some cases having good science and 
having all stakeholders supporting it may not be enough to get that final political support, 
and that someone needs to champion the policy at that high level. It may also be that a 
champion is needed to get an issue on the policy making agenda in the first place. 
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Foreword 
 
I am pleased to release Western Australia’s first State Environment Policy 
and delighted that this first policy is for the protection of the environmental 
quality of Cockburn Sound. 
 
The Policy will be implemented through existing statutory powers under 
the Environmental Protection Act 1986. 
 
It takes a precautionary approach to environmental management, where 
early warning levels will help trigger preventative action rather than wait 
for environmental incidents to occur. 
 
This Policy will be backed by the full force of recently expanded powers under the Environmental 
Protection Act 1986, including environmental harm, clearing controls, licensing and unauthorised 
discharge regulations to prevent environmental impacts that might threaten the long-term ecological 
sustainability of the Sound. 
 
For example, for premises licensed under the Environmental Protection Act 1986, licence 
conditions will ensure that the environmental values are protected and environmental quality 
objectives are being met. 
 
For diffuse sources of emissions which find their way to the waters of Cockburn Sound, the 
Cockburn Sound Management Council plays a role in ensuring that land use practices within the 
catchment of Cockburn Sound are addressed. 
 
As well, this Policy empowers the Cockburn Sound Management Council to report annually to the 
Minister on the ‘State of the Sound’ and for the Minister to table that report in the Parliament. 
 
The State Environmental Policy raises the Government’s level of commitment to the protection of 
water quality in Cockburn Sound, supported by the expanded powers of the Environmental 
Protection Act. 
 
This Policy will be reviewed in seven years unless reviewed earlier by Government. 
 
 
 
Dr Judy Edwards MLA 
Minister for the Environment 
January 2005 
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 Draft State Environmental (Cockburn Sound) Policy 
 
 
1. Preamble 
 
The Government of Western Australia –  
 
(a) recognises that Cockburn Sound, situated within Perth’s coastal waters, is highly valued 
by the community for its ecological, economic and recreational attributes; 
(b) is conscious of the need to protect the intrinsic value of biological diversity and the 
ecological, genetic, social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational, 
aesthetic, and natural values of biological diversity and its components; 
(c) recognises the importance of not unnecessarily restricting public access to the foreshore 
and waters of Cockburn Sound; 
(d) recognises the importance of Cockburn Sound for activities such as fisheries, 
aquaculture and tourism which require a high level of marine water quality and for uses 
such as industry, shipping, harbours and marinas (even though they can lower 
environmental quality in localised areas), provided that all reasonable and practicable 
measures are taken to prevent or minimise waste discharge and contamination; 
(e) recognises the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment made between the 
Commonwealth, the States and Territories, and the Australian Local Government 
Association on 1 May 1992; in particular the four principles of ecologically sustainable 
development pertaining to management of ecosystems, biodiversity, intergenerational 
equity, and the precautionary principle; 
(f) recognises that all the uses of Cockburn Sound and its catchment, as they affect the 
Cockburn Sound, need to be managed in accordance with the above-mentioned 
principles of ecologically sustainable development; 
(g) recognises the policy’s linkages with other Commonwealth and State legislation, policies, 
strategies and action plans concerning Cleaner Production, Best Practice and Waste 
Minimisation, Continual Improvement and sustainability; 
(h) recognises that the policy strives for best environmental quality throughout Cockburn 
Sound; 
(i) recognises that events and activities outside the policy area may adversely affect the 
environmental values established in the policy from time to time; and 
(j) recognises the importance of Cockburn Sound and Naval Waters to the Australian 
Defence Force and acknowledges the Commonwealth environmental, legislative and 
policy framework by which it abides. 
 
 
2. Citation 
 
 This policy may be cited as the State Environmental (Cockburn Sound) Policy 2005. 
 
 
3. Purpose of policy 
 
(1) This policy establishes the basis on which Cockburn Sound and the environment 
of adjacent land is to be protected. 
 
(2) The purposes of this policy are – 
(a) to declare, protect and maintain the environmental values of Cockburn 
Sound; 
(b) to abate pollutants and restrict activities that diminish the environmental 
values of Cockburn Sound; 
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 (c) to establish a program to protect and enhance environmental quality to 
support the environmental values of Cockburn Sound;  
(d) to give effect to the environmental quality objectives and the environmental 
quality criteria for Cockburn Sound; and 
(e) to give effect to the Environmental Management Plan for Cockburn Sound. 
 
 
4. Definitions 
 
“background level” means the level of an indicator (measured in a manner and at a 
location specified by the Environmental Protection Authority) in marine waters 
outside the influence of any discharges containing a measurable level of that 
indicator; 
“biodiversity” means the variety and types of naturally occurring marine life. This 
encompasses genetic, species and ecosystem levels at the local and regional scale; 
“Cockburn Sound Management Council” means the Cockburn Sound Management 
Council as established under clause 15 of schedule 1 of the Water and Rivers 
Commission Act 1995; 
“decision scheme” specifies the way monitoring data are to be assessed against the 
environmental quality criteria in order to determine whether or not a management 
response is required; 
“diffuse source” means multiple non-point sources spread over a wide area; 
“environmental management plan” means the Environmental Management Plan 
referred to in clause 10(1)(a); 
“ecological integrity” means the state of an ecosystem being whole and unimpaired, 
which is usually determined by reference to appropriate ecosystem indicators and 
criteria; 
“ecological value” means the intrinsic natural values of ecosystems which require 
protection from the effects of pollution, environmental harm, waste discharges 
and deposits; 
“environmental quality criteria” means the numerical values (e.g. cadmium 0.7 Pg/L) 
or narrative statements (e.g. the 95th percentile of the bioavailable contaminant 
concentration in the test samples should not exceed the environmental quality 
guideline value) that serve as benchmarks to determine whether a more detailed 
assessment of environmental quality is required (these criteria are termed 
environmental quality guidelines), or whether a management response is required 
(termed environmental quality standards); 
“environmental quality guideline” means a numerical value or narrative statement 
which if met indicates there is a high probability that the associated 
environmental quality objective identified in clause 7(2) has been achieved; 
“environmental quality objective” means a specific management goal for a part of the 
environment and is either ecologically based by describing the desired level of 
health of the ecosystem or socially based by describing the environmental quality 
required to maintain specific human uses; 
“environmental quality standard” means a numerical value or narrative statement 
beyond which the associated environmental quality objective identified in 7(2) 
has not been achieved and a management response is triggered; 
“environmental value” means a particular value or use of the marine environment that is 
important for a healthy ecosystem or for public benefit, welfare, safety or health 
and which requires protection from the effects of pollution, environmental harm, 
waste discharges and deposits. Two types of environmental value are considered: 
ecological value and social value; 
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 “high level of ecological protection” means to allow small changes in the quality of 
water, sediment or biota (i.e. small changes in contaminant concentrations with no 
resultant detectable changes beyond natural variation in the diversity of species 
and biological communities, ecosystem processes and abundance/biomass of 
marine life); 
“licensed premises” means a residential, industrial or other premises of any kind 
whatsoever (including land, water and equipment), licensed by any regulating 
agency operating in the policy area; 
“low level of ecological protection” means to allow for large changes in the quality of 
water, sediment and biota (i.e. large changes in contaminant concentrations that 
could cause large changes beyond natural variation in the natural diversity of 
species and biological communities, rates of ecosystem processes and 
abundance/biomass of marine life, but which do not result in 
bioaccumulation/biomagnification in near-by high ecological protection areas); 
“marine environment” means marine waters and underlying sediments and the marine 
life therein; 
“moderate level of ecological protection” means to allow moderate changes in the 
quality of water, sediment and biota (i.e. moderate changes in contaminant 
concentrations that could cause small changes beyond natural variation in 
ecosystem processes and abundance/biomass of marine life, but no detectable 
changes from the natural diversity of species and biological communities); 
“policy area” means the area to which this policy applies, as shown in Schedule 1; 
“pollutant” means any matter or thing that could have the potential to alter, directly or 
indirectly, the environment to the detriment of the environmental values;  
“practicable” means reasonably practicable having regard to, among other things, local 
conditions and circumstances (including costs) and to the current state of technical 
knowledge; 
“protected area” means the marine environment within the policy area; 
“protection” means in relation to the environment, conservation, preservation, 
enhancement and management thereof; 
“public authority” means Minister of the Crown acting in his or her official capacity, 
department of the Government, State agency or instrumentality, local government 
or other person, whether corporate or not, who or which under the authority of a 
written law administers or carries on for the benefit of the State, or any district or 
other part thereof, a social service or public utility; 
“relevant public authority” means a public authority with responsibilities within the 
policy area that are relevant to the maintenance of the environmental values of 
Cockburn Sound, including but not limited to, those public authorities identified 
in the Environmental Management Plan, but not including a public authority in 
the capacity of operating a licensed premise; 
“social value” means a particular value or use of the marine environment that is 
important for public benefit, welfare, safety or health and which requires 
protection from the effects of pollution, environmental harm, waste discharges 
and deposits; and 
“to discharge” in relation to waste or other matter, means to deposit it or allow it to 
escape, or cause or permit it to be, or fail to prevent it from being, discharged, 
deposited or allowed to escape. 
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 5. Application 
 
(1) The portion of the environment to which this policy applies is the portion of the 
marine environment and its land catchment that is shown in Schedule 1 as the 
policy area. 
 
(2) The area declared as a protected area under this policy is the portion of marine 
environment within the policy area. 
 
 
(3) This Policy will be reviewed in seven years from date of publication, unless 
reviewed earlier by Government. 
 
 
6. Environmental values 
 
(1) The environmental values for the protected area under this policy are – 
 
(a) Ecosystem health (an ecological value); 
(b) Fishing and aquaculture (social values); 
(c) Recreation and aesthetics (a social value); and 
(d) Industrial water supply (a social value). 
 
(2) The environmental values require protection from the effects of pollution, 
environmental harm, waste discharges and deposits. 
 
(3) Environmental quality objectives must be achieved to protect and maintain the 
environmental values. 
 
 
7. Environmental quality objectives 
 
(1) Environmental quality objectives may be defined for each environmental value 
identified under clause 6(1). 
 
(2) The environmental quality objectives identified under this policy are -  
 
(a) For ecosystem health: 
Maintenance of ecosystem integrity: 
The level of ecological protection to be maintained for ecosystem integrity 
is described in terms of structure (e.g. biodiversity, biomass and abundance 
of biota) and function (e.g. food chains and nutrient cycles). The level of 
ecological protection is set out in Tables 1-3 of the Environmental Quality 
Criteria Reference Document for Cockburn Sound (2003- 2004) 
(Environmental Protection Authority 2005) and is set at one of the three 
levels, such that -  
(i) High level of ecological protection allows small changes in the 
quality of water, sediments and biota; 
(ii) Moderate level of ecological protection allows moderate changes in 
the quality of water, sediments and biota; and 
(iii) Low level of ecological protection allows for a reduced level of 
environmental quality. 
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(b) For fishing and aquaculture: 
(i) Maintenance of seafood for human consumption, such that seafood is  
          safe for human consumption when collected or grown; and 
(ii) Maintenance of aquaculture, such that water is of a suitable quality 
for aquaculture purposes. 
 
(c) For recreation and aesthetics: 
(i) Maintenance of primary contact recreation, such that primary contact 
recreation (e.g. swimming) is safe; 
(ii) Maintenance of secondary contact recreation, such that secondary 
contact recreation (e.g. boating) is safe; and 
(iii) Maintenance of aesthetics, such that the aesthetic values are 
protected. 
 
(d) For industrial water supply:  
Maintenance of industrial water supply, such that water is of suitable 
quality for industrial water supply. 
 
(3) For ecosystem health –  
 
(a) the boundaries between the High and Moderate ecological protection areas 
of the particular environmental quality objective identified in clause 7(2)(a) 
are shown in Schedule 2 1; and 
(b) a map of the Low ecological protection areas as at the date of publication of 
this policy is shown in Schedule 3. 
 
(4) For ecosystem health, Low ecological protection areas –  
 
(a) will be located east of the boundary between the High ecological protection 
area and the Moderate ecological protection area on the eastern side of 
Cockburn Sound; and  
(b) will occupy a cumulative water surface area not to exceed five percent of 
the total water surface area east of the boundary between the High 
ecological protection area and the Moderate ecological protection area on 
the eastern side of Cockburn Sound 2; and 
(c) may be changed following review by the Environmental Protection 
Authority after three years or following a Government decision under the 
Environmental Protection Act 1986 2. 
 
(5) The environmental quality objectives identified in clause 7(2)(b-d) – 
 
(a) apply to High and Moderate ecological protection areas as shown in 
Schedule 2; and 
(b) apply to the Low ecological protection areas, except where the 
Environmental Protection Authority, after public consultation, determines 
that the pursuit of a particular objective is not reasonably compatible with 
discharge(s) authorised in that area(s). The extent of any variation will be 
published. 
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(6) Activities and practices within the policy area are to be managed and reasonable 
and practicable measures are to be taken so that the environmental quality 
objectives established by this policy are achieved. 
 
 
8. Environmental quality criteria 
 
(1) To protect the environmental values and meet the environmental quality 
objectives established under this policy, environmental quality criteria are 
established, which comprise numerical values and narrative statements. 
 
(2) Environmental quality criteria will be the benchmarks against which the level of 
achievement of the environmental quality objectives identified under clause 7 will 
be measured. 
 
(3) The focus for management is to ensure that the environmental quality objectives 
are achieved by meeting environmental quality guidelines. If an environmental 
quality guideline is not met then there is uncertainty over whether the associated 
environmental quality objective has been achieved and a more detailed 
assessment against an environmental quality standard is triggered as required 
under clause 9(2).  
 
(4) The environmental quality criteria –  
 
(a) are established in the Environmental Quality Criteria Reference Document 
for Cockburn Sound (2003-2004), Environmental Protection Authority 
2005 (as amended and published from time to time by the Environmental 
Protection Authority following public consultation); and 
(b) apply to the protected area through the decision schemes shown in 
Schedules 4 to 6.  These are referred to in the table over. 
 
(5) The priority for management will be based on assessment of monitoring data from 
the protected area, such that –  
 
(a) if it is determined that no environmental quality guidelines are exceeded, 
then the environmental quality objectives are considered to be fully met 
and the environmental values are considered to be protected; 
(b) if an environmental quality guideline is exceeded, it will trigger more 
detailed investigations to determine whether the environmental quality 
standard has been met; and 
(c) if an environmental quality standard is exceeded then the associated 
environmental quality objective is not met, and it will trigger an 
appropriate management response as required in clause 9(3). 
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Summary of EV, EQO, EQC and Decision Schemes for Cockburn Sound 
 
 
Environmental 
Values 
Environmental Quality 
Objectives and their 
descriptions 
Environmental quality criteria  Decision scheme
 
Ecosystem Health 
(ecological value) 
Maintenance of ecosystem 
integrity 
Ecosystem integrity is 
considered in terms of 
structure (e.g. the biodiversity, 
biomass and abundance of 
biota) and function (e.g. food 
chains and nutrient cycles).  
Three levels of ecological 
protection (High, Moderate, 
and Low) shall apply to 
different areas of Cockburn 
Sound. 
 
Table 1 : Physical and Chemical 
Stressors 
Table 2 : Toxicants in water 
Table 3 : Toxicants in sediment  
 
Reference to Tables means those 
contained in the document titled 
Environmental Quality Criteria 
Reference Document for Cockburn 
Sound (2003-2004) 
 
Schedule 4 in this 
Policy 
 
 
Fishing and 
Aquactultue 
(social value) 
Maintenance of seafood safe 
for human consumption 
Seafood is safe for human 
consumption when collected 
or grown in Cockburn Sound. 
 
Maintenance of aquaculture 
Water is of a suitable quality 
for aquaculture purposes. 
 
Table 4 : Seafood safe for human 
consumption 
Table 5 : Aquaculture  
Schedule 5 
 
Recreation and 
Aesthetics (social 
value) 
Maintenance of primary 
contact recreation values 
Primary contact recreation 
(e.g. swimming) is safe to 
undertake in Cockburn Sound. 
 
Maintenance of secondary 
contact recreation values 
Secondary contact recreation 
(e.g. boating) is safe to 
undertake in Cockburn Sound. 
 
Maintenance of aesthetic 
values 
The aesthetic values of 
Cockburn Sound are 
protected. 
 
Table 6 : Primary contact 
recreation  
Table 7 : Secondary contact 
recreation  
Table 8 : Aesthetic quality  
Schedule 6 
 
Industrial Water 
Supply 
(social value) 
Maintenance of industrial
water supply values  
Water in Cockburn Sound will 
be of a suitable quality for 
industrial water supply 
purposes. 
 
None  None 
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9. Application of environmental quality criteria 
 
(1) The relevant public authority or authorities will - 
 
(a) following consultation with the Cockburn Sound Management Council, 
determine which parameters listed in the environmental quality criteria 
tables should become a focus of monitoring, further investigation and /or 
reporting in areas under their jurisdiction; 
(b) notify the Cockburn Sound Management Council annually on the activities 
and outcomes of such monitoring programs and investigations; 
(c) through the Cockburn Sound Management Council, cause the list of 
parameters and an outline of such monitoring programs to be published, as 
part of their annual performance report; and 
(d) in addition to any other statutory requirements, promptly notify the 
Cockburn Sound Management Council where their monitoring programs or 
investigations identify that environmental quality guidelines or 
environmental quality standards have been exceeded 3. 
 
(2) Where the Cockburn Sound Management Council becomes aware of an 
exceedance of an environmental quality guideline – 
 
(a) the Cockburn Sound Management Council will review the information 
before it and assess whether in relation to the exceedance there is a relevant 
public authority and then - 
(i) where it identifies that there is a relevant public authority, refer the 
exceedance of the environmental quality guideline to be investigated 
and reported by the relevant public authority against the 
environmental quality criteria, within a timeframe agreed with the 
Cockburn Sound Management Council. 
(ii) where it identifies that there is no relevant public authority, investigate 
the exceedance. 
(b) the Cockburn Sound Management Council will report to the Environmental 
Protection Authority the results of that investigation and any 
recommendations of the Cockburn Sound Management Council in relation 
to the maintenance of the environmental quality objectives for Cockburn 
Sound; and  
(c) the Cockburn Sound Management Council will report the results of the 
assessment against the environmental quality criteria to the public in 
relation to the maintenance of the environmental quality objectives for 
Cockburn Sound. 
 
(3) Where the Cockburn Sound Management Council becomes aware of an 
exceedance of an environmental quality standard –  
 
(a) the Cockburn Sound Management Council will report the exceedance to 
the Environmental Protection Authority and the Minister for the 
Environment as soon as practicable; 
(b) the Cockburn Sound Management Council will review the information 
before it and identify whether in relation to the exceedance there is a 
relevant public authority and then - 
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 (i) where it identifies a relevant public authority, refer the exceedance to 
the relevant public authority to investigate and implement an 
appropriate management response that takes into account reasonable 
and practicable measures, within a timeframe agreed with the 
Cockburn Sound Management Council.  
(ii) where it identifies that there is no relevant public authority, investigate 
the exceedance and advise the Environmental Protection Authority 
and the Minister for the Environment on the best means of meeting the 
environmental quality objectives for Cockburn Sound. 
(c) If the exceedance of an environmental quality standard is assessed to be 
the result of a discharge and - 
(i) the discharge is assessed as being from licensed premises or approved 
under Part IV of the Environmental Protection Act 1986, the 
management response will be implemented by the licensee or the 
proponent and the relevant public authority, within a timeframe agreed 
with those parties and the Cockburn Sound Management Council. 
(ii) the discharge is assessed as being caused by or found to be from a 
diffuse source, unlicensed premise or from other activities, a 
management response will be coordinated through the Cockburn 
Sound Management Council. 
(d) The Cockburn Sound Management Council will report to the Minister for 
the Environment the results of any investigations and advise on the 
adequacy of management responses in relation to the maintenance of 
environmental quality objectives for Cockburn Sound as soon as 
practicable; and 
(e) The Cockburn Sound Management Council will report to the public the 
results of any investigations and management responses in relation to the 
maintenance of the environmental quality objectives for Cockburn Sound. 
 
(4) Where the Cockburn Sound Management Council believes that unlicensed 
activities have caused or contributed to the environmental quality guidelines or 
environmental quality standards being exceeded, and does not receive cooperation 
from the party or parties believed to be contributing to the exceedances in 
addressing the problems, then it shall make recommendations to the Minister for 
the Environment and any relevant public authorities as to what actions should be 
taken.  The Cockburn Sound Management Council may publish these 
recommendations as provided for in clause 11. 
 
(5) The environmental quality guidelines and environmental quality standards 
established by this policy are not intended to be used to identify when pollution 
has occurred, but are intended as triggers for investigation and management 
action. 
 
(6) This policy recognises authorisations within the policy area existing as of the date 
of publication. 
 
 
10. Management program to protect 
 
(1) The protection of the environmental values is to be achieved by the taking of 
management actions to meet the environmental quality criteria including - 
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 (a) implementation of an Environmental Management Plan; 
(b) public authorities taking decisions and actions that are consistent with the 
environmental quality objectives referred to in clause 7; and 
(c) the co-operation of public authorities, industry, other relevant bodies and the 
general public in the implementation of this policy. 
 
(2) The management program to protect will consist of the collective actions of 
public authorities responsible for elements of the framework, and will include the 
following components -  
 
(a) an Environmental Management Plan for the policy area, to be –  
(i) prepared and coordinated by the Cockburn Sound Management 
Council; 
(ii) reviewed as necessary with community consultation; and 
(iii) endorsed by the Minister for the Environment on the advice of the 
Environmental Protection Authority. 
 
(b) The endorsed Environmental Management Plan, which will - 
(i) incorporate the environmental quality objectives and the 
environmental quality criteria referred to in clauses 7, 8 and 9; 
(ii) identify critical areas within the policy area requiring priority 
protection, or priority remedial action to achieve the environmental 
quality objectives referred to in clause 7; 
(iii) foster the integration of environmental planning and management for 
the land and marine environment within the policy area; 
(iv) recognise and facilitate multiple use management of the protected 
area; and  
(v) identify the agencies or organisations responsible for particular 
actions recommended under the Environmental Management Plan. 
 
(c) The Cockburn Sound Management Council, which will - 
(i) administer and coordinate the implementation of the Environmental 
Management Plan, and report on its performance in achieving its 
stated objectives; 
(ii) promote the understanding of the Policy and the Environmental 
Management Plan; 
(iii) investigate, monitor, review, report and continually improve on the 
achievement of environmental objectives, criteria and targets where 
appropriate in accordance with the Environmental Management Plan 
and the Policy; 
(iv) co-ordinate, encourage or undertake research and investigations to 
support environmental management to meet the objectives of the 
Environmental Management Plan; and 
(v) report annually to the Minister for the Environment on the 
implementation of the Environmental Management Plan. 
 
(d) Public authorities with management responsibilities in the policy area will, 
within their area of jurisdiction - 
(i) make decisions and actions consistent with the objectives of the 
policy; 
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 (ii) develop best management practices for the control of drainage, 
sewage, ballast water and the disposal of wastewater and the 
discharge of wastes and nutrients, whether point or diffuse source, 
and directly or indirectly discharged into the policy area; 
(iii) incorporate into their work programs means of achieving the 
environmental quality objectives outlined in clause 7, for activities 
which include but are not limited to diffuse sources of emissions 
and to licensed premises discharging wastes or nutrients, directly or 
indirectly, into the policy area; 
(iv) establish monitoring programs and inventories as appropriate, using 
the Manual of Standard Operating Procedures for Environmental 
Monitoring against the Cockburn Sound Environmental Quality 
Criteria (2003-2004), Environmental Protection Authority 2005 (as 
amended and published from time to time by the Environmental 
Protection Authority following public consultation); and 
(v) report the results of monitoring programs to the Cockburn Sound 
Management Council. 
 
 
11. State of Cockburn Sound report 
 
(1) The Cockburn Sound Management Council will report to the Minister for the 
Environment on the State of Cockburn Sound each year. 
 
(2) The report will include annual performance and monitoring reporting as provided 
for in clause 9 and 10. 
 
(3) The Minister shall cause the report to be laid on the table of both Houses of 
Parliament within 10 sitting days of receiving it. 
 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Footnotes 
1 The Policy acknowledges that proposals for facilities such as ports, harbours and marinas in Cockburn 
Sound, if and when approved by Government under the Environmental Protection Act 1986, may 
necessitate boundary modifications including to the boundary of the protected area. 
2 The cumulative figure of 5% will apply for the first three years of this Policy whereupon it will be 
reviewed by the Environmental Protection Authority in consultation with the Cockburn Sound 
Management Council and the public.  The Environmental Protection Authority will make 
recommendations to the Minister for the Environment on an appropriate cumulative figure to apply for 
the balance of the life of the Policy.  As well, changes to Low ecological protection areas are deemed 
“approved” if done through a Ministerial approval under the Environmental Protection Act 1986, and 
Schedule 3 will be amended accordingly. 
3 This Policy acknowledges that the main determinants of water quality in harbours are  
(a) the quality of the external waters, (b) the magnitude of direct nutrient inputs, and (c) the flushing and 
mixing rates of the harbours (which is largely determined by harbour siting and design).  If water quality 
in harbours is poor (due to inappropriate siting, configuration and design, or inadequate management of 
nutrient inputs) this is likely to adversely affect the quality of external waters beyond the confines of the 
harbour.   
Harbour proposals should be designed and managed according to best practice, so that the environmental 
performance of the harbour does not measurably affect the status of a broad Moderate ecological 
protection area.  Accordingly, the Policy is to be interpreted as follows: 
x set Moderate ecological protection areas for water quality within ports, harbours and marinas; 
x assess the water quality within ports and harbours and marinas individually, but not to use these 
results in assessing the status of the overall Moderate ecological protection area; 
x assess the environmental quality status of the broad Moderate ecological protection areas 
(outside ports and harbours and marinas). 
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Schedule 1 
 
 
 
 
Policy Area and Protected Area 
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 Schedule 2 
 
 
 
 
The Boundaries between the High and Moderate ecological protection areas 
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 Schedule 3 
 
 
 
 
Note: Moderate ecological protection area criteria for toxicants may be exceeded in waters adjacent to the Low 
ecological protection areas up to 5% of the time, particularly under plant ‘up-set conditions’. 
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Schedule 3 (continued) 
 
 
 
The Low Ecological Protection Areas are the marine waters within the boundaries of the 
following coordinates: 
 
 
(a) Location and water surface area occupied for each currently authorised LEPA 
 
 
All coordinates in Map Grid of Australia Zone 50 (MGA zone50) Datum: GDA94. 
 
 
 
Western Power Kwinana Power Station  
The Low Ecological Protection Area is the marine water area within the boundaries defined by 
the following coordinates: 
       Easting Northing  
Coordinates     384493.1 6437236.0 
                   384279.3 6436514.7 
       383793.9 6436679.1 
                   384009.9 6437395.5 
 
 Water surface area   36 ha 
 
 
 
BP Refinery (Kwinana) Pty Ltd 
The Low Ecological Protection Area is the marine water area within the boundaries defined by 
the following coordinates: 
       Easting Northing 
Coordinates     383333.2 6434876.2 
   383057.4 6434521.0 
   382758.6 6434775.8 
   383042.9 6435125.1 
 
 Water surface area   16 ha 
 
 
 
CSBP Limited 
The Low Protection Area is the marine water area within a horizontal distance of 9 m (to the 
inshore direction from the diffuser) and 16 m (to the offshore direction from the diffuser), and 
extending 12.5 m beyond each end of the diffuser. 
 
 Water surface area   0.47 ha 
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Tiwest Pty Ltd 
The Low Ecological Protection Area is the marine water area within the boundaries defined by 
the following coordinates: 
       Easting  Northing 
 Coordinates     382779  6433136 
       382779  6433060 
       382795  6433060 
       382795  6433136 
OR 
The Low Ecological Protection Area is the marine water area located within a horizontal 
distance of 8 m from the Tiwest effluent discharge diffuser. 
 
 Water surface area   0.12 ha 
 
 
 
 
 
Millennium Performance Chemicals (Advance Ceramics) Pty Ltd 
The Low Ecological Protection Area is the marine water area within the boundaries defined by 
the following coordinates: 
       Easting Northing  
Coordinates     382082.0  6430412.9 
382065.9  6430425.0 
382078.0  6430440.9 
382093.9  6430429.0 
 
Water surface area   0.04 ha 
 
 
 
 
(b) Cumulative water surface area occupied by all currently authorised LEPAs, relative 
to the total water surface area east of the boundary between the High Ecological 
Protection Area and the Moderate Ecological Protection Area on the eastern side of 
Cockburn Sound, expressed as a percentage. 
 
Cumulative water surface area of currently authorised LEPAs    = 52.6 ha  (Area A) 
 
Total water surface area east of the boundary between the High Ecological Protection Area and 
the Moderate Ecological Protection Area on the eastern side of Cockburn Sound  
   = 1263 ha   (Area B) 
 
 
Percentage of Area A relative to Area B   = 4.2 % 
   
 
 
 
Schedule 4 
         
 
 
 
Decision scheme 4.1: Nutrient/physical indicators 
 
Decision scheme 4.2: Toxicants in water 
 
Decision scheme 4.3: Toxicants in sediment 
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 Decision scheme 4.1: Narrative decision scheme for applying the 
Environmental Quality Criteria (EQC) for physical and chemical stressors 
 
1. Conduct routine monitoring program covering the area to be assessed using Standard Operating 
Procedures. Monitoring program should be designed to allow assessment of environmental quality 
against Environmental Quality Guidelines (EQG) (A to G)  
  - go to step 2. 
 
2. Determine whether nutrient-related EQG (A, B or C) has been exceeded 
  [N]……………… - go to step 3. 
 [Y] (EQG A or B). - go to step 7 unless 
   back-up samples or immediate re-sampling does not confirm exceedance of 
the EQG. 
 [Y] (EQG C)……. - go to step 9 unless 
   back-up samples or immediate re-sampling does not confirm exceedance of 
the EQG.  
 
3.  Determine whether dissolved oxygen-related EQG (D) has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 4. 
 [Y] ……………… - go to step 10 unless 
   immediate re-measurement does not confirm exceedance 
of the EQG. 
 
4.    Determine whether temperature-related EQG (E) has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 5. 
 [Y] ……………… - go to step 11 unless 
   immediate re-measurement does not confirm exceedance 
of the EQG.  
 
5.    Determine whether salinity-related EQG (F) has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 6. 
 [Y] ……………… - go to step 12 unless 
   immediate re-measurement does not confirm exceedance 
of the EQG.  
 
6.    Determine whether EQG (G) for pH has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 1. 
 [Y] ……………… - go to step 13 unless 
   immediate re-measurement does not confirm exceedance 
of the EQG.  
 
The EQG is exceeded triggering more intensive investigation. Ambient quality is now monitored and 
assessed against the Environmental Quality Standard (EQS) 
 
7. Expand monitoring program as appropriate and implement to allow assessment of environmental 
quality against EQG (A or B) and EQS (A and B)      
  - go to step 8. 
 
8. Determine whether EQS (A or B) has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 1. 
  [Y] ……………… - EQS triggered go to step 14. 
 
9. Determine whether EQS (C) has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 1. 
  [Y] ……………… - EQS triggered go to step 14. 
 
10. Determine whether EQS (D) has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 1. 
  [Y] ……………… - EQS triggered go to step 14. 
 
11. Determine whether EQS (E) has been exceeded 
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   [N] ……………… - go to step 1. 
  [Y] ……………… - EQS triggered go to step 14. 
 
12. Determine whether EQS (F) has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 1. 
  [Y] ……………… - EQS triggered go to step 14. 
 
13. Determine whether EQS (G) has been exceeded 
  [N] ……………… - go to step 1. 
  [Y] ……………… - EQS triggered go to step 14. 
 
The EQS is exceeded triggering a management response. 
 
14. Initiate management response to reduce contaminant loads and restore environmental quality to 
comply with the objectives within specified timeframes. 
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 Decision scheme 4.2: Narrative decision scheme for applying the EQC for 
marine waters and sediment pore waters 
 
Options are provided in the decision tree for skipping steps once an EQG has been triggered (eg. go straight to 
testing against biological measures, or implement agreed management strategies to reduce contaminant inputs, 
without undertaking all of the prior steps). This will largely be based on a simple cost/benefit analysis undertaken 
for each step, and would require the agreement of all key stakeholders. 
 
1. Determine whether an EQG exists for the contaminants of concern: 
 [N]..………... - go to step 2.  
 [Y]…………. - go to step 4. 
 
2. Is it appropriate to establish an EQG by determining the 80th percentile for a high ecological protection area, or 
95th percentile for a moderate ecological protection area, of natural background concentration? 
 [N]………….. - go to step 3. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 4. 
 
3. Is it appropriate in the interim to assess water quality against the low reliability values (LRVs) provided in table 
2c of the EQC Reference Document? 
 [N]………….. - go to step 14 if significant threat posed by    
  contaminant, otherwise undertake literature search   
  and derive a suitable LRV. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 19. 
 
4. Undertake routine monitoring program covering the area to be assessed and the contaminants of concern using 
the standard operating procedures and go to step 5. 
 
5. Was the laboratory practical quantitation limit (PQL) for any of the contaminants above the EQG value? 
 [N]………….. - go to step 6. 
 [Y]………….. - if detection of the contaminant is confirmed in a  
   backup sample go to step 10, otherwise assume  
   the contaminant has not been detected and go to  
   step 4. 
 
6. Determine whether EQG (A) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 7. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 9. 
 
7. If the exceedance was for the last sampling occasion has it been confirmed (eg. analysis of back-up samples or 
samples collected immediately from the same sites)? 
 [N]…………. - go to step 9.  
 [Y]………….. - if high or moderate ecological protection area go to step 8, or if EQG 
   derived according to step 2 go to step 10; 
  - if EQG for TBT was exceeded go to step 16;     
  - go to step 17 if the EQG was for a low ecological protection area. 
 
8. For naturally occurring chemicals determine whether the 80th percentile for a high ecological protection area, or 
95th percentile for a moderate ecological protection area, of natural background contaminant concentration 
exceeds the EQG: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 10. 
 [Y]………….. - establish the 80th or 95th percentile of background   
  concentration as the new EQG then go to step 6. 
 
9. For the primary contaminants determine whether EQG (B) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 13. 
 [Y]………….. - no toxicity problem, go to step 4. 
 
The EQG is exceeded triggering more intensive investigation. Ambient quality is now monitored and assessed 
against the Environmental Quality Standard 
SS ttt aa ttt ee    EE nn vv iii rrr oo nn mee nn ttt aa lll    ((( CC oo cc kk bb uu rrr nn    SS oo uu nn dd )))    PP oo lll iii cc yy    22 00 00 55                                                                20    
  
10. Give regard to whether the level of contamination requires an urgent response by determining whether the 
initial management trigger (IMT) from table 2b of the EQC Reference Document has been met while 
investigations against the EQS are on-going: 
 [N]………….. - consider management action to reduce the level    
  of contamination below the IMT; and 
  - go to step 11. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 11. 
 
11. Has the contaminant of concern been identified in Table 2 of the EQC Reference Document as having the 
potential to adversely bioaccumulate or biomagnify? 
 [N]………….. - go to step 12 (steps 14 or 15 also an option), or    
  step 14 if PQL>EQG. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 12 (steps 14 or 15 also optional), or    
  step 14 if PQL>EQG; and 
  - go to step 17. 
 
12. Resolve bioavailable concentrations of relevant contaminants and determine whether EQS (A) has been met: 
 [N]…………… - go to step 14 (steps 15 or 18 also an option). 
 [Y]………….... - go to step 13. 
 
13. For the primary contaminants determine whether EQS (B) has been met: 
 [N]…………… - go to step 14 (steps 15 or 18 also an option). 
 [Y]……….….. - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 4. 
 
14. Undertake direct toxicity assessment (DTA) using relevant species and determine whether EQS (C) and (D) 
have been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 15 or step 18. 
 [Y]………….. - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 4. 
 
15. Undertake detailed field investigation to determine whether EQS (E) has been met for high ecological 
protection areas, and EQS (E) and (G) have been met for moderate ecological protection areas: 
 [N]………….. - EQS triggered. Go to step 18. 
 [Y]………….. - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 4. 
 
16. If a guideline for TBT has been exceeded then undertake detailed field investigation to determine whether EQS 
(F) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - EQS triggered. Go to step 18. 
 [Y]………….. - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 4. 
 
17. Determine whether EQS (G) for high protection has been met in adjacent high ecological protection areas:  
 [N]………….. - EQS triggered. Go to step 18. 
 [Y]………….. - chemical not bioaccumulating, go to step 4. 
 
18. Implement management action to reduce contaminant inputs to the ambient environment and achieve the 
environmental quality objective within an agreed timeframe. Prior to implementing management action 
procedures such as Toxicity identification evaluation (TIE) and Contaminant body residue (CBR) might be 
required to confirm the specific cause of toxicity or the source of contaminants. In extreme circumstances 
environmental remediation may be considered appropriate. If EQC for the maintenance of safe seafood have 
been listed in Table 4 for the problem contaminant(s) then consideration should be given to monitoring the 
contaminant in seafood to assess risk to human health. 
 
19. Include contaminant in routine monitoring program. If the LRV is not exceeded then environmental quality is 
acceptable and no management action is required. If the LRV is exceeded, consult with relevant regulators to 
ensure unacceptable impacts are avoided (this may include undertaking a literature search on effects of the 
contaminant, undertaking direct toxicity assessment or upgrading the LRV into an EQG). 
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 Decision scheme 4.3: Narrative decision scheme for applying the EQC for 
toxicants in sediments 
 
Options are provided in the decision tree for skipping steps once an EQG has been triggered (eg. go straight to 
testing against biological measures, or implement agreed management strategies to reduce contaminant inputs, 
without undertaking all of the prior steps). This will largely be based on a simple cost/benefit analysis undertaken 
for each step, and would require the agreement of all key stakeholders. 
 
1. Determine whether an EQG value exists for the contaminants of concern: 
 [N]..………... - go to step 2.  
 [Y]…………. - go to step 3. 
 
2. Is it appropriate to establish an EQG value based on natural background concentration? 
 [N]………….. - go to step 13. 
 [Y]………….. - establish the 90th percentile of background    
    concentration as the EQG value then go to step 3. 
 
3. Undertake routine monitoring program covering the area to be assessed using the standard operating procedures 
and go to step 4. 
 
4. Determine whether EQG (A) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 5.  
 [Y]…………. - go to step 8. 
 
5. If the exceedance was for the last sampling occasion has it been confirmed (eg. analysis of back-up samples or 
samples collected immediately from the same sites)? 
 [N]…………. - go to step 8.  
 [Y]………….. - go to step 6. 
 
6. Was the exceeded EQG established for a low ecological protection area? 
 [N]………… - if EQG for TBT was exceeded go to step 16; and 
  - go to step 7 (optional); or 
  - go to step 8 to define any ‘hot spots’; and  
  - to step 10 to assess the entire sampled area   
  against the EQS.  
 [Y]…………. - go to step 16. 
 
7. For naturally occurring chemicals determine whether the natural background contaminant concentration 
exceeds the EQG value (unlikely in most cases, note that test site and reference site must have comparable grain 
sizes): 
 [N]………….. - go to step 8 to define any ‘hot spots’; and  
  - to step 10 to assess the entire sampled area  
   against the EQS. 
 [Y]………….. - establish the 90%ile of background     
  concentration as the new EQG value then go to   
  step 4. 
 
8. Assess whether EQG (B) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 9. 
 [Y]………….. - no toxicity problem, go to step 3. 
 
9. Determine whether the extent of potential contamination needs to be characterised further (in most cases this 
will be necessary): 
 [N]…………... - no toxicity problem, go to step 3. 
 [Y]…………… - determine area of potential contamination, if    
  sufficient data for its assessment go to step 4; or 
  - determine area of potential contamination, design   
  sampling program for this area and go to step 3. 
 
The EQG is exceeded triggering more intensive investigation. Ambient quality is now monitored and assessed 
against the Environmental Quality Standard 
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10. Has the contaminant of concern been identified in Table 3 of the EQC Reference Document as having the 
potential to adversely bioaccumulate or biomagnify: 
 [N]…………… - go to step 11 (steps 12, 13 or 14 also an option). 
 [Y]…………… - go to step 11 (step 12, 13 or 14 also optional);  
   and 
  - go to step 16. 
 
11. Resolve bioavailable concentrations (as far as possible) for relevant contaminants and determine whether EQS 
(A) and (B) have been met: 
 [N]…………… - go to step 12 (steps 13, 14 or 17 also an option). 
 [Y]………….... - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 3. 
 
12. Sample and analyse sediment porewaters for those contaminants of concern that have an EQG for water (Table 
2a or EQC Reference document) and determine whether EQS (C) has been met: 
 [N]…………… - go to step 13 (steps 14 or 17 also an option). 
 [Y]……….….. - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 3. 
 
13. Undertake sediment toxicity testing using relevant species and determine whether EQS (D) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 14 or step 17. 
 [Y]………….. - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 3. 
 
14. Undertake detailed field investigation to determine whether EQS (E) has been met for high ecological 
protection areas, or EQS (E) and (G) have been met for moderate ecological protection areas: 
 [N]………….. - EQS triggered. Go to step 17. 
 [Y]………….. - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 3. 
 
15. If a guideline for TBT has been exceeded then undertake detailed field investigation to determine whether EQS 
(F) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - EQS triggered. Go to step 17. 
 [Y]………….. - environmental quality acceptable, go to step 3. 
 
16. Determine whether EQS (G) for high protection has been met in adjacent high ecological protection areas:  
 [N]………….. - EQS triggered. Go to step 17. 
 [Y]………….. - chemical not bioaccumulating, go to step 3. 
 
17. Implement management action to reduce contaminant inputs to the ambient environment and achieve the 
environmental quality objective within an agreed timeframe. Prior to implementing management action 
procedures such as TIE and CBR might be required to confirm the specific cause of toxicity or the source of 
contaminants. In extreme circumstances environmental remediation may be considered appropriate. If EQC for 
the maintenance of safe seafood have been listed in Table 4 for the problem contaminant(s) then consideration 
should be given to monitoring the contaminant in seafood to assess risk to human health. 
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Schedule 5 
          
 
 
 
Decision scheme 5.1:   Seafood safe for human consumption 
 
Decision scheme 5.2:   Aquaculture 
 
 
 
 
SS ttt aa ttt ee    EE nn vv iii rrr oo nn mee nn ttt aa lll    ((( CC oo cc kk bb uu rrr nn    SS oo uu nn dd )))    PP oo lll iii cc yy    22 00 00 55                                                                24    
 Decision scheme 5.1: Narrative decision scheme for applying the EQC for 
seafood safe for human consumption 
 
1. Conduct routine monitoring program covering the area to be assessed and the contaminants of concern using 
the standard operating procedures and go to step 2. 
 
2. Determine whether EQG (A, B and/or C) have been met, and whether EQS (D, E or F) have been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 3. 
 [Y]…………. - seafood suitable for consumption, go to step 1.  
 
3. Are any of the exceedances confirmed by analysing the back-up samples or samples collected immediately 
from the same sites?  
 [N]…………. - seafood suitable for consumption, go to step 1. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 4 if EQG A not met; and 
  - go to step 6 if EQG B not met; and  
  - go to step 7 if EQG C not met; and 
  - go to step 8 if EQS (D, E or F) not met.  
 
The EQG is exceeded triggering more intensive investigation. Ambient quality is now monitored and assessed 
against the Environmental Quality Standard 
 
4. Determine whether EQS (A) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 5 (or proceed directly to step 8). 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 7 for advice on conducting sanitary survey; and  
   - go to step 1. 
 
5. Determine whether EQS (B) has been met: 
  [N]…………… - EQS triggered. Go to step 8. 
  [Y]………….... - go to step 7 for advice on further monitoring  
     of seafood and conducting sanitary survey; and  
   - go to step 1. 
 
6. Determine whether EQS (C) has been met: 
 [N]…………… - EQS triggered. Go to step 9. 
 [Y]……….….. - EQS not triggered, go to step 7; and 
   - go to step 1. 
 
7. Contact the Health Department of WA with the results and seek advice on any additional monitoring or 
management requirements to ensure human health risks are managed at an appropriate level.  
 
8. Implement management action to reduce contaminant inputs, or if this is not practically feasible, then reduce 
risk to public health through implementation of appropriate management on advice of the Health Department of 
WA. If appropriate, environmental remediation may be required.  
 
9. Implement management action to reduce the risk to public health on advice of the Health Department of WA. 
Determine the cause of the toxic algal bloom and, if appropriate, reduce contaminant inputs.   
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 Decision scheme 5.2: Narrative decision scheme for applying the EQC for 
aquaculture production 
 
Options are provided in the decision tree for skipping steps once an EQG has been triggered (eg. go straight to 
testing against biological measures, or implement agreed management strategies to reduce contaminant inputs, 
without undertaking all of the prior steps). This will largely be based on a simple cost/benefit analysis undertaken 
for each step, and would require the agreement of all key stakeholders. 
 
1. Conduct routine monitoring program covering the area to be assessed and the contaminants of concern using the 
standard operating procedures and go to step 2. 
 
2. Determine whether EQG (A and/or B) have been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 3  
 [Y]…………. - suitable for aquaculture, go to step 1. 
 
3. If the exceedance was for the last sampling occasion has analysis of back-up samples, or samples collected 
immediately from the same sites, confirmed the exceedance?  
 [N]…………. - suitable for aquaculture, go to step 1. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 4 if the indicator is naturally occurring; and 
  - go to step 8 if the indicator is a xenobiotic chemical. 
 
4. Determine whether the 95th percentile of natural background contaminant concentration exceeds the EQG: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 6 if EQG A was not met; and 
   - go to step 8 if EQG B was not met. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 5. 
 
5. Establish the 95th percentile of background concentration as the new EQG then determine whether EQG (A 
and/or B) have been met:  
 [N]…………. - go to step 6 if EQG A not met; and 
  - go to step 8 if EQG B not met. 
 [Y]………….. - suitable for aquaculture, go to step 1.  
 
The EQG is exceeded triggering more intensive investigation. Ambient quality is now monitored and assessed 
against the Environmental Quality Standard 
 
6. Determine whether EQS (A) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 7 (step 11 is also optional). 
 [Y]………….. - EQS not triggered, go to step 1. 
 
7. Determine whether EQS (B) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - EQS triggered, go to step 11. 
 [Y]………….. - EQS not triggered, go to step 1. 
 
8. Determine whether EQS (C) has been met: 
 [N]…………… - go to step 9 (steps 10 or 11 also optional). 
 [Y]………….... - EQS not triggered, go to step 1 
 
9. Determine whether EQS (D) has been met: 
 [N]…………… - go to step 10 (step 11 also optional). 
 [Y]……….….. - EQS not triggered, go to step 1. 
 
10. Determine whether EQS (E or F) have been met: 
 [N]…………… - EQS triggered, go to step 11. 
 [Y]……….….. - EQS not triggered, go to step 1. 
 
11. Implement management action to reduce contaminant inputs to the ambient environment and achieve the 
environmental quality objective within an agreed timeframe. Prior to implementing management action 
procedures such as TIE and CBR might be required to confirm the specific cause of toxicity or the source of 
contaminants. In extreme circumstances environmental remediation may be considered appropriate. 
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Schedule 6 
          
 
 
 
Decision scheme 6.1:  Primary contact recreation  
 
Decision scheme 6.2:  Secondary contact recreation  
 
Decision scheme 6.3:  Aesthetic quality 
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 Decision scheme 6.1: Narrative decision scheme for applying the EQC for 
primary contact recreation 
 
1. Conduct routine monitoring program covering the area to be assessed and the contaminants of concern using 
the standard operating procedures and go to step 2. 
 
2. Determine whether EQG (A, B, C and/or D) have been met, and whether EQS (C or D) have been met: 
 [N]………….     .- go to step 3 if EQG B or D or EQS C exceeded. 
  - go to step 4 if EQG A not met, and 
  - go to step 7 if EQG C not met, and 
  - go to step 8 if EQS D not met. 
 [Y]…………. - suitable for recreation, go to step 1. 
 
3. If the exceedance was for the last sampling occasion has it been confirmed (eg. through the analysis of back-up 
samples or samples collected immediately from the same sites)?  
  [N]…………. - suitable for recreation, go to step 1. 
  [Y]………….. - go to step 6 if EQG B not met, and  
    - go to step 8 if EQG D not met, and  
    - go to step 9 if EQS C not met. 
 
The EQG is exceeded triggering more intensive investigation. Ambient quality is now monitored and assessed 
against the Environmental Quality Standard 
 
4. Determine whether EQS (A) has been met: 
  [N]………….. - go to step 5 and, 
    - go to step 9. 
  [Y]………….. - go to step 5. 
 
5. Undertake a sanitary inspection of the site in liaison with the Health Department of WA to further assess the 
risk to recreational users. Develop predictive approaches to give early warning of periods or events likely to 
result in poor microbiological water quality and increase sampling frequency in these areas then:  
    - go back to step 1. 
 
6. Contact the Health Department of WA and intensify monitoring of potentially toxic algal species to assess 
human health risk and determine whether EQS (B) has been met: 
  [N]………….. - go to step 9.  
  [Y]………….. - No issue identified, go to step 1. 
 
7. Swimmers should be urged to use caution when swimming in these waters. Signage may be an option.  
 
8. Contact the Health Department of WA with the results and seek advice on setting an appropriate environmental 
quality standard that protects recreational users and on any additional monitoring or management requirements 
to ensure human health risks are managed at an appropriate level. 
 
9. Reduce risk to public health through appropriate management on advice of the Health Department of WA and 
implement management action to reduce contaminant inputs where these have been shown to have caused the 
problem. If appropriate, environmental remediation may be required. 
 
SS ttt aa ttt ee    EE nn vv iii rrr oo nn mee nn ttt aa lll    ((( CC oo cc kk bb uu rrr nn    SS oo uu nn dd )))    PP oo lll iii cc yy    22 00 00 55                                                                28    
 Decision scheme 6.2: Narrative decisions scheme for applying the EQC for 
secondary contact recreation 
 
1. Conduct routine monitoring program covering the area to be assessed and the contaminants of concern using the 
standard operating procedures and go to step 2. 
 
2. Determine whether EQG (A, B and/or C) have been met, and whether EQS (C) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 3 if EQG B or EQS C not met, and 
  - go to step 4 if EQG A not met, and 
  - go to step 7 if EQG C not met. 
 [Y]…………. - suitable for secondary contact recreation, go to step 1.  
    
3. If the exceedance was for the last sampling occasion has it been confirmed (eg. through the analysis of back-up 
samples or samples collected immediately from the same sites)?  
 [N]…………. - suitable for recreation, go to step 1. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 6 if EQG B not met, and 
  - go to step 8 if EQS C not met. 
 
The EQG is exceeded triggering more intensive investigation. Ambient quality is now monitored and assessed 
against the Environmental Quality Standard 
 
4. Determine whether EQS (A) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 5, and 
  - go to step 8. 
 [Y]………….. - go to step 5. 
 
5. Undertake a sanitary inspection of the site in liaison with the Health Department of WA to further assess the 
risk to recreational users. Develop predictive approaches to give early warning of periods or events likely to 
result in poor microbiological water quality and increase sampling frequency in these areas then:  
  - go back to step 1. 
 
6. Determine whether EQS (B) has been met: 
 [N]………….. - go to step 8;  
 [Y]………….. - no issue identified, go to step 1. 
 
7. Contact the Health Department of WA with the results and seek advice on setting an appropriate environmental 
quality standard that protects recreational users and on any additional monitoring or management requirements 
to ensure human health risks are managed at an appropriate level. 
 
8. Reduce risk to public health through appropriate management on advice of the Health Department of WA and 
implement management action to reduce contaminant inputs where these have been shown to have caused the 
problem. If appropriate, environmental remediation may be required. 
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 Decision scheme 6.3: Narrative decision scheme for applying the EQC for 
aesthetic quality 
 
1. Conduct routine monitoring program covering the area to be assessed and monitor public complaints. Go to 
steps 2 and 3. 
 
2. Determine whether all of EQG (A to I) have been met: 
  [N]………….. - go to step 5. 
  [Y]…………. - aesthetic values not compromised, go to step 1. 
 
3. Determine whether EQG (J) has been met: 
  [N]………….. - go to step 4 
  [Y]………….. - aesthetic values not compromised, go to step 1. 
 
4. If the exceedance was for the last sampling occasion has it been confirmed through analysis of back-up 
samples or samples collected immediately from the same sites? 
  [N]………….. - aesthetic values not compromised, go to step 1. 
[Y]………….. - go to step 6. 
 
The EQG has been triggered and the EQS need to be addressed. 
 
5. Determine whether EQS (A) has been met: 
  [N]………….. - go to step 7;  
  [Y]………….. - aesthetic values not compromised, go to step 1. 
 
6. Determine whether EQS (B) has been met: 
  [N]………….. - go to step 7;  
  [Y]………….. - aesthetic values not compromised, go to step 1. 
 
7. Identify the causes for the loss of aesthetic value in Cockburn Sound and implement management actions to 
prevent further reduction of, and if possible to improve, the aesthetic value within an agreed timeframe. 
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